The black sun of boredom: Henri Lefebvre and the critique of everyday life by Gamsby, Patrick
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Black Sun of Boredom: Henri Lefebvre and the Critique of Everyday Life 
 
 
 
by  
Patrick Gamsby 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Human Studies  
 
 
School of Graduate Studies  
Laurentian University  
Sudbury, Ontario  
 
© Patrick Gamsby, 2012 
  
iii 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines how boredom can be understood in the context of Henri 
Lefebvre’s (1901-1991) critique of everyday life.  Through an integration of the boredom 
literature, both the fully developed studies as well as fragmentary passages, I argue that 
Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life adds an important dimension to understanding 
boredom in modernity.  One of the leading strands in boredom studies today argues that 
boredom is an historically specific experience unique to the rhythms of life imparted with 
the onset of modernity.  Viewed in this light, boredom is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that can be linked to what Lefebvre calls the ‘double process’ of industrialization and 
urbanization.  Although the mass profusion of boredom has left a seemingly indelible 
mark on society, it has received relatively little attention in both everyday life and 
academia.  First coined in the middle of the 19th century, boredom is a relatively new 
word for what today is an all too pervasive experience.  Writing throughout most of the 
20th century, Lefebvre makes numerous references to boredom, yet, despite claiming that 
a study of boredom would be a significant contribution to his critique of everyday life, he 
never developed an in-depth and sustained analysis of this experience.  Lefebvre did, 
however, identify an internal dialectic of mass culture as being an integral component for 
understanding boredom.  It is argued that Lefebvre’s theory of a dialectical process 
inherent to mass culture is a key for understanding boredom as an historically specific 
phenomenon.  In organizing this dissertation, a constellation of themes are presented in 
order to articulate this dialectic.  After exploring boredom’s relationship to modernity, I 
then discuss what Lefebvre considers as the verso of modernity, everyday life.  Following 
this, I consider the contradictions of space that give rise to boredom in urban centres and 
suburban peripheries by critically analyzing both the production of those spaces as well 
as how they are consumed in everyday life.  Finally, I consider the escape from boredom 
offered in select sounds and images of the culture industry and its opposite, the embrace 
of boredom in certain 20th century avant-garde art movements.  Through a reading of 
Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life and complementary texts, this interdisciplinary 
dissertation is a contribution to understanding the mass phenomenon of boredom in 
modernity.   
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Introduction: Integrating a Riddle with a Puzzle 
 
Who after all can honestly say that [she or] he has never experienced boredom?1 – Reinhard Kuhn 
 
Man on the earth is bored to death,  
and this boredom is buried so deeply within him  
that he no longer knows it.2 – Antonin Artaud 
 
It can’t be helped: boredom is not simple.3 – Roland Barthes 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
Boredom is above all else a mysterious phenomenon.  As early as 1929/30, Martin 
Heidegger set out to think through this difficult topic through a series of philosophical 
lectures.  Here, Heidegger offered one of the best summaries of the difficulty in capturing 
the essence of boredom when he referred to it as a “riddle.”4  As Heidegger was well 
aware, boredom is not a standard riddle which can be glanced at and pondered over, or 
even passed on orally from one person to another; it is difficult to read.  While boredom 
could be described as a philosophical riddle for Heidegger, to other scholars it will appear 
as a different type of riddle depending on their particular disciplinary or interdisciplinary 
background(s).  As Linda L. Caldwell et al. argue, “the only apparent consensus is that 
boredom is a complex phenomenon.”5  The complexity of boredom is compounded by its 
fluidity.  That is, if one wishes to describe one’s own experience(s) of boredom, the 
moment one begins to think about it, the experience begins to dwindle or vanish entirely.  
Furthermore, the boredom experienced today could be different from that experienced 
                                                 
1 Reinhard Kuhn, The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 4. 
2 Antonin Artaud, Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 
459.  I take the use of the term ‘man’ here as meaning ‘human’.  I follow Henri Lefebvre who asks: 
“Human-beings – Why do we persist in saying ‘man’?” PS, 132.  There are, however, many instances 
throughout his work where Lefebvre himself uses the term ‘man’ (homme). 
3 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), 25. 
4 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William 
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 89. 
5 Linda L. Caldwell, Nancy Darling, Laura L. Payne, and Bonnie Dowdy, ‘”Why are you Bored?”: An 
Examination of Psychological and Social Control Causes of Boredom Among Adolescents,” Journal of 
Leisure Research 31(2), (1999): 103. 
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tomorrow.  As such, one of the main methodological and theoretical difficulties in 
studying boredom is that it is an experience that effaces its own history.
6
  Perhaps, then, 
the biggest challenge with theorizing boredom is how to grasp the historical particularity 
of this particular mode of experience.
7
   
One novel solution to pinning down boredom has been to map it out.  In their 
fictional contribution to cartography titled The Atlas of Experience, Louise van Swaaij 
and Jean Klare sought to map out boredom alongside other common experiences.  In the 
introduction to their book, the authors acknowledge the impossibility of cartographic 
perfection through a discussion of Jorge Luis Borges’s famous story of a map that was so 
detailed and precise that it gradually became so big that it covered the entire Empire 
which it was constructed to represent.
8
  With this in mind, the authors set out to construct 
a map that substituted “the names of cities, rivers and seas for concepts, feelings and 
everyday experiences.”9  The globe itself, then, is a representation, albeit incomplete, of 
all the experiences of life.  Viewed as a globe, boredom can be found at the highest point, 
                                                 
6 Elizabeth S. Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 7. Akin to Goodstein, Ben Anderson notes how the study of boredom can be 
difficult as there is “the risk of losing hold of boredom by being interested.” In “Time-Stilled Space-
Slowed: How Boredom Matters,” Geoforum 35 (2004): 752. 
7 On this matter, Jean Baudrillard writes: “Boredom (ennui) is a subtle form of filterable virus, of fossilized 
tonality, which might be said to pass invisibly across the substance of time (durée), without altering it.  
Fine particles of boredom striate time like neutrinos, leaving no trace.  There is scarcely any living memory 
of boredom.  This is why it can superimpose itself on all kinds of activities, even exciting ones, since it 
lives in the interstices.” Fragments: Cool Memories III, trans. Emily Agar (London: Verso Press, 2007), 50.  
It is worth mentioning that this series of diaries written by Baudrillard has been described by Steven Best 
and Douglas Kellner as works where “ennui is especially evident.” Postmodern Theory: Critical 
Interrogations (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), 135. 
8 The Atlas of Experience, 11.  For the story itself, which is, somewhat ironically, less than a single page in 
length, see Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science,” Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New 
York: Viking, 1998), 325. 
9 Louise van Swaaij and Jean Klare, The Atlas of Experience (English text version) David Winner (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2000), 5.  This ‘cartography’ of boredom can be compared to Baudrillard’s mention, 
albeit in passing, of an “oceanographer of ennui.”  Cool Memories II: 1987-1990, trans. Chris Turner 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 13.  Whereas van Saaij and Klare implicitly portray boredom 
as a concrete entity (represented by physical land), Baudrillard’s suggestion is much more suitable for the 
purposes of this dissertation, as it emphasizes the fluidity of boredom.  I am, therefore, not concerned with 
erecting rigid parameters for different forms of boredom. 
3 
the northernmost tip of a vast landmass of other experiences.  Boredom, often thought of, 
when it is thought of at all, to be related to time, is here demonstrated, at least implicitly, 
to be related to space.  As informative as this map is, it is nevertheless incomplete.  
Indeed, because of its static scale, a great deal of detail is absent, or, if it is present, it is 
sketched in a vague and imprecise way.  What can be gleaned from the labels on the map 
are some of the standard themes with which boredom is associated, such as Sunday 
afternoons in the west, suburbia to the north, queues to the south, and routines to the east.  
At the level of a map such as this, boredom is relatively unremarkable, and there is no 
apparent reason for anyone to want to immerse themselves in it. 
What is missing from this static depiction of boredom is historical specificity.  It 
is difficult to discern how the landmass came to be this way and why it persists.  Those 
details are not present because the map cannot depict the processes that have contributed 
to this.  In order to unravel the riddle of boredom it is not only necessary to take a closer 
look, but it is also necessary to take several looks.  One important detail on the map may 
elude a cursory glance, but is important for understanding the challenges involved in the 
study of boredom.  On the right-hand side of the map, on the eastern shore, a lighthouse 
shines its beam away from the grounds of boredom and points the way to adventure, or, 
depending on one’s perspective, warns those who may be approaching it against the 
dangers of its shores.  Another perspective, one that informs this dissertation, takes the 
lighthouse as a welcome signal for the adventure that lay ahead in the mysterious land(s) 
of boredom. 
4 
Connecting boredom with adventure may seem odd at first glance,
10
 but it is a key 
methodological principle for Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991) in his critique of everyday life.  
Whereas Lefebvre asks: “Why should the study of the banal itself be banal?,”11 in the 
fifth and last installment of Jean Baudrillard’s Cool Memories diaries, Baudrillard (a 
former assistant to Lefebvre)
12
 articulates the difficult task confronting any study of 
boredom by exclaiming that “boredom is out of luck; today it is being discussed in 
crushingly boring terms.”13  The timing of this comment is worth highlighting as it relates 
to any discussion(s) of boredom.  This aphorism of Baudrillard’s was published in the 
original French in 2005, the same year two of the major studies of boredom were 
published in English.  These are the translation of Lars Svendsen’s book A Philosophy of 
Boredom and Elizabeth Goodstein’s Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and 
Modernity.
14
  Was Baudrillard reacting to the publication of these texts?  Was Baudrillard 
                                                 
10  On the seemingly incompatible nature of adventure and boredom, McKenzie Wark notes, “Adventure is 
nothing if not the practical refutation of boredom.” The Beach Beneath the Street: The Everyday Life and 
Glorious Times of the Situationist International (London: Verso Press, 2011), 99. 
11 EE, 9.  Additionally, Lefebvre argues the importance of studying the banal in a serious manner, as there 
is nothing self-evident about it: “To experience banality is not enough to tell us what banality actually is.” 
CEL 2, 259. 
12 Although the two thinkers were interested in many of the same topics, and the two clearly had a personal 
connection, a serious, lengthy study comparing Lefebvre’s work with Baudrillard’s has yet to be written.  
Douglas Kellner has noted that Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life “deeply influenced Baudrillard,” 
however, Baudrillard’s approach “differed significantly from his teacher.” Jean Baudrillard: From 
Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 4.  Mike Gane has 
contrasted Lefebvre and Baudrillard’s analyses of technology, but these reflections are relatively scant, 
leaving much to be desired.  See Gane’s Baudrillard’s Bestiary: Baudrillard and Culture (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 50-52.  See also Baudrillard’s “Review of Henri Lefebvre’s Taking a Position: Against 
the Technocrats ,” The Uncollected Baudrillard, 52-55. 
13 Jean Baudrillard, Cool Memories V, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 26.  This 
statement can be contrasted with Leszek Kolakowski’s view on boredom: “I shall try not to be boring about 
boredom.  In other words, I shall try to be brief.  The problem of boredom is in itself neither boring nor 
trivial, for it concerns a sensation we have all experienced.” Leszek Kolakowski, “On Boredom,” Freedom, 
Fame, Lying, and Betrayal, trans. Agnieszka Kolakowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 85.  
14 It is worth highlighting for the purpose of this dissertation that Lars Svendsen writes that he had 
“personally never been so bored as when I was in the process of completing a large dissertation after 
several years of work.” Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, trans. John Irons (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2005), 35.  Oddly enough, Svendsen begins his book by stating that “a long essay is the most 
suitable form for an investigation of [boredom], not a strictly analytical dissertation.” Ibid., 8.  Length is a 
5 
even aware of these entries into the study of boredom?  If combined, the publication of 
these texts reveals a contradiction in boredom studies.  By the midpoint of the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century, the study of boredom was simultaneously exhausted and 
revitalized.  
Along with the publication of two important studies of boredom, 2005 was also 
the year that the third and final volume of Henri Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life 
was first published in English.  Originally completed in 1981, Lefebvre’s book is an ideal 
companion to Svendsen and Goodstein’s respective boredom studies.  In this particular 
text, Lefebvre discussed the marginalization of boredom in academia in addition to the 
equally enigmatic topic of everyday life.  Lefebvre writes: “We are introducing into the 
theory of daily life what is generally regarded as a subjective judgement: vulgarity, 
boredom, malaise.  The so-called social or human 'sciences' do not take account of such 
things.  Thus, boredom does not exist for sociologists as a social fact.  They are 
wrong!”15  Having worked in various sociology departments throughout his academic 
                                                                                                                                                 
key aspect where Svendsen’s book departs from Goodstein, who wrote an incredibly detailed and hefty 
tome on boredom.  My view on the matter of length clearly falls in line with Goodstein. 
15 CEL 3, 74. (my italics). As a sociologist, Lefebvre was not alone in this sentiment.  Putting a humourous 
slant on this blind spot in sociology, two contemporary sociologists have written that “sociology has largely 
ignored boredom, although producing a rather large amount of it.” Donna K. Darden and Alan H. Marks, 
“Boredom: a Socially Disvalued Emotion,” Sociological Spectrum 19 (1999): 33.  Lefebvre clearly was not 
satisfied with the attention or lack thereof that supposed trivial subjects such as boredom received from the 
social sciences.  Orrin E. Klapp, taking a somewhat more optimistic approach to the potential of the social 
sciences, mentions “social scientists have something to say about boredom.”  Klapp, Overload and 
Boredom: Essays on the Quality of Life in the Information Society (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 
35.  There are differing perspectives on whether there has, in fact, been anything akin to a sociology of 
boredom.  On the one hand, it has been argued that “[a] sociology of boredom has yet to be written.” J. 
Milton Yinger, Countercultures: The Promise and Peril of a World Turned Upside Down (New York: The 
Free Press, 1982), 202.  On the other hand, it has also been argued that “[t]here is a history as well as a 
sociology of boredom.” Robert Nisbet, Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press,1987), 27.  One notable exception to Lefebvre’s declaration of boredom not existing as a 
social fact for sociologists is Wolf Lepenies, a German sociologist, who wrote about boredom in the late 
1960s.  See Lepenies, “Spaces of Boredom and Melancholy,” In Melancholy and Society, trans. Jeremy 
Gaines and Doris Jones (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 87-130.  For a critique of 
Lepenies’ study of boredom, see Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 65-100. 
6 
career,
16
 Lefebvre was frustrated by the inattention paid to a phenomenon he believed to 
be a significant experience in everyday life.   
While the social sciences have, indeed, largely neglected boredom, the discipline 
of psychology is one notable exception.
17
  Lefebvre’s point is nevertheless well taken.  It 
is interesting that boredom is generally not considered to be a serious area of study 
considering, as Fredric Jameson once claimed, boredom is the “disease of academics.”18  
Furthermore, while boredom may not be widely considered as an important object of 
inquiry, it has been said that the experience of boredom is inherent to the processes of 
academic scholarship, specifically the social sciences.  Max Horkheimer argues that in 
the social sciences, “empirical research carries out its long, boring, individual studies that 
split up into a thousand partial questions, culminating in a chaos of countless enclaves of 
specialists.”19  Along these lines, Zygmunt Bauman attributes the 20th century American 
psychologist Gordon Allport with having quipped that social scientists do not actually 
solve problems; they simply become bored by them.
20
  Scholarly boredom may entail the 
shifting of one’s research interests and/or research projects, but, at the same time, it 
carries with it the potential to lead one to other opportunities. 
                                                 
16 Lefebvre was a professor of sociology at the University of Strasbourg from 1961-65 and then the 
University of Paris – Nanterre from 1965-1973.  Later in his career he would not accept sociologist as a 
label for himself. 
17 The point has been made that “the field of psychology contains by far the largest body of research on 
boredom.”  Teresa Belton and Esther Priyadharshini. “Boredom and Schooling: a Cross-Disciplinary 
Exploration,” Cambridge Journal of Education, 37(4), (December, 2007): 582.  For one of the first and 
most influential psychological studies of boredom, see Otto Fenichel. “On the Psychology of Boredom,” In 
The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel: First Series (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953), 292-
302.  Not everyone believes psychology is an appropriate discipline for inquiring into the phenomenon of 
boredom.  Martin Heidegger, for example, argues that “we cannot possibly treat boredom as an object of 
psychology.” The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 283. 
18 This comment arose during a conversation I had with Jameson on December 2nd, 2010 in his office at 
Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. 
19 Max Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social 
Research,” Between Philosophy and Social Sciences: Selected Early Writings (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1993), 9.  My italics. 
20 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992), 93. 
7 
Interdisciplinarity 
Nancy Anne Cluck wonders if interdisciplinarity is “merely a new game for bored 
scholars.”21  Perhaps the boredom of specialization leads one to adopt or delve into an 
integrative approach.  I would like to give Cluck’s thought a further twist by turning her 
line around and argue that the study of boredom could be a new game for 
interdisciplinary scholars.  It is no coincidence that several of the texts that have been 
published on boredom in the last decade acknowledge the importance of an 
interdisciplinary approach.  Elizabeth Goodstein specifically describes her study of 
boredom as “interdisciplinary, because it integrates the seemingly incompatible results of 
previous studies, which have interpreted the experience from within particular 
hermeneutic horizons.”22  Similarly, Richard Winter describes his approach in his book 
Still Bored in a Culture of Entertainment as coming from “many angles.”23  Lars 
Svendsen, too, utilizes an interdisciplinary approach, and offers an apt assessment of the 
complexity of boredom when he writes: “Since the phenomenon is so diverse, it calls for 
an interdisciplinary approach.”24 The present situation of boredom studies, then, is one 
where interdisciplinarity is a popular, if not necessary, approach.   
As for academia in general, it can be said that, unlike the social sciences, the 
humanities, especially literature and philosophy, have been much more receptive to 
taking boredom seriously.  In the case of philosophy, Martin Heidegger’s aforementioned 
                                                 
21 Nancy Anne Cluck, “Reflections on the Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Humanities,” 
Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature, ed. William H. Newell (New York: The College Board, 
1998), 361. (my italics). 
22 Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 13. She also goes on to mention that her approach is meta-
disciplinary.   
23 Richard Winter, Still Bored in a Culture of Entertainment, (Downvers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2002), 9.  This could also be interpreted as a multidisciplinary approach, though the author integrates them 
in an interdisciplinary fashion as opposed to analyzing them side-by-side.   
24 Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, 9. 
8 
lectures have set the standard.  Fellow German philosopher Friedrich Schlegel has argued 
that “there is a kind of person for whom an enthusiasm for boredom represents the 
beginning of philosophy.”25  Along these lines, in his ‘early writings’, Karl Marx argued 
that “[t]he mystical feeling which drives the philosopher from abstract thinking to 
intuition is boredom, the longing for a content.”26  This longing for content, however, is 
not restricted to philosophers, but is one that is felt on a daily basis by countless 
individuals.  This ‘longing for content’ is a definition for boredom that roughly 
approximates to Lefebvre’s usage of boredom as a concept, especially as it relates to his 
work on everyday life. 
For Lefebvre, it is no coincidence that boredom has been excluded as a topic of 
inquiry from many disciplines, much the same as everyday life is largely neglected by 
academics.  Lefebvre believes the omission of boredom from serious academic 
consideration to be the result of what he calls “intellectual terrorism.”27  Though this may 
appear to be extreme in its condemnation of academic study, it is not without its merits.  
He would elaborate this point as follows: 
The bureaucracy still allows this terrorism to dominate.  There are things that can 
be spoken of and things that cannot be spoken of.  In the decade of the 1960s 
there were topics that were considered as matters of gravitas and those that were 
lacking gravitas.  This spirit of gravity was, and still is, in many places the 
expression of a latent terrorism tied, moreover, to the sense of responsibility, to 
the respect of competence, incontestable qualities of the techno-bureaucracy.  But 
it was impossible to be heard if one said, for example that the people were bored.  
Where?  In Sweden, in the United States?  Perhaps.  Certainly not in France!  The 
boredom of the people was not measurable, it did not have to be taken into 
consideration except as a journalistic theme or in humor.  Repressive space could 
                                                 
25 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 24. Incidentally, Heidegger describes his lectures from 1929/1930 as “the 
beginning of an actual living philosophizing.” Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 57. 
26 Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Books, 
1992), 398. 
27 SSW, 175. 
9 
also not be spoken of; that was not a “serious” topic; since space, possessing an 
objective character and being a scientific object, was neutral, politically…28 
 
It is important to note that Lefebvre speaks of boredom and space in rapid succession 
here.  I will return to this thought later.  For now, it is worth highlighting that while the 
current wave(s) of boredom studies can be dated back to the middle of the 1970s,
29
 there 
have, nevertheless, been many who have contributed analyses of boredom in less obvious 
ways.  Ironically, the 1960s, the very decade which Lefebvre condemns for not 
acknowledging the significance of boredom, produced some of the most penetrating 
analyses, including his own.  These studies are largely focused on modernity and only 
consider boredom in fragmentary form.  For example, the 1960s were the decade when 
the urban studies of Jane Jacobs were first published and recognized, the activist 
philosophizing of the Situationist International was most vibrant, and the art of Andy 
Warhol was gaining widespread acclaim.  These diverse projects, along with many 
others, offer extraordinary insights into the phenomenon of boredom without explicitly 
labeling their projects as studies of boredom.  The references to boredom are hidden in 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 There is somewhat of a publication trend for major boredom texts.  They largely appear in publication in 
the middle of a decade at least in the English language.  Prior to Svendsen and Goodstein, a decade earlier 
in 1995 two other monumental boredom texts were published: Patricia Meyer Spacks’s Boredom: the 
Literary History of a State of Mind and the English translation of Martin Heidegger’s lectures on boredom 
called The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude.  In the middle of the 1980s 
there were three important boredom studies: Orrin E. Klapp’s text Overload and Boredom: Essays on the 
Quality of Life in the Information Society was published in 1986, the same year as Richard Farmer and 
Norman D. Sunberg published their article on the ‘boredom proneness scale’.  Two years earlier, Seán 
Desmond Healy published his book Boredom, Self, and Culture.  In the 1970s there were, again, three 
important contributions on boredom.  Reinhard Kuhn’s 1976 book, The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in 
Western Literature, is often credited with initiating the current wave of boredom studies, but it is predated 
by two others.  The 42nd issue of the journal Social Research put out in 1975 featured several essays on 
boredom and the collection of essays titled Boredom: Root of Discontent and Aggression edited by Franz 
R. Goetzl also published in 1975 is another key source.  The essays in the Goetzl collection are based on 
papers given at a conference on boredom that took place in Berkeley, California two years earlier in 1973.  
There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern.  See Michael Raposa, Boredom and the Religious 
Imagination (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999); Winter, Still Bored in a Culture of 
Entertainment (Downvers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002); Barbara Dalle Pezze and Carlo Salzani eds. 
Essays on Boredom and Modernity (New York: Rodopi, 2009); Peter Toohey, Boredom: A Lively History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
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these texts, and it is only through looking closely at them can one see their value for 
understanding boredom.  
The connections between boredom and Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life are 
also buried in his texts.  The content, then, is available, but requires a great deal of 
exploration.  It may be surprising to some Lefebvre scholars that Lefebvre proposed a 
study of boredom not as a side project, but as a key component to his critique of everyday 
life.  Both explicitly and implicitly, the theme of boredom looms large in Lefebvre’s 
critique of everyday life.  The threads, though incomplete, can be found scattered 
throughout his work, and the subject matter may not always be apparent.  For example, in 
one text, Everyday Life in the Modern World, Lefebvre writes that “our sun is black and it 
spreads terror.”30  This short passage touches upon both Lefebvre’s concept of a ‘black 
sun’, as well as the ‘intellectual terrorism’ surrounding it in academia.  So far, boredom is 
absent.  However, in another text, Introduction to Modernity, Lefebvre writes that “the 
threat of massive boredom hovers over us: exhausted themes, worn-out expressivity, 
universal pleonasm, spectacles which are monotonously ‘private’, etc.”31  Boredom is 
present in this passage, and the mention of it hovering above could be an allusion to the 
black sun.  Here, then, are two threads which may be related; it is only in another text 
where it becomes apparent that there are links between them.  These two threads are 
brought together with a passage from the second volume of the Critique where Lefebvre 
claims that “on the horizon of the modern world dawns the black sun of boredom, and 
                                                 
30 ELMW, 170. 
31 IM, 231.  This is not to say that boredom is the only modern experience, or the only one that is of 
concern to Lefebvre, but it is nevertheless a very important one.  As Lefebvre puts it, “the sky of modernity 
has seen several stars in the ascendant: the sable sun of melancholy and ennui, disaster’s pale moon, the red 
sun of joy.” Ibid., 224. 
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critique of everyday life has a sociology of boredom as part of its agenda.”32  This is 
ultimately where Lefebvre emphasizes the importance of boredom for his work. 
Sociology of Boredom 
Despite the fact that Lefebvre explicitly states that boredom is an important part 
of his critique of everyday life, Lefebvre never followed through with his proposed 
sociology of boredom, or any other kind of study of boredom.  However, around the same 
time of the second volume of his Critique, at the beginning of the 1960s, Lefebvre 
offered his most complete sketch of this project in his Introduction to Modernity.  Here, 
Lefebvre discusses the interrelationship between modernity and boredom: 
From this we can sketch out the main features of a sociology of modern boredom.  
It would draw attention to the ambiguity and internal dialectic of ‘mass culture’.  
This culture raises the average level of people’s culture; it helps to promote 
training, education, and above all, technicity.  It is informative.  It is interesting.  
At the same time it swamps people with information which is neutralized by its 
very quantity.  It establishes a parallel between cultural and intellectual 
consumption and ‘private’ material consumption.  It is voracious.  It pillages 
culture’s accumulated wealth.  It endlessly exploits old symbols, myths, forms 
and styles.  It transfers the totality of history into discourse, and shatters discourse 
with visual images.  It engineers a cultural retrogression into biology and brute 
nature (by way of sex or violent body language).  Its ersatz provocations 
accelerate the wear and tear upon experience, and blight the world of 
expressivity.
33
 
 
Despite the richness of his proposed project, Lefebvre never explicitly followed through 
with his sociology of boredom, nor did he elaborate on the above obscure passage.  The 
guiding thesis, however, is clear enough with Lefebvre’s emphasis on an ‘internal 
dialectic of mass culture’ as a key for understanding boredom in modernity.  With this, 
                                                 
32 CEL 2, 75.  This is the line I borrow from for the title of this dissertation.  The only theorist to analyze 
Lefebvre’s nascent project in a sustained manner is Michael Gardiner.  See, Michael E. Gardiner, “Henri 
Lefebvre and the ‘Sociology of Boredom’,” Theory, Culture & Society 29(2), (2012): 37-62. 
33 IM, 231.  A passage that is virtually identical to this one can be found in the following text: Henri 
Lefebvre, “Theses on Modernism,” In Modernism and Modernity, eds. Benjamin H.D. Buchoh, Serge 
Guilbaut, and David Solkin (Halifax: The Press of Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 2004), 5-6. 
12 
there is a connection between the mass culture of modernity and the historical uniqueness 
of boredom as an experience.  It would follow that, for Lefebvre, in order to contribute 
towards an understanding of boredom, it is important to examine some elements of 
modernity’s mass culture broadly defined34 to include the production and consumption of 
things in space as well as space itself, specifically the contradictions of space.   
Focusing on space is where Lefebvre’s work is similar to The Atlas of Experience 
mentioned near the beginning of this introduction, but it is also where he departs from 
many other contemporary thinkers who study boredom.  For example, according to 
Martin Heidegger, boredom has “an almost obvious relation to time, a way in which we 
stand in respect to time, a feeling of time.  Boredom and the question of boredom thus 
lead us to the problem of time.”35  Most would not disagree with the emphasis on time, 
but what about space?  Lefebvre’s work is a key for incorporating space with time in a 
discussion of boredom in modern everyday life.
36
  As Helen Liggett puts it, “Lefebvre 
uses space to understand time and vice versa.”37  While Lefebvre emphasizes space, it is 
not at the exclusion of time.  Lefebvre is clear on this point when he argues that “time 
                                                 
34 It is important to note the uniqueness of Lefebvre’s use of the term ‘mass culture’, as Lefebvre himself 
acknowledges the difficulty in effectively communicating one’s message with such language, as “the term 
‘culture’ gives rise to a good deal of confusion.” PS, 230.  For Lefebvre, the confusion is due to the fact 
that the “terms ‘culture’ and ‘cultural’ represent a jumbled mixture of art and science, ethics and esthetics, 
established ‘values’ and crumbling ideologies, fictitious ends and means that are effective or believed to be 
effective.” EX, 142.  Culture in general, then, is difficult to pinpoint.  As for mass culture, Lefebvre argues 
that “mass culture is an aspect of the enigma of modernity.” IM, 337.  When Lefebvre refers to mass 
culture, he is not just talking about products, although those are important.  His use of the term ‘mass 
culture’ is fairly broad and essentially applies to all of the products and by-products of capitalism imparted 
on the masses.  For Lefebvre, this includes buildings, city streets, suburban houses, or, as he would put it, 
the contradictions of these spaces.     
35 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 80. 
36 According to Lefebvre himself, not privileging time over space is a point of difference he has with 
Heidegger.  Despite Heidegger’s explicit spatial examples, such as the peasant house of the Black Forest 
and the Greek temple, Lefebvre argues that “there can be no doubt about the main thrust of his thinking 
here: time counts for more than space.” PS, 121. 
37 Helen Liggett, Urban Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 174. 
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and space are intimately related”38 and when he writes that “time is distinguishable but 
not separable from space.”39  This is a common link Lefebvre’s work shares with 
Reinhard Kuhn who argues that boredom is “inextricably linked with the notion of time 
and space.”40  Unfortunately, Kuhn does not go on to expound this assertion, but his point 
is nevertheless well taken.  In Lefebvre’s work, it is implicitly argued that boredom 
necessarily requires an emphasis on space, but one that does not neglect time.  The 
foundation for this assertion can be found in Lefebvre’s book The Survival of Capitalism 
when he establishes a connection between everyday life, space, and boredom: 
It is the everyday that carries the greatest weight.  While Power occupies the 
space which it generates, the everyday is the very soil on which the great 
architectures of politics and society rise up.  It is still, however, ambiguous, a 
mixture of poverty and wealth.  In the everyday, the unbearable is mixed up with 
pleasure, and unease with satisfaction.  The concrete becomes abstract and 
abstraction concrete.  Happiness easily becomes intolerable.  The reproduction of 
the relations of production enlarges, we said, by reproducing the fundamental 
contradictions: the contradiction between happiness and boredom has turned into 
a running sore.  The great positive minds will no doubt regard it as utterly utopian 
and unrealistic to introduce boredom into a theoretical and political discussion.  
For them, boredom doesn’t count.  Really it doesn’t.  Let’s not insist, however, on 
this curious contrast between realized boredom and promised happiness.  Let us 
dwell instead on the contradictions of space.
41
 
 
Taken together, it is through the ‘contradictions of space’ where one can get at the 
heart of the ‘curious contrast’ between boredom and happiness in everyday life.  Further 
to this point, Lefebvre argues elsewhere in the same book that “the contradictions of 
space, yet to be discovered in their vastness, conceal those of time by displacing them, 
though not without adding new conflicts to them.”42  In addition to space, what lies 
nascent in Lefebvre’s work is the idea that boredom is a clue to the contemporary 
                                                 
38 INT, 33. 
39 PS, 175. 
40 Kuhn, The Demon of Noontide, 5. 
41 SC, 88-89.  
42 SSW, 199. 
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situation in two interrelated respects.  First, it is an indication of the dissatisfaction people 
have with everyday life in the modern world.  Second, the experience of boredom is also 
utopian in the Lefebvrean sense of the term.
43
  It is an indication that what is now is not 
desirable.  Instead, something else, perhaps an unknown ‘x’, is desired.  The basic 
definition of this utopianism can be found in Lefebvre’s book Everyday Life in the 
Modern World when he writes: “Utopian?  Yes indeed; we are all utopians, so soon as we 
wish for something different and stop playing the part of the faithful performer or watch-
dog.”44  This is where there is a common link between Marx’s abovementioned definition 
of boredom as a ‘longing for content’ and Lefebvre’s notion of utopianism.  Rob Shields 
elaborates this point nicely at the beginning of his book Lefebvre, Love & Struggle when 
he argues that “Henri Lefebvre’s humanistic Marxism highlights the importance of the 
felt experience of dullness, boredom and estrangement as a source of utopian inspiration 
and revolutionary resolve.”45  For Lefebvre, then, boredom is a potentiality for the 
revolutionary alteration of everyday life. 
The Context of the Critique of Everyday Life 
Though interest in Lefebvre, at least in the English speaking world, has increased 
a great deal since the 1991 publication of the translations for both the first volume of his 
Critique of Everyday Life and his book The Production of Space,
46
 his work still largely 
goes unnoticed even by those who are writing about the same issues.  For example, in the 
                                                 
43 For in-depth analyses of the complexity of Lefebvre’s utopianism, see two articles by Michael Gardiner: 
“Everyday Utopianism: Lefebvre and his Critics,” Cultural Studies 18(2/3), (March /May, 2004): 228-254, 
and “Utopia and Everyday Life in French Social Thought,” Utopian Studies 6(2), (2005), especially 96-
103.  
44 ELMW, 75. 
45 Rob Shields, Lefebvre, Love & Struggle: Spatial Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1999), viii. 
46 For a summary of the impact of these two publications on English speaking scholars, see Stuart Elden, 
“Politics, Philosophy, Geography: Henri Lefebvre in Recent Anglo-American Scholarship,” Antipode 
33(5), (2001): 809-825. 
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acknowledgements section of her recent book on everyday life titled Refiguring the 
Ordinary, Gail Weiss wonders whether or not she has left something out, such as a 
specific text, a key figure, or perhaps even an entire intellectual current.
47
  One name that 
went completely unnoticed was Henri Lefebvre.  Lefebvre, who has been referred to as 
the “grandfather of everyday life,”48 the “quintessential critical theorist of everyday 
life,”49 and “perhaps the most important theorist of the everyday,”50 is an ideal guide to 
the complexities and excitement lurking within the mundane and trivial.  So why did 
Weiss fail to recognize Lefebvre as a key theorist?  Quite simply, Henri Lefebvre is a 
relatively unknown intellectual despite the incredibly prolific publication record he 
amassed over his 90 year lifetime.
51
  Stanley Aronowitz makes this clear in the title of his 
retrospective essay on Lefebvre’s career that he was and perhaps still is: “The Ignored 
Philosopher and Social Theorist.”52  Following one of Lefebvre’s major contemporary 
commentators, Stuart Elden, Lefebvre “remains to be discovered, rather than 
rediscovered.”53  It is, therefore, appropriate to state that those interested in his work are 
going back to Lefebvre in the sense that Robert Hullot-Kentor wrote about going ‘back to 
                                                 
47 Gail Weiss, Refiguring the Ordinary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), xi. 
48 Tom Conley, “Afterword: Riding the Subway with Marc Augé,” In the Metro (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 75. 
49 Michael Gardiner, Critiques of Everyday Life (London: Routledge, 2000), 71. 
50 Bryony Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 16. 
51 There are a handful of bibliographies of Lefebvre’s work available in English, some of which are more 
complete than others.  See Rob Shields, Lefebvre, Love & Struggle, 190-204; Stuart Elden, Understanding 
Henri Lefebvre, (London: Continuum, 2004), 257-262; See David Harvey’s ‘Afterword’ in Lefebvre’s The 
Production of Space for a brief summary of Lefebvre’s life and work and a partial bibliography, 425-434; 
Henri Lefebvre and the Philosophies Group: A Bibliography compiled by Joan Nordquist (Santa Cruz, CA: 
Reference and Research Services, 2001).  This bibliography provides a keyword index, a list of background 
books, a listing of the secondary literature on Lefebvre, and the bibliographies of his associates from early 
in his career.  For a detailed account of Lefebvre and the early associates of Lefebvre, see Bud Burkhard, 
French Marxism Between the Wars: Henri Lefebvre and the “Philosophies” (New York: Humanity Books, 
2000). 
52 For more on Lefebvre’s importance as an intellectual, as well as his obscurity, see Stanley Aronowitz, 
“The Ignored Philosopher and Social Theorist,” Situations 2(1), 2007: 133-156. 
53 Stuart Elden and Elizabeth Lebas, “Introduction: Coming to Terms with Lefebvre,” In KW, xi. 
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[Theodor] Adorno’, which is “a return to what was never reached in the first place.”54  As 
far as intellectual interest is concerned, studying Lefebvre and everyday life parallels the 
study boredom.  Both have largely been ignored in academia and their respective 
popularity amongst academics is relatively recent.  
On the point of going back to Lefebvre, there are two issues with Lefebvre’s work 
that make this difficult for English speakers: 1) the availability of Lefebvre’s work on the 
one hand, and 2) its accessibility on the other.  Only a fraction of Lefebvre’s work has 
been translated into English.  Even if there were a great deal of interest in him and these 
individuals could read the original French, the bulk of his material is long out of print.  
Furthermore, if it were all in print, Lefebvre can be difficult to understand.  Described as 
a “frustratingly vague and rambling writer,”55 Lefebvre’s prose can be challenging to 
follow for even the most enthusiastic reader, yet I would argue that it ultimately rewards 
a reader’s patience.  His prose weaves and winds its way through his texts, vaguely 
alluding to numerous topics and theories, and suspending threads on one page only to 
pick it up a few dozen pages later or even in another text altogether.
56
  Because of this his 
theoretical threads can be difficult to piece together.  Not surprisingly, then, Derek 
                                                 
54 Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Back to Adorno,” Telos 81 (Fall, 1989), 5. 
55 Tim Dant, Critical Social Theory (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 74. 
56 This is a deliberate rhetorical move on Lefebvre’s part.  He explains this in his book Introduction to 
Modernity as follows: “Like life, any journey into the unknown takes time, and patience.  There seem to be 
a great many people who want to know what everything is about even before they start, who just want 
conclusions.  They demand assertions followed by arguments which can be skipped because the 
conclusions have already been established.  Something like Reader’s Digest should keep them happy.  Here 
such procedures are impossible: the author is following a certain direction, but he has no clear idea of 
where it will lead him.  Join him in the quest – if not, don’t bother to look.  If you already know what 
‘modernity’ is, if you have a theory about the modern world, if you are determined to carol its praises or to 
condemn it out of hand, if you have already adopted a system, stop reading this book now.  If you do go on 
reading it, you must agree to follow a winding path, with a few twists and turns here and there.  You must 
allow the author to meander a bit.  He promises – and it’s his only undertaking – not to meander for ever.” 
IM, 240.  This is perhaps related to Lefebvre’s contention that, at least for philosophers, “a straight line – a 
linear orientation, without deviations, without meanders – is generally a practical impossibility.”  CEL 1, 
25.  A nonlinear orientation is, according to Allen Repko, a necessity for interdisciplinary thinking.  Repko, 
Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory (London: Sage, 2008), 46.   
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Gregory has noted how “Lefebvre is a puzzle to most commentators on Western 
Marxism.”57  Much the same as boredom has been referred to as a riddle, Lefebvre has 
been referred to as a puzzle.  Perhaps being labeled as a “puzzle” has something to do 
with his project of a critique of everyday life, as Rita Felski explains: “Everyday life is 
the most self-evident, yet the most puzzling of ideas.”58   
Although there are three volumes of his Critique of Everyday Life, it is difficult to 
say where his project begins and where it ends.  It virtually spans the entire length of his 
remarkable career.
59
  His first article on everyday life was published in 1933,
60
 but the 
first volume of his Critique (written in 1945) appeared in 1947 and was followed by a 
lengthy foreword of one hundred pages for the second edition published in 1958.  The 
second volume was published in 1961, but this time Lefebvre began the work with 100 
pages to ‘clear the ground’ instead of adding them later as was the case with the first 
volume.  The third volume was published in 1981, but another book, Everyday Life in the 
Modern World, appeared in 1968, which belongs alongside the three volumes of the 
critique.  Additionally, his last published text, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and 
                                                 
57 Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), 354.   
58 Rita Felski, “The Invention of Everyday Life,” New Formations 39, (1999/2000), 15. (my italics)  
Despite its ordinariness, everyday life is, nevertheless, puzzling.  Lefebvre, who, it will be shown, views 
the everyday as the verso of modernity, has referred to the modern world as “that bloody riddle.” EE, 9.  
When the materials that have been presented so far in this dissertation are tallied up, both boredom and the 
modern world are referred to as riddles, whereas Lefebvre and the everyday are referred to as puzzles.  
While the subtitle of this introductory chapter refers to the integration of the riddle of boredom and the 
puzzle of Lefebvre, the everyday and the modern world are also important for this integration.  
59 Stefan Kipfer astutely notes that the critique of everyday life is Lefebvre’s “most enduring of projects.” 
DM, xxix.  This is not to say, however, that there is no variation amongst the themes.  There are both 
continuous and discontinuous elements over the course of the project.  One example of a shift is his use of 
the concept of alienation.  Whereas alienation was used as a major concept in the first volume of his 
Critique , it receives less attention in the second volume, barely any attention in the third volume, and is not 
even mentioned in the unofficial fourth volume: Rhythmanalysis. 
60 This essay, titled ‘Mystification: Notes for a Critique of Everyday Life’, was coauthored with Norbert 
Guterman.  See KW, 71-83. 
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Everyday Life, is said to have been the fourth volume of the critique.
61
  Is it possible to 
delineate when or where Lefebvre’s project begins or ends?  Like the necessary boundary 
crossing with the topic of boredom, Lefebvre’s work bursts at the seams, spilling over 
into many of his other works on the urban, space, modernity, etc.   
Why is the everyday such a persistent thought of Lefebvre’s?  Mark Poster has 
claimed that “with daily life as the organizing concept, Lefebvre could discover historical 
tensions that were not named by previous Marxists.  Daily life was characterized by 
boredom and passivity, wherein the masses viewed their society as a ‘spectacle’.”62  
Further, Stuart Elden notes that “almost all of his writings can be seen as part of that 
large, multi-faceted and ongoing project.”63  For this reason, I omit italics from the 
‘critique of everyday life’ in the title of this dissertation.  That is, it is important to 
establish the idea that Lefebvre’s critique extends beyond the three volumes of his 
Critique and, for the purpose of this dissertation, it will extend well beyond Lefebvre 
himself to include texts that help shape the so-called sociology of boredom Lefebvre 
proposed.  Therefore, in order to utilize Lefebvre as a theoretical framework, one must 
transcend the boundaries of his texts.  
                                                 
61 Stuart Elden, “Rhythmanalysis: An Introduction,” In RH, vii.  Elden attributes this to Armand Ajzenberg. 
62 Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), 247.  Regarding the use of the word ‘spectacle’, Poster is likely referring to Guy 
Debord and the Situationist International’s concept of ‘the society of the spectacle’.  For the original source 
material, see Debord’s, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone 
Books, 1994) and his follow-up Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, trans. Malcolm Imrie (London: 
Verso Press, 1998). 
63 Elden, “Rhythmanalysis: An Introduction,” In RH, xv.  In his book on Lefebvre, Elden offers a variation 
on this statement when he writes: “Indeed, the notion of everyday life is immanent to almost all of his 
work.” Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 110. 
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Human Studies and Dialectical Method 
Lefebvre’s project of critiquing everyday life is specifically geared towards the 
humanities and social sciences, or a combination of the two: human studies.
64
  In 
Lefebvre’s theoretical framework, “human raw material” is “the substance of everyday 
life.”65  However, Lefebvre goes further than simply accepting the study of everyday life 
as one area of human studies amongst others when he writes: “In so far as the science of 
man exists, it finds its material in the ‘trivial’, the everyday.”66  Here, Lefebvre is more 
prescriptive in his assessment than descriptive.  Inquiry into the mundane ought to be the 
focus of human studies.  This is evident where Lefebvre asserts that the disciplines of 
“History, psychology and the science of mankind must become a study of everyday 
life.”67  Elsewhere, Lefebvre continues this thought by writing: “The human world is not 
defined simply by the historical, by culture, by totality or society as a whole, or by 
ideological and political superstructures.  It is defined by this intermediate and mediating 
                                                 
64 As for boredom and humans, according to Bertrand Russell, boredom is a distinctly human experience 
and no animal can “experience anything analogous to boredom.” In The Conquest of Happiness (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930), 57.  Erich Fromm similarly argues that “man is the only animal that 
can be bored.” The Sane Society, 24.  Robert Nisbet also argues that boredom is a unique experience for 
humans and contrasts it with apathy, which he believes both humans and animals can experience.  See his 
two short pieces: “Boredom,” Commentary, (September, 1982): 48; “Boredom,” In Prejudices: a 
Philosophical Dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 23.  Jerome Neu asks: “Do 
animals suffer from boredom?  How would we know if they did?”  Neu thinks that instead of boredom 
stemming from within such as it does for humans, “reactive boredom may make sense for animals,” 
because he believes animals may not be equipped with the self-consciousness necessary to experience 
boredom “from within.”  In “Boring from within: endogenous versus reactive boredom,” Emotions in 
Psychopathology: Theory and Research, (eds.) William F. Flack, Jr. & James D. Laird, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 169.  If it is true that only humans experience boredom, this would certainly make 
the purchase of a book such as Nikki Moustaki’s Boredom Busters for Dogs: 40 Tail-Wagging Games and 
Adventures (Irvine, CA: BowTie Press, 2010) ineffectual for altering a dog’s sluggish and/or hyperactive 
behaviour.  
65 CEL 1, 97.  This can be compared with Fredric Jameson’s claim of “culture as the very substance of 
everyday life.”  In “Future City,” in The Ideologies of Theory (London: Verso, 2008), 575.  When 
combined, a conceptual triad emerges: human-everyday life-culture.  In this light, Lefebvre’s critique of 
everyday life can be thought of as meshing, if not fully compatible, with the broader fields of cultural 
studies and human studies.   
66 CEL 1, 133. 
67 Ibid., 137. 
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level: everyday life.”68  Additionally, Lefebvre believed that “the study of life and of 
‘human raw material’ is the great precept of dialectical method.”69  It would follow, then, 
that a study of everyday life following Lefebvre is a dialectical one.   
What exactly is dialectical methodology?  There are, of course, numerous 
variations.
70
  While far too complicated to delve into here, it should be noted that 
Lefebvre’s dialectical approach is different from Marx’s as well as Hegel’s,71 two of the 
largest pillars of dialectical thought.  It is best summarized when Lefebvre writes: 
This, then, is what is new and paradoxical: the dialectic is no longer attached to 
temporality.  Therefore, refutations of historical materialism or of Hegelian 
historicity cannot function as critiques of the dialectic.  To recognize space, to 
recognize what “takes place” there and what it is used for, is to resume the 
dialectic; analysis will reveal the contradictions of space.
72
 
 
                                                 
68 CEL 2, 45. 
69 CEL 1, 191.  As well, according to Allen Repko, dialectical methodology is vital to all forms of 
interdisciplinary inquiry.  He writes: “In many ways, dialectical thinking is the opposite of disciplinary 
thinking, but it is an important skill of the interdisciplinarian and is a method that underlies 
interdisciplinary work.”  Repko, Interdisciplinary Research, 45.  Repko here follows Walter A. Davis who 
writes: “Dialectic is thus the method of interdisciplinary thought; all its procedures are based on the insight 
that all problems and questions are necessarily interrelated.” Walter A. Davis, The Act of Interpretation: a 
Critique of Literary Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 95. 
70 For a thorough account of the variations of dialectical thought, see Fredric Jameson’s Valences of the 
Dialectic (London: Verso Press, 2009). 
71 Lefebvre clarifies this point as follows: “The dialectic is back on the agenda.  But it is no longer Marx’s 
dialectic, just as Marx’s was no longer Hegel’s.  Besides, it does not much matter what Hegel and Marx 
wrote about this or that in particular, and especially about the dialectic.  What matters is to grasp movement 
and non-movement in the present, to grasp what it is that shifts and collides with that which does not shift.  
The dialectic has gone through some difficult times, but it has probably emerged strengthened from the test.  
The same goes for truth, which has been shaken by the dialectic.” SC, 14.  An example of the ‘difficult 
times’ of the dialectic can be found in Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time where he writes that “the 
‘dialectic’, which has been a genuine philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous,” 47.  Lefebvre’s 
version of the dialectic, then, is one that is different than both Hegel’s and Marx’s, and one that attempts to 
combat criticism such as Heidegger’s.  For diverse takes on Lefebvre’s dialectic, see Ed Soja, “The Socio-
Spatial Dialectic,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 70(2), (June, 1980): 207-225; 
Christian Schmid, “Henri Lefebvre’s Theory of the Production of Space: Towards a Three-Dimensional 
Dialectic,” Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al., 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 27-4; Rob Shields, “The Father of the Dialectic and Critic of Structuralism,” In 
Lefebvre, Love & Struggle, 109-126. 
72 SC, 17.  “Dialectical thinking,” according to Lefebvre, “has never ceased to evolve nor new aspects of it 
to appear, both in the lifetime and the writings of Marx and Engels, and since.” DM, 98.  This is due to the 
fact that, for Lefebvre, “dialectical reason knows that its work can never be completed.” CEL 1, 76. 
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Lefebvre argues that “dialectical reason grasps real movements.”73  That is to say, the 
movements are actually existing, material processes, and not simply mental exercises.  
Furthermore, what Lefebvre calls a “dialectical relation” is defined as “unity in 
opposition,”74 or a “contradiction within a unity.”75  To analyze such dialectical relations, 
Lefebvre often employs triads in order to critically analyze this ‘unity in opposition’.  
Lefebvre argues that “dialectics allows for the analysis of becoming, that is to say, of 
time, more or less connected to space, something that can only be conceived in three 
conflictual moments.”76   
Along with its dialectical approach, Lefebvre’s study of everyday life is also an 
inherently interdisciplinary one, as Joe Moran makes clear as follows: 
The study of everyday life is thus interdisciplinary not simply because it 
encompasses material overlooked by the existing disciplines, but because it forms 
a kind of connecting glue which shows how these established systems of thought 
are ultimately related to each other, even as they attempt to deny this 
relationship.
77
  
 
Lefebvre himself viewed his study as one that necessarily crosses boundaries, arguing 
that the “[c]ritique of everyday life is not intended to be a new specialism, or a particular 
                                                 
73 IM, 141. 
74 RH, 8.  One important dialectical relation theorized by Lefebvre that will be employed throughout this 
dissertation is the unity between the opposites of negative and positive.  To Lefebvre, the two seemingly 
incompatible terms are dialectically intertwined, as “the positive is negative, but what is most negative is 
also what is most positive.” CEL 1, 72.  Furthermore, Lefebvre writes: “Our thesis is that the negative is 
also positive, and that it is not a bad thing to overcome the separation between the positive and the 
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methodological tool to invert certain texts in order to create a positive argument.  According to Allen 
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Repko, Interdisciplinary Research, 46.   
75 PS, 353. 
76 TLCP, 86.  For more on Lefebvre’s use of triads, see his “Triads and Dyads” in KW, 50-56. 
77 Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity (London: Routledge, 2001), 68. 
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branch of sociology.”78  In addition to the fluidity of Lefebvre’s project of a critique of 
everyday life, Stuart Elden has noted a similar difficulty in affixing a rigid label to 
Lefebvre in a standard academic discipline.  To Elden, “[i]t is not a simple task to 
compartmentalize his work into convenient academic departments, as even within single 
works he cuts across disciplines.”79 On this point, Lefebvre would write that “[i]deas 
have boundaries.  We must do everything in our power to find out where these 
boundaries lie, and if we are to map them out we must cross them.”80   
In this light, what Lefebvre refers to as a ‘sociology of boredom’ in the context of 
his critique of everyday life is much more accurately labeled as a thoroughly 
interdisciplinary ‘social philosophy of boredom’.81  My use of the term ‘social 
philosophy’ to describe Lefebvre’s project stems from Max Horkheimer’s inaugural 
address in 1931 at the Institute for Social Research, also known as the Frankfurt School.
82
  
In this case, we can say that the Horkheimer’s use of the term ‘social philosophy’ is 
shorthand for his interdisciplinary integration of sociology and philosophy, or, as 
Horkheimer puts it, a “philosophically oriented social research” where the social 
sciences, though still retaining their core concepts such as society for sociology, are not 
                                                 
78 CEL 2, 27. 
79 Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 4.   
80 CEL 2, 29. 
81 While I would argue that it could also be labeled as a ‘critical theory of boredom’, Lefebvre would have 
perhaps referred to his proposed project as a ‘metaphilosophy’ of boredom, as he adopted this label for his 
work in the latter part of his career.  In fact, the title Lefebvre gave to himself was ‘meta-philosopher’, 
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Concerns of Mankind, ed. Fons Elders (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), 202. 
82 See Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy,” 1-14.  Horkheimer’s usage of the term is 
consistent with what Julie Thompson Klein refers to as “narrow interdisciplinarity” where integration 
“occurs between disciplines with compatible methods, paradigms, and epistemologies.” Humanities, 
Culture, and Interdisciplinarity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 63. 
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positivistic, but follow an interpretive approach.
83
  Horkheimer’s Frankfurt School 
colleague, Theodor Adorno, further clarifies this point when he articulates a simple, yet 
complex difference between philosophy and the social sciences: “Plainly put: the idea of 
science (Wissenschaft) is research; that of philosophy is interpretation.”84  While the two 
are different, Adorno does not detach the two, as evidenced in a sociology lecture where 
he exclaimed the necessity for “philosophy, which I refuse to divide strictly from 
sociology.”85  Fused together, one interprets social phenomena, such as boredom, with 
extensive research.  Additionally, in Adorno’s inaugural address he expands on his notion 
of interpretation, or of philosophy, as “riddle-solving.”86  With this, we can see a key for 
studying boredom.  Recall Heidegger’s claim that boredom is a ‘riddle’, mentioned at the 
beginning of this introduction.  To solve this riddle, or at least advance a position that 
helps one get closer to understanding some aspect of the riddle, one must interpret it.  
Essentially, this is what Lefebvre did in his critique of everyday life,
87
 so Lefebvre’s 
                                                 
83 Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy,” 14.  This could be called Max Horkheimer’s 
vision of materialism, which he claims “requires the unification of philosophy and science.” In 
“Materialism and Metaphysics,” Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell, (London: 
Continuum, 2002), 34.  This could also be interpreted more generally as an integration of philosophy and 
the social sciences, such as when Richard Wolin comments, “[I]n Horkheimer’s view, the two disciplines, 
philosophy and social science are necessary mutual complements.  Empirical research that proceeds 
without the guidance of general concepts tends to churn out a mass of disunified and meaningless data – 
data for data’s sake.”  Richard Wolin, The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, 
Existentialism, Poststructuralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 48.  Regarding 
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leads to suicide.”  Cool Memories V, 72.  In the spirit of Baudrillard’s clever formulation, I argue that social 
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84 Theodor Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” In The Adorno Reader, 31.  Jean Baudrillard is a 
suitable example for a philosopher’s approach that distances itself from research, specifically library and/or 
archival research.  He writes: “There is nothing worse than this obligation to research, to seek out 
references and documentation that has taken up residence in the realm of thought and which is the mental 
and obsessional equivalent of hygiene.” Cool Memories I, 115. 
85 Theodor Adorno, Introduction to Sociology, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), 5. 
86 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 32. 
87 Lefebvre’s position on the interdisciplinary integration of philosophy and social sciences is strikingly 
similar to that of both Horkheimer and Adorno.  With regards to the critique of everyday life, Lefebvre 
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proposed study of boredom would follow this same approach: a dialectical method that 
seeks to solve riddles through interpretation.   
Ordinariness of Boredom 
Similar to Lefebvre, Adorno has argued that “it is possible that a concern with 
apparently out-of-the way, obscure phenomena could lead to extraordinarily relevant 
social insights.”88  While boredom is an ordinary, commonplace phenomenon, it is 
simultaneously one that is ‘out-of-the-way’ and ‘obscure’, which results in it receiving 
scant attention.  The lack of attention is somewhat odd considering boredom is, by and 
large, an experience that is a feared bugbear of contemporary society.  Lefebvre argues 
that “anything goes in the fight against boredom,”89 and Erich Fromm similarly argues 
that “one of the main goals of man today is ‘escape from boredom’.”90  That is, the desire 
to escape boredom occurs when one takes an ordinary view of boredom.  One of the most 
succinct explanations of the ordinary conception of boredom is in Martin Heidegger’s 
lectures when he philosophizes:   
How unfamiliar the essence of boredom and its origin remains and must remain to 
our everyday understanding is attested by the ordinary assessment of boredom.  
Boredom in the ordinary sense is disturbing, unpleasant, and unbearable.  For the 
ordinary understanding all such things are also of little value, they are unworthy 
and to be condemned.  Becoming bored is a sign of shallowness and 
superficiality.  Whoever sets a proper task for his or her life and gives it content 
does not need to fear boredom and is secure in the face of it.
91
 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
argues that “it must blaze its own trail between philosophical reflections and fragmented and specialized 
research.” CEL 2, 5.   
88 Adorno, Introduction to Sociology, 17. 
89 INT, 32. 
90 Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 
244. 
91 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 158.  Heidegger’s assertion that boredom ‘must 
remain’ unfamiliar to ‘our everyday understanding’ is a point of rupture with Lefebvre’s thought.   
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Similar to Marx, Heidegger touches on the relationship between boredom and ‘content’ 
in life, or lack thereof.  With its emphasis on the unpleasant, Heidegger’s definition can 
be placed alongside the following passage from Fromm: 
When boredom is mentioned, people think, of course, that it is not pleasant to be 
bored, but they do not think it is a serious matter.  I am convinced that boredom is 
one of the greatest tortures.  If I were to imagine Hell, it would be the place where 
you were continually bored.  In fact, people make a frantic effort to avoid 
boredom, running away to this, that, or the other, because their boredom is 
unbearable.  If you have “your” neurosis and “your” analyst, it helps you feel less 
bored.  Even if you have anxiety and compulsive symptoms, at least they are 
interesting!  In fact, I am convinced that one of the motivations for having such 
things is escape from boredom.
92
 
 
Taken together, the two above passages from Heidegger and Fromm complement the 
other.  They both demonstrate the dual aspects of the fear and ordinariness of boredom.  
In order to understand boredom, it is important to understand why people are running 
away from it and what leads them to believe they ought to run away from it in the first 
place.   
As an experience that is equally detested and insignificant to so many, it is worth 
asking: Who actually experiences boredom?  Arthur Asa Berger posits that “most 
people’s lives are very routine and boring.”93  The Belgian artist and writer Marcel 
Broodthaers once wrote in a letter that “999 days out of 1,000, I am exposed only to 
boredom.”94  For those like Broodthaers, boredom is the rule rather than the exception.  
Erich Fromm argues that while “many people would readily admit they are bored; very 
                                                 
92 Erich Fromm, The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology and Culture (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 181. 
93 Arthur Asa Berger, Ocean Travel and Cruising: a Cultural Analysis (New York: Haworth Hospitality 
Press, 2004), 74. 
94 Quoted in Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, “Marcel Broodthaers: Open Letters, Industrial Poems,” Neo-
Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975 (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 97. 
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few would admit that they are boring.”95  Taking a different perspective, Northrop Frye 
argues that “a man is bored because he bores himself.”96  Dennis Brissett and Robert 
Snow claim that “[m]ost everyone knows a bore; most everyone at some point in their 
life has been bored.”97  However, “some people,” argues Orrin E. Klapp, “say they are 
never bored.”98  Siegfried Kracauer, believing such claims to be highly dubious, has a 
response to these individuals:  
People today who still have time for boredom and yet are not bored are certainly 
just as boring as those who never get around to being bored.  For their self has 
vanished – the self whose presence, particularly in this so bustling world, would 
necessarily compel them to tarry for a while without a goal, neither here nor 
there.
99
 
 
Klapp also counters the claim of never being bored by saying boredom is experienced by 
“some people much of the time and almost everyone some of the time.”100  Søren 
Kierkekaard is succinct in his assessment when he quips that “all men are bores.”101  
Amongst all of these passages it would seem that the people who claim to have never 
experienced boredom appear to be in the minority.  For these few, is it because they 
simply do not have time to be bored, or, as Kracauer puts it, do they have the time for 
boredom but do not become bored?  To Kracauer, they may not be bored, but they are 
boring other people.  Lars Svendsen hazards a “guess that almost one hundred per cent of 
                                                 
95 Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 
243. 
96 Northrop Frye, “Leisure and Boredom,” In Northrop Frye on Literature and Society, 1936-1989: 
Unpublished Papers, ed. Robert D. Denham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 226. 
97 Dennis Brissett and Robert P. Snow, “Boredom: Where the Future Isn’t,” Symbolic Interaction 16(3), 
(1993): 237. 
98 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 11. 
99 Siegfried Kracauer, “Boredom,” The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 331. 
100 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 30. 
101 Søren Kierkegaard, “The Rotation Method,” Either/Or, Vol. I (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), 
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present purposes, the issue of pseudonyms and the attribution of authorship will be set aside. 
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the population suffers from boredom in the course of their life.”102  Richard Bargdill goes 
one step further and claims “at some point in everyone’s life there is an experience of 
being bored.”103  Michael Raposa in the introduction to his book Boredom and the 
Religious Imagination writes, “[t]he experience of boredom, sooner or later, now and 
then, seems inevitable for most persons.”104  At the end of his book, Raposa is much 
more optimistic when he writes: “boredom is never inevitable.”105   
Historical and Geographical Parameters  
The diverse range of comments from the various authors listed in the above 
paragraph demonstrates the lack of a consensus on the cause, prevalence, and inevitably 
of boredom.  As for Lefebvre, while speaking from an everyday life perspective, he 
writes that “ [t]he ‘worldwide’, the ‘planetary’ are already synonyms for the world of 
boredom, where the maelstrom of technicity leaves human relations and everyday life in 
its wake like so much stagnant jetsam.”106  That is, Lefebvre identifies a trend in 
perception regarding the world as a boring thing.  Along these same lines, Klapp lists 
numerous countries as examples of widespread boredom, such as Sweden, France, Japan, 
Britain, United States, Switzerland, and the former Soviet Union.
107
  This is consistent 
with Elizabeth Goodstein’s point that in the context of modernity “the phenomenon is 
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105 Ibid., 138. 
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discusses many of the same issues tackled by Lefebvre: “We are bored with this planet.  It has seen better 
centuries, and the promise of better times to come eludes us.  The possibilities of this world, in these times, 
seem dismal and dull.  All it offers at best is spectacles of disintegration.  Capitalism or barbarism, those 
are the choices.  This is an epoch governed by this blackmail: either more and more of the same, or the end 
times.  Or so they say.  We don’t buy it.  It’s time to start scheming on how to leave the twenty-first 
century.  The pessimists are right.  Things can’t go on as they are.  The optimists are also right.  Another 
world is possible.  The means are at our disposal.  Our species-being is a builder of worlds.” The Beach 
Beneath the Street, 1.  
107 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 20-23. 
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international.”108  With the advent of modernity, people can be bored around the world.  
Lefebvre touched on this point in a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor in his book 
Introduction to Modernity: 
My dear chap, everyone is bored already.  I mustn’t exaggerate – not bored to 
death, nor bored to death with not dying, as a mystic might say – or a nihilist, 
which is the same thing.  People are more bored in advanced countries like the 
USA and Sweden than they are in Africa or Yugoslavia, or even in this dear old 
France of ours.  Don’t let’s mention the Soviets or the Chinese, they haven’t time 
to get bored, to get bored you need leisure.  Those good people are workers, they 
produce; they are told that production is synonymous with satisfaction.  Maybe 
they believe it is.  If so, so much better for them, so much the worse for us.  Even 
so, they have some fairly pressing needs, but they go on waiting; they get less 
bored than we do.  In my opinion it is modern boredom which poses the problem 
of style in life.
109
 
 
Here, it is evident that, to Lefebvre, it is the advanced (i.e. industrialized) countries
110
 
where boredom is most prevalent.  This passage builds upon a similar discussion 
Lefebvre had a few years prior.  In his autobiography, written in 1958, Lefebvre 
discusses the importance of boredom in the critique of everyday life.  He asks: “If it is 
true that the U.S. and Sweden represent the contemporary civilization of boredom, where 
does this profound boredom come from?  Do satisfaction and boredom go together?  
Must we maintain a dialectical movement of 'satisfaction-dissatisfaction', and how?”111  
With his identification of the ‘internal dialectic of mass culture’ as a key for analyzing 
boredom, it would appear that he answered his own question. 
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Fredric Jameson has written that “boredom is a very useful instrument with which 
to explore the past, and to stage a meeting between it and the present.”112  As for this 
dissertation, while earlier times are discussed, the primary concern is with the twentieth 
century and the adventure of boredom throughout this century.  This stands in contrast 
with the majority of boredom literature which predominantly concerns itself with the 
mid-1800s through to the early 1900s.  Elizabeth Goodstein and Patricia Meyer Spacks, 
for example, in their respective studies focused on texts written during or written about 
this time period that are largely focused on Western Europe.  The present study will 
depart from this by predominantly focusing on texts from and about the twentieth century 
and on both American and European analyses.  Much has been written on the boredom 
plaguing Europe, so this is not much of a stretch.  But why add America?  Boredom’s 
ubiquity in America is exemplified by a story that ran in the November, 1974 issue of 
Harper’s Magazine with the title ‘Boredom: The Most Prevalent American Disease’.113  
Could the land of opportunity be the land of boredom? 
Not only is boredom prevalent in America, but, as Lefebvre argues, “boredom is 
the great fear in America.”114  Lefebvre is not alone with this sentiment.  Another French 
intellectual, Simone de Beauvoir, also argues that boredom is a major component to 
everyday life in the United States.  “The arid basis of American life,” according to de 
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Beauvoir, is none other than “boredom.”115  In his aptly titled travelogue America, yet 
another French philosopher, Jean Baudrillard, writes that “whatever the boredom, the 
hellish tedium of the everyday in the US or anywhere else, American banality will always 
be a thousand times more interesting than the European – and especially the French – 
variety.”116 Following Baudrillard, if an ‘interesting’ study of boredom is at all possible – 
and it should be remembered that Baudrillard was skeptical about this – it ought to have a 
substantial focus on America.  Boredom and America seem to go hand in hand for these 
French theorists.  It is as though boredom is as American as apple pie and baseball.  But 
is this merely a French bias?  Regarding America, Erich Fromm (a German) writes: 
“Here, and throughout the Western world, our problem is not cruelty, it is not 
destructiveness: it is boredom.  Life is meaningless.  People live, but feel they are not 
alive; life runs out like sand…  Such people sense that they live in a world in which they 
should be excited, interested, active, yet they seem to be dead and inhuman.”117  Fromm’s 
fellow Frankfurt School member, Adorno, who is also German, though not explicitly 
referring to boredom, essentially outlines its material conditions: “When you come to 
America, everywhere looks the same.  The standardization, the product of technology and 
monopoly, is disconcerting.”118  The famed English novelist Rudyard Kipling, too, found 
America to be the land of boredom.  In a letter to William James written August 31
st
 
1896, Rudyard Kipling claims: “Half your trouble is the curse of America – sheer, 
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hopeless, well-ordered boredom; and that is going some day to be the curse of the 
world.”119  Kipling was not writing from a far away land, theorizing America from afar, 
but was actually writing from Morristown, New York.  Finally, Americans themselves 
have noted the relationship of boredom and their homeland.  In a letter to Allen Ginsberg 
dated July 10
th
, 1953, American author William S. Burroughs wrote: “In the U.S. you 
have to be a deviant or die of boredom.”120  Coincidentally, a great deal of my writing for 
this dissertation has taken place in America. 
Dissertation Outline 
While Lefebvre failed to realize his proposed study of boredom, there are, 
nevertheless, several fragments scattered throughout his writings offering clues.  By 
culling them together,
121
 by constructing a constellation, the basic framework of 
Lefebvre’s thought regarding boredom begins to take shape.  I argue that there are six key 
elements to Lefebvre’s proposed study of boredom.  First, as a ‘sociology of boredom’, it 
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point is that it will not do so, for the ellipse is superior to the straight line.” Fragments: Cool Memories III, 
8. 
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is primarily concerned with modern society.  Second, the rise of boredom as a mass 
phenomenon is tied to the historical processes of industrialization.  Third, contradictions 
of space are important factors for his thought in general, but understanding boredom in 
particular.  Fourth, there is a utopian element to the experience of boredom (longing for 
content).  Fifth, boredom is related to style of life.  Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, 
there is an internal dialectic of mass culture that is linked with the perpetuation of 
boredom.  These six interrelated elements all fit within the context of Lefebvre’s 
historically specific study of everyday life, all of which will be explored throughout this 
dissertation. 
 The goal of this dissertation is to pick up where Lefebvre left off by incorporating 
the theoretical framework of his critique of everyday life into a study of boredom.  The 
guiding thesis is that what Lefebvre identified as the ‘internal dialectic of mass culture’ is 
a key for understanding boredom in modernity.  That is, there is a connection between the 
mass culture of modernity and the historical uniqueness of boredom as an experience.  To 
contribute towards an understanding of boredom, it is important to examine some 
elements of modernity’s mass culture.  For this, I argue that Lefebvre’s project, the 
critique of everyday life, is an important but incomplete point of departure.  This 
dissertation, then, will be much more Lefebvrean than explicitly about Lefebvre.   
 This dissertation consists of five chapters, the organization of which is modeled 
after Lefebvre’s dialectical thought.122  Each chapter is interrelated and develops a 
                                                 
122 The structure of this dissertation stems from a passage in volume two of Lefebvre’s Critique.  At the end 
of the introduction, or what Lefebvre calls ‘clearing the ground’, he outlines the necessary components for 
his project.  The ultimate academic goal is to gain insight into today’s society as a whole: modernity 
(chapter 1).  For this, he argues that what must be studied are “the links between everyday life, the modern 
city and housing developments; the place and the future of art in the so-called modern world, etc.” CEL 2, 
99.  This one sentence gives the precise flow of chapters 2-5 of my dissertation.  Chapter 2 is concerned 
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continuity and discontinuity with the preceding chapter.  The chapters are related, yet 
ultimately different.  The first chapter is a review of the boredom literature with a specific 
focus on boredom’s relationship to history in general and modernity in particular.  The 
second chapter continues this discussion by incorporating Lefebvre’s concept of everyday 
life with boredom and modernity.  With the first two chapters, then, we have what 
Lefebvre refers to as “two inter-dependent realities,”123 modernity and everyday life.  
Lefebvre states that together “modernity and everydayness constitute a deep structure that 
a critical analysis can work to uncover.”124  It is in the second chapter where Lefebvre’s 
basic definition of boredom as the absence of style in everyday life will be discussed.
125
  
The third chapter takes the ‘deep structure’ of modernity and everyday life developed in 
the first two chapters and develops it by considering the general tendencies of modern 
urbanism
126
 from the path-breaking (both literal and figurative) planning project of 
Haussmann, the predominance of the money economy, the ‘machines for living’ by Le 
Corbusier, through to the wave of ‘new town’ planning.  The third chapter focuses on the 
centre; the fourth chapter focuses on the peripheries.  The fourth chapter extends this 
discussion of urbanism by turning to a tendency of twentieth century planning, especially 
                                                                                                                                                 
with everyday life, chapter 3 with urbanism (modern city), chapter 4 with the suburbs (housing 
developments), and chapter 5 with the culture industry (art). 
123 ELMW, 24. 
124 EE, 10-11. 
125 Michael Gardiner has noted that because Lefebvre never systematically studied boredom, he often used 
the term in contradictory ways.  Gardiner, “Henri Lefebvre and the ‘Sociology of Boredom’,” 40.  In 
referring to Lefebvre’s view of boredom, I do so within the context of it being linked to his corresponding 
concept of the ‘absence of style in everyday life’. 
126 The third chapter focusing on the urban, or the centre, follows the second chapter on everyday life in 
order to remain consistent with Lefebvre’s work.  As Stuart Elden notes, in referring to Lefebvre: “His 
work on everyday life can be seen as providing the foundation for his studies on urban […] life.” 
Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 9.  Lefebvre himself made the intertwinement of the two by arguing that 
the everyday and the urban are “indissolubly linked.” WC, 185,  
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after World War II, suburbanization.
127
  Whereas the third chapter predominantly 
discusses Europe, the fourth chapter will largely discuss America.  Here, the neglected 
figure of the bored housewife will be examined, in addition to the ticky-tacky housing 
schemes and big box stores found around the country, along with the influx of televisions 
in particular and technology in general into everyday life.  The fifth chapter will build on 
the discussion in the fourth chapter of suburbia’s penchant for consumption.  Specifically, 
this final chapter will integrate Lefebvre’s theory of consumption with the Frankfurt 
School’s concept of the ‘culture industry’.  Here, certain sounds and images of the culture 
industry will be juxtaposed alongside avant-garde sounds and images.  Specifically, the 
culture industry’s production of sound in the form of popular music will be contrasted 
with the Fluxus group (particularly John Cage) and their use of boredom in music.  The 
discussion will then shift to the culture industry’s production of images in the form of 
advertisements and will be followed by the importance of ‘boring things’ in Andy 
Warhol’s Pop art. 
As has been highlighted by Michael Gardiner in his book Critiques of Everyday 
Life, Lefebvre frequently quoted a passage by Hegel: “The familiar is not necessarily the 
known.”128  This serves as the unofficial slogan for Lefebvre’s study of everyday life and 
                                                 
127 Lefebvre argues that a study of the suburbs can only follow a study of the city: “They cannot be studied 
sociologically apart from the city and without a study of its problems.” KW, 134.  For this reason, I follow 
the theme of the urban in chapter 3 with the theme of the suburbs in chapter 4.   
128 Gardiner, Critiques of Everyday Life, 1.  It can be found in CEL 1 on pages 15 and 132.  This passage 
comes from the famous preface of Hegel’s Phenomenology, though it is less poetic in its two English 
translations: (1) “What is ‘familiarly known’ is not properly known, just for the reason it is ‘familiar’.” 
G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), 
17; (2) “Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood.” G.W.F. 
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. J.N. Findlay (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), 18.  
Lefebvre believed in the forcefulness of this passage so much he would argue that “Hegel’s aphorism 
should appear at the beginning of any methodology of the social sciences.” KW, 111.  This admiration for 
Hegel’s dictum can also be found in another work of Lefebvre’s that has yet to be translated into English, 
but is of particular importance for human studies.  He writes: “The first methodological principle of human 
studies can be found in an admirable formula from Hegel: The familiar is not necessarily the known.”  In 
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will serve as an unofficial slogan for my study of boredom.  What I aspire to accomplish 
with what follows is an integration of the boredom literature with the theoretical 
framework offered by Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life, along with additional material 
(often fragmentary) that both discusses boredom and is consistent with Lefebvre’s 
project.  I am looking at the familiar yet ultimately faintly known phenomenon of 
boredom.   
In summary, to approach the problematic of boredom I have employed the work 
of the French interdisciplinary theorist Henri Lefebvre, specifically his project of a 
critique of everyday life, as a general framework, though one that requires considerable 
additions from external yet related material.  It is hoped that boredom as an historically 
specific social phenomenon will be seen in a new light, one that makes it shine a little 
brighter.   
                                                                                                                                                 
the original French: Le premier principe méthodologique de la science de l’homme se trouve dans une 
admirable formule de Hegel: “Le familier n’est pas pour cela connu.” Méthodologies des sciences: inédit 
(Paris: Anthropos, 2002), 126.   
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Chapter 1: The Rise of Boredom in the Modern World 
 
[W]ith the advent of modernity,  
the magic of the enchanted universe is forever lost,  
reality will forever remain gray.1 – Slavoj Žižek 
 
Boredom becomes widespread when traditional structures of meaning disappear.2 – Lars Svendsen 
 
[T]hat most elusive of questions: modern boredom.3 – Ihab Hassan 
 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
In one of his most sprawling and lengthy texts, Introduction to Modernity, Lefebvre 
argues that the “boredom which certain aspects of ‘modernity’ exude like some kind of 
radioactivity is so immeasurably appalling that a return to the pleasure principle seems 
highly desirable.”4  Writing these words in 1961, what Lefebvre observed around him 
was a widespread acceptance of an atmosphere of boredom coupled with a utopian hope 
for something else.  For many individuals, boredom is tolerated as long as the future 
promises something else, something better.  What largely goes unrecognized is that the 
very same modernity that promises this better life is also the one that bores.
5
  To 
recognize this, the historical specificity of boredom must first be considered.  It is 
important to ask the question: Why did boredom emerge simultaneously with modernity?  
                                                 
1 Slavoj Žižek, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2009), 58. 
2 Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, 153. 
3 Ihab Hassan, “A re-Vision of Literature,” New Literary History 8(1) (Autumn, 1976): 137. 
4 IM, 258.  Lefebvre’s proposed return to the pleasure principle (inspired by the work of Stendhal) is a 
reversal of Freud’s terms where one’s maturation is linked to one’s exiting the pleasure principle and 
entering the reality principle.  Lefebvre is implicitly arguing that society follows the reality principle and 
should consider reversing its priorities.  For more on Freud’s two principles, see Sigmund Freud, 
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (trans. and ed.) James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1966), 443-444.  Rob Shields has referred to Lefebvre as “one of the great theorists of 
modernity.” Shields, Lefebvre, Love & Struggle, 94. 
5 In the third volume of his Critique, Lefebvre explicitly links the era of modernity with the promise of 
happiness.  He writes: “Modernity was promising.  What did it promise?  Happiness, the satisfaction of all 
needs.  This promesse de Bonheur – no longer through beauty, but by technical means – was to be realized 
in daily life.” CEL 3, 49-50.  While Lefebvre does not believe that modernity fulfilled its promise as an era 
of happiness, he does believe that previous time periods were fairly happy.  So unlike the 20th century, he 
argues that “in the past there have been relatively happy periods – in the thirteenth century, perhaps, and in 
the first half of the sixteenth.” IM, 373.  He goes on to say that he is a type of sixteenth century man. 
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Such a question, if it is to be taken seriously, takes both boredom and modernity as 
complex concepts.  Lefebvre has noted that, much like boredom, people often speak of 
the ‘modern’ without acknowledging its historical specificity or complexity.  Various 
utterances such as modern music, modern paintings, or modern times are spoken on a 
daily basis with little thought as to what ‘modern’ means.6   
Neither the experience or concept of boredom nor the experience or concept of 
modernity is common knowledge.  For this, links between these two concepts must be 
established.  This is somewhat difficult, as one commentator notes, “we take modernity 
for granted, and we often are bored with it.”7  First, it should be asked: What or when 
exactly is modernity?  From a Lefebvrean point of view, it is the present period and 
stretches back roughly two hundred years.  Lefebvre refers to the modern era as “the 
nineteenth century, since the French Revolution.”8  He also distinguishes between “our 
modernity” and the pre-modernity of the nineteenth century.  This may appear to be a 
contradiction; however, Lefebvre is referring to a characteristic of the modern world to 
reinvent itself over and over again.  So, while the nineteenth century is indeed part of 
modernity, it is often viewed as another era altogether.  Seen this way, there are several 
modernities within modernity. 
So if boredom is indeed historically specific to recent times, why did boredom 
arise as a mass experience with modernity?  What is it about this particular historical era 
that has created the material conditions for this experience?  One of the most prominent 
boredom scholars, Elizabeth Goodstein, has argued that “the experience of boredom as 
                                                 
6 IM, 1. 
7 Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 1. 
8 RH, 6. 
38 
we know it came into being in the aftermath of Enlightenment, as a product of the 
struggle to express how modern subjects lived problems of meaning in a world without 
God.”9  This passage from Goodstein’s book Experience Without Qualities is deceptively 
simple in its brevity.  Goodstein’s assertion, as will be shown, can only be described as 
counterintuitive.  Her basic argument is one that is fairly difficult to articulate since it 
goes against the common conception of boredom as something easily understood, as well 
as something that has always been and always will be.  But if boredom is indeed an 
historical phenomenon, why is it the case that boredom is viewed as ahistorical?  As 
Goodstein and fellow boredom theorist Patricia Meyer Spacks both argue, over the 
course of time, and especially throughout the twentieth-century, the experience of 
boredom has become naturalized.
10
  That is to say, the ahistorical picture of boredom has 
become a common sentiment over time; its historical specificity goes unnoticed.  Such 
naturalization has undoubtedly played no small part in its characterization as trivial, 
inconsequential, and unworthy of serious inquiry.  
Goodstein asserts that boredom is linked to what she calls the “democratization of 
skepticism”11 where the masses are no longer tied to the idea of divine providence and 
are thus free to cast doubt upon anything and everything.  Similar to Goodstein, in 
reference to the preceding two centuries, another major boredom theorist, Seán Desmond 
                                                 
9 Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 408. 
10 Ibid., 336; Spacks, Boredom, 272.  Further to this point, anthropologist Yasmine Musharbash’s 
ethnographic study of the Australian Aboriginal settlement of Yuendumu was so difficult to conduct 
because of this naturalization of boredom.  She writes: “Going through my field notes, I realized that 
boredom had been a sizeable aspect of the everyday but that, perhaps because of its normalcy, I had failed 
to collect systematic data about it and, what is more, that anthropology did not offer any frameworks within 
which to analyze this phenomenon.” In “Boredom, Time and Modernity: an Example from Aboriginal 
Australia,” American Anthropologist, 109(2), (June, 2007): 307. 
11 Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 29. 
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Healy, has noted how “knowledge has poured in and skepticism has mounted.”12  For 
Healy, the widespread accumulation of empirical facts has led to the ascendance of 
science
13
 and the decline of purely faith based interpretations of the world.
14
  In concert 
with this democratization of skepticism arose the ever flourishing, to use Lefebvre’s term, 
“double process,”15 of urbanization and industrialization.  Although Goodstein would add 
‘rationalization’ and ‘secularization’ to this constellation,16 she has also theorized such a 
double process: “In the mid-nineteenth century, as industrialization and urbanization 
transformed the European landscape, the problem of boredom emerged as a mass 
phenomenon.”17   
Although he strove to prove boredom’s ancestral lineage, Ian Irvine would agree 
with Goodstein’s linking boredom with the processes of the modern world, such as when 
he writes how “chronic ennui was associated with the costs to the subject of urbanization, 
bureaucratization and the industrial revolution.  In a sense, then, the concept was used to 
                                                 
12 Healy, Boredom, Self, and Culture, 101. 
13 Commenting on the uneven development of civilization, Lefebvre writes: “The natural sciences were the 
first to progress.  For a wide variety of reasons, certain sectors of knowledge and life lagged behind.  The 
sciences of human reality (medicine, physiology and psychology – history – political economy and its 
applications, etc.) are still behind the natural sciences.  As for practical, everyday life – a fundamental 
sector nevertheless – it is so backward that it can often appear unchanged or merely down-graded.” CEL 1, 
247. 
14 This is not to say that religion plays no role in the modern world; rather, it is one that is markedly 
different from times gone by.  Lefebvre theorizes that “Religion will end in boredom; and to offer boredom 
to the Lord is hardly a living sacrifice.”  CEL 1, 220.  He then wonders if he is being hasty with this 
thought, as the same religious services have been taking place for ages and yet they have endured up until 
the present society. 
15 The full passage helps to articulate Lefebvre’s use of this complex concept: “We have before us a double 
process or more precisely, a process with two aspects: industrialization and urbanization, growth and 
development, economic production and social life.  The two ‘aspects’ of this inseparable process have a 
unity, and yet it is a conflictual process.  Historically there is a violent clash between urban reality and 
industrial reality.  As for the complexity of the process, it reveals itself more and more difficult to grasp, 
given that industrialization does not only produce firms (workers and leaders of private enterprises, but 
various offices – banking, financial, technical and political.” WC, 70.  Despite being referred to as the 
double process of industrialization and urbanization, this chapter will focus mostly on the former of the two 
terms.  Urbanization did not arise at the same time as industrialization; it is, according to Lefebvre, the 
inevitable outcome of the industrial process.  ELMW, 194-195.  The second part of the double process, 
urbanization , will be dealt with throughout the third chapter. 
16 Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 15. 
17 Ibid., 101. 
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illustrate the dark side of modernity.”18  So there is at least some agreement in the 
literature that the city and the factory were the two spaces that initially established 
boredom as a mass phenomenon.
19
 Not surprisingly, according to the prominent architect 
Charles Jencks, “the major metaphor for modern architecture [is] the factory.”20  
Additionally, it has been said that for certain theorists “the boredom of everyday city life 
is the boredom of the assembly line, of one thing after another, of pieces locked in an 
infinite series that never really progress: the more it changes, the more it remains the 
same.”21  It is here where the ‘double process’ can be viewed as both a key feature of 
modernity and for the mass proliferation of boredom.  But, again, what is modernity?  In 
order to properly sketch the general contours of modernity it is important, in following 
the work of Lefebvre, to acknowledge that any “picture of modernity would be 
incomplete if we failed to sketch the relations of the modern with the past, and with 
history.”22  
                                                 
18 Ian Irvine, “Acedia, Tristitia and Sloth: Early Christian Forerunners to Chronic Ennui,” Humanitas 12(1), 
(1999): 104. 
19 Goodstein. Experience Without Qualities, 403. 
20 Charles Jencks, The New Paradigm in Architecture: The Language of Post-Modernism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), 22. 
21 Laurie Langbauer, Novels of Everyday Life: The Series in English Fiction, 1850-1930 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), 131.  In the first section of the next chapter I will address Laurie 
Langbauer’s interpretation of Lefebvre. 
22 IM, 224.  Lefebvre is here alluding to what he would call his regressive-progressive method.  Arguably, 
the clearest explanation for this method is given in The Production of Space where Lefebvre argues as 
follows. “Though it may seem paradoxical at first sight, this method appears on closer inspection to be 
fairly sensible.  For how could we come to understand a genesis, the genesis of the present, along with the 
preconditions and processes involved, other than by starting from that present, working our way back to the 
past and then retracing our steps?  Surely this must be the method adopted by any historian, economist or 
sociologist - assuming, of course, that such specialists aspire to any methodology at all.” PS, 66.  While the 
previous passage was published in its original French in 1974, such an approach was present in Lefebvre’s 
work as early as 1939 with the publication of his book Dialectical Materialism.  There he argues that “in 
order to elucidate modern industrial society, the analysis must go back to older societies.” DM, 94.  The 
difficulty with this is establishing the cutoff point for one’s historical analysis.  Nevertheless, this approach 
has been cited approvingly by Jean-Paul Sartre who in his Search for a Method finds Lefebvre’s approach 
to be of paramount importance.  He writes: “[I]t is a Marxist, Henri Lefebvre, who in my opinion has 
provided a simple and faultless method for integrating sociology and history in the perspective of a 
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There are two main goals for this chapter: (1) To establish the coordinates of 
recent boredom scholarship and the varied takes on boredom’s historical specificity via a 
review of the literature, and (2) to establish a general theoretical framework of modernity 
before continuing on with another key concept of this dissertation, which Lefebvre argues 
is the other side of the coin of modernity: everyday life.  To accomplish these goals, I 
have divided this chapter into five parts.  The first part analyzes two positions – Joseph 
Brodsky’s and Bertrand Russell’s – that are at odds with each other, as well as at odds 
with linking boredom exclusively with modernity.The tension found in these two pieces 
will serve as points of reference for the duration of the chapter.  Part two explores a wide-
range of positions on the possibility of the experience of boredom in pre-modern life with 
a special focus on the concepts of acedia and ennui.  In addition, this section takes a 
general look at some of the historically specific ways of life in pre-modern times – the 
Middle Ages in particular – in order to distinguish them from modernity.  Part three 
builds on the argument established in part two by discussing the hidden yet visible 
relationship between boredom and modernity and the unique shift in space-time 
experience brought by industrialization and urbanization.  The fourth part examines one 
of modernity’s principal technological advances, the railway, its impact on the world, and 
its relationship to boredom.  The fifth and final part identifies a dialectical relationship 
theorized in Lefebvre’s work between the interesting and boring.  This dialectic is one of 
Lefebvre’s original contributions to boredom studies, it is a key element to understanding 
boredom in modernity, and it will inform the rest of the dissertation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
materialist dialectic.” Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1963), 51. 
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Two Ahistorical Theories of Boredom 
Two Nobel laureates – Bertrand Russell and Joseph Brodsky23 – have theorized 
two of the more commonly held positions on the historical trajectory of boredom.  Both 
have explored the topic of boredom in relatively brief ways, yet both of the respective 
pieces provide ample fodder for any discussion of boredom.  What makes these two 
pieces so intriguing is that, although they both perpetuate the ‘ordinary’ conception of 
boredom, albeit in different ways, they also express important insights into boredom that 
are often overlooked.  These are minor works by major thinkers, but I argue they both 
make major points on the often denigrated and supposedly minor subject of boredom.  
Because of the contradictions imbedded within, these pieces are ideally suited as points 
of departure for a dialectical study of boredom.  Instead of strictly mining the major 
works of boredom, it is vital to the present study of boredom to acknowledge that 
penetrating insights are often found in unlikely places.  To use a metaphor of Lefebvre’s, 
one cannot stare directly at the black sun of boredom in order to understand it; one also 
has to look where its rays are shining.  The challenge is to either take brief glances before 
turning away, or, as is being argued here, look indirectly.  It is the lesser quality of 
Russell and Brodsky’s respective pieces (with respect to their oeuvres) that reflects the 
experience of boredom more generally in that they are both usually overlooked.    
1) Joseph Brodsky – In Praise of Boredom 
The first example is Joseph Brodsky’s commencement address to Dartmouth 
College entitled ‘In Praise of Boredom’, delivered at a summer convocation ceremony in 
                                                 
23 Both won the prize for their contributions to literature.  Bertrand Russell received his award in 1950 and 
Joseph Brodsky accepted his prize in 1987. 
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July, 1989.
24
  The title of the piece is counterintuitive, as praising boredom is an odd 
choice for a commencement address which surely goes against the grain of the usual 
commencement topics.
25
  Brodsky’s words of advice to the audience are summarized in 
two successive lines: “When hit by boredom, go for it.  Let yourself be crushed by it; 
submerge, hit bottom.”26  The idea is that the sooner one wades through boredom’s 
greyness, the sooner one can go on with one’s life.  Brodsky cautions the graduating class 
that “a substantial part of what lies ahead of you is going to be claimed by boredom.”27  
This prophecy is based on Brodsky’s view that humanity has endured “centuries of 
boredom.”28  Having completed all of their degree requirements, and having been well 
acquainted with what Michel de Certeau calls “the massive boredom of people at 
school,”29 these (former) students were surely able to comprehend the general thrust of 
Brodsky’s address.  
Despite the boredom these students may have endured at one time or another 
throughout their higher education, Brodsky exclaims that they are now “entering the 
world” where there is going to be “plenty of dark and, what’s worse, dull hours, caused 
                                                 
24 For a perspective that fully endorses Brodsky’s musings on boredom, see Karl E. Scheibe, The Drama of 
Everyday Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 53-71. 
25 The series of books called Boredom Busters is representative of conventional wisdom, or, ‘going with the 
grain’.  These books often provide ‘solutions’ for eliminating boredom, especially amongst children.  They 
often provide activities without actually studying boredom in any depth.  For the most in-depth of these 
types of books, see Linda Deal, The Boredom Solution: Understanding and Dealing with Boredom (San 
Luis Obispo, CA: Dandy Lion Publications, 2003). 
26 Joesph Brodsky, “In Praise of Boredom,” On Grief and Reason (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1995), 
108.  Michael Raposa differs from Brodsky when he writes, “[t]o appreciate the value of boredom does not 
require that one welcome, much less celebrate, its occurrence.” Raposa, Boredom and the Religious 
Imagination, xi. 
27 Brodsky, “In Praise of Boredom,” 104. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1984), 153.  For a thorough analysis of boredom and education, see Ch.6 Healy, Boredom, 
Self, and Culture, 118-140. 
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as much by the world outside as by your own minds.”30  There are two important points 
being made here involving: 1) boredom and its study; 2) boredom and its immediate 
origins.  The first point, then, is that students are now entering the world, as if they were 
outside of it while undertaking their higher education and, therefore, the ‘world’ could 
not have played a significant role in their experiences of boredom.  To Brodsky, although 
universities and colleges may induce boredom, they do not analyze it, and, therefore, 
students would only know it as an experience, but not as a theoretical concept.  In his 
estimation, it is not a topic of interest or importance and therefore classes are not offered 
on boredom nor are there boredom studies.  He laments that “neither humanities nor 
science offers courses in boredom.”31  It would have come as a surprise to Brodsky to 
learn that Martin Heidegger devoted roughly 1/3 of his lectures from 1929/1930 
specifically to the topic of boredom, which brings us to the second point.  Heidegger’s 
lectures are also an important source for the second important point from Brodsky’s 
claim, that the roots of boredom are equally subjective and objective – the ‘world 
outside’ and in ‘your own minds’.  In Heidegger’s lectures on boredom he argues: “The 
character of ‘boring thus belongs to the object and is at the same time related to the 
subject.”32  Heidegger summarizes as follows: “In short: boredom – and thus ultimately 
every attunement – is a hybrid, partly objective, partly subjective.”33  
So, what exactly, according to Brodsky, causes boredom?  As stated above, the 
general idea is that both the world and our selves instil boredom.  Expanding on this, he 
delves further into the phenomenon with a much more concrete cause.  While 
                                                 
30 Brodsky, “In Praise of Boredom,” 112. 
31 Ibid., 104. 
32 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 84. 
33 Ibid, 88. 
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acknowledging that it “is a complex phenomenon,” Brodsky believes he has found its 
simple formula, and sums it up as “by and large a product of repetition.”34  Brodsky goes 
so far as to say that “repetitiveness is boredom’s mother.”35  Continuing with this 
metaphor, sameness, it would appear, gives birth to boredom.  Repetition of any kind 
effectively induces boredom and, for Brodsky, there is nothing more repetitive than time.  
It is time that recurs over and over again.  This is, of course, nothing new under the sun, 
but Brodsky gives this formulation a twist when he goes on to link time with social 
status.  He argues that since the rich have money, and money buys time, it follows that 
the rich have more time than anyone.  This abundance of time leads Brodsky to conclude 
that “nobody is as bored as the rich.”36  This is at odds with Goodstein’s theorization of a 
‘democratization of scepticism’ shared by the masses in the Western industrialized and 
urbanized society mentioned above.  Unlike Goodstein, for Brodsky, the line of causality 
is the following: money–time–repetition–boredom.  This effectively excludes the 
working class who, without very much money, cannot afford the time to be bored.  This 
presents a rather circular problem.  The rich endure the most boredom, but the rich are 
also those who can afford the most distractions.  Is it possible that distraction causes 
boredom?  Brodsky is silent on this point. 
It is quite evident that there is no historical uniqueness to the experience of 
boredom in Brodsky’s theory of boredom.  One reason for this is Brodsky does not 
differentiate between boredom and its supposed synonyms such as ennui and acedia.  
Instead, Brodsky takes what Seán Desmond Healy would call the “commonsense 
perception” (similar to Heidegger’s ‘ordinary’ perception mentioned in the introductory 
                                                 
34 Brodsky, “In Praise of Boredom,” 104. 
35 Ibid., 105. 
36 Ibid., 106. 
46 
chapter of this dissertation) of boredom and treats the different terms as mere “aliases” 
for the same phenomenon.
37
  Of course, a term like acedia is not a matter of simple 
commonsense since the majority of people do not use the term today.
38
  Nevertheless, this 
commonsensical view of boredom does not even consider the possibility of a historico-
social specificity of the experience.  In this view, boredom has simply been around since 
the dawn of time.  Ultimately, Brodsky believes boredom is an inevitable experience 
which we as a society should do our best to avoid, but, if it does arise, we must tarry with 
it.   
What is most original in Brodsky’s theory of boredom is his advocacy for 
accepting the experience, if not inviting it, into one’s life.  This is a largely 
counterintuitive notion.  What is least original in Brodsky’s theory of boredom is its 
reliance on an ahistorical position.  Richard Winter, another defender of an ahistorical 
position, is not as enthusiastic about the experience as Brodsky.  Winter believes 
boredom is a fundamental flaw in the fabric of society, which can be remedied by 
“remembering the big picture” of God,39 but its extensive history makes the eradication 
of boredom difficult.  Regarding this history, Winter writes: “There is plenty of evidence 
that boredom has always existed.”40  The crux of the historicity of boredom is predicated 
upon one’s acceptance of its aliases, or whether one views those concepts as referring to 
something else.  That is, one either sees the similarities between the various terms, or one 
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disentangles boredom from a select few of its seemingly synonymous terms
41
 and it 
ultimately emerges as an historically specific mood.   
2) Bertrand Russell – The Conquest of Happiness 
The second example comes from the twentieth century analytic philosopher 
Bertrand Russell.  Two commonalities between Brodsky and Russell should be 
highlighted first before delving into Russell’s work.  Much like Brodsky, Russell is of the 
opinion that 1) boredom has received far less consideration than it deserves and, in a 
somewhat related way, 2) boredom ought to be taught, especially to young people, as 
something that, if endured, is “essential to a happy life.” 42 These insights can be found in 
the fourth chapter of Russell’s 1930 book The Conquest of Happiness titled ‘Boredom 
and Excitement’.  Here, one passage in particular leaps off the page.  Near the beginning 
of the chapter, Russell makes the claim that “the machine age has enormously diminished 
the sum of boredom in the world.”43  Russell arrives at this conclusion by comparing the 
amount of what he calls ‘amusements’ that the urbanized machine age has bestowed upon 
humanity with the amusements that were, or better yet, were not available before the 
Industrial Revolution.  When Russell uses the term amusements he is referring to such 
hallmarks of popular culture as films, novels, technologies, etc.  By this definition, 
amusements have undoubtedly increased since Russell’s essay was published over 80 
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years ago, which would mean, following Russell, that there would be even less boredom 
today than ever before.  In fact, the further back in history Russell goes, the heavier and 
more pervasive boredom becomes.
44
   
As an example of Russell’s conception of boredom throughout history, he 
constructs a thought experiment featuring a dull winter season in an entirely fictional 
medieval village.  Its inhabitants cannot read or write to pass the time, they light up the 
darkness of night with candles, and they huddle together in the only room the heat from 
the fire can reach.  As well, the village is isolated from other villages, as the connecting 
roads were impassable.  With this description of the underwhelming experience of pre-
modern life it would seem as though Russell was on to something, especially when one 
considers all of the excitement or amusements that can be found in contemporary society.   
Russell’s piece is essentially a philosophical reflection on boredom that is a brief 
yet salient analysis of what boredom is, what it is not, and why people experience it.  In 
order to contain the experience as a concept, Russell erects some parameters for boredom 
by philosophizing about what it is not.  To accomplish this, Russell argues that “the 
opposite of boredom, in a word, is not pleasure, but excitement.”45  This is the idea where 
the title of his essay – Boredom and Excitement – stems from.  Unlike Brodsky, for 
Russell, money provides one with the opportunity to get away from boredom.  That is, 
the more money one has, the more money can be spent on entertainment and excitement 
and, therefore, the more time appears to be chock-a-block full.  Russell makes this point 
in the following way: “Those who have to earn a living get their share of boredom, of 
necessity, in working hours, but those who have enough money to be freed from the need 
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of work have as their ideal a life freed from boredom.”46 Numerous people would surely 
agree with this assessment since those with a considerable amount of affluence seem to 
be able to step outside of the monotony of everyday life.  Then again, the well-known 
platitude “money can’t buy happiness” would seem to fly in the face of this theory.  If 
this commonplace observation is taken seriously, it would follow that money itself does 
not forestall boredom and bring on happiness. 
To end this section, a brief summary of both Brodsky and Russell’s basic 
positions will be beneficial.  Both thinkers link boredom to money.  There is either a 
positive correlation between them, as is the case with Brodsky, or there is a negative 
correlation with them, as is the case with Russell.  As well, in Brodsky’s convocation 
speech, there is a steady continuity of the experience of boredom throughout history.  As 
long as time has been part of the cosmological picture, people have been bored with it.  A 
common thread throughout all of history, then, is boredom.  In Russell’s essay, there is 
no historical continuity; rather, there is actually a discontinuity with the experience of 
boredom.  Russell would surely agree with Brodsky that there have been centuries and 
centuries of boredom, but would take exception with the idea that there has been an equal 
distribution of boredom throughout history.  Perhaps, if the two thinkers were to have had 
a dialogue and compared notes, they would have come up with a third position on 
boredom’s history.  That is, boredom is neither ahistorical nor largely diminished in 
recent times, but has actually flourished with modernity.   
For Lefebvre, it is important to distinguish the signifier from that being signified.  
This is evident when he writes to an interlocutor: “Surely you’re not one of those people 
who believe that something or someone cannot exist until there is a word to label them 
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with!”47  Indeed, the experience undoubtedly came before the name, not the other way 
around.  However, as the English philologist Logan Pearsall Smith puts it, “when 
anything becomes important to us it finds its name.”48  With this, the question arises: 
How much does the experience of boredom predate the language employed to articulate 
it?  While one cannot pinpoint a specific date, or specific location, it is nevertheless 
pertinent to cast a backward glance at pre-modernity in order to understand modernity.   
Acedia and Ennui 
Following Elizabeth Goodstein’s pathbreaking study, one must begin with the 
following hypothesis:  Pre-modern times are without boredom.  To begin to expand on 
this it is worthwhile to briefly turn to the British sociologist Anthony Giddens who 
writes: “In all pre-modern cultures, including the large agrarian civilizations […] the 
level of time-space distanciation is relatively low as compared with the conditions of 
modernity.”49  Giddens’ concept of time-space distanciation should be underlined here.  
The experience of space and time was, in this view, simply different, and it would follow 
that the pace of life, the prospects for engaging with one’s environment, and the sense of 
belonging to a rigid cosmological order
50
 were not the same in the pre-modern world as 
they are with the double process of industrialization and urbanization that are the 
hallmarks of modernity.   
As is made clear in her book Boredom: The Literary History of a State of Mind, 
Patricia Meyer Spacks offers a succinct explanation of the different expectations for life 
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by noting: “If life was never boring in pre-modern times, neither was it interesting, 
thrilling, or exciting, in the modern sense of these words.”51  Although the pre-modern 
world may appear boring to people today – such as it did for Bertrand Russell – it very 
well could have been a meaningful society to inhabit at the time.  One can look back on 
pre-modern times and compare all of the thrills and excitement available today and come 
to the hyperbolic conclusion that people were dying of boredom.  However, that would be 
an incorrect assessment, as it would compare yesterday’s society with today’s standards.   
Acedia 
If there is one persistent terminological bugaboo that has continuously challenged 
the historical uniqueness of boredom, it is the medieval term: acedia.  It does not persist 
in everyday discourse so much as it does in theological literature.  Kathleen Norris, for 
example, does not distinguish between boredom and acedia in her 2008 book Acedia & 
Me.  This is important to note considering Norris’s book was featured in the New York 
Times book review section,
52
 thus receiving the promotional advantages that many books 
on boredom are not fortunate enough to garner.  Norris’ ahistorical perspective has its 
roots in one of the first comprehensive book-length studies of boredom, Reinhard Kuhn’s 
book The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature.  Although it is a book on 
what Kuhn describes as a specific form of boredom (ennui), the first part of his title ‘The 
Demon of Noontide’ is a reference to acedia.  As Norris notes, “the desert monks termed 
acedia the noonday demon.”53  The second part of Kuhn’s title ‘Ennui in Western 
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Literature’ signifies boredom.  The colon separating these two parts of the title, in a 
certain sense, is portrayed as an equal sign.  The demon of noontide (acedia) is the same 
as ennui (boredom).  Not surprisingly, Norris follows in the footsteps of Reinhard Kuhn.  
She acknowledges Kuhn as an author to whom she is “deeply indebted,” because his text 
is an examination of “acedia’s baleful effects on the human spirit over centuries.”54  It is 
also no surprise that she does not acknowledge the historical specificity of boredom when 
one considers that she makes no mention of the most forceful argument linking the two, 
which can be found in Goodstein’s book.  Norris ends her book with a smattering of 
quotations that are roughly in chronological order stretching all the way back to Anthony 
the Great, Seneca, and the Psalms, all the way up to contemporary scholars such as Orrin 
E. Klapp, Michael Raposa, and Lars Svendsen.  Despite all of the passages that are 
quoted at the end of the book, Goodstein’s book is noticeably absent.  Norris’s book was 
published three years after Goodstein’s, so there is no immediate reason for having 
excluded it from consideration, despite it completely contradicting her own book.   
In her book, Norris briefly discusses Brodsky’s convocation speech and believes 
that although he was speaking to American university students, his words would have 
resonated with medieval monks.
55
 Contra Norris, it could be argued that very little of 
Brodsky’s speech would resonate with monks.  Certainly, monks were not thinking about 
the new movies that are coming out, or about their turn in the car pool rotation, or even 
about the news report they saw on television the previous night.  The technological 
advances necessary for these thoughts were still several centuries away.  So what exactly 
were medieval monks contemplating?  Of course, that would be impossible to fully 
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answer.  However, according to Lefebvre, “the monks in their cloisters contemplated 
death and could contemplate only death: they had to die in the ‘world’ so that the ‘world’ 
might be fulfilled.”56  Norris would agree with Lefebvre on this point, as she notes in 
another one of her books St. Benedict’s dictum: “Keep death daily before your eyes” was 
an important guiding principle for monks.
57
  Following Lefebvre, this not only answers 
what they were contemplating, but also where they were contemplating.  Both the mental 
space and the physical space are important here.  Although the monks were seeking to 
fulfill the world, cloisters were, interestingly enough, constructed to facilitate a “retreat 
from the world.”58   
Of course, medieval monks do not constitute a representative sample of medieval 
society; they are but one segment of a much larger mosaic of groups and individuals.  
However, monks are the group that are most often associated with acedia.
59
   Harvie 
Ferguson notes, “daily life for a monk […] was vastly different to that of a member of the 
nobility, or a townsman; and this was not a matter of economic resources alone but was 
an obligatory aspect of differentiated social orders.”60 What about the average medieval 
person?  James Burke offers the following description: 
The medieval adult was in no way less intelligent that his modern counterpart.  He 
merely lived in a different world, which made different demands on him.  His was 
a world without facts.  Indeed, the modern concept of a fact would have been an 
incomprehensible one.  Medieval people relied for day to day information solely 
on what they themselves, or someone they knew, had observed or experienced in 
the world immediately around them.  Their lives were regular, repetitive and 
unchanging.
61
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Burke’s description not only speaks to the everyday situation in medieval times, but also 
the absence of Goodstein’s concept of a ‘democratization of skepticism’.  While their 
lives were ‘repetitive’, they were not ‘redundant’ and as Michael Raposa puts it, 
“redundancy is a recipe for boredom.”62  The democratization of skepticism that goes 
with modernity creates a space for a critique of the redundancy of repetition that would 
have been unavailable to pre-modern folks. 
While stressing what she believes as the contemporary situation of acedia as 
boredom, Norris ponders, albeit in a rhetorical way, the relationship between boredom 
and God.  She asks: “Might we consider boredom as not only necessary for our life but 
also one of its greatest blessings?  A gift, pure and simple, a precious chance to be alone 
with our thoughts and alone with God?”63  Instead of taking boredom to be a secular 
experience of the modern world akin to Goodstein’s ‘democratization of skepticism’, 
Norris suggests it is an inherently Christian one where individuals are afforded the 
opportunity to (re)connect with their maker.  Such an assertion casts doubt on her 
assimilation of the terms boredom and acedia.  If acedia is a sin and boredom is not a sin, 
how can they be the same?  Norris attempts to sidestep the general agreement that acedia 
is a sin by simply claiming it is not.  This claim pinpoints a rift in the literature on 
boredom where, on the one hand, there are those who believe acedia is another name for 
boredom and, on the other hand, there are those who believe the experience of boredom 
is something entirely different than acedia.  Norris’s work clearly fits with the former of 
these two positions.  Unfortunately, Norris does not grapple with the philological 
difficulties inherent in the study of boredom, which perhaps explains why she did not 
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explore Goodstein’s work, the most antithetical text to Norris’s thesis of boredom as a 
modern day acedia. 
Edward Peters remarks how most authors believe acedia to be “the remote 
ancestor of the modern concept of boredom.”64  Perhaps this is the case, but the diverse 
perspectives ought to be analyzed to reveal their differences along with their similarities.  
In his book Boredom and the Religious Imagination, Michael Raposa traces the 
“extended theological reflection” of acedia back to the fourth century.65  Lars Svendsen 
argues that “a crucial difference is that acedia is first and foremost a moral concept, 
whereas ‘boredom’, in the normal sense of the word, more describes a psychological 
state.  Another difference is that acedia was for the few, whereas boredom afflicts the 
masses.”66 The emphasis on boredom as a mass phenomenon is a crucial distinction.  
Svendsen goes on to write that acedia was a “premodern precursor to boredom,” and one 
that “afflicted monks in particular.”67 Aldous Huxley’s depiction of acedia or, as he refers 
to it, the “midday demon” is a spiritual one in which he believes “monks were still his 
favourite victims, but he made many conquests among the laity also.”68   
Is acedia restricted to the church, or those who are involved in an official capacity 
with a religious institution?  It certainly appears to be the case.  According to Spacks, 
acedia was a medieval sin which is a “combination of what we call boredom and what we 
call sloth, it was understood as a dangerous form of spiritual alienation, a misery of the 
soul that could, like other sins, be avoided by effort or by grace.”69  It is odd, then, that 
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the people who were most afflicted by acedia were the ones who were likely the most 
cognisant of the evils of this sin.  Why did acedia afflict medieval monks more than 
others?  Healy argues that “something, or everything, about their situation sapped their 
spiritual energies.”70  If Lefebvre is correct with his assertion that medieval monks 
contemplated death all day, such a repetition of the macabre could have been a cause of 
this depletion of spiritual energies.  Locating the source of the affliction in one’s soul, it 
would appear as though acedia does not have a place in a secular society.  That is, at least 
not for those who do not put any faith into the idea of acedia as a sin. 
 Elizabeth Goodstein defines acedia in a very general way as “literally, lacking 
care or interest”71 much the same as Raposa’s definition as an affliction that stems from a 
“lack of care.”72  Healy hones this definition to being an affliction that is specifically 
related to lack of care of one’s “spiritual good.”73  Unlike Raposa, the aforementioned 
Kuhn, and Norris who essentially believe boredom and acedia to be one and the same, 
Goodstein goes on to differentiate between acedia and boredom.  “Attempts to identify 
boredom with melancholy or acedia,” writes Goodstein, “thus efface the distinctive 
modernity of the experience without qualities.”74  It is quite evident that Goodstein is of 
the mind that there are much stronger discontinuities between the two terms than 
continuities.  Despite these disagreements in the boredom literature, it can be said that 
there is somewhat of a consensus throughout that ‘lack of care’ is a point of continuity 
between acedia and boredom.  One notable difference being that acedia is a sin whereas 
boredom is not.   
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If acedia is not related to boredom, is it much more akin to depression?  If so, is 
there a definitive difference between boredom and depression?  Throughout the literature 
on boredom it is Healy in his book Self, Boredom, and Culture that arguably offers the 
most useful distinction between boredom and depression.  To Healy, bored individuals do 
not have any “satisfying goal” whereas the depressed individual “does not believe in 
one’s ability to achieve a desired goal.”75  This is an important contribution despite some 
authors such as Peter Toohey who think a distinction between boredom and depression is 
a “moot point.”76  Richard Winter and Lars Svendsen have both commented on the 
difference between boredom and depression, with varying degrees of precision.  
Svendsen is uncertain of the difference when he writes, “my guess is that there is 
considerable overlap.”77  In contrast, Winter is much more certain of the distinction.  
“Unlike the bored person,” writes Winter, “the depressed person has a very negative view 
of herself.”78 According to Winter, the bored person is someone who has a desire for 
something but does not know what, whereas the depressed individual has no desire for 
anything.  J.M. Barbalet argues that “depression is thus inwardly directed to the self, 
boredom more typically outwardly directed to activity, engagements, and environment.”79  
Barbalet and Winter are much closer to Healy than Svendsen with regards to their 
respective articulations of the differences between boredom and depression.  One 
definitive distinction between boredom and depression can be found in the work of 
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Stendhal who once wrote that “boredom strips away everything, even the courage to kill 
oneself.”80  Conversely, a depressed person would be able to commit suicide. 
Three terms are here being considered: boredom, acedia, and depression.  The 
components of this constellation can be found scattered throughout the work of Walter 
Benjamin; it is just a matter of assembling the appropriate pieces. Benjamin is an 
important theorist not only for differentiating boredom from acedia, but also for 
establishing links between acedia and depression,
81
 although it is slightly obscured by 
some of his commentators.  For example, in his introduction to the English edition of 
Walter Benjamin’s text The Origin of German Tragic Drama, George Steiner conflates 
boredom with acedia.  It is but a minor point in his essay, but it is nevertheless one that is 
well worth considering here.  Steiner writes: “Benjamin shows how it is in its figuration 
of ‘world-sadness, of acedia – that final boredom of the spirit – that baroque thought and 
art achieve their truest depths.”82  Despite Steiner’s conflation of boredom, sadness, and 
acedia, Benjamin makes no mention of boredom in this particular book, nor does he 
allude to it.  This absence alone does not suggest a difference amongst the terms, but I 
argue that Benjamin implicitly differentiated between boredom and acedia in his overall 
body of work.  For example, Benjamin’s unfinished magnum opus The Arcades Project 
features a section (Convolute D) called ‘Boredom, Eternal Return’.  Despite its size, this 
small section consisting of original and quoted fragments has been an influential source 
for contemporary boredom scholarship.
83
  He makes no mention of acedia throughout this 
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section of his Arcades Project.
84
  In another essay, though, Benjamin summarizes acedia 
quite nicely as follows: “Among medieval theologians, acedia was regarded as the root 
cause of sadness.”85  Sadness is the keyword that ought to be highlighted in this sentence.  
In addition, it should also be noted that Benjamin does not refer to boredom in this essay.  
To sum up: when Benjamin refers to boredom, he does not mention acedia.  When 
Benjamin mentions acedia, he does not conflate it with boredom but instead links it with 
sadness.  Much like boredom is separate from acedia in Benjamin’s work, so too are the 
terms in their definitions.  With this in mind, the following hypothesis can be proposed: 
acedia is not the same as boredom because sadness is not the same as boredom.  Sadness 
is more akin to depression than boredom.  Therefore, I claim, following Benjamin, that 
acedia is a form of melancholy, depression, sadness, whereas boredom is something else 
entirely, despite Steiner’s conflation of these terms. 
Ennui 
Keeping with George Steiner, he offers an interesting interpretation of ennui in 
his essay ‘The Great Ennui’.  Steiner argues that “boredom is not an adequate translation” 
of ennui “nor is Langeweile except, perhaps in Schopenhauer’s usage; la noia comes 
much nearer.”86  In contrast, Goodstein regards the contemporary usage – that is to say, 
after boredom was in widespread circulation as a concept denoting an experience of these 
four terms – ennui, langeweile, la noia, and boredom – to be the same experience 
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described by different languages.
87
  What may be going on here is a lack of recognition 
between contemporary usages of those terms, and their usage pre-boredom.  Steiner does 
not consider the possibility that these terms could be interchangeable depending on the 
situation and the speaker/writer who is using them.  To Steiner, they are simply different.  
Where Steiner is consistent with much of the literature is his belief that ennui is special.  
Steiner locates the birth of widespread ennui in the following passage: “It is to the years 
after Waterloo that we must look for the roots of “the great ennui,” which as early as 
1819, Schopenhauer defined as the corrosive illness of the new age.”88  Steiner continues, 
writing, “The city itself, once festive with the tocsin of revolution had become a 
prison.”89  The theme of the city will prove to be a significant one.90  Nevertheless, in this 
ennui Steiner postulates that there is a “vague waiting – but for what?”91  With this, we 
can see the resemblance between Steiner’s ‘ennui’ and Benjamin’s ‘boredom’.  Benjamin 
notes in his Arcades Project that “[w]e are bored when we don’t know what we are 
waiting for.  That we do know, or think we know is nearly always the expression of our 
superficiality or inattention.”92  Here we can see that Benjamin is using waiting in a very 
specific way.  Andrew Benjamin describes it as “awaiting without an object.”93  
Benjamin’s depiction of boredom is one where waiting is instrumental to the experience.  
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This waiting is for nothing in particular. Rather, one waits for the unknown.  The longing 
for a nameless, faceless, shapeless thing in Benjamin’s work is similar to the “vague 
waiting” Steiner refers to as ‘ennui’.  This similarity is understandable since Benjamin’s 
remark about boredom is derived from his intense and lengthy study of the Paris Arcades 
and the word ‘ennui’ stems from the French language.   
Seán Desmond Healy locates the formation of the French word ‘ennui’ in the 
thirteenth century.
94
  The connection between boredom and ennui is usually found in the 
work of Blaise Pascal.  Lars Svendsen summarizes the boredom theorized by Pascal as 
follows: “For Pascal, man is doomed to boredom without God.”95  It is worth noting that 
there is no social element to boredom for Pascal.  It is “an essential characteristic of man 
as such.”96  Elizabeth Goodstein astutely notes that Pascal’s “interpretation assimilated 
ennui to the sin of acedia.”97  In contrast, Reinhard Kuhn makes the claim that “despite 
the many points they do have in common, there is an abyss that separates the ennui of 
which Pascal writes and the acedia of the Middle Ages.”98  In fact, in Kuhn’s opinion, 
there is an abyss between ennui and all the other forms of boredom.  Kuhn acknowledges 
ennui to indeed be a form of boredom, which should be differentiated from the other 
much more trivial forms.  Simply put, in Kuhn’s view ennui is an important phenomenon 
for academic scholarship and the others are not.  It is, however, important for Kuhn to at 
least mention what he believes to be lesser, insignificant forms of boredom.  He makes 
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this comparison early in his book and once this comparison has been made the other 
boredoms are no longer considered.   
In his influential book The Demon of Noontide, Kuhn devotes slightly less than 
400 pages for analyzing ennui, or what he calls a ‘particular form of boredom’.99  Ennui 
is contrasted with four other “dissimilar types of boredom” and, although he privileges 
ennui, Kuhn concedes that it cannot be “completely divorced” from the others.  Kuhn 
labels these four types as (1) désoeuvrement, (2) psychosomatic boredom, (3) monotony, 
and (4) anomie.
100
  Though being able to focus on only one particular type is a testament 
to the depth of boredom, Kuhn’s decision to avoid analyzing its breadth is problematic.  
Goodstein writes of Kuhn that he has the “assumption that ‘ennui’ is an ahistorical 
feature of the human condition.”101  Since Kuhn essentially puts ‘ennui’ hierarchically 
above what he terms ‘ordinary’ forms of boredom, he perhaps cannot see them as having 
a deeper relationship than merely sharing the general title of boredom.  This privileging 
of ennui in Kuhn’s study is effectively clouding the other forms of boredom.   
Following Kuhn, Verna Gehring writes: “Ennui, by contrast, covers more territory 
than does boredom.”102  Gehring is referring to the importance and mysterious nature of 
ennui in contrast to the dull and banal nature of boredom.
103
  With this sexiness attributed 
to it, it is no surprise that ennui, according to Spacks, is considered to be boredom’s 
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“more dignified cousin.”104  Spacks here seems to imply that the two words are related, 
yet are not so close in definition.  Spacks offers a distinction between the two when she 
writes: “Boredom was not (is not) the same as ennui, more closely related to acedia.  
Ennui implies a judgment of the universe; boredom, a response to the immediate.  Ennui 
belongs to those with a sense of sublime potential, those who feel themselves superior to 
their environment.”105 Spacks does not consider the possibility that ennui is a form of 
boredom, or vice versa, in the sense that those who are bored could have a ‘sense of 
sublime potential’ or ‘feel superior to their environment’. This is a problematic feature in 
her book, as she often uses the two terms interchangeably despite her claim that they are 
different.   
Michael Raposa, on the other hand, does make the link between the two terms.  
To Raposa, ennui is “boredom colored by melancholy.”106  Much the same as Kuhn, 
Raposa believes that ennui has a certain prestige about it where the afflicted person “may 
be admired rather than pitied.”107  Raposa goes on to say that people who have ennui can 
be seen as superior to their surroundings.  This, of course, could only work if others 
bought into this pose.  That is, a beggar on the street would be hard pressed to convince 
others that his boredom is a sign of his superiority to his environment.  Boredom alone is 
not enough of a sign.  There must be other factors such as affluence that must already be 
present in order for boredom to be a sign of one’s superiority to one’s surroundings.  
Boredom as pose can be contrasted with boredom as reality.  Posing as bored, as some 
people would do, entails pretending to be bored, as opposed to genuinely experiencing it.  
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It may actually be exciting for certain posers to elevate themselves above the social 
situation at hand.  This is understandable when boredom is believed to be a status 
symbol.  If being bored demonstrates one’s significant social status, it would follow that 
some people would fake their boredom in order to appear as being among the elite. 
Klapp takes a cue from Kuhn in one respect by defining ennui as an experience 
that can be “distinguished from ordinary boredom by being deeper, chronic, a feeling of 
meaninglessness or spiritual anguish.”108  As was mentioned above, Kuhn’s study focuses 
on one form of boredom called ennui which he contrasts with the “great many forms of 
boredom” because he believes they are “hardly worth serious study.”109 But why is it that 
ennui seems to be a much more profound boredom than the other forms of boredom?  
Goodstein claims that “Kuhn abstracted ennui from its worldly conditions.”110   
Separating the experience from its worldly conditions is problematic for my 
particular analysis of boredom.  Whereas Goodstein contends that Kuhn assumes “ennui 
is an ahistorical feature of the human condition,”111 my analysis is similar to Goodstein’s 
own work, which considers boredom as an historically specific phenomenon.   This is the 
major rift in the literature on boredom.  Essentially, any study of boredom proceeds from 
one of two assumptions: either boredom is a historically specific phenomenon or it is 
timeless and ahistorical.  While Bertrand Russell may be the exception, if boredom is 
linked to particular historical circumstances, it is linked to the specific material 
conditions of the historical era of modernity. 
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Modernity in General: Industrialization  
In his book Self, Boredom, and Culture, Seán Desmond Healy lists such 
intellectual luminaries as St. Gregory the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, Pascal, 
Kierkegaard, Freud, and Heidegger as thinkers who could not address one of boredom’s  
most obvious features, its immensely increased prevalence in the last several 
hundred years in the West.  All were firmly individualistic and psychological in 
their approach, rather as if one were to attribute the rising number of deaths on the 
roads in the last half century to behavioral idiosyncrasies rather than to the larger 
number of faster cars on a greatly extended network of roads during that period of 
time.
112
 
 
It is easy to see how some of these intellectuals were unable to adequately articulate 
boredom when one considers that it did not exist and was thus impossible.  There are 
numerous anachronistic readings of boredom where the authors extract, although most 
likely unknowingly, the historical specificity.  Such a view inevitably leads to an 
ahistorical reading of boredom, as opposed to seeing boredom as tied to modernity.   
“Modern boredom,” writes Elizabeth Goodstein, “undeniably resembles, echoes, 
and resonates with older form of malaise – melancholy, acedia, horror loci, taedium vitae 
– stretching back to antiquity.  However, it can be identified with none of them.”113  It is 
hoped that the preceding section has cast a shadow of doubt on the link between boredom 
and its supposed pre-modern pre-cursors by showing the lack of consensus amongst 
boredom scholars regarding boredom and history.   
If boredom cannot be identified with older forms of malaise, why is it so often 
identified with them?  One final excursion through a position counter to Goodstein’s is 
perhaps needed here, that of Peter Toohey.  Toohey, like Brodsky and Winter, insists that 
boredom has been around for ages.  Toohey claims it has survived “through fifteen 
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hundred years of Western culture” and he chalks the lack of definition during its long 
history up to not having the same importance for “ancients as it does for moderns.”114  
What Toohey is doing here is claiming a lack of care for boredom amongst the ancients.  
He has effectively congealed boredom with the lack of care that is the vital characteristic 
of acedia.  In making this claim, Toohey does not acknowledge the enormous changes 
that have occurred with dawning of modernity.  This section will demonstrate that 
boredom is a modern phenomenon because the necessary conditions to experience 
boredom with regards to space and time are only available in modernity.   As such, there 
are structural differences in society today from that of the Middle Ages that make a 
different experience of everyday life inevitable.   
The following hypothesis arises: Modern life is different than pre-modern life.  So 
why does boredom emerge in modernity?  What is it about an industrialized world that 
creates the material conditions for such an experience?  According to Leslie Paul Thiele, 
with the processes of modernization it seems “a deep boredom with life seems the 
inevitable and most threatening consequence of becoming modern.”115  William 
McDonald helps expand on this thought: 
Boredom is not a universal feature of human life, but arises as a distinctive 
malady of modernity in epidemic proportions.  The epidemic is accompanied by a 
burgeoning of discourse about boredom in the nineteenth century, which both 
mirrors the epidemic and helps to propagate it.  The modern concept of boredom 
is distinct from the medieval concept of acedia in belonging to a different 
discourse, which is produced by different institutions; it is conceived as a 
psychological malady, a social malaise, or an aesthetic challenge, rather than as a 
sin; its antidotes are conceived as either distraction by means of “busyness” or by 
craving “the interesting,” or as transfiguration of experience through 
intensification of the imagination, rather than as spiritual discipline, patient 
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devotion or penance; and it is conceived in purely human secular terms, rather 
than in religious.
116
 
 
Continuing in this vein, boredom’s “comparatively brief linguistic history,” writes 
Spacks, “suggests that it is by no means universal.”117  Spacks notes how “the first 
citation of the noun boredom belongs to 1864.”118  While locating the initial English 
usage of the French word ‘ennui’ in the late 17th century, Spacks goes on to say, “If 
people felt bored before the late eighteenth century, they didn’t know it.”119 With the 
industrialized world, both the language and the experience emerge. 
Kevin Aho gives a wonderfully succinct summary of boredom as “a mood born in 
the urban industrial centers of Western Europe and America and reaching a state of 
ubiquity in the technological age.”120  Aho’s position is the opposite of Bertrand 
Russell’s, especially with regards to the ubiquity of boredom.  Instead of declining in the 
machine/technological age as Russell claimed, boredom flourishes.  Michael Hanby, 
writing in a similar vein to Aho, offers a lengthier explanation that helps to recapitulate 
the general sentiment of the previous section: 
The advent of this concept of boredom coincides, tellingly, with the rise of 
bourgeois society and the triumph of industrialization.  There is no etymological 
record of the word or the concept prior to the eighteenth century.  Boredom 
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differs in important ways from such antecedents as ennui or acedia.  The 
diagnosis of these maladies traditionally contained within them a moral judgment 
of the subject, whose melancholy was understood as a moral and spiritual affront 
to a true and meaningful order of things.  Boredom, by contrast, names a twofold 
failure of an altogether different kind: a failure of the world to be compelling to a 
subject ostensibly entitled to such an expectation and a failure or incapacity on 
the part of the subject to be compelled.
121
 
 
It is clear that Hanby and Aho both link boredom to modernity by emphasizing, if not 
pinpointing an explicit catalyst, its chief driving force: industrialization.   
But what exactly is it about industrialization that creates the conditions for an 
experience such as boredom?  With industrialization, space and time are experienced in 
new ways.  The experience of time and space of pre-modern times differs from the 
temporal and spatial experience(s) of today.  Bringing Lefebvre back into the picture, for 
him, these experiences can only be historically specific ones.  What is difficult to 
pinpoint, however, is the initial crack that leads to the proliferation.  In his book The 
Production of Space, Lefebvre identifies one such crack that emerged roughly six 
hundred years ago.  He writes: “Beginning in the sixteenth century, the accumulation 
process exploded the framework of small medieval communities, towns and cities, 
fiefdoms and principalities.”122  The process of accumulation, then, altered the spatial and 
temporal experiences of the time.  This is the beginning of the end of medieval society 
and the onset of modernity.  Lefebvre explains that,  
[t]here is no doubt that medieval society – that is, the feudal mode of production, 
with its variants and local peculiarities – created its own space.  Medieval space 
built upon the space constituted in the preceding period, and preserved that space 
as a substrate and prop for its symbols; it survives in an analogous fashion itself 
today.  Manors, monasteries, cathedrals – these were the strong points anchoring 
the network of lanes and main roads to a landscape transformed by peasant 
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communities.  This space was the take-off point for Western European capital 
accumulation, the original source and cradle of which were the towns. 
 
Each era has its own spatial configurations that are both a departure from the old spatial 
configurations while also building on them.  Lefebvre portrays a transition from the space 
of feudalism (medieval) to the space of capitalism (modern): 
Capitalism and neocapitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the 
‘world of commodities’, its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the 
power of money and that of the political state.  This space is founded on the vast 
network of banks, business centres and major productive entities, as also on 
motorways, airports and information lattices.  Within this space the town – once 
the forcing-house of accumulation, fountainhead of wealth and centre of historical 
space – has been disintegrated.123 
 
This disintegration can in small part be attributed to what Joe Moran calls “capitalism’s 
endless search for novelty and innovation.”124  For Lefebvre, this lust for novelty is part 
of the ideology of modernity.  Writing at the beginning of the 1980s, Lefebvre casts a 
glance backwards at the true meaning of modernity. “[M]odernity as an ideology,” writes 
Lefebvre, “now appears as an episode in the development and realization of the capitalist 
mode of production.”125  
Notwithstanding the endless quest for innovation that is a hallmark of modernity, 
there are pre-modern practices that have been preserved, or, at the very least, have an 
element of continuity between the past and the present.  Harvie Ferguson, in his book 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 53. (my italics) 
124 Moran, “Benjamin and Boredom,” 179. 
125 CEL 3, 50.  In the preface to the first volume of Lefebvre’s Critique, Michel Trebitsch argues that this 
search for perpetual newness is an apt definition of modernity itself.  “Modernity,” writes Trebitsch, “is the 
movements towards the new, the deployment of technology and rationality (which Lefebvre calls 
‘modernism’), but it is also the absence of any real transformation of social relations, and leads from the 
human towards the inhuman, towards barbarity.”  The key here for Trebitsch is the lack of newness with 
the new.  While there are indeed new items for consumption, they are predominantly variations on older 
themes, with very little in the way of innovation.   For Lefebvre, however, there is indeed something new 
with the modern world.  He writes: “Surely what is new and genuinely ‘modern’ is the contradiction 
between individual loneliness and the bringing-together of crowds or masses in gigantic cities, in massive 
business companies, in vast offices, in armies, in political parties.” IM, 189. 
70 
Self-Identity and Everyday Life, writes that modernity is a “radical change” from pre-
modern times that nevertheless retains certain pre-modern ways of life albeit coloured 
and fashioned by the modern.  
Modernity is a large scale, comprehensive transformation in the conditions of 
people’s lives; it is, equally, a transformation in their world view, recreations and 
personal relations.  It also transforms everything in the past that seems, in some 
form, to have persisted into the present.  Everything that appears still to be pre-
modern, including older religious perspectives, small communities and 
traditionalism of many sorts, is irresistibly and fundamentally altered in becoming 
part of modern society.  They appear as other possible experiences of life, rather 
than, simply, particular ways of life.  Modernity, in other words, is cunningly 
inclusive and does not readily allow people to ‘opt out’ of its radical break with 
the past.  Every apparent survival of the pre-modern, along with the newly created 
alternative mode of life, is assimilated to another version of its own essential form 
and becomes just another possible experience.
126
 
 
Despite the radical change that took place with the onset of modernity, it is not simple to 
identify the exact time modernity came into being, nor is it simple to pinpoint the space 
in which boredom was first experienced.  In fact, Lars Svendsen argues that “it is of 
course impossible to determine precisely when boredom arose.”127  
How does one go about giving a rough approximation of the emergence of 
boredom?  A vital clue can be found amongst library shelves, or, as Walter Benjamin 
calls it, “the mild boredom of order”128 that are library shelves.  A brief excursion 
through the reference section of any well stocked library reveals hidden truths about the 
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evolution of society through the emergence of new words.  For example, Goodstein 
located the term in the Oxford English Dictionary.   
If we may trust the Oxford English Dictionary, boredom was literally non-existent 
until the late eighteenth century – that is, it came into being as Enlightenment was 
giving way to Industrial Revolution.  While its continental cousins “ennui” and 
“Langeweile” are older, they were not used synonymously, that is, in the modern 
sense that combines an existential and a temporal connotation, until about the 
same time.  This linguistic convergence reflects experiential transformations that 
were transnational in nature, for modernization literally altered the quality of 
human being in time.  In the course of the nineteenth century, even as the 
temporal rhythms of everyday life were being revolutionized by technological and 
economic developments, a new, secular interpretation of human temporality was 
gaining ground.
129
  
 
To add to this, it is interesting to note that Roland Barthes once described the nineteenth 
century as “the century of Boredom.”130  Walter Benjamin is even more precise in his 
assessment locating its explosion in the middle of the century when he states that 
“boredom began to be experienced in epidemic proportions during the 1840s.”131  It is 
fairly safe to assume that Benjamin was referring to France with this assertion since it 
comes from his study of the Paris arcades.  What happened in Paris in the 1840s for this 
to occur?  According to Michel Carmona, order imposed by the state was the root cause.  
He writes: “The institutions were stable – too stable.  The Soult-Guizot government had 
been in place since October 1840; it suited the king, and no one could see how a majority 
could be found to topple it.  But for this very reason France had grown bored.”132  
Goodstein also argues that “modern boredom, which masquerades as a universal feature 
of the human condition, is a democratized form of the disaffection that plagued the 
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nineteenth-century outsiders, ineffectual protestors against an order ineluctably on the 
rise.”133 Is order the root cause of boredom?  No, as was discussed above, there was a 
cosmological order in pre-modern times.  Does order have something to do with 
boredom?  Yes, but it is only part of a constellation of factors.  It would be much more 
accurate to speak of bureaucratic order, something unique to modernity, as opposed to 
speaking of order in general. 
What are some of the other factors that make up the constellation of boredom?  In 
the introductory section of her book, Spacks offers the following four hypotheses as the 
possible causes for the proliferation of boredom as a mass phenomenon in modernity:   
1. Emergence of leisure 
2. Decline of orthodox Christianity 
3. Newly elaborated notion of individual rights 
4. Concomitant increase in personal sense of entitlement134 
 
These four possible causes of boredom, which are mentioned in the first chapter of 
Spacks’s book, are unfortunately not expanded upon throughout the text.  Instead, they 
are left to linger throughout the course of the book with seldom opportunities for 
connections to some of the literary material.  It is perhaps the lack of confidence in her 
assertions that lead to the ambiguous use of these four explanations.  What Spacks is 
confident about, however, is that “boredom appears everywhere in the early twentieth 
century.”135 So, while, according to Barthes, the nineteenth century was the ‘century of 
boredom’, the twentieth century brought more of the same.  I argue that this continuity is 
an ideological quest for discontinuity.  That is, the common thread of boredom 
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(continuity) shared between the nineteenth century and the twentieth century is a result of 
modernity’s pursuit of the new (discontinuity). 
To see this continuity and discontinuity, it would be beneficial to examine the 
ever-shifting contours of modernity.  This is a difficult yet necessary endeavour in order 
to find one’s way through what Lefebvre calls “the labyrinthine complexities of the 
modern world.”136  Lefebvre’s book Introduction to Modernity, though itself something 
of a labyrinth, offers the following description of modernity:   
Modernity is best characterized not as an already established ‘structure’, nor as 
something which clearly has the capacity to become structured and coherent, but 
rather as a fruitless attempt to achieve structure and coherence.  Everything leads 
us to the conclusion that structures are being ‘destructured’ even before they have 
gained a coherent internal stability.  They are then integrated within new systems 
which themselves are already threatened by contradictions and negativity.  
Everything leads us to the conclusion that it is impossible to represent the ‘world’ 
as having a realizable structure and a possible stability.
137
 
 
Such instability recalls a famous phrase from Marx and Engels in The Communist 
Manifesto that Marshall Berman adopted for the title of his influential book on modernity 
All that is Solid Melts Into Air.
138
 This phrase is deceptively simple in its brevity, yet 
certainly complex.  In an effort to convey its complexity, Berman begins his book with 
the following definition of modernity: “There is a mode of vital experience – experience 
of space and time, of the self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils – that is shared 
by men and women all over the world today.  I will call this body of experience 
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modernity.”139  Building on this, on the next page, Berman offers an extraordinarily rich 
description of modern experience in general which is worth quoting in full: 
The maelstrom of modern life has been fed from many sources: great discoveries 
in the physical sciences, changing our images of the universe and our place within 
it; the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into 
technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up 
the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class 
struggle; immense demographic upheavals severing millions of people from their 
habitats, hurtling them across the world into new lives; rapid and often 
cataclysmic urban growth; systems of mass communication, dynamic in their 
development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and 
societies; increasingly powerful nation states, bureaucratically structured and 
operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of 
people and peoples, challenging their political and economic rulers, striving to 
gain some control in their lives; finally, bearing and driving these people and 
institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world 
market.  In the twentieth-century, the social processes that bring this maelstrom 
into being, and keep it in a state of perpetual becoming, have come to be called 
“modernization.”140  
 
Throughout this sprawling description of the ‘perpetual becoming’ of modern times 
Berman makes no mention of boredom.  So what does Berman’s above passage have to 
do with boredom?  Admittedly, it would appear as though Berman’s description of the 
processes of modernization leave little room for boredom.  After all, to use Berman’s 
term, such a ‘maelstrom’ of expansion, change, and fluidity would seem to produce 
excitement and interest at best, and alarm and horror at worst.   
Shortly after Berman wrote the above description of the process of modernization, 
Orrin E. Klapp, in his 1986 book, offers a somewhat tentative assertion: “I think there is 
reason at least to suspect that boredom is associated with modernity.”141  If one follows 
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the theologian Michael Raposa, boredom snugly “sits on a conceptual map somewhere 
between interest and despair.”142  Berman’s description, it would seem, offers a binary of 
experiences that roughly approximates to interest and despair, leaving out the third term 
of boredom.  It should come as no surprise that Berman does not take up the problem of 
boredom in his otherwise thorough engagement with modernity, as most people, scholars 
and laymen alike, fail to acknowledge boredom as an important issue.  This exclusion is 
only odd if one takes into account Elizabeth Goodstein’s claim that “the problems of 
theorizing boredom are the same problems of theorizing modern experience more 
generally.”143     
Goodstein claims that the proliferation of boredom amongst lower classes during 
the 19
th
 century has more to do with the increase in mass entertainments than the increase 
in factory labour.
144
  I differ slightly from her on this point.  The question must be asked: 
What about the factory?  Recall Lefebvre’s articulation of the ‘double process’ of 
industrialization and urbanization mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.  This 
double process makes it difficult to claim that boredom has much greater links to mass 
entertainments than the factory.  This is but a minor point of contention I have with 
Goodstein’s work, but it is an important one all the same.  Leisure is certainly a feature of 
modern society that is absolutely vital for the experience of boredom.  I do not contest 
that point at all.  Following Lefebvre, however, I argue that the two processes are 
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interlinked and cannot be easily separated.  I much prefer to think of the factory and the 
streets in a dialectical way.  After all, are not the factory workers the same people who 
are taking part in the mass entertainments?   
As for workers and industrialization, there are two interrelated examples that 
ought to be highlighted as particularly relevant for the extension of boredom in the 
twentieth century: Taylorism and Fordism.  It is not too difficult to link the intensification 
of boredom with the increased specialization that came with the advents of Taylorism and 
Fordism.  Stanley Aronowitz explains that “Taylorism and its variant, Fordism, have 
imposed themselves universally in the workplace of advanced industrial societies.”145  
But what are Taylorism and Fordism?  Whereas Taylorism can be located in the texts of 
its inventor, the industrial psychologist Frederick W. Taylor, – in particular The 
Principles of Scientific Management – Fordism is in many ways the practical application 
of Taylorism with the aid of technological innovations. Where they differ is that Henri 
Ford, the iconic auto maker whom Fordism is attributed, employed an assembly line for 
his efficient management and he also recognized that “mass production meant mass 
consumption.”146   
Taylorism 
Jeff Ferrell describes the ‘innovations’ of Taylor and Ford as merely “calibrating 
their instruments of organized boredom.”147 Following Ferrell’s suggestion, it is 
important to ask: How exactly did Taylor and Ford ‘calibrate their instruments of 
organized boredom’?  As Fordism sprang from the innovations first established with 
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Taylorism, it would be beneficial to further define the latter term first.  Lefebvre offers a 
useful explanation of Taylorism as follows: 
Taylorism, one of the first ‘scientific’ approaches to productivity, reduced the 
body as a whole to a small number of motions subjected to strictly controlled 
linear determinations.  A division of labour so extreme, whereby specialization 
extends to individual gestures, has undoubtedly had as much influence as 
linguistic discourse on the breaking-down of the body into a mere collection of 
unconnected parts.
148
 
 
Lefebvre’s definition is confirmed by Taylor himself who argued that “in the past the 
man has been first; in the future the system must be first.”149  Taylor was not simply 
concerned with maximizing efficiency in the factory, he held a much broader vision of 
maximizing efficiency in every aspect of everyday life.  He writes: “the great loss which 
the whole country is suffering through inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts.”  He 
then goes on to say, “[i]t is hoped, however, that it will be clear to other readers that the 
same principles can be applied with equal force to all social activities.”150 Taylor’s 
influence, then, could potentially extend to anyone and everything in modernity.  
In an article from 1974, Richard Schonberger concludes his analysis of the 
intertwinement of boredom and Taylorism by exclaiming: “Taylorism is unlikely to die in 
the foreseeable future.”151  This can be contrasted with Klaus Ronnegerber’s claim that 
“during the 1970s […] Taylorism had exhausted itself.”152  The increase in automation 
that has taken place in the factory, office, street, department store, home, and so on, may 
seem as though Taylorism has waned in that machines have replaced the repetitive work 
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of the human, but I argue the opposite is true.  While I fully acknowledge the increase in 
automation by machines, I believe that Taylorism has not waned, it has become much 
closer to being fulfilled.
153
  The standardized and repetitive movements advocated by the 
ideology of Taylorism are ideally suited to the technological precision of machines. It is 
everywhere, so it does not readily stand out against a background of otherness, and thus 
appears nowhere despite its pervasiveness amongst myriad occupations.  
Ben Highmore claims “the experience of homogenized time is unevenly 
distributed across social differences: the boredom of factory work is differentiated from 
the boredom of the computer operators, which is differentiated from the boredom of the 
domestic worker, and so.”154  But what are the differences?  There are both continuities 
and discontinuities amongst the activities required with each vocation.  Some workers 
have more variation in their workday while others, such as those on an assembly line, 
face countless hours of sameness.  Whereas Highmore argues the varying degrees of 
boredom at work, Jean Baudrillard conversely argues that “[t]he fatigue of the citizen of 
post-industrial society is not far removed from the ‘go-slow’ or ‘slowdown’ of factory 
workers, or the schoolchild’s ‘boredom’.”155  Regardless of the similarity or difference in 
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boredom being experienced amongst different occupations, the majority of these spaces 
and practices are specific to modernity and the majority of which, even if they are 
‘flexible’, include elements that are consistent with Taylor’s vision.  So, if Taylorism has 
waned, it is only through its proliferation and realization.  Schonberger argues that while 
the worker may not like Taylorism, consumers love it: “The craftsman, carefully 
fashioning and fitting gun parts or automobile parts together, was replaced by the bored 
but well-paid assembly-line cog.  Yes, he hates his job.  But consumers adore his output: 
low-cost, reliable guns and bullets, autos and electric knives, power mowers and 
telephones, on and on, ad infinitum.”156 The same workers who dislike their monotonous 
employment most likely appreciate the low-cost of products when their shift ends and 
they switch to consumers instead of producers. 
Fordism 
As for Fordism, its hallmark is the assembly line.  Walter Benjamin argues that 
“boredom in the production process arises as the process accelerates (through 
machinery).”157  Following Benjamin, it would seem as though the incorporation of the 
assembly line into the production process would inevitably lead to boredom.  Perhaps it is 
no coincidence, then, that the birth of Fordism has been linked to boredom.  One 
commentator notes that “realizing that boredom and monotony were major causes of 
employee concern, [Henry] Ford simply paid his workforce more for their time.”158  
Similarly, Richard Sennett argues that “Henry Ford believed worry about the quality of 
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work life ‘mere moonshine’; five dollars a day was a handsome enough reward for 
boredom.”159  With this, monotonous work is tolerated if the pay rate is substantial 
enough. 
Fordism is not restricted to the Ford Motor Company, but is the general logic 
behind the use of assembly lines for manufacturing.
160
  An example of the boredom of 
Fordism can be found in the autobiographical book Rivethead.  Here, its author, Ben 
Hamper, recalls his ambivalent, lifelong relationship with the General Motors plant in 
Flint, Michigan.  In many ways, these memoirs are a collection of tales on the topic of 
waiting.  Waiting for his father to come home from work; waiting for GM to call him to 
come back to work after being laid off; waiting for his shift to end, etc.  In one 
particularly vivid account, Hamper describes his first experience with automobile 
manufacturing when he visited GM for ‘family day’.  On this particular day, he – a young 
boy at the time – and his mother went to visit his father working on the assembly line.  
After walking through row after row of sameness, they eventually come upon his father 
at his workstation.  While Hamper wrote about this as an adult, long after his visit as a 
child, it made a substantial impression on him that lasted for decades.  He describes the 
visit: 
We stood there for forty minutes or so, a miniature lifetime, and the pattern never 
changed.  Car, windshield.  Car, windshield.  Drudgery piled atop drudgery.  
Cigarette to cigarette.  Decades rolling through the rafters, bones turning to dust, 
stubborn clocks gagging down flesh, another windshield, another cigarette, wars 
blinking on and off, thunderstorms muttering the alphabet, crows on power lines 
asleep or dead, that mechanical octopus squirming against nothing, nothing, 
NOTHINGNESS.  I wanted to shout at my father “Do something else!”  Do 
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something else or come home with us or flee to the nearest watering hole.  DO 
SOMETHING ELSE!  Car, windshield.  Car, windshield.  Christ, no.
161
   
 
This description is reminiscent of a passage from Marx’s Capital Volume 1 where Marx 
likens the factory experience to the ‘torture of Sisyphus’ of being condemned to carry out 
the same task ad infinitum without ever accomplishing one’s goals. 
Factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost; at the same time, it 
does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom 
of freedom, both in bodily and in intellectual activity.  Even the lightening of the 
labour becomes an instrument of torture, since the machine does not free the 
worker from the work, but rather deprives the work itself of all content.
162
 
 
Here, Marx points to the industrial process as causing one’s work to become empty, or 
without ‘content’, or as Ben Hamper puts it, ‘nothingness’.  It is worth recalling Marx’s 
phrase mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation of boredom as the ‘longing for 
content’.  Incredibly, Marx wrote these words roughly one century before young Ben 
Hamper went into his father’s factory.   
After all of the difficulty with accepting the nature of working on an assembly 
line, Hamper still followed in his father’s footsteps.163  In Hamper’s own experience 
working on the assembly line at GM he became all the more aware of the difficulties in 
performing the same task(s) over and over again.  He argues that such a position presents 
the worker with “the age old plight that came to haunt every screw jockey,”164 which was 
time.  Confronting this plight boils down to one simple question for Hamper and his 
coworkers: 
[W]hat the fuck do you do to kill the clock?  There were ways of handling nimwit 
supervisors and banana sticker rednecks and lopsided rails.  But the clock was a 
                                                 
161 Ben Hamper, Rivethead: Tales from the Assembly Line (New York: Warner Books, 1991), 2. 
162 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), 548. 
163 He acknowledged the irony of this point when he writes: “Working the line at GM was something 
fathers did so that their offspring wouldn’t have to.” Ibid., 13. 
164 Ibid., 95. 
82 
whole different mammal altogether.  It sucked on you as you awaited the next job.  
It ridiculed you each time you’d take a peek.  The more irritated you became, the 
slower it moved.  Thinking was a very slow death at times.
165
  
 
As for Hamper’s linking of thought and boredom, this is reminiscent of Jean 
Baudrillard’s assertion that “the worst thing is when thought and language move at the 
same pace.  That is when boredom sets in.”166  Depending on the situation, glancing at 
the clock can be an indication of one’s boredom.167  Outside of the factory, for example, 
while watching a film, a simple glance at one’s watch indicates the viewer’s boredom 
with what is on screen.  The same struggle against the clock takes place both in the 
workplace and outside it.  As for Hamper’s battle with the clock, James Carey astutely 
observes the irony of the standard company retirement gift: “Modern conceptions of time 
have rooted into our consciousness so deeply that the scene of the worker receiving a 
watch at his retirement is grotesque and comic.  He receives a watch when the need to tell 
time is ended.  He receives a watch as a tribute to his learning the hardest lesson of the 
working man – to tell time.”168   
Modernity in Particular: Railways 
The new kinds of workspaces developed in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century that emphasize the importance of technology, precision, time, and 
quantity effectively compound the effects of boredom.  One of the most important 
technological advances that have influenced the ‘modern conceptions of time’ is the 
railway.  While the factory is the symbol of industry, and the street is the archetypal 
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symbol of the urban, it has been said that the most “potent [and] dramatic symbol of the 
Industrial Revolution,”169 railroads.  Railroads are an important common element of the 
‘double process’ of industrialization and urbanization.  As Goodstein notes, “the railways 
speeded urbanization, facilitated industrialization by making production for distant 
markets efficient, and democratized travel.”170  The Marxist geographer David Harvey, 
whom Andy Merrifield refers to as Henri Lefebvre’s “Anglo-Saxon soul mate,”171 offers 
the following expansive yet concise account of the importance railroad construction had 
in the nineteenth century:  
[E]xcessive speculation in railroad construction triggered the first European-wide 
crisis of over-accumulation, the resolution to the crisis after 1850 rested heavily 
upon further exploration of temporal and spatial displacement.  New systems of 
credit and corporate forms of organization, of distribution (the large department 
stores), coupled with technical and organizational innovations in production 
(increasing fragmentation, specialization, and de-skilling in the division of labour 
for example), helped speed up the circulation of capital in mass markets.  More 
emphatically, capitalism became embroiled in an incredible phase of massive 
long-term investment in the conquest of space.  The expansion of the railway 
network, accompanied by the advent of the telegraph, the growth of steam 
shipping, and the building of the Suez Canal, the beginnings of radio 
communication and bicycle and automobile travel at the end of the century, all 
changed the sense of time and space in radical ways.
172
   
 
The famed Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan illustrates in his book 
Understanding Media how the railway “accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous 
human functions, creating totally new kinds of cities and new kinds of work and 
leisure.”173  Similarly, as the subtitle to Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s book The Railway 
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Journey: the Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19
th
 Century indicates, the 
railways had a significant impact on both space and time.   
But where does boredom come in?  In a nice dialectical formulation, the British 
historian William Addison observes that “railways extended the range of pleasures as 
well as the range of boredom.”174  With this, the triad of boredom-modernity-railways is 
beginning to take shape. All three emerged at the same time.  
The modern world began with the coming of the railways.  They turned the 
known universe upside down.  They made a greater and more immediate impact 
than any other mechanical or industrial innovation before or since.  They were the 
first technical invention which affected everyone in any country where they were 
built – which, effectively, meant most of the world.  They were the noisy, smoky, 
obtrusive heralds of a civilization destined to be increasingly dominated by 
industrial innovations.
175
 
 
With this passage, the author, Nicholas Faith, makes the case for railroads as not only one 
of the driving forces of modernity, but the driving force of modernity.  Of course, 
throughout the twentieth-century other modes of transportation have entered onto the 
scene.  Lefebvre puts it the following way: 
Undeniably the railways played a fundamental role in industrial capitalism and 
the organization of its national (and international) space.  But at the same time, at 
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an urban scale so did trams, underground railways, buses.  Then on a worldwide 
scale: air transport.  The previous organization disintegrates and the mode of 
production absorbs the results.  A double process, visible for several decades in 
our towns and countryside, with the help of recent technology – but extending 
from the centres of cities to their distant outskirts.
176
 
 
Regardless of these more recent technological advances in travel, the enormous impact 
railways had on the experience of space and time deserves emphasis for its historical 
importance.  At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the effect of travelling by rail was 
presented as the “annihilation of space and time”177 that these other modes of 
transportation would only accomplish afterwards.  Marshall Berman sees the pre-
determined route and time schedule made railways a “nineteenth-century paradigm of 
order.”178 As was noted above in the previous section of this chapter, according to 
Benjamin, order such as this has an aura of mild boredom. 
Martin Heidegger’s lecture course from 1929/30 is perhaps a good place to further 
establish connections between boredom, modernity, and the railroad.  Though it is not the 
earliest writing on boredom, these lectures are one of the first thoroughly rigorous 
analyses of the phenomenon, and a brief excursion through the basic framework of his 
lectures, though far too complex to deal with in any great detail here, will suffice for the 
present purposes.  The numerous secondary literature which cite or specifically address 
Heidegger’s work on boredom attest to its influence.179  Here, Heidegger offers an 
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original take on what he sees as the three forms of boredom,
180
 as well as a 
methodological guide on how boredom can and should be grasped.  Boredom in 
Heidegger’s view is an ‘attunement’ that must be ‘awakened’.  To Heidegger, the 
“ordinary opinion” of attunements as “feelings […] is correct within certain limits.”181  
Put simply, an attunement is not restricted to a state of mind, or something that is simply 
thought, but is something that is felt.  There are many attunements and we are “never 
without an attunement […] there is only ever a change of attunement.”182  Something is 
always being felt.  Heidegger would also note that “the attunements out of which our 
being gripped philosophically and our philosophical comprehension arise are always 
necessarily fundamental attunements [Grundstimmungen] out of Dasein,” which means 
“philosophy […] happens in a fundamental attunement.”183  To awaken the attunement of 
boredom is a specific process, which Heidegger differentiates from ‘ascertaining’.  
Ascertaining is what scientists or social scientists do, whereas the properly philosophical 
way of analyzing boredom, according to Heidegger, is to let it reveal itself.   
Heidegger mentions what could initially be referred to as superficial boredom, a 
more profound boredom, and then profound boredom.  These are the three levels of 
escalating intensity in the experience of boredom.  These three forms of boredom may 
not be a complete and definitive answer for Heidegger to the ‘riddle’ of boredom, but 
they are nevertheless important for the boredom literature.  This seems to be a riddle that 
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cannot be solved, at least not in its entirety.  However, Heidegger philosophizes a key for 
understanding boredom by noting the “two structural moments” for the all types of 
boredom.  These structural moments are ‘being held in limbo’ and ‘coming to be left 
empty’.184  The first type of boredom, ‘becoming bored by’, is a situational boredom 
where one can point to what is boring.  It can be characterized as a form of boredom 
where one can identify the source by pointing towards ‘this’ or ‘that’.185  This train 
station is boring, that store over there looks boring, etc.  It is this first type of boredom 
where railways, modernity, and boredom come together. 
Waiting for the Train 
For the first type of boredom identified in his lectures, Heidegger uses an example 
of waiting at a train station for a train whose arrival is approximately four hours away.  In 
his lectures he uses the inclusive ‘we’ in order to convey to his class that they, too, are 
part of the philosophizing taking place.  ‘We’ mistakenly arrived at the train station too 
early and are stuck there while having to wait for the train to arrive.  To pass the time 
‘we’ have a book in a rucksack, but it does not entice at the moment.  This is an 
interesting refusal, as Orrin E. Klapp has mentioned a case where he can “call to mind a 
man who says he carries a book wherever he goes, to avoid boredom while waiting or 
riding.”186  But, what if, as in Heidegger’s example, the man becomes bored of the book?  
This seems to demonstrate different levels of intensity for the same type of boredom.  
Boredom awakens, but can then be subdued with a book.  A more intense experience 
presents itself and boredom awakens and smothers any interest in the book.   
                                                 
184 Ibid., 106. 
185 Ibid., 114. 
186 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 11. 
88 
 Aside from the book buried in the rucksack, Heidegger goes on to mention 
various ways of passing the time while waiting for this train such as going for a walk, 
counting trees, drawing in the nearby sand, all the while looking at a watch to see how 
much time has gone by (or has not gone by).  Although this experience of waiting may 
seem like boredom, Heidegger writes: “Being bored is neither a waiting nor a being 
impatient.  This having to wait and our impatience may be present and surround 
boredom, but they never constitute boredom itself.”187  Heidegger notes that waiting can 
be filled with suspense and thus is not necessarily boring.  As mentioned above, Walter 
Benjamin, in contrast to Heidegger, uses waiting as a key aspect of his conception of 
boredom throughout the section in his Arcades Project that deals with boredom.
188
  As 
opposed to Heidegger’s example of waiting for something that we know, or think we 
know is coming, Benjamin does not attach any specific thing or event to this waiting.  
Instead, waiting in Benjamin’s sense is free floating without any specific future thing or 
event to look forward to and to anchor oneself.  “Waiting,” quips Benjamin, “is in a 
sense, the lined interior of boredom.”189 For Heidegger, then, waiting may surround 
boredom, but to Benjamin, it is at the core of boredom. 
The train station in Heidegger’s example does not include other potential 
passengers (unless the students in his class are considered passengers).  Perhaps this is 
due to the fact that the train will not arrive for another four hours.  The example given by 
Heidegger is one where there is very little to do at the station, except wait.  It should be 
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noted that railway stations became less desolate as time wore on than the picture 
Heidegger portrays in his lectures.  For example, Wolfgang Schivelbusch notes that “in 
the late 1840s, English booksellers established stalls in railway stations, as well as a 
peculiar kind of lending library, to meet the general demand for things to read while 
travelling.”190  On this point, it is worthwhile to recall Benjamin’s above-mentioned 
claim that the 1840s saw an outbreak of boredom.  According to one railroad expert, 
Nicholas Faith, “in Britain bad books are sold by their thousands in stations to relieve the 
monotony…the boredom…the impatience of the journey.”191  But why is the railway 
journey so boring?  While Heidegger’s example helps to think about the boredom of a 
train station, although that was not his primary intention, the example ends before the 
arrival of the train, so there is only a partial picture of the railway journey.   
Travelling on the Train 
In his book Overload and Boredom, the sociologist Orrin E. Klapp examines 
railway travel, but, instead of waiting for a train to appear, he discusses waiting while one 
is travelling on the train.  As opposed to the monotony of waiting for its arrival, this is the 
boredom of waiting for the train to disappear.  If there was a certain relief from one’s 
boredom when the train arrives at the station, it could be awoken when one is actually 
riding on the rails.  The arrival of the train is only a temporary relief from boredom, as 
the realization of more waiting becomes clear to the passenger.  To illustrate this, Klapp 
describes a hypothetical situation of being a passenger on a train that has no distractions 
such as a book, newspaper, or game of some sort.  Klapp, unlike Heidegger, discusses 
three types of travelling companions one could encounter on a train: 1) one that does not 
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talk very much, if at all, 2) one that talks too much about too little, and 3) one that 
“rambles on about everything.”192  These are all variations of ‘bores’.193  Though the ‘we’ 
in Heidegger’s example may be momentarily relieved of boredom when ‘we’ gets on the 
train, ‘we’ may wish to reach in our satchel for the book ‘we’ are carrying.  It should be 
noted that, “[t]he act of reading itself was effectively modernized by the railway too, 
because the train’s motion made unprecedented demands on the reader’s concentration, 
enforcing short bursts of attention.”194  So, although the ‘we’ in Heidegger’s example 
may be momentarily relieved of boredom when ‘we’ get on the train, ‘we’ may wish to 
reach in our rucksack for the book ‘we’ are carrying if ‘we’ encounter one of Klapp’s 
three travelling companions.  However, the book itself may bore us. 
Train travel in general, according to Goodstein, was a major source of 
boredom.
195
 Goodstein relies on the work of Wolfgang Schivelbusch to make this point.  
So, aside from the ‘bores’ in Klapp’s example, what is it that happens on the train to 
induce boredom?  According to Schivelbusch, in the nineteenth century railway travel 
was a culture shock for those who were used to pre-industrial modes of transportation and 
were “not able to develop modes of perception appropriate to the new form of 
transportation.”196  Schivelbusch continues: 
Dullness and boredom resulted from attempts to carry the perceptual apparatus of 
traditional travel, with its intense appreciation of landscape, over to the railway.  
The inability to acquire a mode of perception adequate to technological travel 
crossed all political, ideological and esthetic lines, and appeared among the most 
disparate personalities of the nineteenth century.
197
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While the boredom induced by railway travel was experienced on a mass scale, 
Schivelbusch uses the famed author Gustave Flaubert
198
 as a representative example of 
the boredom induced by railway travel: 
Flaubert wrote to a friend in 1864: ‘I get so bored on the train that I am about to 
howl with tedium after five minutes of it.  One might think that it’s a dog 
someone has forgotten in the compartment; not at all, it is M. Flaubert, groaning’.  
Before a railway journey, Flaubert stayed up all night in order to be able to sleep 
through the journey and not experience it at all: he could do nothing with the vista 
offered to him by the compartment window.  The most diverse sources provide 
any number of similar complaints.
199
 
 
What is so intriguing about Flaubert’s boredom is that, according to Schivelbusch, similar 
complaints could have come from any number of railway passengers.   
Goodstein has noted how Flaubert once claimed in regards to the title character in 
his masterpiece Madame Bovary, Emma Bovary, “Emma, c’est moi,”200 which roughly 
translates into English as “I am Emma.”  It is no surprise, then, that Goodstein calls this 
particular novel “the epic of modern boredom.”201  Goodstein also notes that “it is as the 
object as well as the subject of boredom that Flaubert’s Emma Bovary epitomizes the 
dilemma of the modern subject, for whom desire has come unhinged from the narratives 
that once rendered life meaningful.  Her tragedy exemplifies the fate of that subject, adrift 
in a world without God, without History, without hope.”202  Interestingly, Andreas 
Huyssen believes “one of the founding texts of modernism, if there ever was one, is 
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Flaubert’s Madame Bovary.”203  Following this line of thought, it is somewhat odd to 
equate an eminently interesting text such as Madame Bovary with boredom.  How can a 
book belonging to the canon of modernism be depicted as the epic of modern 
boredom?
204
  Quite simply, in modernity the line between the interesting and the boring 
cannot be safely distinguished.  The boundary between what is interesting and what is 
boring is often blurred. 
The Dialectic of Boredom and Interest 
While referring to the “history of industrialized society,” Lefebvre mentions the 
steady progression of “stagnation beneath the mask of frenetic agitation.”205  With respect 
to boredom, it is often hidden beneath the interesting.  Despite the intensification of the 
rhythms of life, the seemingly perpetual expansion of the urban fabric, the exponential 
growth of digital technologies, despite all of these interesting things, there nevertheless is 
a great deal of boredom.  From a Lefebvrean perspective, boredom and interest are 
dialectically related.  This is prevalent in the boredom literature, albeit without the 
authors explicitly acknowledging it.  For example, in their introductory contribution to 
the aptly titled collection Essays on Boredom and Modernity, Barbara Dalle Pezze and 
Carlo Salzani assert that “modern boredom is construed as an aesthetic and psychological 
problem, which consists in a lack of resources to make life interesting.”206  Boredom is 
here opposed to interest.  Despite not alluding to aesthetics or psychology, Spacks makes 
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a similar point in writing: “the interesting (in its modern version) and the boring imply 
one another […] Interesting means not boring; the boring is the not interesting.”207   
The interesting poses a significant problem for Spacks roughly halfway through 
her book.  The sole interlude in Spacks’s book is devoted to what she calls the “problem 
of the interesting.”  Why is it that halfway through her book on boredom Spacks pauses 
to reflect on the interesting?  Is it because the problem of the interesting is the same as the 
problem of boredom?  Without going this far, Spacks was, however, right to note there is 
some kind of relationship between boredom and interest.  Lars Svendsen argues that “the 
word ‘boring’ is bound up with the word ‘interesting’; the words became widespread at 
roughly the same time and they increase in frequency at roughly the same rate.”208  This 
seems to resolve a major theoretical deadlock in Benjamin’s Arcades Project when he 
asks the essential question: “What is the dialectical antithesis to boredom?”209  As was 
seen above in the first part of this chapter, Bertrand Russell argues that excitement is the 
antithesis to boredom.  Here, the dialectical antithesis is a much more general term: 
interesting.   
In the first section of this chapter, Joseph Brodsky’s convocation address to 
Dartmouth College was discussed.  In a similar context, in keeping with the relatively 
insulated sphere of academia, conference presentations can serve as an example of the 
proliferation of boredom masked only by the absence of it being verbalized.  “When, at a 
conference,” muses the Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek, “a 
speakers asks me: ‘Did you like my talk?’, how do I politely imply that it was boring and 
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stupid?  By saying: It was interesting.”210  Boredom is here masked as its opposite.  In 
this context the two terms appear interchangeable.  Of course, the question arises, in this 
situation how does one signal that they were actually interested in the talk?  The term 
interesting seems to be spoken for.  It is not as though people can say they were bored in 
order to imply they were interested.  Indeed, an appropriate question to ask is: “Where 
does interest end and boredom begin, and why there?”211  Such a question is, of course, 
under the presumption that one can actually draw a line to differentiate between boredom 
and interesting.  Such a seemingly trivial task is by no means a simple one.  What if 
instead of looking for a discontinuity, or the point(s) of rupture, we look at the continuity 
between boredom and interest? 
It is pertinent to again pick up a previously mentioned thread, that of the linguistic 
emergence of boredom.  Following Goodstein, as well as Spacks and Svendsen, if we are 
willing to put our trust in the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘interesting’, much 
like boredom, did not exist until the late eighteenth century.  Spacks notes how the 
Oxford English Dictionary lists 1768 as the date of its ‘official’ emergence.212  Here is 
the entry: 
Interesting: Adapted to excite interest; having the qualities which rouse curiosity, 
engage attention, or appeal to the emotions; of interest.
213
 
 
During the exact same year (1768) the verb ‘bore’ emerged for the first time.  The brief 
entry is the following: 
Bore: To weary by tedious conversation or simply by the failure to be 
interesting.
214
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 It is well worth noting how these two words emerged simultaneously.  Furthermore, the 
definition of ‘bore’ specifically hinges on lack of interest.   
Spacks’s study, primarily of literary works, is above all else concerned with this 
contrast, or, as she puts it, “the polarities of boredom and interest.”215 The contrast 
between these two polarities is prevalent in the boredom literature, such as when Klapp 
argues that “lack of interest is the heart of boredom.”216  Similarly, for Spacks, what is 
boring is often thought of as what is not interesting and vice versa.  However, Spacks 
does believe that a boring object (such as a novel) can be interesting and an object that 
was once interesting can become boring in a process she calls “cultural oscillations.”217  
Such cultural oscillations, I argue following Lefebvre, are prominent features of 
modernity.  In his book Introduction to Modernity, Lefebvre describes the omnipresence 
of interesting things available for consumption in modernity:  
There is a proliferation of interests and centres of interest.  How many fascinating 
things there are, how many fascinating people, and objects, and subjects!  Never 
before has news been so fertile, so full of surprises.  How does it come about that 
when something is interesting, boredom is always lurking in the background?  
How incredibly swiftly does the one turn into the other!
218
   
 
Further on in the same book Lefebvre picks up this line of argumentation: 
Suffice it to note that pleasurable elements of interest are no longer defined by 
themselves, but by what is devoid of interest, that is, by their opposite.  
Unfortunately, interest is a short-lived phenomenon.  It is quickly exhausted.  The 
interesting becomes boring.  As soon as it is no longer topical, as soon as the 
brief, orgasmic instant during which it disguises boredom is over, it too enters the 
realm of the boring, making way for boredom in all its unpasteurized purity.  
Something we found intensely interesting last year bores us today.  It is finished, 
                                                                                                                                                 
214 Ibid., Volume 2, 414. 
215 Spacks, Boredom, 183. Though Spacks is not referring to herself, it is clear from the repetition of these 
two concepts throughout her text that these are two core concepts in her study.  
216 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 35. 
217 Spacks, Boredom, 129. 
218 IM, 194-195. 
96 
empty.  Everything (no matter what: anecdotes, small news items, etc.) can 
become interesting.  It is merely a question of getting the presentation right, 
meeting a few technical requirements: surprise, suspense.  If there is anything 
more boring than an interesting thing which has ceased to be interesting, it is 
something which has not been successfully ‘put across’.  This could be one of the 
dialectical movements within ‘modernity’, one of its concealed movements.219  
 
With this passage we see that Lefebvre has identified a dialectical process of the boring 
and the interesting that is specific to modernity.  There is a unity of opposites.  This is 
one of Lefebvre’s most original contributions to the boredom literature.  This is an 
important point, as this gives some colour to the dialectic of mass culture, first mentioned 
in my introductory chapter, which will inform the rest of this dissertation.   
If one is to locate the sources of boredom, one must not only look at what is 
under-stimulating, or what it is over-stimulating, but also at what was once interesting 
and is now boring.  Although similar to Spacks’s work in this respect, a key difference is 
Spacks refers to different centuries where individuals from different eras have different 
tastes and preferences whereas Lefebvre is referring to the short lifespan of interest.  
Instead of a shift over the course of one century, the span of one year can be the 
difference between something interesting and something boring.  With this in mind, it is 
important to link Lefebvre’s dialectic with the work of Orrin E. Klapp.   
Akin to Lefebvre, Klapp, perhaps because he was a sociologist like Lefebvre, sees 
boredom as a complex social problem which to him means “not only that it affects a 
considerable number of people, but that some of its causes are systemic – structural, 
cultural, or communicational.”220  Klapp formulates two “sides” to boredom: underload 
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and overload.
221
  Simply put, underload stems from a lack of stimulation, whereas 
overload is an overabundance of stimulation.  Both too much and too little stimulation 
lead to boredom.  Underload is the most common perception of boredom as being left 
empty by not having enough to do.  Whereas, overload is being left empty by having too 
much to do, or, as Klapp would put it, too much information to process.  Boredom, then, 
according to Klapp, attacks on either side of the stimulation found in one’s everyday life.  
That is, both the underwhelming aspects of the routine, dull, and monotonous, as well as 
the overwhelming aspects of having an abundance of exciting, thrilling, and amusing 
experiences are roads leading to the experience of boredom.  Lefebvre’s dialectic 
establishes a third term, so to speak, in this theory.  Instead of too much stimulation or an 
absence of stimulation, the dialectical process of boredom identified by Lefebvre occurs 
even when the stimulation is just right. 
Klapp begins his book with a discussion of the amount of multitasking – that is to 
say, distraction – people partake in on a daily basis, which is typical of recent modernity.  
The example given is reading the morning newspaper while listening to the radio, or 
watching the television, or perhaps all three!  Using somewhat dated references from the 
1980s such as ‘walkmans’ and ‘ghetto blasters’, Klapp’s message nevertheless remains 
clear: “boredom as we experience it today is more likely to be from an overload than an 
underload.”222  Similar to Lefebvre’s dialectic of mass culture, Klapp sees boredom at its 
most powerful when there is a great deal of interesting things, as opposed to not enough 
interesting things.  As has already been made clear, this is a counterintuitive assertion, as 
boredom is often associated with a lack of stimulation not overstimulation.   
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Instead of lacking something, the boredom that arises from an overload of 
information stems from either “too much redundancy or too much noise.”223  These terms 
are fairly vague, so it would be beneficial to ask: What exactly does Klapp mean when he 
uses the term ‘noise’?  In a very basic way, he formulates it as “the meaning-defeating 
(boring) element in variety.”224  This is a nice, compact definition, but it requires an 
additional explanation to understand what he means by the term ‘variety’.  Variety, as 
Klapp uses it, is the opposite of redundancy.  Variety offers choice and options, whereas 
redundancy is more of the same.  In this sense, “boredom is bimodal.”225  It can arise 
from too much or too little variety.  The overwhelming abundance of information in an 
information society is extremely difficult to sift through.  How can you tell what is 
important information and what is misinformation? There is simply too much to examine 
it all.  Sifting through all the information will ensure that one will ultimately encounter a 
lot of noise. 
Who generally encounters this noise?  It would seem as though most people do.  
Klapp quotes a manager of a refrigerator manufacturing company who offers his 
assessment of society: “We’re all bored with what we are doing.  Students don’t want to 
study; workers don’t want to work.  Managers don’t want to manage; garbage collectors 
don’t want to collect garbage.  The question nowadays is ‘Who wants to do what they’re 
supposed to do’?”226  This is a rather stark worldview where no one is happy with what 
they are doing.  People simply tolerate the work they have to do and are bored because of 
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it.  This is a similar sentiment as the one found in Theodor Adorno’s claim: “Boredom is 
a function of life which is lived under the compulsion to work, and under strict division 
of labour.”227  Surely this is not the case for everyone.  To take an example from what 
Adorno would call the ‘Culture Industry’, with the numerous magazines populating 
newsstands, available for purchase every week, it seems as though there are some writers 
who like to write.  Similarly, with the amount of new films that debut at the local cinema 
every week, it seems as though some actors still like to act, directors like to direct, and 
producers like to produce.  But does the production of these works actually say anything 
about whether or not people are bored?  These positions are somewhat more glamorous 
than collecting garbage, but are these workers less bored?  Perhaps they are less bored.  
Then again, maybe they are not.  Are these workers not bored at all?  Such complete 
satisfaction with one’s work at all times would be an amazing, if not impossible feat 
given the spatio-temporal constraints and opportunities they face in modernity.  Boredom 
appears to be far too ubiquitous for people to completely escape its grasp.  Indeed, it 
appears to be a virtually inescapable feature of everyday life in the modern world.  
Following this, I will now turn my attention to Henri Lefebvre’s project of a critique of 
everyday life to further explore the problematic of boredom in modernity. 
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Chapter 2: The Absence of Style in Everyday Life 
 
Boredom is the everyday become manifest: as a consequence of having  
lost its essential – constitutive – trait of being unperceived.1 – Maurice Blanchot 
 
The quotidian is […] the realm of routine, repetition, reiteration:  
the space/time where constraints and boredom are produced.2 – Alice Kaplan and Kristin Ross 
 
[B]oredom born out of boredom.3 – Ezra Pound 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
The previous chapter dealt with the proliferation of boredom as a mass phenomenon 
historically specific to modernity, a strand of boredom studies principally associated with 
the work of Elizabeth Goodstein and her book Experience Without Qualities.  The point 
of departure for this chapter is Henri Lefebvre’s assertion that “the everyday is covered 
by a surface: that of modernity.”4 This adds another dimension to the relationship 
between boredom and modernity.  With this, a conceptual triad of boredom-modernity-
everyday life has emerged.   Following Goodstein’s assertion that the problems for 
theorizing boredom are the same as those for theorizing modern experience, and 
following Lefebvre’s argument that modernity is the surface of everyday life, the 
question being asked is: How is boredom related to everyday life?  For this, one must 
begin to formulate everyday life as a concept.  This is lacking in the majority of literature 
on boredom, as some boredom theorists believe the everyday is what obscures one’s 
analysis of boredom.
5
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the “negative picture” of everyday life when he writes: “Everydayness is more or less exclusively 
associated with what is boring, habitual, mundane, uneventful, trivial, humdrum, repetitive, inauthentic, 
and unrewarding.”  Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the 
Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23. (my italics).  It would follow, then, that the boring is 
negative for many people.  It should be mentioned that this ‘negative picture’ is not his own.  Sheringham 
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Michael Raposa invites the readers of his book Boredom and the Religious 
Imagination to “shake off the veil of everydayness”6 from boredom.   For Raposa, the 
experience of boredom has a bad reputation as something ordinary and entirely lacking 
even the slightest shred of profundity when it associates with ‘everydayness’.  Raposa 
seems to be suggesting that boredom ought to be analyzed by discarded its everydayness.  
What if, however, this everydayness is also the key to understanding boredom?  It would 
be prudent to turn to Lefebvre to confront Raposa’s recommendation, specifically with 
one of his questions: “Why wouldn’t the concept of everydayness reveal the 
extraordinary in the ordinary?”7  Indeed, why is the ordinary treated as insignificant and 
unworthy of attention?  Or, in Raposa’s case, why is the ordinary divorced from being 
extraordinary?  This may appear as obvious, but when one looks closely it is not an easy 
distinction to make.  For this, Lefebvre would say that “[p]eople who gather flowers and 
nothing but flowers tend to look upon soil as something dirty.”8  Continuing with the 
metaphor, it is as if flowers are mysterious, but soil is nothing but commonplace material 
and all too obvious.  Effectively, it could be said that Raposa wants to pluck the flower 
from the dirt without realizing the flower cannot grow without the dirt or the dirt has its 
beauty just like the flower.   
Ironically, Raposa’s wish to unveil boredom, thus revealing what it truly is, 
actually creates a veil.  Removing the supposed ‘veil’ of everydayness is exactly what 
                                                                                                                                                 
is merely recounting what he sees as the commonsense notion of everyday life, but he unfortunately does 
not extend this thought to a thorough analysis of boredom.  Sheringham treats this as though it is obvious, 
which, of course, it is.  That is, it is obvious in a commonsensical way.  Such a view does not, however, 
take a full picture of boredom, one that is not so quick to label boredom as a negative experience.  Aside 
from a select few authors, boredom and everyday life are not studied together.  Those who study everyday 
life do not necessarily include boredom for analysis and vice versa. 
6 Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, xi. 
7 EE, 9. 
8 CEL 1, 87. 
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should not happen when thinking about boredom.  Instead, the everyday should be 
analyzed as a significant phenomenon much the same as boredom.  Or, perhaps more 
concretely, the everyday should be analyzed as a condition of boredom.  Instead of 
‘shaking off’ the everyday, it should be embraced.9  Shaking off the everyday from 
boredom robs boredom of its essence.  As Ben Anderson puts it, “[t]o be bored, or 
perhaps more importantly to potentially/probably be bored, has become part of the 
common-place experiential fabric, the affective texture, of Modern everyday life.”10  
Similarly, Goodstein begins her book with a simple definition of boredom by claiming in 
the very first line: “It is an experience without qualities, this quotidian crisis of 
meaning.”11   
 I follow Lefebvre by arguing that everydayness does not simply veil the 
extraordinariness of boredom.  Rather, attempting to remove a veil that does not exist 
brings forth the opposite goal.  That is to say, everydayness does not veil boredom, it is 
the foundation of boredom.  If this claim is to be upheld, Lefebvre’s concept of the 
everyday must be articulated.  It will be argued that Lefebvre’s work is a key to 
understanding the complex relationship between boredom, modernity, and everyday 
life.
12
   
There are four main parts to this chapter.  The first part will outline Lefebvre’s 
intellectual contours via a critique of Laurie Langbauer’s book Novels of Everyday Life.  
After establishing what Lefebvre’s project is not, some common links will be presented 
                                                 
9 This point follows Lefebvre’s assertion that “Nothing gives these specialists the right to observe everyday 
life from aloft and from afar simply because they do not deem it worthy of being a specialism.” CEL 2, 25. 
10 Ben Anderson, “Time-Stilled Space-Slowed: How Boredom Matters,” Geoforum 35 (2004): 739. 
11 Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 1. (my italics) 
12 Peter Conrad has linked boredom with everyday life, however the bulk of his work stems from a reading 
of Patricia Meyer Spacks’ book.   See Conrad, “It’s Boring: Notes on the Meanings of Boredom in 
Everyday Life,” Qualitative Sociology 20(4), (1997): 465-475.  
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between Lefebvre and other thinkers, specifically Theodor Adorno.  Part two extends part 
one by delving into the specifics of Lefebvre’s project of a critique of everyday life.  The 
third part discusses Lefebvre’s concept of an ‘absence of style’ as a key factor in the 
emergence of boredom as a mass phenomenon in modernity.  The last part will follow 
from the theory of an ‘absence of style’ in everyday life with various attempts to fill this 
absence by spending time, specifically leisure time, as a form of escapism from the 
boredom of everyday life.
13
  The goal of this chapter is to include everyday life as an 
important facet to understanding the historical specificity of boredom in modernity, and 
establish the background of modernity and everyday life for the chapters that follow. 
Contours of the Critique of Everyday Life 
Before continuing with the conceptual triad of boredom-modernity-everyday life, 
it is important to sketch the contours of the third term, everyday life.  For this, it would be 
prudent, in keeping with the above metaphor of the flower and dirt, to disentangle 
Lefebvre’s Critique from some of the weeds of criticism that have grown around it in 
recent time, thus making it easier to see through the weeds to the dirt and flowers behind 
them.  Like many important thinkers, there is certainly nothing obvious or simplistic 
about Lefebvre’s overall intellectual project.  In order to utilize Lefebvre’s notion of 
everyday life for the duration of this dissertation, it is necessary to sketch the contours of 
his critique of everyday life, and in order to grasp the contents of his project, it is 
necessary to also say what it is not.  No doubt Lefebvre appears to be standing on his 
head to some since he is rarely straightforward in his theorizing.  On the surface, 
Lefebvre may appear to be as his opposite.  In order for Lefebvre to appear in his rightful 
                                                 
13 Lefebvre argued that along with “philosophy and contemplation, dream and art, violent political or 
warlike action” everyday life is also criticized “by flight and escape.”  CEL 1, 29. 
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position of standing on firm ground, it will be beneficial to examine some assertions 
made by one of his critics, Laurie Langbauer, who, I argue, has represented Lefebvre’s 
project in a manner that differs quite markedly from my own.  With this, it is hoped that 
we can see where Lefebvre truly stands before applying his work elsewhere. 
Negative Definition of Everyday Life 
Laurie Langbauer’s book Novels of Everyday Life is an ideal point of departure 
with her negative use of Lefebvre’s project to articulate her position.14  Further, in this 
text Langbauer discusses several topics that are of interest for this dissertation: 
everydayness, the city, modernity, and, of course, boredom.  While Langbauer’s text 
covers many of the themes that are of interest to Lefebvre, her book is nevertheless a 
microcosm of mistaken identity regarding Lefebvre’s basic position.  By arguing this 
point I should make it clear that Langbauer’s book is not about Lefebvre.  For the present 
purposes, I am not interested in critiquing her entire work.  It should also be noted that 
Langbauer’s text is a valuable addition the literature on everyday life in general.  For 
example, she is quite correct in her assessment of the boringness of everydayness when 
she writes: “the problem with the everyday is trying to get anyone interested in it.”15  
Lefebvre would certainly agree with this statement, but that is probably where their 
commonality stops.  In Langbauer’s critique of Lefebvre’s work she has attributed 
numerous positions that, I would argue, bear little resemblance to Lefebvre’s overall 
project.  In fact, many of Langbauer’s points articulate the exact opposite of Lefebvre’s 
position. 
                                                 
14 Lefebvre would surely approve of Langbauer’s approach of tarrying with the negative, as well as the one 
being employed on this page, as he believed “the first definition of everyday life is a negative one.” CEL 1, 
86. 
15 Langbauer, Novels of Everyday Life,136. 
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To begin, it is important to consider Langbauer’s portrayal of Lefebvre’s 
intellectual heritage.  In a footnote to her book Novel of Everyday Life, Langbauer 
charges that Lefebvre “was working from Lukács and Heidegger.”16 To her, these two 
figures are the roots of Lefebvre’s position.  It is certainly accurate with regards to 
chronology, considering that both Lukács and Heidegger established themselves as 
leading thinkers well before Lefebvre did.  As well, this is an understandable claim since 
these two thinkers both developed their respective notions of the everyday before 
Lefebvre.
17
  Such an assertion is, nevertheless, an incorrect one if one considers 
Lefebvre’s own comments on these two figures.  In the third volume of his Critique, 
Lefebvre makes it clear that “[i]t would be incorrect and dishonest to say that the critique 
of everyday life derives its philosophical positions from either Lukács or Heidegger.”18  It 
is understandable that Langbauer missed this assertion since the third volume of 
Lefebvre’s Critique was translated into English several years after her book was 
published.  It is, nevertheless, puzzling, as she had access to Michel Trebitsch’s preface 
to the English translation of the first volume of the Critique published in 1991.  There, 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 129.  Later in the same book, Langbauer is less certain of this link when she writes that Lefebvre’s 
work on the everyday “perhaps took its understanding from Lukács.” Ibid., 177. (my italics)  It has been 
argued, however, that Lukács was influential on other theorists of the everyday.  For example, Michael 
Gardiner has shown a relationship between Agnes Heller’s conceptualization of everyday life with that of 
Georg Lukács.  See chapter 6 of Gardiner’s Critiques.  For the triad of Lukács, Heidegger, and Heller, see 
Sheringham’s Everyday Life, 31-39. 
17 Tony Bennett and Diane Watson make the same claim when they write that Lefebvre owed “his interest 
in the concept of everyday life to the work of Lukács and Heidegger.” Bennett and Watson, 
“Understanding Everyday Life: An Introduction,” Understanding Everyday Life, eds. Tony Bennett and 
Diane Watson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), xiv. 
18 CEL 3, 18.  For differing positions on Heidegger’s influence on Lefebvre, see Stuart Elden, “Between 
Marx and Heidegger: Politics, Philosophy and Lefebvre’s The Production of Space,” Antipode 36(1) 2004: 
86-105 and Geoffrey Waite, “Lefebvre Without Heidegger: “Left-Heideggerianism” qua conradictio in 
adiecto,” In Space, Difference, Everyday Life; Reading Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 94-114. 
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Trebitsch argues that “for Lefebvre everyday life is not reduced to the inauthenticity of 
Alltäglichkeit, as in Heidegger or Lukács.”19   
Keeping with its philosophical underpinnings, Langbauer situates Lefebvre’s 
work within the long and esteemed lineage of system builders found in what could be 
called ‘traditional philosophy’.  She claims that “[i]n insisting on a system, Lefebvre still 
gestures to totality, but his system continually calls its own notion of totality into 
question.”20  Langbauer’s claim is not entirely false, as she touches on the openness of 
Lefebvre’s thought when she writes that he puts the ‘notion of totality into question’.  
There are essentially two issues here: systemic thought and the concept of totality.  
‘Totality’ is a key issue in Lefebvre’s philosophical and sociological thought, which will 
be dealt with below.
21
  For now, it is important to dwell on Langbauer’s claim that 
Lefebvre insists on a system.  On this point I must be perfectly clear in my response.  
Lefebvre was unabashedly an anti-systemic thinker and was unambiguous in his 
disavowal of system building.  For example, the last line of his book The Production of 
Space not only casts a backward glance to the words that preceded it, winding its way all 
the way back to the front cover, but I would argue that it also applies to his entire oeuvre.  
Without any ambiguity, Lefebvre asserts: “And we are concerned with nothing that even 
remotely resembles a system.”22  In addition, Lefebvre has specifically stated that unlike 
traditional philosophers, “I don’t build a system.”23  If taken at his word, Lefebvre was 
                                                 
19 Michel Trebitsch, “Preface,” In CEL 1, xxiii-xiv. 
20 Langbauer, Novels of Everyday Life, 20. 
21 While a ‘key’ to his thought, Lefebvre acknowledges the difficulties in employing such a concept: “One 
cannot, however, avoid the fact that the notion of “totality” is difficult to define and even more difficult to 
employ.” SM, ix. 
22 PS, 423. 
23 Leszek Kolakowski and Henri Lefebvre, “Evolution or Revolution,” 202. 
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not a system builder.  The openness of his work, as well as the erratic manner in which 
his prose often flow, would also signal a disdain for creating a system.  
Describing her own project, Langbauer writes that she is “interested that one 
reaction to the everyday can be pleasure – and not just with the banalized tedium that 
someone like Henri Lefebvre or Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno wants to locate in 
serial production.”  She goes on to say that her “version of the everyday brings [her] 
lasting comfort, deep and abiding joy.”24  With this, Langbauer defines her ‘version of 
the everyday’ against Lefebvre’s.  As will be made clear later on, Langbauer is quite 
correct to see similarities in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer with Lefebvre.  
Although, what she sees is infinitely dirtier, messier than is actually the case.  That is to 
say, she is arguing that these three figures dwell in the mud of everyday life without any 
appreciation for the joy or comfort it offers.   
Lefebvre’s take on everyday life is much more nuanced than Langbauer gives him 
credit for.  For example, Mary McLeod, in her summary of Lefebvre’s project, argues 
that “it is difficult to sustain the optimism of Lefebvre’s vision.”25  Recall Lefebvre’s 
claim, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, which I shall paraphrase here, that 
those who gather flowers tend to look at dirt as something insignificant and unworthy of 
attention.  As was discussed earlier, the boredom theorist Michael Raposa was trying to 
wash boredom clean of its messy ‘veil’ of everydayness.  Langbauer is here doing the 
exact same thing.  I do not doubt that Langbauer’s everyday life is filled with deep joy 
and lasting comfort, but whatever splendours she enjoys are not the same circumstances 
as those that work on a factory line, serve pretzels to passengers on a plane, answer 
                                                 
24 Langbauer, Novels of Everyday Life, 3. 
25 Mary McLeod, “Henri Lefebvre’ Critique of Everyday Life: an Introduction,” In Architecture of the 
Future, eds. Steven Harris and Deborah Berke (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), 28. 
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telephone calls from customers with a smorgasbord of dispositions, etc.  To Langbauer, it 
is as if Lefebvre and company found no joy whatsoever within the everyday.  I argue that 
this is simply incorrect.  Lefebvre’s account of the everyday is a dialectical one, 
“allusive” even.26 There is a “double dimension” to the everyday, which Lefebvre argues 
oscillates between “platitude and profoundness, banality and drama.”27  In a similar 
manner, Ben Highmore writes that everyday life alternates in and between two 
experiences, boredom and mystery.
28
  Both Lefebvre and Highmore leave space for joy 
and comfort, but that is only one side of the coin of everyday life.  It appears as though 
Langbauer attributed Lefebvre’s position with the characteristics of someone like Arthur 
Schopenhauer, who, instead of Lefebvre’s dimensions of platitude/banality and 
profoundness/drama, limits life to two other dimensions: pain and boredom.
29
  It would 
seem as though Langbauer’s position is the exact opposite of Schopenhauer’s.  Much the 
same as in physics where a collision between matter and anti-matter will leave no trace if 
they were to collide, if Schopenhauer and Langbauer were somehow to have the 
opportunity to meet, they would vanish upon the introductory handshake. 
                                                 
26 SC, 58.  Lefebvre himself acknowledges that the first volume of his Critique , which Langbauer draws 
upon extensively to make her case, is difficult to comprehend because it is allusive rather than making 
things explicit.   
27 CEL 2, 65.  The everyday is not simply sameness.  Rather, according to Lefebvre, it can be viewed “as 
the place where repetition and creativity meet and confront each other,” CEL 2, 239.  Additionally, it has 
been noted that “[f]or Lefebvre, everyday life was not synonymous with banality or boredom.” Derek 
Schilling, “French Sociologies of the Quotidian: From Dialectical Marxism to the Anthropology of 
Everyday Practice,” In Encountering the Everyday: an Introduction to the Sociologies of the Unnoticed, ed. 
Michael Hviid Jacobsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 187.   
28 Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, 12. 
29 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, argue that Schopenhauer’s philosophy depicts “the pendulum of 
life” as oscillating “between pain and boredom.”  Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 205.  This is most likely a reference to 
the following passage by Schopenhauer: “There is not much to be got anywhere in the world; it is full of 
privation and pain and for those who have escaped there from boredom lurks at every corner.” In “What a 
Man is,” Parerga and Paralipomena: Volume One (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 333. 
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 Whereas it is well documented that Schopenhauer had severe disdain for 
women,
30
 Langbauer is a proud feminist.  Unfortunately, she depicts Lefebvre’s position 
as being closer to Schopenhauer’s than her own, which is simply not the case.31  This is 
emblematic of virtually all of Langbauer’s various assessments of Lefebvre scattered 
throughout her book.  One in particular, which should be apparent to anyone remotely 
familiar with Lefebvre’s work is Langbauer’s depiction of Lefebvre’s position as 
structuralist.  A Lefebvrean triad deserves attention at this point, that of structuralism-
poststructuralism-anti-structuralism.  Langbauer believes she identifies the rupture where, 
at one point, “with the introduction of the everyday, Lefebvre’s structuralism becomes 
poststructuralism.”32  Langbauer has, unfortunately, left out the third option in the above 
triad, anti-structuralism.  Referring to Lefebvre’s work as a form of “structuralism” is a 
significant departure from the majority of Lefebvre’s commentators.  There is a general 
consensus on this particular point.  For example, the very first sentence from Virginia 
Blum and Heidi Nast’s co-authored article on Lefebvre is: “Henri Lefebvre strongly 
opposed structuralisms of any sort.”33  As well, his former student Jean Baudrillard has 
made it clear regarding Lefebvre that “structuralism was his number one enemy.”34  
Further, in a recent collection on Lefebvre, its editors note how “Lefebvre remained 
                                                 
30 Simon Critichley sums up this point quite nicely stating: “Schopenhauer was a notorious misogynist.” 
The Book of Dead Philosophers (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 175.  Also, see Schopenhauer’s “On 
Women,” Essays and Aphorisms, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin), 85-88. 
31 Lefebvre’s view of women and the everyday is discussed in the third section of chapter 4.   
32 Langbauer, Novels of Everyday Life, 19. 
33 Virginia Blum and Heidi Nast, “Where’s the Difference?: The Heterosexualization of Alterity in Henri 
Lefebvre and Jacques Lacan,” Environment and Planning D 14(5), (1996): 559-580.   
34 Jean Baudrillard, Fragments: Conversations with François L’Yvonnet, trans. Chris Turner (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 16.  Mike Gane, a Baudrillard scholar, similarly remarked that Lefebvre was “very much 
an anti-structuralist thinker.” In “Introduction,” Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews, ed. Mike Gane, 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 2.  
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unpopular for refusing to follow the fashions of structuralism, poststructuralism.”35 By 
distancing himself from structuralism and its offshoots and subsequently facing the wrath 
for maintaining such a position, Lefebvre’s work fell on deaf ears, if it ever reached them 
at all.  With this, it is difficult to comprehend how anyone could confuse Lefebvre’s 
position as resembling structuralism.  Lefebvre himself writes that “the cutting-edge of 
knowledge operates far beyond structuralism.  And has done for a long time.”36 
Finally, Langbauer characterizes Lefebvre’s position as a utopian one when she 
writes: “as Lefebvre suggests, utopically.”37  This brings my critique of Langbauer’s 
interpretation of Lefebvre back to where it began.  Recall, Langbauer admonishes 
Lefebvre as someone who characterizes the everyday as an intense atmosphere of 
boredom and desolation.  This is odd considering she sees Lefebvre as a utopian.  As was 
made clear in the introductory chapter, Lefebvre’s utopianism is highly nuanced.  
Virtually anticipating accusations such as this from Langbauer and her ilk, Lefebvre 
composed a short dialogue between himself and an imaginary interlocutor who charges 
Lefebvre with being an ‘utopist.’  To this, Lefebvre replies: “And why not?  For me this 
term has no pejorative connotations…I am indeed a utopian…a partisan of possibilities.  
But then are we not all utopians, apart from you?”38  To Lefebvre, most people are 
utopian, it is only those “not very interesting people [who] escape utopianism.”39  
Utopian is not here employed as a pejorative term, and it is actually something Lefebvre 
has in common with Langbauer, despite their differing accounts on everyday life. 
                                                 
35 Stefan Kipfer et al., “On the Production of Henri Lefebvre,” Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading 
Henri Lefebvre, eds. Goonewardena et al. (London: Routledge, 2008), 5. 
36 KW, 37.  For an in-depth study of Lefebvre’s anti-structuralism, see Edith Kurzweil, “Henri Lefebvre: A 
Marxist Against Structuralism,” In The Age of Structuralism: Lévi-Strauss to Foucault (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980), 57-85. 
37 Langbauer, Novels of Everyday Life, 22. 
38 ELMW, 192. 
39 WC, 151. 
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Intellectual Parallels 
Having dealt with what Lefebvre is not in a general way, it is now appropriate to 
sketch some similarities with other theorists.  The question arises: Where can one find 
parallels between Lefebvre’s work and other intellectuals?  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Andy Merrifield asserted that David Harvey was his “Anglo-Saxon soul mate,” 
but Merrifield has also described a close, yet ultimately ‘Faustian’, relationship between 
Lefebvre and the Situationist International, specifically its leading figure, Guy Debord.
40
  
But the parallels do not stop there.  Quite a few essays have been written comparing 
Lefebvre’s work with other theorists, such as the Greek philosopher Kostas Axelos,41 
French structuralist Roland Barthes,
42
 French philosopher Henri Bergson,
43
 Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci,
44
 French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan,
45
 American pragmatist 
                                                 
40 Andy Merrifield, “Lefebvre and Debord: a Faustian Fusion,” Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading 
Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. (London: Routledge, 2008), 176-189.  For Lefebvre’s 
take on his strained relationship with the Situationists and Debord, see LEF. 
41 Stuart Elden, “Mondialisation Before Globalization: Lefebvre and Axelos,” Space, Difference, Everyday 
Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. (London: Routledge, 2008), 80-93. 
42 See Michael Kelly, “Demystification: a Dialogue Between Barthes and Lefebvre,” Yale French Studies 
98 (2000): 79-97.  For an actual dialogue between Barthes and Lefebvre, see “Fashion, a Strategy of 
Desire,” In Roland Barthes, The Language of Fashion, trans. Andy Stafford and eds. Andy Stafford and 
Michael Carter (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2006), 86-90. 
43 See Benjamin Fraser, “Toward a Philosophy of the Urban: Henri Lefebvre’s Uncomfortable Application 
of Bergsonism,” Environment and Planning D 26(2), (2008): 338-358.  Interestingly, Andy Merrifield 
notes that Lefebvre constructed “a framework of historical duration from the standpoint of the moment – 
from, in other words, the exact opposite pole to Bergson’s.”  He then summarizes Lefebvre’s overall 
feelings for Bergson in one brief sentence:  “Lefebvre hated Bergson’s guts.”  Henri Lefebvre, 27. 
44 See two essays by Stefan Kipfer, “Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, 
Gramsci and the Problematic of Hegemony,” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 13(2), (June, 2002): 117-149; 
“How Lefebvre Urbanized Gramsci: Hegemony, Everyday Life, and Difference,” Space, Difference, 
Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. (London: Routledge, 2008), 
193-211. 
45 See Derek Gregory, “Lefebvre, Lacan and the Production of Space,” In Geography, History and Social 
Sciences, eds. Georges B. Benko and Ulf Strohmayer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 15-
44; Virginia Blum and Heidi Nast, “Where’s the Difference?: The Heterosexualization of Alterity in Henri 
Lefebvre and Jacques Lacan,” Environment and Planning D 14(5), (1996): 559-580.  In their essay, “Lost 
in Transposition,” Kofman and Lebas write that Lefebvre: “in particular poured scorn on Lacan whom he 
called an escroc (swindler) and a fumiste (not serious) because he dared speak about women, sex and the 
libido without knowing what he was talking about!”, 29. 
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Charles Peirce,
46
 French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre,
47
 and the British cultural Marxist 
Raymond Williams.
48
  While there may indeed be parallels between these figures and 
Lefebvre, this list does not exhaust the contours that are necessary for demonstrating 
Lefebvre’s intellectual perspective, especially not in the case of his project of a critique 
of everyday life. 
While the above-mentioned intellectuals are all fine company for anyone, 
Lefebvre’s intellectual constellation was above all formed by three other key figures of 
Western thought: Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche.
49
  It is perhaps not a stretch to say that 
Marx’s influence looms much larger in Lefebvre’s thought than the other two.  If for 
many, Marx’s thought stopped breathing in the nineteenth century as Michel Foucault has 
asserted,
50
 it was certainly not the case for Lefebvre.  The latter believed that “authentic 
Marxist thought has a style: the style of intensification and broadening of life.  This style 
                                                 
46 See Pentti Määttänen, “Semiotics of Space: Peirce and Lefebvre,” Semiotica 166 (1/4), (2007): 453-461.  
47 See Michael Kelly, “Towards a Heuristic Method: Sartre and Lefebvre,” Sartre Studies International 
5(1), (1999): 1-15.   This is an intriguing comparison, considering Lefebvre frequently criticized Sartre.  
For example, in the first volume of his Critique, Lefebvre has this to say about his fellow French 
intellectual: “[R]eading Sartre is an increasingly cold, dry experience, overladen with falsely concrete 
details (noted down deliberately and consciously in order to be concrete!), without passion, without interest 
in life, without youth and without maturity, and quite simply boring.” CEL 1, 236. 
48 Andrew Shmuely, “Totality, Hegemony, Difference: Henri Lefebvre and Raymond Williams,” Space, 
Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 212-230. 
49 In English translation, the most explicit example of the profound influence of these three thinkers on 
Lefebvre’s thought and work can be found in Lefebvre’s “Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche,” KW, 42-49.  Lefebvre 
would argue that these are three essential thinkers and a “[c]onfrontation of the theses and hypotheses of 
Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche is just beginning – and only with great difficulty at that.” PS, 24.  Despite his 
admiration for Nietzsche, Lefebvre claims that Nietzsche’s concept of ‘Grand Style’ has nothing to do with 
his own concept of style, or, more precisely, the absence of style, a concept that will be dealt with below.  
In referring to ‘style’, Lefebvre argues that “we must discard Nietzschean theories, for our subject is more 
limited and precise.” ELMW, 115.   
50 Foucault’s actual line is: "Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought like a fish in water: that is, it is 
unable to breathe anywhere else.”  The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 285.  Lefebvre seems to be alluding to Foucault’s claim when he summarizes the general 
sentiment preceding the worker and student revolts of May 1968 in France when he writes: “In brief, 
Marxist thought is dated; it reflects the nineteenth century.”  EX, 11. 
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has been completely abandoned by today’s ‘Marxists’.”51  It is worth keeping ‘style’ in 
mind, as it will resurface during part three of this chapter.  A certain strand of Marxism, 
specifically Lefebvre’s version, seems to be an authentic mode of thought which could 
potentially result in an authentic mode of living.  Contained within a critique of 
contemporary society is the utopian longing for something else.  This is above all else 
where Lefebvre takes his cue from Marx.  But is Lefebvre too utopian for his own good?    
There is a direct connection between Lefebvre’s interest in Marx and boredom.  
Lefebvre held no illusions with the popularity of Marxism, noting “Marxism has become 
boring.  It has been a disappointment; young people are disappointed with it because it 
bores them.”52  With the rise of boredom with Marxism came the decline of its style.  At 
best, Lefebvre would concede that Marxism was dying of boredom, but never that it was 
dead; there was always a glimmer of hope that it would resurface, or at least be partially 
alive despite its association with boredomElsewhere Lefebvre notes that “one cause of 
boredom for Marxists was and remains the fate of the work [oeuvre] and the concepts 
inherited from Marx and Engels.”53  His critique, then, can be viewed as an effort to 
revitalize Marx and make it interesting.  How does he go about doing that?  Ironically, 
Lefebvre went about this by studying what is boring, the mundane elements of society 
commonly associated with everyday life.  In order to combat the boredom of Marxism, 
Lefebvre studied taken for granted, boring things.  This is not that radical of a departure 
from some of Marx’s own work, such as in the first volume of his Capital which features 
                                                 
51 IM, 140. 
52 CEL 1, 84-85. 
53 SSW, 303. 
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chapters on the commodity, money, and the working day.
54
  What could be more ordinary 
than those things?   
Despite such parallels between Marx and Lefebvre, Lefebvre was criticized by 
some who felt he had deviated too far from the master’s work.  As Lefebvre puts it, “[t]o 
try to extricate the concept of the everyday, of everyday life does not enter precisely into 
the framework of what is called Marxism.  And I’ve certainly been told that!”55  It is 
perhaps best encapsulated by Harvey Molotch in his review of Lefebvre’s The 
Production of Space when he writes: “This is no ordinary Marxism.”56  If ordinary 
Marxism was what bored, Lefebvre would gladly break away from its intellectual 
framework erected and policed by other thinkers. 
Lefebvre advocated reading Marx’s work with fresh eyes instead of looking at it 
through someone else’s eyes.  For Lefebvre, whatever one hears about Marx should be 
immediately put into question.  Writing in 1939, Lefebvre exclaimed that “the fact 
remains that today we can and must reread Marx with fresh eyes, especially the early 
works.”57 He continues on a little later in the same text by stating that “the early writing 
of Marx become of the first importance.”58  So what does this mean for his Critique?  
Lefebvre argues that “in order to understand the modern world, it is necessary not only to 
retain some of Marx’s essential concepts but also to add new ones: the everyday day, the 
urban, social time and space, the tendency toward a state-oriented mode of production.”59  
                                                 
54 These are the basic themes for chapters 1, 3, and 10, respectively, in Capital: Volume 1 of the Penguin 
edition with the Ben Fowkes translation. 
55 ME, 23.   
56 Harvey Molotch, “The Space of Lefebvre,” Theory and Society 22(6), (December, 1993): 890. 
57 DM, 5. 
58 Ibid., 7. 
59 TLCP, 77. 
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He thought Marxism was not a singular, monolithic entity, but was in fact plural.
60
  There 
is and ought to be multiple variations of this school of thought.  His version is consistent 
with some and radically different than others.   
While discussing his version of Marxism, Lefebvre said he has “nothing in 
common with Lukács, but would be closer to Adorno.”61  While examining the parallels 
between Lefebvre and Lukács would be a fruitful endeavour, it is a project that falls well 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  However, in the case of Adorno, it is worthwhile to 
ask, how is Lefebvre close to Adorno?  In brief, both Adorno and Lefebvre were both 
20
th
 century thinkers that often employed constellations as a metaphor,
62
 both theorized 
and critiqued consumption,
63
 they were both ardent proponents of dialectical thought, 
both were highly influenced by Marx, Hegel, and Nietzsche, and so on and so on.  The 
commonalities and differences between these two thinkers could be explored in 
                                                 
60 As Lefebvre himself notes, “[t]here is no Marxism; there are several Marxisms!” ME, 22.  Elsewhere, 
Lefebvre argues “[t]here is not one Marxism but rather many Marxist tendencies, schools, trends, and 
research projects.” TLCP, 75.  Ed Soja offers a useful description of Lefebvre’s Marxism as “intentionally 
incomplete, endlessly explorable, resistant to closure or easy categorical definition, but persistently faithful 
in spirit and intent to Marx.”Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 36. For present purposes, it is important to note that Fredric 
Jameson argues that: “The central Marxist figure in the analysis of daily life is, however, Henri Lefebvre, 
whose pioneering studies in this area date back to the immediate postwar years (1947) and seem to have 
emerged independently of the phenomenological tradition.” Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso 
Press, 2009), 347. 
61 INT, 29.  Lefebvre summarizes a key difference between the two thinkers with their interpretations of 
modernity: “If you believe the negative consists solely in the other, reverse side of the positive; and, 
consequently, that it creates nothing, since it can only dissolve and decompose the positive to create space 
for what is to come, then Lukács’s peremptory critique of modernity and modern art follows.  If, on the 
other hand, you accept that the negative moment creates something new, that it summons and develops its 
seeds by dissolving what exists, then you will adopt Adorno’s position.” CEL 3, 49. 
62 Stefan Kipfer believes Lefebvre’s use of ‘constellation’ to be “a more concretely lived, less galactic 
version” than Adorno’s. “Preface to the New Edition,” In DM, xxiv.  On Adorno’s use of constellation, 
Susan Buck-Morss notes that he actually “brought it down to earth” from Walter Benjamin’s use of it.  The 
Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New 
York: The Free Press, 1977), 93.  If Buck-Morss is taken seriously, it would seem as though Adorno’s 
usage of constellation is in fact ‘concretely lived’, and thus much closer to Lefebvre’s than Kipfer 
acknowledges.   
63 Gardiner, Critiques of Everyday Life, 89. 
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numerous volumes.
64
  For present purposes, it is worthwhile nothing that in his preface to 
the first volume of Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life, Michel Trebitsch writes that the 
“critique of everyday life is more of a prefigurement of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics.”65  
One could also say that Lefebvre’s term ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ 
parallels Adorno and Horkheimer’s concept of the ‘culture industry’.66  In an essay on 
Lefebvre’s aesthetics, Thomas Davis notes how Lefebvre’s references to modern art and 
literature “bear more than a family resemblance to Adorno’s writings on art and music.”67  
In his commentary on Davis’ essay, Ben Highmore, too, sees parallels between Adorno’s 
negative dialectics and Lefebvre’s critique.68  One of Lefebvre’s biographers, Rémi Hess, 
believed that Adorno was “incontestablement le philosophe allemand le plus proche de 
Lefebvre,”69 which roughly translates to: “unquestionably, the German philosopher 
closest to Lefebvre” was Adorno.  
One last point to be made is the similar assertions on realizing philosophy 
respectively made by both Lefebvre and Adorno.  Here are two passages in succession by 
the two intellectuals that demonstrate the parallels.  1) Lefebvre writes: “Because of its 
                                                 
64 While this dissertation will make considerable use of Adorno’s work, especially in the final chapter, his 
oeuvre is far too complex and diverse to develop many of his intellectual parallels with Lefebvre in detail.  
Such a project falls well outside the scope of this dissertation.  While certain continuities have been noted 
above, it must be acknowledged here that the discontinuous elements largely go unmentioned.   As one 
example of a discontinuity, Lefebvre once wrote that he “cannot think exactly like those who were friends 
of Thomas Mann.”  TLCP, 76.  Adorno was one such friend of Mann’s.  This is clear in their frequent 
exchange of letters.  For this, see Adorno and Mann’s Correspondence: 1943-1955, ed. Henri Lonitz 
(Malden, MA: Polity, 2006).  Adorno would perhaps have argued that Lefebvre misunderstood Mann.  As a 
friend, Adorno argued that Mann was not what he appeared on the surface: “What people hold against 
Thomas Mann, taking it for decadence, was its opposite, nature’s capacity to be mindful of itself as 
something fragile.  Humanness is none other than that.” Adorno, “Toward a Portrait of Thomas Mann,” 
Notes to Literature, Volume Two, 19. 
65 Michel Trebitsch, “Preface,” CEL 1, xviii. 
66 This parallel will be explored further as the central theme of the fifth chapter in this dissertation. 
67 Thomas S. Davis, “What true project has been lost?: Modern Art and Henri Lefebvre’s Critique of 
Everyday Life,” Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross (London: Routledge, 2009), 
66. 
68 Ben Highmore, “Disdained Everyday Fields: Response to Thomas S. Davis,” In Ibid., 83. 
69 Rémi Hess, Henri Lefebvre et l’aventure du siècle (Paris: Éditions A.M. Métailié, 1988), 308 
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failure to supersede itself by fulfilling itself – or by fulfilling the aims and aspirations of 
philosophers by superseding abstract philosophical thought – philosophy finds itself in a 
difficult situation.  It goes on seesawing between system and experiment, between state 
ideology and anarchizing critique.”70  2) Adorno begins his Negative Dialectics in a 
similar manner by stating that “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on 
because the moment to realize it was missed.”71  The common thread between these two 
passages is the utopian potentiality of philosophy becoming fully lived, which has not yet 
happened, or may never happen.  The source of inspiration for both theorists is Marx’s 
infamous 11th thesis on Feuerbach, part of Marx’s ‘early writings’: “The philosophers 
have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”72  
Further to this, an echo of Lefebvre’s position to be outlined below can be found in 
Adorno’s Minima Moralia when he writes: “What the philosophers once knew as life has 
become the sphere of private existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as 
an appendage of the process of material production, without autonomy or substance of its 
own.”73  An emptiness, or absence in life, everyday life, seems to be an ever present 
reality for the two authors, and it is one brought on by the onset of modernity, or, as 
Adorno puts it above, by “the process of material production” commonly understood as 
                                                 
70 CEL 2, 23. 
71 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 3.  Lefebvre cites this passage approvingly in TLCP, 84. 
72 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1978), 145.  Writing directly about this passage, Lefebvre argues that philosophy is 
essential for changing the world.  He writes: “Philosophers have interpreted the world: now it must be 
changed; can this change be accomplished without philosophy?  No, because it consists in the practical 
realization of what philosophers have only thought of or represented: freedom, happiness, knowledge, joy.” 
KW, 202. 
73 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 15.  On the same page, Adorno mentions that he is presenting a ‘melancholy 
science’, Ibid.  Lefebvre refers to Adorno’s concept in the third volume of his Critique as follows: “The 
myth of transparency and its ideology end thus: the substitution of a melancholy science for lived 
experience and a gay science; the administration of daily life according to models, modes and modalities 
that are mimetically connected.” CEL 3, 161.  Although only mentioned in passing, I argue that such an 
allusion is further evidence that a serious study of the parallels between Lefebvre and Adorno ought to be 
undertaken. 
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industrialization.  To grasp the absence, it is important that the discussion now turns to 
what is present in everyday life.  
Boredom-Modernity-Everyday Life 
The conceptual triad of boredom-modernity-everyday life guides this section.  In 
order to grasp the complexity of boredom and its relationship to modernity and everyday 
life, it would be beneficial to first articulate the relationship between modernity and 
everyday life.  So, beginning with the latter two concepts, it must be asked again, what is 
the interrelationship between modernity and the everyday?  In his book Everyday Life in 
the Modern World, Lefebvre articulates the interrelationship as follows: 
The quotidian is what is humble and solid, what is taken for granted and that of 
which all the parts follow each other in such a regular, unvarying succession that 
those concerned have no call to question their sequence; thus it is undated and 
(apparently) insignificant; thought it occupies and preoccupies it is practically 
untellable, and it is the ethics underlying routine and the aesthetics of familiar 
settings.  At this point it encounters the modern.  This word stands for what is 
novel, brilliant, paradoxical and bears the imprint of technicality and worldliness; 
it is (apparently) daring and transitory, proclaims its initiative and is acclaimed for 
it; it is art and aestheticism – not readily discernible in so-called modern 
spectacles or in the spectacle of the modern world makes of itself to itself.  The 
quotidian and the modern mark and mask, legitimate and counterbalance each 
other.
74
 
 
What has been missing from the conceptual triad of boredom-modernity-everyday life is 
the problematic concept of the postmodern.  Although Lefebvre has made the 
connections between everyday life and modernity, how does he deal with those who 
argue we are in a new era of postmodernity?
75
  To answer this question, Lefebvre begins 
by asking:  
How can we avoid the conclusion that the alternative – modernity or 
                                                 
74 ELMW, 24. 
75 Fredric Jameson makes the point that “[n]o ‘theory’ of modernity makes sense today unless it comes to 
terms with the hypothesis of a postmodern break with the modern.” A Singular Modernity: Essay on the 
Ontology of the Present (London: Verso Press, 2002), 94. 
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postmodernity – is false?  Posed in this way, the question avoids the main thing: 
technological modernism, its import, its capacity for intervention in daily life; and 
the related problem, which is simultaneously theoretical and political, of 
controlling technology.  Meanwhile, daily life goes on.
76
  
 
While Lefebvre was skeptical of the postmodern as an era and a concept, there are several 
insights that can be gleaned from studies that use the postmodern as the point(s) of 
departure.  For example, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner’s trilogy on the postmodern is 
easily one of the most thorough studies available on the subject matter.  Their work can 
be stitched at the end of some of Lefebvre’s open threads of argumentation.  The 
following passage from the first volume of the trilogy is an example of this. 
Modernity entered everyday life through the dissemination of modern art, the 
products of consumer society, new technologies, and new modes of transportation 
and communication.  The dynamics by which modernity produced a new 
industrial and colonial world can be described as ‘modernization’ – a term 
denoting those processes of individualization, secularization, industrialization, 
cultural differentiation, commodification, urbanization, bureaucratization, and 
rationalization which together have constituted the modern world.
77
    
 
This linking of modernity and everyday life by Best and Kellner can be grafted onto the 
following overview of what they call postmodern culture: “Within postmodern culture, 
subjects wear designer jeans or cruise the Internet hour after hour yet remain lonely and 
unhappy; the spectacle is ubiquitous, but people are still bored; everyday life is shit and 
people know it.”78 Whether labelled as modern or postmodern, one thing is clear: the 
everyday persists.   
An important question to ask at this point is: What is the difference between life 
and everyday life in Lefebvre’s thought?  After all, as Lefebvre scholar Rob Shields puts 
                                                 
76 CEL 3, 50.  Despite his unwillingness to adopt postmodernity as a concept, Lefebvre theorized the 
“reign” of modernity, when its effects were most prevalent, as lasting from the beginning of the twentieth 
century up until the early 1980s.  CEL 3, 46.  With this, in Lefebvre’s work there is the possibility of 
modernity’s end. 
77 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory, 2-3. 
78 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner. The Postmodern Turn (New York: The Guilford Press, 1997), 116.   
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it in his book Lefebvre, Love & Struggle: “To criticise everyday life is to begin to theorise 
the complaint that ‘life is boring’.”79  So is everyday life synonymous with life or is there 
a difference?  To Lefebvre, “daily life does not exhaust lived experience, for there is 
lived experience outside it: above and/or below it.”80  There are two ways to read this 
statement.  The first is that those entrenched in the fabric of everyday life are thrown into 
exceptional events that transcend the dull horizon of the everyday and, therefore, there is 
more to life than everyday life.  Tragedy falls outside the scope of the everyday.  The 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 in the United States are examples of this.
81
  The everyday life of 
those people in the twin towers, along with countless other sympathetic people around the 
world, was shattered as the two planes smashed into the buildings.
82
  The second way to 
                                                 
79 Shields, Lefebvre, Love & Struggle, 66. 
80 CEL 3, 11. 
81 This event inaugurated what has come to be known as the ‘War on Terror’.  Martin Amis has written that 
this event also inaugurated an intense and widespread boredom.  Amis writes: “The age of terror, I suspect, 
will also be remembered as the age of boredom.  Not the kind of boredom that afflicts the blasé and the 
effete, but a superboredom, rounding out and complementing the superterror of suicide-mass murder.” In 
“Terror and Boredom: The Dependent Mind,” The Second Plane, 76.  Modern warfare has been linked with 
boredom before.  For example, in a diary entry dated July 25th 1940, Virginia Woolf complains about the 
boredom of World War II.  She writes: “This war inflicts boredom endlessly.” The Diary of Virginia Woolf, 
Volume 5, 305.  Additionally, Jean Baudrillard has argued that the Gulf War “ended in general boredom” 
for those that followed it on television.  The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, 62.  The boredom of war is not 
restricted to civilians.  Lefebvre has noted how “there is a saying that army life is made up of a lot of 
boredom and a couple dangerous moments.” CEL 2, 42.  For an in-depth examination of the long history of 
military boredom, see Bård Meland and Paul Otto Brunstad, Enduring Military Boredom: From 1750 to the 
Present.   
82 For Lefebvre, tragic events such as this exit the everyday.  He writes: “[t]he tragic is the non-everyday, 
the anti-everyday.” CEL 3, 172.  Incidentally, Jean Baudrillard claims that the terrorists “used the banality 
of American everyday life as cover and camouflage” in order to perpetrate their crimes. The Spirit of 
Terrorism, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso Press, 2003), 19.  This particular book by Baudrillard is 
notable for the topic of boredom, although he does not use the word in it.  Walter Kirn’s New York Times 
Book Review essay discusses the plethora of books on the topic of 9/11 that were available shortly after the 
even took place, and midway through the review he singles out Baudrillard’s text.  Kirn writes: “First prize 
for cerebral cold-bloodedness goes to French philosopher Jean Baudrillard. … It takes a rare, demonic 
genius to brush off the slaughter of thousands on the grounds that they were suffering from severe ennui 
brought about by boring modern architecture.” See his September 8th, 2002 review on page 7 of the Times 
Review Section titled “Notes on the Darkest Day: Book After Book Offers on the Terrain so Violently 
Altered on Sept. 11, 2001,” or see the back of Baudrillard’s book where the above quote is reproduced by 
the publisher in order to sell it!  Of course, Baudrillard was not the first to link the Twin Towers with 
boredom.  It may come as a surprise to Kim that a former employee of The New York Times, Pulitzer Prize 
winner Paul Goldberger, described the World Trade Center buildings in 1973 as “boring, so utterly banal as 
to be unworthy of a bank in Omaha.”  Quoted in Jencks, The New Paradigm in Architecture, 265.   
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read Lefebvre’s claim that lived experience falls outside of everyday life is based on the 
concept of class.  That is, those who live in squalor are below the level of the everyday, 
whereas billionaires who live on mounds of money do not have the same repetitive 
routines or schedules as those embedded in the everyday.  The former are referred to as 
“rejects” that live at the level of “infra-daily life” whereas the latter “Olympians” live at 
the “supra-daily life” level.83 Lefebvre’s terminology here is used in a facetious manner.  
He neither lauds the Olympians nor does he deplore the rejects.  With this, it appears that 
everyday life is, therefore, not all things to all people.  Although, it should be highlighted 
that in the first volume of his Critique Lefebvre seems to equate “life as a whole” with 
everyday life.
84
  The shift in perspective demonstrates the movement in Lefebvre’s 
thought from the first volume of his Critique published in the 1940s to the third volume 
published in the 1980s.  In summation, Lefebvre’s evolved position on the pervasiveness 
on the everyday can be summarized in the following passage.  Lefebvre writes: “Thus, 
there are countries and peoples, in the grip of deprivation and need, which must be said to 
exist ‘short of’ the everyday realm, because they can only aspire to a firmly grounded 
everyday life.”85     
So what, then, is Lefebvre’s general conception of everyday life?  First, it should 
be mentioned that, according to Lefebvre, everyday life is the historically specific mode, 
                                                 
83 CEL 3, 87.  If broadly defined, the ‘middle-class’ is an appropriate term here.  Although, this is not exact, 
as Lefebvre’s work also applies to those traditionally referred to as ‘working class’.  In Lefebvre’s 
formulation, the middle class are the people who are not exceedingly rich or devastatingly poor.  The purest 
example for Lefebvre and his study of everyday life, however, is not the entire middle class, but “in the 
middle of this middle” class. CEL 3, 160.  Regarding the middle-class and boredom, Erich Fromm asks 
some penetrating questions that mesh well with Lefebvre’s work.  Fromm asks:  “Could it be that the 
middle-class life of prosperity, while satisfying our material needs leaves us with a feeling of intense 
boredom, and that suicide and alcoholism are pathological ways of escape from this boredom?  Could it be 
[an] illustration for the truth of the statement that ‘man lives not by bread alone,’ and that […] modern 
civilization fails to satisfy profound needs in man?  If so, what are these needs?” The Sane Society, 10-11. 
84 CEL 1, 199. 
85 PS, 415. 
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or modes, of life produced and reproduced within the processes of modernity.  That is, 
although there has always been ‘daily life’, the processes of modernity resulted in a new 
experience of time and space, with new routines, new technologies, a new emphasis on 
leisure, and therefore transformed daily life into everyday life.  Lefebvre argues that 
in industrial society, the everyday manifests itself as a discrete level.  In previous 
societies, everyday life was incomparably more integrated into the culture as a 
whole – into religious life, for example; it was not separate from it.  In our society 
there is an increasing disparity between the level of the everyday and higher 
levels – those of politics and the State, high technology, or high culture, for 
instance.  The gap is widening and helps to define the everyday as such, as a 
level.  Furthermore, at the same time as it is gradually becoming defined as a 
level, the everyday is spreading and leveling out throughout industrial society, in 
all countries, and in all the cultures that are subordinate to industrial society; and 
it is becoming uniform, in other words, defined.
86
 
 
Lefebvre uses a screen as a metaphor to illustrate the problematic.  The everyday is a 
screen in both senses of the word in which it both conceals and reveals the modern 
world.
87
   
Quite generally, Lefebvre’s project was an attempt to decode the modern world 
via the concept of the everyday, or, keeping with the metaphor of the screen, to see what 
it shows as well as what it conceals.   No small task by any stretch of the imagination, 
Lefebvre was not attempting to singlehandedly divulge the secrets of the world, he 
simply wanted to provide what he saw as a way in for not only himself but all of society.  
He lays out his object of analysis in the first volume of his Critique as follows: 
Everyday life, in a sense residual, defined by ‘what is left over’ after all distinct, 
superior, specialized, structured activities have been singled out by analysis, must 
be defined as a totality.  Considered in their specialization and their technicality, 
superior activities leave a ‘technical vacuum’ between one another which is filled 
up by everyday life.  Everyday life is profoundly related to all activities, and 
encompasses them with all their differences and their conflicts; it is their meeting 
place, their bond, their common ground.  And it is in everyday life that the sum 
                                                 
86 KW, 100-101. 
87 TLCP, 78. 
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total of relations which make the human – and everyday human being – a whole 
takes its shape and its form.
88
   
 
This is an oft quoted passage that anyone familiar with the secondary literature on 
Lefebvre and/or everyday life will perhaps recognize.
89
  Instead of tarrying too long on 
this well trodden ground, there are two issues in this passage that out to be highlighted: 
‘totality’ and ‘what is left over’.   
First, the concept of totality is strewn throughout Lefebvre’s work on everyday 
life.
90
  It is something that Lefebvre felt could never be grasped by a single discipline (or 
person), as they isolated facts and inevitably blurred the concept of totality.   Along the 
lines of Clifford Geertz, Lefebvre advocated a ‘blurring of genres’91 to confront the 
totality of everyday life.  Although, it should be mentioned, utilizing a complex concept 
such as totality was no guarantee for making everyday life any clearer or simpler.  
Rather, totality is the virtually unattainable goal that presents almost “insurmountable 
difficulties.”92  It is akin to reaching for the stars knowing full well that one would most 
likely never be able to touch them.  It was simply a concept that Lefebvre thought we 
could not do without
93
 and attempting to confront it is a necessary part of understanding 
everyday life in the modern world. 
                                                 
88 CEL 1, 97. 
89 See Gardiner, Critiques of Everyday Life, 79; Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, 115; 
Moran, Interdisciplinarity, 68; Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London: 
Verso Press, 1995), 191-192; Mark Poster, “Everyday (Virtual) Life,” New Literary History 33(4), 
(Autumn, 2002): 745. 
90 Martin Jay’s book Marxism & Totality features a chapter on surrealism and Lefebvre’s use of the term 
‘totality’.  However, Jay pays scant attention to Lefebvre and instead focuses on surrealism and other 
authors. See chapter 9 in Jay’s Marxism & Totality: the Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 276-299. 
91 See Clifford Geertz, “Blurring Genres: the Refiguration of Social Thought,” Interdisciplinarity: Essays 
from the Literature, ed. William H. Newell (New York: The College Board, 1998), 225-237. 
92 CEL 2, 186. 
93 Ibid., 180. 
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Second, there is the related issue of what is ‘left over’.  This is a key aspect of 
whether one buys in to studying everyday life, or whether everyday life is relegated to the 
dustbin of scholarship.  There are essentially three perspectives on this matter.  To a 
metaphysician everything is left over and this concept lacks precision.  To positivists or 
scientists, nothing, or virtually nothing, is left over as everything is already accounted for.  
To Lefebvre and those who accept everyday life as a concept, there is simply something 
left.
94
  Is Lefebvre promoting an elitist view where he and similar thinkers are alone in 
seeing the world as it really is?  No, Lefebvre was clear in his work that he did not see 
people as ignorant to everyday life, but were much closer to being indifferent.
95
  
Everyday people, or ordinary people,
96
 are all too aware of their mundane routines, but 
do not reflect in depth on what they are or why they came about.  Most people simply do 
not have the time to formulate a well documented, well researched critique.  Then again, 
perhaps they do have the time, but they choose to fill their blocks of leisure time with 
other things.  Adorno would certainly disagree that people can freely choose what to do 
with their free time.  He writes: “If people were able to make their own decisions about 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 46-47. 
95 Lefebvre attributes this indifference towards the everyday to the everyday itself.  He writes: “Habit and 
familiarity gradually dull our curiosity and bring, not peace, but a comforting indifference.” CEL 1, 243.  
Further to this point of indifference and not ignorance, elsewhere Lefebvre states that “People today are no 
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themselves and their lives, if they were not caught up in the realm of the eversame, they 
would not have to be bored.  Boredom is the reflection of objective dullness.”97  
Critiquing everyday life does not “make life’s problems any simpler,”98 but 
Lefebvre would argue it is a step in the right direction.  Lefebvre articulated the necessity 
for an integrative approach by illustrating the complexity of the modern world with the 
following passage: “The human world is not defined simply by the historical, by culture, 
by totality or society as a whole, or by ideological and political superstructures.  It is 
defined by this intermediate and mediating level: everyday life.”99  He drew upon diverse 
sources such as the films of Charlie Chaplin, the theatre of Bertolt Brecht, novels like 
James Joyce’s Ulysses, daily newspapers both local and international, magazines (most 
notably Elle magazine which helped initiate the study of everyday life), commodities 
such as dish soap, the physical landscape, and many others.  These can be “everyday facts 
such as furniture, objects and the world of objects, time-tables, news items, 
advertisements,”100 etc.  With this, Lefebvre demonstrated that the study of everyday life 
is not only about examining what is on the margins, or minor works in comparison to 
major works, but it is also about studying the minor in major works.  Perhaps most 
importantly, Lefebvre offers a utopian longing for change throughout his academic work, 
as he believes “[t]o study the everyday is to wish to change it.”101  
 Ulysses 
 Keeping with one of the major works highlighted above, the perennial example of 
the everyday for Lefebvre is none other than what Marshall Berman refers to as “the 
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archetypal modernist book,”102 James Joyce’s novel Ulysses.  There is a great affinity 
between an incredibly detailed novel and the vastness of everyday life.  To Lefebvre, 
“[t]he novel accepts the everyday; it narrates it.”103  There is no surprise, then, that 
Lefebvre used a novel as the epitome of everyday life.  To Lefebvre, Joyce’s canonical 
text is not only the archetypal book of modernity, but it is also the archetypal book of 
everyday life.  In the first volume of his Critique, Lefebvre describes Joyce’s masterpiece 
as follows: “Ulysses demonstrates that a great novel can be boring.  And ‘profoundly’ 
boring.  Joyce nevertheless understood one thing: that the report of a day in the life of an 
ordinary man had to be predominantly in the epic mode.”104  Here the conceptual triad of 
boredom-modernity-everyday life that made its debut at the beginning of this chapter 
takes shape.  In another text, Lefebvre writes that in Ulysses “the quotidian steals the 
show.”105  In yet another text, Lefebvre emphasizes Joyce’s impact on his home country 
of France: “Joyce, an Irish writer who had enormous influence in France, really 
established the idea of daily life in literature.  Ulysses is twenty-four hours in the life of 
an ordinary.  Many writers call themselves existentialists, but in reality they are 
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continuing Joyce’s exploration of the everyday.”106  Further to this point, Fredric 
Jameson has argued that “in Ulysses Joyce invented the single day as a new category of 
lived experience.”107 
 How is it so that one of the most important modernist books is profoundly boring?  
Bertrand Russell has noted that “all the best novels contain boring passages,”108 but select 
passages are a far cry from the scope of an entire book, especially one as lengthy as 
Ulysses.  The German philosopher Novalis once argued “many books are longer than 
they seem.  They have indeed no end.  The boredom that they cause is truly absolute and 
infinite.”109  This is all fine and good for an amateur novelist who gives his or her 
‘magnum opus’ to anyone and everyone that he or she can persuade into reading it, but 
we are talking about James Joyce here.
110
  Are there others who share Lefebvre’s belief 
that Ulysses is profoundly boring? Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is yes.  Joyce 
scholar John Nash argues that “boredom might be thought of as one of the conditions of 
Joyce’s Dublin.”111 Boredom, then, as a condition of Dublin, is no minor phenomenon.  It 
may appear as such since the actual word ‘boredom’ is not used in the book.  Perhaps this 
is why, following Jonathan Culler’s line of argumentation, overall, critical discussions 
about literary works regarding this particular phenomenon are sorely lacking. 
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[T]he concept of boredom is as frequent in the experience of reading major works 
as it is infrequent in the critical discussions of them.  Or, at least, when critics do 
use it, it becomes an empty gesture of rejection.  But boredom is a literary 
category of the first importance; it is the background against which the activity of 
reading takes place and which continually threatens to engulf it.  The strategies of 
reading and interpretation must be understood as attempts to avoid boredom, and, 
on the other hand, boredom itself is a literary device whose usefulness modern 
literature has increasingly forced us to appreciate.  To recognize the potential 
sources of boredom in a work and the different rhythms of reading which can be 
used to neutralize them is to discover important facts about its structure.
112
  
 
Clearly, with books such as Spacks’s Boredom: the Literary History of a State of Mind, 
acknowledging boredom in literary works has changed since 1977 when Culler penned 
the above passage.
113
  With this, even the most noteworthy of literature can be considered 
boring. 
While discussing important literary works, Fredric Jameson recounts a brief 
conversation he had with a fellow author from China. “As Deng You-mei, one of the 
most interesting Chinese writers, said to me: ‘We are not much interested in Western 
modernism as such.  We are bored by novels that don’t tell stories.’  In other words, the 
elaborate symbolism you find in James Joyce or Virginia Woolf doesn’t do anything for 
them.”114 But are these two perspectives mutually exclusive?  Can a novel be both boring 
and full of elaborate symbolism at the same time?  It would appear that Jameson has 
already answered this question in his essay ‘Ulysses in History’.  In the first paragraph of 
the essay, Jameson explains the relationship between Ulysses and boredom: 
I had it in mind, in what follows, to say something about the two most boring 
chapters of Ulysses: most people would agree that these are surely the Eumaeus 
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and the Ithaca chapters, the scene in the cabmen’s shelter and the catechism.  I 
have found, however, that in order to do that properly one must necessarily speak 
about the rest in some detail so that finally those parts are greatly reduced.  One of 
the things such a subject leads you to consider, however, is boredom itself and its 
proper use when we are dealing with literary texts of this kind, and in particular 
the classical texts of high modernism or even postmodernism […] I think there is 
a productive use of such boredom, which tells us something interesting about 
ourselves as well as about the world in which we live today – but I also mean to 
use this word in a far less positive sense, so I will do that first and say that if there 
are boring chapters of Ulysses, with which we must somehow learn to live, there 
are also boring interpretations of Ulysses, and those we can really make an effort 
to do without, sixty years after its publication, and in a social and global situation 
so radically different from that in which the canonical readings of this text were 
invented.
115
 
 
Perhaps one can infer from Jameson’s dismissal of boring interpretations of Ulysses as 
being characterized by those who fail to see the boredom in it.  Referring to James 
Joyce’s Ulysses as boring is only scandalous if boredom is viewed as a superficial 
experience, unworthy of attention, consideration, or extended reflection.   
In her book Modernism and the Ordinary, Liesl Olson begins her chapter on 
Joyce by saying “[t]o explore how the ordinary functions in literary modernism without 
examining Ulysses would be like describing the weather outside without noting the 
temperature.”116  The point to be emphasized here is that the lofty status of Joyce’s book 
is not in question; rather, the ordinary becomes extraordinary in this work, which is 
undoubtedly why Lefebvre frequently employed it as an example.  Jameson, too, believes 
that “boredom is not Joyce’s failure, then, but rather his success, and is the signal 
whereby we ourselves as organisms register a situation but also forms that are finally 
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stifling for us.”117  Evidently, Joyce was not alone with this literary technique, as some of 
his fellow writers, too, utilized an atmosphere of boredom in their novels as Joe Moran 
makes clear:   
Modernist classics like James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) and Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. 
Dalloway (1925) also use the structure of a single day in a modern city to 
juxtapose the profound and the banal, the weightiest matters of life and death with 
the most trivial quotidian detail.  All these books use chronology as a great 
leveller, a way of deferring the question of whether these familiar activities are 
significant enough to write about.  In the structure of a single day, everything 
receives roughly the same amount of attention – however dull or boring it might 
at first seem.
118
 
 
Further to this point, Susan Sontag argues that “[w]e should acknowledge certain uses of 
boredom as one of the most creative stylistic features of modern literature.”119  With this, 
it would seem that creating an atmosphere of boredom is a highly skilled endeavour.  The 
immense effort it takes to properly articulate the depth and pervasiveness of everyday life 
should not go unrecognized.   
At the same time, however, it seems to be fairly easy to make something boring.  
As mentioned above, amateur novelists around the world bore their relatives and 
coworkers all the time with their dull and repetitive stories.  It would seem appropriate, 
then, to differentiate between a work that intends demonstrate boredom and others that 
are boring despite their best efforts.  Perhaps it goes without saying, but there are those 
who firmly believe boredom is literature’s enemy.   
If the reader were given the whole story, and there were nothing left for him to do, 
then his imagination would never enter the field, the result would be the boredom 
which inevitably arises when everything is laid out cut and dried before us.  A 
literary text must therefore be conceived in such a way that it will engage the 
reader's imagination in the task of working things out for himself, for reading is 
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only a pleasure when it is active and creative. In this process of creativity, the text 
may either not go far enough, or may go too far, so we may say that boredom and 
overstrain form the boundaries beyond which the reader will leave the field of 
play.
120
 
 
The Argentine writer Marcos Aguinis would surely disagree with the usefulness of 
boredom for literature.  Speaking about the writing process (specifically the myriad 
changes employed throughout his works), he says: “When I am asked about it, I say that I 
change characters and scenes for reasons of courtesy, so as not to bore my reader.  But if 
I dare to confess the truth, I say that I do it so I don’t bore myself.  Boredom, in my 
judgment, is the worst of all sins.”121  Setting aside Aguinis’s assertion of boredom as a 
sin, which the first chapter attempted to debunk as a possibility, Aguinis makes a fairly 
salient point.  After all, who picks up a novel to be bored?  One usually picks up a novel 
to stave off boredom, not induce it.  Recall the gentleman mentioned in the first chapter 
who carries a book with him wherever he goes so he does not have to face boredom. 
As for Lefebvre’s assertion that Ulysses is ‘profoundly boring’ in the first volume 
of his Critique, it is important to note that with the next line the text abruptly shifts to 
another topic.  In the very next paragraph Lefebvre moves on to discuss Anglo-Saxon 
humour.  Why does humour follow boredom here?  And why is it specifically Anglo-
Saxon humour?  Granted, this may appear to be a bit of a non-sequitur, but when read 
alongside a passage from his book Introduction to Modernity, the transition becomes 
clear. 
Irony and humour are close neighbours, but they should not be confused.  The 
Anglo-Saxons have a humorous vision of that enormous ennui which 
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characterizes their social life, and which raises fears for the future of ‘industrial 
society’.  They need this sense of humour; it makes the boredom bearable.  
Humour can soften a situation, then go on its way.  Humour manages to 
metamorphose the ennui of everyday life – almost.  It may fail to transform it 
completely, but it makes it more decorative, and so henceforth the man who is 
bored can at least find his boredom enjoyable.  He lives a life of well-being 
without pressing problems and devoid of all romance, and he cannot decide 
whether to feel comfortable or merely bored, a dilemma for which humour offers 
him a kind of solution.  In any sociology of boredom, the study of Anglo-Saxon 
humour would bulk large.  Humour resolves the conflictual situation, though the 
resolution is not a lasting one.  Irony, of course, would emphasize it.  It would 
reveal the appalling state of all those decent folk who have every reason to be 
happy (comfort, a multiplicity of satisfactions), who are not only bored but also 
acutely aware that it is unfair that they should be so.
122
 
 
This passage gives insight into both boredom and, I believe, Lefebvre’s writing style.123  
In the foreword to the English translation of Lefebvre’s book The Urban Revolution Neil 
Smith suggests that Lefebvre’s style is like a “stream of philosophical consciousness.”124  
Albeit without explicitly stating so, it seems as though Smith is likening Lefebvre’s 
philosophizing to Molly Bloom’s stream of consciousness narrative at the end of Ulysses.  
Although Smith believes Lefebvre “rarely if ever provides a linear argument,” Smith 
acknowledges that there is a “larger picture” at work.125  As mentioned above, the first 
volume of Lefebvre’s Critique is “allusive.”  When fragments are culled together from 
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his writings, allusive passages become sharper and clearer.  When assembled, the 
fragments may still appear as ‘allusive’, but not ‘elusive’.  The link between Anglo-
Saxon humour and boredom appears elsewhere in his work in a similarly random way: 
Today there are so many worlds in the world that one more won’t make a 
difference, so I’ll add another, the world of respect: the world of state and of 
bureaucrats who cannot stand irony, the world of being ‘decent’, which turns a 
blind eye to public or private immorality.  And it’s nothing new.  Moralism, the 
moralism of moral order, has always gone hand in hand with immoralism.  Being 
‘decent’ as a general and generally accepted virtue has always gone side by side 
with cynicism as a type of general reality and consciousness.  The one disguises 
the other, completing it, making it bearable.  Will cynicism one day become the 
humour of this ‘decent’ society?  Will we treat our po-faced ‘decency’ in the same 
way as the Anglo-Saxons deal with their traditional boredom?  Could that be the 
road we will travel, the French road to ennui?
126
 
 
Before one can travel on the road to ennui, it first and foremost has to be produced.  But 
why does boredom persist when there are so many things that combat it?  As Lefebvre 
noted, Anglo-Saxon humour is only a temporary relief from the boredom of everyday 
life.  The same temporary relief, though helpful in living one’s life, masks the deeper 
issue of an absence of style in the everyday.     
The Erosion of Style in Everyday Life 
 As was mentioned above, and denoted by the title of this chapter, style is 
important to Lefebvre as far as the study of everyday life is concerned, but it is absolutely 
essential for understanding his fragmented theory of boredom.
127
  Style is here not simply 
meant in the sense of designer clothes, fast cars, or expensive homes, but in the sense of 
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the totality of everyday life.
128
  These items are, nevertheless, essential components for 
understanding the distinction between what people are looking for and what they get, 
which is, at its roots, the distinction between style and mass culture.   
 Throughout everyday life in the modern world, through leisure activities and 
routines, people seek a style of living that is ultimately shrouded by mass culture.  Under 
the guise of style, mass culture comes to dominate and colonise everyday life.  This, it is 
argued, occurs beneath the attention of consumers despite their best intentions.  As 
Lefebvre puts it, “leisure involves an original search – whether clumsy or skilful is 
unimportant – for a style of living.  And perhaps for an art of living, for a kind of 
happiness.”129  Temporary happiness may be achieved, yet the eternal happiness 
promised by mass culture conversely offers but a fleeting satisfaction despite the promise 
of a unique style of life.  Lefebvre argues that “[s]tyle has degenerated into culture – 
subdivided into everyday culture for the masses and higher culture.”130  The basic 
definition of style can be found in the third volume of his Critique where he writes: “The 
term ‘style’ refers to an aesthetic or ethical bearing in which the middle classes are 
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precisely lacking.  As for lifestyle, it is easily defined: it is the everyday itself.”131  
 The longing for a style of life permeates all of Lefebvre’s writings on everyday 
life, and in many other places as well.  It is a recurring, persistent concern for Lefebvre 
not only as a theoretical exercise, but, more importantly, as a vital component for the 
practical revolution of everyday life.  To demonstrate its ubiquity in his writings, 
consider the following four passages from four different texts written by Lefebvre:  
In ancient societies, one ate, one drank, one worked; there were houses, streets 
and rooms, pieces of furniture, useful objects, instruments and other things.  Yet 
there was not ‘everydayness’.  In the unity of ethics and aesthetics, or practice and 
knowledge, in a style, the contemporary levels [la superposition actuelle] of the 
everyday and ‘culture’ (high, medium, low) had neither reason, nor sense [n’avait 
ni raison, ni sens].
132
  
 
Once upon a time there was a sad, restricted, oppressed existence.  The land 
divided into a thousand and one domains, was ruled by King God and Queen 
Death.  Yet derelict and oppressed as it was, the existence never lacked style; 
basically religious or metaphysical (does the basic ideology matter?), style 
reigned and permeated every aspect…. Were we to continue this story we would 
see that these people lived in extreme poverty but were nevertheless snug and 
warm.
133
 
 
More generally, in so far as ‘modernity’ is part and parcel of economic or 
technological growth and the processes of accumulation, it cannot produce a style.  
Instead it spends its time struggling against the boredom of the absence of style, 
or trying to turn the clock back, exhuming old styles, myths and symbols from a 
pre-capitalist past.
134
 
 
Is this a lifestyle, or is it life unequivocally stripped of all style?  Although we 
would tend towards the second of these hypotheses, it is still too early to reach a 
decision; scrutiny of these hypotheses and this problem is part of the sociology of 
boredom…135 
 
These four passages mark a shift from pre-modern times to modernity.  The common 
thread implicitly running throughout is the search for a style of life.  Lars Svendsen notes 
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that searching for a style of life is a replacement for old traditions. 
A central motif in modernity is the liberation from tradition.  Traditions have been 
replaced by lifestyles.  The concept of a lifestyle sounds trivial, but it is crucial for 
understanding modern life.  A lifestyle is essentially a set of practices maintained 
for a period of time.  Modern man must choose a lifestyle, but, as it is based on a 
choice, one can simply choose to replace one lifestyle by another.
136
 
 
 Aside from being a persistent thought for Lefebvre, what can be gleaned from 
these four passages that share the common thread of an absence of style in everyday life?  
First, it is clear that style once existed.  In pre-modern times there was an abundance of 
style in life.  This was before capitalism and therefore before modernity.  With the advent 
of modernity, style of life dwindled and in its place what has come to be known as 
everyday life, that is, in its modern sense, began to take shape.   
Before the series of revolutions which ushered in what is called the modern era, 
housing, modes of dress, eating and drinking – in short, living – presented a 
prodigious diversity.  Not subordinate to any one system, living varied according 
to region and country, levels and classes of the population, available resources, 
season, climate, profession, age, and sex.  This diversity has never been well 
acknowledged or recognized as such; it has resisted a rational kind of 
interpretation which has only come about in our time by interfering with and 
destroying that diversity.  Today we see a worldwide tendency to uniformity.  
Rationality dominates, accompanied but not diversified by irrationality; signs, 
rational in their way, are attached to things in order to convey the prestige of their 
possessors and their place in the hierarchy.
137
 
 
The withering away of style in life brings with it a quest for a style as well.  This is a 
dialectical movement.  With the absence of style emerges the experience of boredom and 
the quest for style brings with it a temporary solution.  For Lefebvre, permanent solutions 
can be had, but they require a revolution in everyday life.  A revolution is here meant as a 
radical change, as opposed to a slight shift, which can only be referred to as a reform. 
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 In the first volume of his Critique, Lefebvre proclaimed that everyday life “should 
become a work of art.”138  At first glance, this appears to be a fairly simple proclamation.  
But what does Lefebvre mean by this phrase ‘make life a work of art’?  Why the poetics?  
What Lefebvre is referring to is the widespread inability in the modern world to make life 
a work of art.  Lefebvre’s utopian longing for everyday life as a work of art is consistent 
with this.  What better way to live one’s life than as a work of art?  To understand what 
Lefebvre means by this poetic phrase, a distinction must be made between his use of the 
term ‘work’ and his use of the term ‘product’.  Combined, these two concepts constitute 
“the human world” in Lefebvre’s work.139  Lefebvre distinguishes them by noting 
“whereas a work has something irreplaceable and unique about it, a product can be 
reproduced exactly, and is in fact the result of repetitive acts and gestures.”140  Further, a 
work is “unique, original, and primordial.”141 As Lefebvre himself notes, “[f]or many 
people, to describe something as a work of art is simply the highest praise imaginable.”142 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that there is the “prospect of discovering a 
dialectical relationship in which works are in a sense inherent in products, while products 
do not press all creativity into the service of repetition.”143  Style of life, then, at least to 
Lefebvre, entails the transformation of everyday life into a work of art.    
 It is somewhat odd to claim the absence of style in everyday life.  After all, style 
abounds in virtually every aspect of everyday life.  With the proliferation of websites, 
magazines, television programs, and newspaper columns that flood everyday life, all of 
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which instruct one on the appropriate style of life, it seems crucial to scrutinize these 
representations and whether they truly offer styles of life or whether they represent their 
opposite, an absence of style.  From magazines and websites to the billboards at the side 
of the highway and the television shows - even a television channel
144
 – if anything, style 
seems to be omnipresent rather than absent.  Lefebvre argues his case as follows: 
Magazines and weeklies, particularly those directed at women and even those that 
defined the ‘cause of women’, work out complete daily schedules – buying and 
selling, shopping, menus, clothing.  From morning to evening and evening to 
morning, everyday time is full to bursting: fulfilment, plenitude.  With ‘values’ – 
femininity, virility, or seductiveness – but above all with the ultimate value: 
satisfaction.  Being satisfied: this is the general model of being and living whose 
promoters and supporters do not appreciate the fact that it generates discontent.  
For the quest for satisfaction and the fact of being satisfied presuppose the 
fragmentation of ‘being’ into activities, intentions, needs, all of them well-
defined, isolated, separable and separated from the Whole.  Is this an art of living?  
A style?  No.  It is merely the result and the application to daily life of a 
management technique and a positive knowledge directed by market research.  
The economic prevails even in a domain that seemed to elude it: it governs lived 
experience.
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With Lefebvre being an ardent proponent of the dialect, his method of analysis often 
involved seeing a surface masking its opposite.  If style is to be found, it is not lurking in 
the pages of a style magazine or the flickering images of a television show that claims 
style as its own. 
Lefebvre’s dialectical theorization of the absence of style amongst style is part of 
his much more general view of modernity.  Lefebvre argues that “[t]he most 
extraordinary things are also the most everyday; the strangest things are often the most 
trivial.”146 With this, he is essentially suggesting the ordinary lurking in the extraordinary 
and the extraordinary hiding in the ordinary.  As an example of everydayness we can here 
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take a newspaper or cable news program as a mysterious yet mundane daily activity for 
readers and/or viewers.  What is so mysterious is the utter lack of the daily in daily news.  
As Lefebvre’s old friend Georges Perec would say, “The daily papers talk of everything 
except the daily.”147  It is as though they are constructed in order to escape the everyday.  
If they brought readers closer to the everyday it may bore them.  Boring newspapers 
would surely constrict sales.  But, do newspapers or news programs really escape the 
everyday?  Lefebvre argues that  
[n]ews stories and the turbulent affectations of art, fashion and event veil without 
ever eradicating the everyday blahs.  Images, the cinema and television divert the 
everyday by at times offering up to its own spectacle, or sometimes the spectacle 
of the distinctly noneveryday; violence, death, catastrophe, the lives of kings and 
stars – those who we are led to believe defy everydayness.148 
 
Interestingly enough, when the news is at its most banal in its everydayness it is seen as a 
slow news day.  Despite its emphasis on the exceptional, Lefebvre believes “the ‘news’ 
never contains anything really new.”149  An ideal version of the daily news conceals the 
everyday in that it highlights the exceptional and entertaining, whereas it simultaneously 
reveals a daily practice for many television viewers who make up the audience.  Such 
infotainment where nothing remotely close to the everyday is presented can be contrasted 
with the social networking tools Twitter and Facebook, or even texting which are all 
largely used for extending one’s everydayness to any and all that are willing to look at it.  
For example, today, while one yawns at the boring content of the daily newscast on the 
television screen for its lack of excitement, one picks up an iPhone for distraction and is 
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enthralled by the plethora of virtual friends who have updated their statuses on Facebook 
describing what they had for dinner, what they are wearing to school tomorrow, or how 
they are feeling.  All of these are tools utilized for the ever important aspect of everyday 
life to pass the time. 
Leisure and Escapism 
What time is being passed when one proclaims they are just passing the time?  
There are so many to choose from.  Alone time, leisure time, work time, are a select few 
of the myriad categories of time scattered throughout everyday life.  It will be instructive 
to first focus on two important forms of time for Lefebvre.  The spaces of everyday life 
are pregnant with the tension between what he calls cyclic time and linear time.  These 
two forms of time are “two very different modalities of the repetitive.”150  He outlines 
them as follows: 
The everyday is situated at the intersection of two modes of repetition: the 
cyclical, which dominates in nature, and the linear, which dominates in processes 
known as “rational.”  The everyday implies on the one hand cycles, nights and 
days, seasons and harvests, activity and rest, hunger and satisfaction, desire and 
its fulfillment, life and death, and it implies on the other hand the repetitive 
gestures of work and consumption.
151
 
 
Linear time – which can be compared to what Guy Debord refers to as “irreversible 
time,” or the “general time of society”152 – excels with the modern world.  It is the time 
instituted by the market.  While the cyclical and the linear are both persistent features of 
everyday life, for Lefebvre, natural, cyclical time struggles against the rationalized, linear 
time. 
In modern life, the repetitive gestures tend to mask and to crush the cycles.  The 
everyday imposes its monotony.  It is the invariable constant of the variations it 
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envelops.  The days follow one after another and resemble one another, and yet – 
here lies the contradiction at the heart of everydayness – everything changes.  But 
the change is programmed: obsolescence is planned.  Production anticipates 
reproduction; production produces change in such a way as to superimpose the 
impression of speed onto that of monotony.  Some people cry out against the 
acceleration of time, others cry out against stagnation.  They’re both right.153 
 
Lefebvre here demonstrates that linear time is programmed.  In contrast, cyclic is not.   
Everyday life is modelled on abstract, quantitative time, the time of watches and 
clocks.  This time was introduced bit by bit in the West after the invention of 
watches, in the course of their entry into social practice.  This homogeneous and 
desacralised time has emerged victorious since it supplied the measure of time of 
work. 
154
 
 
Similar to Lefebvre, Anthony Giddens writes that “[t]he widespread use of mechanical 
timing devices facilitated, but also presumed, deeply structured changes in the tissue of 
everyday life – changes which could not only be local, but were inevitably 
universalising.”155  
The everyday imposes its monotony and the monotony imposes the everyday.  
This being specific to modern life is evident when one considers that, according to Barry 
Schwartz, conceptions of time are also specific to modernity.  He begins his book, 
Queuing and Waiting, with a rather startling claim: 
Many traditional societies furnish no equivalent for the English word “time”; their 
members consequently have no conception of what it is to be “on time” or to 
“wait.”  In a modern society, however, where order is the outcome of integrated 
scheduling and where productive and monetary value is assigned to systematically 
divided units of time, it becomes not only possible but, from a practical 
standpoint, also quite necessary for punctuality and delay to be reflected upon and 
to become serious concerns of everyday life.
156
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Indeed, time schedules are certainly serious concerns of everyday life.  This is not the 
startling part.  What is jarring in Schwartz’s formulation is the fact that time as a concept 
has a historical uniqueness to it.  For those unaware of this fact, it could be said that they 
have no conception of no conception of time.  A shared conception of linear time, 
enforced by time schedules, is essential for the function of modern society.  This is most 
forcefully endorsed and perpetuated by the ‘double process’ of urbanization and 
industrialization. 
 “Urbanization and industrialization,” writes Elizabeth Goodstein, “had 
thoroughly transformed the temporality of everyday life, integrating people into modern 
orders of work and consumption that depended on the highly rationalized temporal 
framework of “living by the clock.”157  This serves as another link with Lefebvre who 
writes: “If we examine time as it is experienced by many of today’s men and women, we 
will see that it is chock-a-block full and completely empty.”158 This is a fine rebuttal for 
those who scoff at the idea of even having the time to be bored, such as those mentioned 
in the introductory chapter.  There are many who “readily admit being bored much of the 
time, not just in work but in leisure and voluntary activities.”159   
How is leisure related to everyday life?  Lefebvre writes, “[t]oday leisure is first 
of all and for (nearly) all a temporary break with everyday life.  We are undergoing a 
painful and premature revision of all our old ‘values’; leisure is no longer a festival, the 
reward of labour, and it is not yet a freely chosen activity pursued for itself, it is a 
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generalized display: television, cinema, tourism.”160  A passage by Joe Moran can be seen 
as an extension of Lefebvre’s thought on this point: “While leisure provides the illusion 
of individualistic escape from the monotony of life and work under capitalism, boredom 
in fact threatens the leisure classes as much as it does the workers at their machines.”161  
This is consistent with Elizabeth Goodstein’s concept of a democratization of skepticism, 
mentioned in the first chapter.  The monotony of the everyday imposes itself on a great 
deal of people.  More money cannot help one get away from boredom, and neither can 
less money.  So why do people continue on with their everyday lives as they are?   
 Leaving the everyday is part of the everyday.  That is, ‘escapism’ is part and 
parcel of the fabric of everyday life.
162
  While there are those who assume escapism, or 
‘getting away from it all’, is far away from being a form of alienation, Lefebvre argues 
that “there is an alienation through escapism, and a different one through non-
escapism.”163  Distractions are constantly sought out, and, in turn, distractions constantly 
seek out.  Distractions are important elements to escapism.  They allow one the 
opportunity to get away from ‘it’.  What is this ‘it’ that people refer to on a daily basis?  
With enough money and time it is presumably easy to get away from ‘it’.  But if one has 
enough money and time, why get away from it?  That is to say, if ‘it’ provides so much 
satisfaction, why would anyone want to escape?  Henri Lefebvre offers a fine example of 
such attempts at escapism: 
One fine morning the middle-class citizen passes out like a Victorian lady, or like 
the Kierkegaardian character he starts shouting ‘Everything is now possible’; he is 
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no longer content with exchanging reality for make-believe and vice versa, with 
jumbling the levels, he wants something else; consuming satisfies him and yet 
leaves him dissatisfied; consuming is not happiness, comfort and ease are not all, 
joy does not depend on them; he is bored.
164
  
 
How is this escapism?  With everything being possible, this ‘character’ believes he can 
do whatever he pleases.   But all the while he yearns for something else.  If it cannot be 
consumed, what could it be?  His situation leaves him feeling bored.  His boredom 
appears to be a dead end street with nowhere to turn.  The content he longs for is not 
readily available to him.  Perhaps Jean Baudrillard is correct when he writes, “our leisure 
now is no more than the charnel-house where dead time is born.”165 
This brings Martin Heidegger’s lectures from 1929/30 back into the picture.  
Having used the example of waiting at a train station for his first form of boredom, for his 
second form of boredom Heidegger uses the example of a dinner party.  This would be an 
apt example for Henri Lefebvre who once mentioned “the exquisite boredom of the 
never-ending dinner party with over polite host.”166 Given that there are three forms of 
boredom for Heidegger, this second form is best viewed as an intermediate form between 
the first and the third.  In reference to Heidegger’s example, Parvis Emad puts it nicely as 
a situation where one “participate[s] without being involved.”167  One is present at the 
party, but also absent.  Orrin E. Klapp would characterize it as “busy boredom.”168  This 
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busy boredom consists of having a plethora of activities to do, but these activities lack 
meaning that grips someone in a significant way.  This would be a difficult boredom to 
combat since busy work does not remedy it, as one is experiencing this form of boredom 
while one is doing busy work, or, in this case, attending a party.  It is not, however, the 
activities that are boring for one in Heidegger’s view, as “what bores us in this boredom 
is that ‘I know not what’, that indeterminate unknown.”169  This boredom is “less 
situation-bound than the first” form of boredom and “we are held more toward ourselves, 
somehow enticed back into the specific gravity of Dasein.”170  I would argue, instead, 
that it is similarly situation bound such as Heidegger’s first form of boredom mentioned 
in the first chapter.  It is just a different situation.  The continuity lies in the shared pursuit 
of the interesting of both the ‘we at the train station in the first example and attending a 
dinner party in the second example.  Endlessly chasing after what is interesting, 
oftentimes the newest thing fosters the experience of boredom in the modern world and in 
everyday life, even if one is temporarily stepping out of the everyday. 
 So, why are dinner parties so boring?  It is not the parties themselves per se that 
are boring.  That is, parties as social functions where a diverse array of people gather 
together in a shared space does not entail the experience of boredom immediately.  One 
possibility is the people at these parties, some of which may be given the unflattering 
moniker of ‘bore’.  Here is a broad sketch of a bore: 
Those who carry the despicable reputation of being a bore have not earned it at 
home or in the work setting proper, but almost exclusively in those places and 
occasions given to sociability.  Where people expect more of conversation they 
are accordingly repulsed by those who abuse it, whether by killing a topic with 
inappropriate remarks or by talking more than their share of the time.  
Characteristically, bores talk more loudly than others, substituting both volume 
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and verbosity for wit and substance.  Their failure at getting the effect they desire 
only serves to increase their demands upon the patience of the group.  
Conversation is a lively game, but the bore hogs the ball, unable to score but 
unwilling to pass it to others.
171
 
 
What ‘bores’ do is waste someone else’s time in a relatively limited space.  Jean 
Baudrillard contributes something similar to this definition of the bore: 
I quite like wasting my time, but not having my time wasted.  When I am faced 
with too much calculated slowness, entirely affected even if circumstances 
impose it, or with the boredom exuded by certain of our contemporaries like a 
timeless virus, my impatience is unleashed – the only thing gained in the end 
being a bad conscience.
172
 
 
Friedrich Schlegel once wrote that “[b]oth in their origins and effects, boredom and stuffy 
air resemble each other.  They are usually generated whenever a large number of people 
gather together in a closed room.”173 The bore would be at home in the confined space of 
a dinner party and, perhaps, the effect would intensify one’s boredom.  The boredom of 
the dinner party can be found at other leisure events.  For example, Adorno theorizes a 
constellation of leisure activities that are of the same ilk as dinner parties: 
That this self-fêting in no way enriches life is manifest in the boredom of the 
cocktail parties, the weekend invitations to the country, the golf, symbolic of the 
whole sphere, the organization of the social round – privileges giving real 
enjoyment to none, and serving only to conceal from the privileged how much in 
the joyless whole they too are without the possibility of pleasure.
174
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These activities are all ways of temporarily escaping one’s everyday life.  As Adorno 
claims, these activities do not offer what they promise. 
What, if anything, follows through with its promises for escaping everyday life?  
What about tourist brochures?  Perhaps some of the time for some people they do deliver.  
However, according to Lefebvre, tourist maps and guide books emphasize ‘beauty spots’.  
As Lefebvre would say, “[i]f the maps and guides are to be believed, a veritable feast of 
authenticity awaits the tourist.”175  What is this authenticity?  Is it spending a week living 
as the locals do?  Do all locals live in similar manners?  Yes and no.  Yes, in that one has 
limited options for shopping for groceries, taking public transit, walking certain streets, 
going to certain theatres, etc.  And no, in that people have different schedules, different 
friends and companions, different dwelling spaces, different interests, etc.  There is no 
one way for locals to be.  So how does one capture the authenticity of such an 
experience?  As Lefebvre puts it, “tourism [is] a modern phenomenon that has become 
essential, and which in a curious way prolongs the historical problematic of conquests.  
Here too a paradox reveals itself: tourism is added to the traditional and customary use of 
space and time, of monumentality and rhythms ‘of the other’ without making it 
disappear.”176  It would seem as though one must partake in a ‘conquest’ in order to 
capture the essence of a particular space.  That is, of course, if the tourist brochures are to 
be believed. 
It is not too difficult to see the antithetical relationship between the everyday and 
vacations.
177
  When going on vacation, people often remark that they are “getting away” 
                                                 
175 PS, 84. 
176 RH, 97-98. 
177 Although, Lefebvre wrote facetiously that: “Leisure activities and holidays must be the true life.  The 
true life starts the moment we go away.” IM, 90.  In 1967, Lefebvre acknowledged the novelty of vacations 
148 
or “I just need to get away,” etc.  What exactly are they getting away from?  Their 
everyday lives, of course.    
One only has to open one’s eyes to understand the daily life of the one who runs 
from his dwelling to the station, near or far away, to the packed underground 
train, the office or the factory, to return the same way in the evening and come 
home to recuperate enough to start again the next day.  The picture of this 
generalized misery would not go without a picture of ‘satisfactions’ which hides it 
and becomes the means to elude it and break free from it.
178
 
 
There are ample opportunities available for exiting the everyday, albeit briefly,
179
 if one 
has the financial means. 
The leisure industry rounds off the culture industry by offering travel plans and 
tourism, which are bought like a wardrobe offering travel plans and tourism, 
which are bought like a wardrobe or an apartment you can move into 
immediately.  Discover such and such a country, town, mountain, sea!  People 
buy the ‘discovery’, the change of scene, the departure and escape, which prove 
disappointing because they no longer have anything in common with the wish 
(not desire) and the advertisement.  In its turn, the tourist industry thus perfects 
that of organized leisure and culture, fragmented into exchangeable pieces like 
space.  The extra-ordinary sells very well, but it is now no more than a sad 
mystification.  In this way, the image of a pseudo-freedom takes shape, one that is 
practically organized and substituted for ‘genuine freedom’, which has remained 
abstract.  Hence a continuity in the simulation of use, and in the simulation of not 
working by leisure.
180
 
 
Regarding parents taking their kids on a ‘family vacation’ to Las Vegas or Atlantic City, 
James Howard Kunstler argues that “a more dreadful sort of boredom is hard to imagine 
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for a child.”181  Since anyone under the age of 21 is not allowed inside the casinos, 
children are left to fend for themselves outside its confines.  Only those that can legally 
consume alcohol are allowed to gamble their money away, or, as would be the equivalent 
for Joseph Brodsky, game their boredom away.  Only the adults are allowed to escape 
from boredom in these situations. 
 There is, of course, the option of purchasing one’s own vacation spot instead of 
going to a resort.  “Leisure spaces,” writes Lefebvre, “are the object of a massive 
speculation that is not tightly controlled and is often assisted by the state (which builds 
highways and communications, and which directly or indirectly guarantees the financial 
operations etc.).  This space is sold, at high prices, to citizens who have been harried out 
of the town by boredom and the rat-race.”182  Here, it seems as though boredom drives 
people out of the everyday, or at least drives their desire to exit the everyday, in search of 
adventure.  Jean Baudrillard does not agree with those that think they can escape 
boredom and the everyday so easily.  He argues that 
a human being can find a vacation a greater boredom than in everyday life – a 
redoubled boredom, because it is made up of all the elements of happiness and 
distraction.  The important point is the predestination of vacations to boredom, the 
bitter and triumphal foreboding that there’s no escaping this.  How could we 
suppose that people were going to disavow their daily life and look for an 
alternative to it?  On the contrary, they’ll make a destiny out of it: intensify it 
while seeming to do the opposite, plunge into it to the point of ecstasy, seal the 
monotony of it with an even greater monotony.  This hyperbanality is the 
equivalent of fatality.
183
 
 
Keeping with Baudrillard, he offers the following assessment of the shift in the 
experience of boredom.  “Boredom,” writes Baudrillard, “used to be born out of 
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uniformity; today, it is the product of acceleration.  The more we believe we are escaping 
boredom by centrifugal force, the more we fall into true boredom.”184 Is this boredom of 
today some sort of postmodern boredom?  Baudrillard’s assertion is remarkably similar to 
the concept of ‘overload’ that Klapp associated with boredom in what he often referred to 
as the ‘information society’.  The acceleration that Baudrillard is referring to is also 
similar to Georg Simmel’s comments on blaséness.185 However, is Baudrillard’s new 
type of boredom a new form of boredom as he claims?  Boredom arising out of 
uniformity is deemed to be a thing of the past, though this should be taken as an 
exaggeration since it surely exists today.  Such uniformity can even be found on vacation. 
Though he never utilized the specific terminology, Klapp refers to numerous 
cultural and social phenomena that are consistent with the literature on ‘postmodernity’.  
Maybe the term ‘postmodernity’ simply is not needed for Klapp to articulate his thoughts.  
Klapp does, however, cover many of the same themes as the postmodernist par 
excellence Jean Baudrillard.  For example, while referring to what he calls ‘banalization’, 
or “the overload of sameness,”186 Klapp writes, “[t]he ultimate banality of travel is 
offered by Disney Enterprises’ World Showcase, in which one does not go anywhere at 
all but visits imitation places, such as a Costa Rican fishing village, Japanese feudal 
fortress, or Moroccan walled city.”187  Similarly, Baudrillard argues that “what is offered 
in Disneyland is a parody of the world of imagination.”188  It is a simulation of the real 
vacation where one is at the actual physical location.  Of course, it is slightly more 
                                                 
184 Jean Baudrillard, Fragments: Cool Memories III, 20. 
185 Simmel’s concept of blaséness will be examined in much more depth in the second section of the next 
chapter. 
186 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 128. 
187 Ibid., 59. 
188 Baudrillard, America, 55. 
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complicated than that, as most people that go to Disney World/Disneyland are on 
vacation at an actual physical location.
189
  One goes to these locations to go on vacation.  
You have to therefore go on vacation in order to simulate another vacation.  In a sense, it 
is a vacation without a vacation.  It could be that, according to Best and Kellner, “for 
many, Disney World and other theme parks with simulated environments are more 
attractive than actual geographical sites.”190  For those that believe Disney World and/or 
Land allows for ample opportunity to escape from the boredom of everyday life, James 
Howard Kuntsler certainly disagrees.  He argues that “because everything is programmed 
or scripted down to the last detail, there is an inescapable air of mechanized boredom to 
these goings-on.”191  Whatever mystery surrounded this land of adventure in the 
anticipation leading up to experiencing it quickly vanishes when its visitors come to the 
realization that there is nothing unique about it.   
The ‘inescapable air of mechanized boredom’ is not restricted to resorts, but can 
also be found in the surrounding cities/suburbs.  In reference to a planning proposal for a 
plastic tree project in Los Angeles, Klapp writes: “The time may be coming when people 
prefer the fake to the real, even outdoors.”192  He notes that this proposal was met with 
substantial backlash from the public and was ultimately withdrawn from consideration.  
Though, if Klapp is correct, it may just be a matter of time when spaces become more 
and more artificial.  After collecting some dust, such a proposal could resurface in the 
future.  This is an interesting example of society’s straddle between the modern and the 
                                                 
189 Interestingly, Baudrillard once wrote: “At Disneyworld in Florida they are building a giant mock-up of 
Hollywood, with the boulevards, studios, etc.  One more spiral in the simulacrum.  One day they will 
rebuild Disneyland at Disneyworld.” Cool Memories II, 42. 
190 Best and Kellner, The Postmodern Adventure, 74. 
191 Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere, 225. 
192 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 68. 
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postmodern.  Though natural trees are surely not a product of modernity, the cityscape of 
concrete and glass throughout Los Angeles was mixed with natural trees in modernity.  
The simulation of trees is a step towards postmodernity.  The mere fact that such a 
proposal was formulated and even considered shows that some are willing to take the 
necessary steps toward a postmodern society.  If a fake plastic tree were damaged, it 
could easily be replaced by another identical fake plastic tree.  This would give some sort 
of continuity to the cityscape where one could count on seeing the same plastic tree in the 
same condition no matter what time of the day or day of the year.  Would such 
consistency and stasis lead to boredom?  Would the simulation be enough to take the 
place of the real thing?  Best and Kellner similarly wonder how “perhaps individuals 
eventually get bored with mere simulation and hyperreality, or perhaps they are 
confronted by the discrepancies between these realms and their lived experience.”193 
Sometimes when one’s physical environment lacks the necessary stimulation, the remedy 
sought is not in another physical space, but in another mental space. 
Klapp notes that the consumption of drugs and/or alcohol is often associated with 
boredom, or, more precisely, as the instruments employed to propel one away from 
boredom.
194
  In William S. Burroughs’s novel Naked Lunch the character Dr. Benway 
offers his professional medical opinion on the junky’s (stereotypical: after all, they’re all 
the same to him) relationship to boredom.  “Boredom,” asserts Dr. Benway, “which 
always indicates an undischarged tension, never troubles the addict.  He can look at his 
shoe for eight hours.  He is only roused to action when the hourglass of junk runs out.”195  
                                                 
193 Best and Kellner, The Postmodern Adventure, 80. 
194 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 16. 
195 William S. Burroughs, Naked Lunch: the Restored Text, eds. James Grauerholz and Barry Miles (New 
York: Grove Press, 2001), 31. 
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Coincidentally, a hit of ‘junk’ lasts the same amount of time as the traditional 9 to 5 job: 
eight hours.  In this case, the ‘junk’ washes away the boredom of everyday life.  This has 
further implications, outside of the realm of fiction.  Lars Svendsen has also commented 
on drugs as a form of escapism from boredom. 
In a culture determined by pure functionality and efficiency, boredom will rule 
because the quality of the world disappears in the pantransparency, in the all-
embracing diaphanousness.  In such a culture, experiments with sex and drugs – 
or escapes into the fog of new religion, for that matter – will appear tempting, 
because they seem to offer a way out of a piteously boring everyday life and a 
way into something that goes beyond the banal.  The sad thing is that these 
exercises can never satisfy the longing out of which they spring.
196
 
 
Drugs appear as a way to get away from ‘it’.  To Svendsen, they are only temporary fixes 
to a much larger issue, which, according to Lefebvre is the absence of style in everyday 
life.  While Lefebvre and Svendsen share a commonality on this issue, Lefebvre would be 
at odds with Svendsen’s declaration of an ‘all-embracing diaphanousness’.   
What exactly does Svendsen mean by this or ‘pantransparency’?  He seems to be 
referring to a view where the world is portrayed as clear, obvious, evident.  With this, 
ideology has been liquidated from the world, much the same as alienation.  Put simply, 
this is the ideology of the end of ideology.
197
  This would account for the closing remarks 
in Svendsen’s book that there is no escape from boredom, which is essentially a variation 
of the ‘end of history’ thesis.198 Lefebvre is much more optimistic in believing that the 
style of the past can be revitalized, albeit in a new form.  It is, however, difficult to create 
                                                 
196 Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, 89. 
197 Lefebvre once wrote that “[i]deology leads to an awareness of ideology.  Once ideology has been 
rendered conscious, it is powerless.  An awareness of ideology means the end of ideology.” IM, 91.  
Elsewhere, Lefebvre notes that recognizing ideology can be difficult given that “ideology can profess to be 
non-ideology.” SC, 29.  In the third volume of his Critique, Lefebvre also notes that this is “one of the most 
curious paradoxes in an age full of them: the ideology of the end of ideologies.” CEL 3, 33.   
198 Incidentally, Lefebvre wrote a book called The End of History (La fin de l’histoire) where he briefly 
philosophizes about the implications of a ‘post-historical boredom’ (l’ennui post-historique).  See Henri 
Lefebvre, La fin de l’histoire (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1970), 207-208. 
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awareness of this absence of style since style seems to be everywhere today.  However, to 
Lefebvre, today’s style is tomorrow’s boredom and will continue to be so until there is 
widespread recognition that the various attempts to actively break out of everyday life via 
holiday, heroine, or hanging out are often futile ones.  At best, it is a temporary solution 
to an enduring problem.  At the end of whichever road is travelled, the boredom of 
everyday life seems to be waiting patiently.  Perhaps this is a bit hasty.  After all, people 
are free to pursue whichever lifestyle(s) they wish.  But are these really styles of life?  
Despite the overabundance of styles available, it is at least plausible that Lefebvre was on 
to something when he claimed an absence of style.  If so, all attempts to escape the 
boredom of everyday life in modernity are doomed to fail from the start. 
The escape from everyday life is an escape from the rationalized routine that is a 
common link between people of various social and cultural backgrounds in an 
industrialized and urbanized society.  For Lefebvre, this ‘double process’ continuously 
permeates all aspects of everyday life and results in an absence of style in everyday life.  
This, for Lefebvre, is a hallmark of modernity, though one that is largely hidden from 
view and one where an irrational reality is masked by rationality.  Lefebvre explains the 
root of this as follows: “Hidden beneath what appears to be human reason lies an 
irrational reality; but lying even more deeply hidden beneath what appears to be absurd is 
a dehumanized Rationality.  Where?  All around us – though not so much in rural areas as 
in our ‘modern’ towns.”199 To further investigate the absence of style in everyday life, the 
logic of such ‘modern towns’ will be examined in the following chapter.  This is 
                                                 
199 CEL 1, 244. 
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important for Lefebvre’s project of a critique of everyday life, as the street is for him “the 
microcosm of modern life.”200 
                                                 
200 CEL 2, 310.  Perhaps in reference to this passage, Lefebvre scholar, Kristin Ross, has noted that “the 
active urban street […], for Lefebvre, represents everyday life in its most complete figuration, the 
microcosm or condensation of modern life.” Kristin Ross, “Streetwise: The French Invention of Everyday 
Life,” Parallax 2(1), (February, 1996), 72. 
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Chapter 3: The Incredible Dullness of Urbanism 
 
A more subtle cause of the prevalence of boredom was  
the disproportionate growth of the great towns.1 – Aldous Huxley   
 
It is thickest in cities where there are the most varieties, pleasures, and opportunities.   
Like smog, it spreads to all sorts of places it is not supposed to be.   
The most common name for this cloud is boredom.2 – Orrin E. Klapp 
 
As a form of subjective malaise proper to modernity,  
boredom is first of all an urban phenomenon.3 – Elizabeth Goodstein 
 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
In Martin Heidegger’s lectures from 1929/1930, he theorizes a form of boredom called 
“profound boredom,” which is described as a “fundamental attunement.”4  After stating 
that there is no example for this type of boredom, an “entirely non-binding” example is 
given of going for a walk through the streets of a big city on a Sunday afternoon.
5
  It is 
worth noting that while this is a supposedly “non-binding” example, Heidegger was not 
alone in using Sunday in a big city as an example of boredom.  For instance, Walter 
Benjamin, in his essay ‘Some Motifs on Baudelaire’ writes: “The man who loses his 
capacity for experiencing feels as though he is dropped from the calendar.  The big-city 
dweller knows this feeling on Sunday.”6  In his essay on Benjamin and boredom, Joe 
Moran notes that what Benjamin was referring to was none other than the experience of 
boredom. 
For Benjamin, one of the most significant developments of modernity is the 
replacement of Erfahrung with Erlebnis: in other words, the capacity to 
assimilate, recollect and communicate experience to others is replaced by the 
                                                 
1 Aldous Huxley, “Accidie,”354. 
2 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 11-12. 
3 Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities, 18. 
4 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 80.  He interprets this third form of boredom as 
“the condition of possibility of the first and thereby the second,”4 which were mentioned in the previous 
two chapters.  Ibid., 156. 
5 Ibid., 135. 
6 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt and trans. Harry Zohn, (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1968), 184-185. 
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sense of life as a series of disconnected impressions with no common 
associations.  The man who is denied the potential for Erfahrung is a hostage to 
boredom.
7
  
 
In another essay, titled ‘The Storyteller’, Benjamin delves further into the relationship 
between the city and boredom. 
If sleep is the apogee of physical relaxation, boredom is the apogee of mental 
relaxation.  Boredom is the dream bird that hatches the egg of experience.  A 
rustling in the leaves drives him away.  His nesting places – the activities that are 
intimately associated with boredom – are already extinct in the cities and are 
declining in the country as well.
8
 
 
With this example, it would seem as though boredom could not be experience in a 
profound way in a city, at least not the way Heidegger envisions.  This is odd considering 
Benjamin explicitly links boredom with the city in his Arcades Project.  Unfortunately, 
as Joe Moran notes, Benjamin failed to provide a specific definition of boredom, instead 
only offering fragments.
9
  Nevertheless, it is curious how two intellectuals as diverse as 
Heidegger and Benjamin both use the big city on a Sunday as an example of boredom.
10
  
There are two aspects to this example that may be isolated for the purpose of the present 
discussion.   
The first aspect of the above example from Heidegger’s lectures is Sunday, 
specifically Sunday afternoon, though the day itself will serve as the general example.  
To some, Sunday is the key element for the awakening of boredom.  For example, in his 
piece “Dare to be Lazy” Roland Barthes quotes Schopenhauer’s statement: “The social 
representation of boredom is Sunday.”  Barthes then argues that children are often bored 
                                                 
7 Joe Moran, “Benjamin and Boredom,” Critical Quarterly, 45 (1-2), (July, 2003): 169. 
8 Benjamin, Illuminations, 91. 
9 Moran, “Benjamin and Boredom,” 168. 
10 The common link is especially curious considering Benjamin had planned on studying Heidegger’s Being 
and Time with his friend Bertolt Brecht in an effort to “annihilate Heidegger.” Selected Writings Volume 2, 
Part 2, 1931-1934, ed. Michael Jemmings et al. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 2005), 841.   
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on Sundays, speaking not only about what he saw at the time of writing but also as a 
memory from his experience a child.  Now that he is an adult, Sunday is a “happy day” 
filled with idleness instead of boredom.
11
  Depending on one’s perspective, or perhaps 
one’s position in life, Sunday may be associated with boredom or it may be associated 
with idleness, or perhaps something else entirely.        
The second aspect to the example is the city.  While this is ‘non-binding’ for 
Heidegger, I argue that using a big city as the example is more appropriate for discussing 
boredom, especially profound boredom, than Heidegger acknowledges in his lectures.  
What makes this form unique is what is absent in its experience.  Heidegger argues that 
“[p]assing the time is missing in this boredom.”12  How can it be that passing the time is 
missing?  Is boredom not a heightened awareness of time?  If time is missing, is space all 
that is left?  Is this a spatial boredom?  According to Heidegger, time is absent because 
one is not bored “with objects nor subjects, but temporality as such.”13  Quite simply, this 
form of boredom is characterized as: “It is boring for one.  It – for one – not for me as 
me, not for you as you, not for us as us, but for one.  Name, standings, vocation, role, age, 
and fate as mine and yours disappear.”14  What if ‘it’ is modernity itself?  What if ‘it’ is 
the fabric of everyday life manifesting itself?  How can we conceptualize this ‘it’?  
Heidegger goes on to write, “This profound boredom only becomes awake if we do not 
counteract it.”15  With this, this form of boredom is a lot more difficult to achieve than 
simply not counteracting it.  Unexpected distractions arise all the time that are outside of 
                                                 
11 Roland Barthes, “Dare to Be Lazy,” The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1985), 345.   
12 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 135. 
13 Ibid., 158. 
14 Ibid., 134-135. 
15 Ibid., 160. 
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one’s control.  For example, there could be a beep of a car horn, a shout from the street, a 
bird chirping in a tree, etc.  As Benjamin would say, a rustling in the leaves drives 
boredom away.  Many of these occurrences are beyond one’s control.  They simply show 
up unexpectedly, especially with an area with a high concentration of people such as in a 
big city.  Perhaps one would have to isolate oneself in order to experience profound 
boredom, but can this be done in a big city?  Ben Highmore argues that “the city reveals 
itself as a series of possibilities as well as the closure of possibilities through the 
production of boredom and constraint.”16 It would, therefore, be difficult to isolate 
oneself in a large city any time and it is unclear if Heidegger envisions encountering 
other people in this example.  Although, it should be mentioned again, this example is not 
concrete for Heidegger.  Rather, it is a ‘non-binding’ observation that is not given much 
weight.  But is this really a random example?   
Of the two aspects from Heidegger’s example of walking in a city on a Sunday 
afternoon, this chapter will focus on the spatial element, but in the context of the 
everyday and not limiting it to one day.  For this, the argument put forth in the previous 
chapter, the absence of style in everyday life, will be expanded.  This is one of the central 
aspects of Lefebvre’s fragmented theory of boredom and can readily be applied to 
modern urbanism.  The key passage denoting this can be found in a book on Le Corbusier 
where Lefebvre offered two modest pages as a preface.  Here, Lefebvre makes note of the 
“town-planning level, at which a certain way of life, a certain style (or absence of style) 
makes itself felt.”17  The purpose of this chapter, then, is to develop Lefebvre’s idea that 
                                                 
16 Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, 133. 
17 Henri Lefebvre, “Preface,” Lived-in Architecture: Le Corbusier’s Pessac Revisited, trans. Gerald Onn 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), np.  Elsewhere, Lefebvre further articulates the relationship 
between everyday life, style/absence of style and the urban through a brief discussion of ‘habitation’.  He 
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the absence of style in everyday life, discussed in the previous chapter, is felt on the 
town-planning level.  For this, I will tease out the links between the urbanism of 
modernity, its impact on everyday life, and the experience of boredom.
18
  Or, following 
C. Wright Mills, this chapter will “consider the metropolis-the horrible, beautiful, ugly, 
magnificent sprawl of the great city.”19 Therefore, this chapter will begin with a 
consideration of the metropolis and move on, or sprawl out, from there.  For this, several 
key critiques of city planning will be considered.  One of the goals is to sketch the 
importance of the straight line in modernist planning and architecture.  For this, 
ironically, a straight line will not be taken with sources, which would surely fill volumes, 
but instead a selection of some of the most prominent ‘doctors of space’20 who have had 
                                                                                                                                                 
writes: “Habitation expresses itself ‘objectively’ in a ensemble of the creations, products and things that 
make up a partial system: the house, the city or the urban area.  Each object is part of the whole, and carries 
its stamp; it testifies to the style (or lack of style) of the whole.” KW, 126.  For Lefebvre, the partial objects 
that constitute the whole, or totality, are keys for understanding the lack of style, or boredom, felt in a given 
area. 
18 In their effort towards an ‘Urban Design Manifesto’, Allan Jacobs and Donald Appleyard argue that 
“architects and planners take cities and themselves too seriously; the result too often is deadliness and 
boredom, no imagination, no humor, alienating places.  But people need an escape from the seriousness and 
meaning of the everyday.” Allan Jacobs and Donald Appleyard, “Toward an Urban Design Manifesto,” 
Journal of the American Planning Association 53(1), (Winter, 1987): 116.  There are several insights in 
these two lines.  The first is that Jacobs and Appleyard speak of both architects and planners in the same 
breath.  Oftentimes the one is emphasized at the exclusion of the other.  The authors see the need to 
integrate the two perspectives.  After all, what are buildings with no city and what is a city without 
buildings?  The second insight, which is most explicitly relevant for the present discussion, is the boredom 
that goes along with the production of urban space.  Here a link is made between boredom and alienation.  
The third point to be extracted is the need for an escape from the everyday.  In the previous chapter, it was 
demonstrated that people do indeed seek escape from the everyday via holidays, dinner parties, or even 
drugs.  Jacobs and Appleyard are suggesting that an escape from the everyday ought to be found in cities.  
A different kind of everyday life does not seem to be a possibility for them.  This is due to the repulsion 
Jacobs and Appleyard, among so many others, share for everyday life.  To them, everyday life is so 
obviously monotonous and undesirable that it should be limited as much as possible.  This, of course, is not 
possible for numerous ordinary individuals. 
19 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9. 
20 My use of the term ‘doctors of space’ stems from the following passage by Lefebvre: “In connection with 
the city and its extensions (outskirts, suburbs), one occasionally hears talk of a ‘pathology of space’, of 
‘ailing neighbourhoods’, and so on.  This kind of phraseology makes it easy for people who use it – 
architects, urbanists or planners – to suggest the idea that they are, in effect, ‘doctors of space’.  This is to 
promote the spread of some particularly mystifying notions, and especially the idea that the modern city is 
a product not of capitalist or neocapitalist system but rather of some putative ‘sickness’ of society.” PS, 99.  
A similar passage, referring to the desire of urbanists to heal “a sick society” can be found in Lefebvre’s 
book The Urban Revolution. UR, 157. 
161 
tremendous influence on modernity will be examined in concert with some of their more 
vocal critics. 
There are four parts to this chapter.  The first part discusses Baron Georges-
Eugene Haussmann’s revolutionary city plan of Paris that was implemented in the 
nineteenth century and its implications for modernity, everyday life, and boredom.  The 
second part shifts focus to pedestrians via a discussion of the blasé personality sketched 
by Georg Simmel in his essay ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’.  So, while part one 
deals with urban form, the second part will deal with urban practice.  The third part deals 
with the urban from the perspective of architects and their critics, most notably the 
foremost figure of high modernism, Le Corbusier.  These three preceding chapters will 
all lead into the final section, which delves into the purely planned spaces of new towns 
via Lefebvre’s critique of the new town of Mourenx, a town that arose in the Southwest 
of France in the middle of the twentieth century.  It is here where everyday life can be 
viewed in what Lefebvre calls its most ‘chemically pure’ state.   
The City: Haussmannization and its Discontents  
To begin, it is important to ask: How could one discuss the boredom induced by 
urban spaces with any kind of specificity?  It would seem as though one would require a 
general theory and it would be difficult for such a generalization to be convincing 
considering the impossibility of discussing all the intricacies of all urban areas.  
However, it is somewhat interesting to note that emphasizing the fun or entertaining 
aspects of an entire city seems to occur fairly often.  At the end of the last chapter, tourist 
brochures were mentioned as containing what Lefebvre refers to as ‘beauty spots’.  This 
is consistent with the brief description of present-day Paris that can be found in the New 
162 
York Times bestseller 1,000 Places to See Before You Die.  The description is as follows: 
“In the City of Light, the birthplace of romance and style, everything is magic, and 
anything can happen.”21  Based on this description, it would seem as though it were 
nearly impossible to be bored in such a magical place.  After all, ‘anything can happen’ 
there.  As well, according to the description, style was born there, so the absence of style 
Lefebvre wrote about over and over again, it would seem, must have been directed at 
other spaces, if it has any credibility at all.  If anything, there is an abundance of style to 
be found there, if one were to follow this description.  Of course, Lefebvre argues that, on 
the contrary, Paris used to be a city of style before it was modernized.  He notes that for 
all of the accolades bestowed upon modern day Paris for its beauty, it was actually the 
Paris of one hundred or two hundred years ago where “beauty reigned.”22  Despite his 
admiration for certain elements of the past, he is not romanticizing times gone by, as he is 
quick to point out that along with the reign of beauty was the reign of tuberculosis.
23
 
Regardless, if anything can be said about the Paris of modernity, it is that it is an 
interesting city and has been so since it entered modernity.  After all, Walter Benjamin 
has labeled Paris the “capital of the nineteenth century.”24  Further, David Harvey has 
even gone so far as to call it, in a subtitle to his book on Paris, the ‘capital of 
modernity’.25  So, with Roland Barthes’ assertion that the nineteenth century is the 
century of boredom and Elizabeth Goodstein’s assertion that boredom and modernity are 
                                                 
21 Patricia Schultz, 1,000 Places to See Before You Die: A Traveler’s Life List (New York: Workman 
Publishing, 2003), 115. 
22 KW, 158. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See his essay “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” In Benjamin, Reflections, 146-162.  
25 David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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intertwined, then Paris being the capital of both the nineteenth century and modernity 
seems to be a logical place to look for boredom and its relationship to the city.   
How did Paris enter modernity?  Or, perhaps the vital question to be asked is: 
How did modernity enter Paris?  Regardless, one key element to the emergence of 
modern Paris is the design of the city itself.  The city planner Baron Haussmann was 
given absolute power to impart his design on Paris.
26
  Or, as David Harvey puts it in a 
much more partisan way, Haussmann “bludgeoned the city into modernity.”27  The 
transition from Ancient to Modern Paris, then, was not a seamless process.  
The urbanism of Haussmann tore out the heart of old medieval Paris and 
reinvented the concept of a center, of a downtown of bright lights and 
conspicuous consumption.  Erstwhile pesky proletarians would take hold of 
shovels, man the buildings sites, and have no time to make trouble.  They’d also 
find themselves dispatched to a rapidly expanding banlieue, to the new suburbs 
mushrooming in the distance.  In one sense, Paris gained as an independent work 
of art, as an aesthetic experience admired to this day by every tourist and visitor.  
Yet in another sense it lost something as a living democratic organism, as a source 
of generalized liberty.  Hence Haussmann not only patented what we’d now call 
the gentrified city, with its commodification of space, but also pioneered a new 
class practice, bankrolled by the state: the deportation of the working class to the 
periphery, a divide-and-rule policy through urbanization itself, gutting the city 
according to a rational economic and political plan.  The logic of the city would 
never quite be the same again.
28
 
 
It was nevertheless a process, and it is one that has been referred to by countless people 
as Haussmannization.  
So what exactly is Hausmannization?  This depends on one’s perspective.  As 
with most things, there are both supporters and detractors of Haussmannization.  
According to Haussmann’s supporters, it entails the transformation of Paris into the City 
                                                 
26 Haussmann’s plan had secular implications for Parisians.  As Goodstein remarks, “[t]he city demolished 
by Baron Haussmann becomes an enigmatic figure for the emptiness of the heavens.”  Experience Without 
Qualities, 234. 
27 Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity, 3. 
28 Merrifield, Henri Lefebvre, 93-94. 
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of Light.
29
  Without him, the travel guide mentioned above would have a very different 
description.  According to his detractors, Haussmannization was an “excessive use of 
compulsory purchase powers, blind demolition, and large-scale deportation of the 
poor.”30  Taken together, these two views reveal that the beauty of Paris came with many 
sacrifices.  Michael Carmona, one of his biographers, puts it as follows: 
A strong man was certainly needed to turn a still medieval Paris into a great 
modern city.  It is hardly surprising that Haussmann gave the impression of a 
vandal: he bought out tens of thousands of Parisians and dislodged hundreds of 
thousands more.  Authoritarian, pragmatic, and efficient, he was concerned that 
there should be order in all things.  Few people have done so much to shape the 
environment and the atmosphere of a city!
31
 
 
The sacrifices did not stop when Haussmann did.  That is to say, Haussmannization did 
not end with Haussmann’s life or his tenure under Napoleon III.32  Once the plan was set 
in motion, those that followed in Haussmann’s footsteps merely went along with it with 
little to no deviation.  Was it because it was universally hailed at the time as a resound 
success?  Put simply, the answer is no.  Carmona summarizes the critical sentiment 
directed towards the Baron’s plan: 
As the pieces fell into place, was the new Paris at least the bearer of a new 
beauty?  On this, intellectuals were of a single mind: the Baron’s straight lines 
were deadly boring; no building exhibited any quality whatsoever.  But the 
response to this dual verdict was not complicated, the straight line is at the heart 
of the French intellectual and aesthetic heritage; “straightness” is a quality, a 
“swaying” character a personality defect.  Only toward the end of the twentieth 
century would civil engineers begin to ask whether highways should not have an 
occasional little bend, if only to avoid the sleepiness induced by boredom.
33
 
 
                                                 
29 Carmona, Haussmann, 404. 
30 Ibid., 385. 
31 Ibid., 439. 
32 Ibid., 438.  Carmona goes on to say that another book would be required in order to fully sketch the 
contours of Haussmann’s influence. 
33 Ibid., 433. (my italics) 
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The sentiment was, therefore, unanimous, at least among intellectuals.
34
 Writing in a 
similar vein to Carmona, David Harvey argues that “the problem was the monotony, the 
homogeneity, and the boredom imposed by Haussmann’s geometrical attachment to the 
straight line.”35  It would seem as though in the case of Paris, straight streets equate to 
boring ones.
36
  To Leo Charney, the opening up the streets that came with 
Haussmannization inaugurated boredom on modernity.  He writes: “Baron Haussmann 
thought he was just widening the streets, firming up the boulevards, getting the city clear 
and organized.  By giving people all this space to walk in and all these sight lines to peer 
down, he wrought all the boredom of modernity.”37 
What inspired the Baron’s straight swaths cutting into the urban fabric of Paris?  
This question brings Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s railway study, mentioned in the first 
chapter, back into the picture.  According to Schivelbusch, “Haussmann approached Paris 
as a railroad engineer approaches any terrain through which a line has to be laid.”38  
Haussmann, then, approached the city’s streets as if he were laying railway tracks.  Much 
the same as the function of railway tracks, the primary function of Haussmann’s streets 
was to facilitate the flow of traffic. 
The streets that Haussmann created served only traffic, a fact that distinguished 
them from the medieval streets and lanes that they destroyed, whose function was 
not so much to serve traffic as to be a forum for neighborhood life; it also 
distinguished them from the boulevards and the avenues of the Baroque, whose 
linearity and width was designed more for pomp and ceremony than for mere 
                                                 
34 But are intellectuals standing outside and/or above everyday life?  No.  As Lefebvre puts it: “What of the 
intellectual?  He is in it all right!  Intellectuals have careers, wives, children, time-tables, private lives, 
working lives, leisure, dwellings in one place or another, etc.; they are in it, but in a slightly marginal 
position so that they think of themselves as being outside and elsewhere.” ELMW, 74. 
35 Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity, 263. 
36 Although many critics agree on this point, it will be picked up again in chapter 4 in order to show some 
of the dissenting voices.  
37 Leo Charney, Empty Moments: Cinema, Modernity, and Drift (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1998), 114. 
38 Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, 182. 
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traffic.  It is not even necessary to go back as far as the Baroque to recognize the 
‘modernity’ of the traffic function of Haussmann’s streets.39 
 
If nothing else, Haussmann was innovative.  That is, innovative in his appropriation of 
other facets of modernity in order to propel Paris further into modernity.  But are the 
railroads adequate models for streets?  Schivelbusch argues that 
[w]ith the remodeling of Paris to allow for flowing traffic, with the construction 
of streets ‘which have no significance in themselves but are essentially means of 
connection’, the inhabitants familiar with the old Paris experienced a situation 
similar to that of the first railroad travelers.  As the latter, accustomed to the 
space-time perceptions of coach travel, experienced the railroad journey as a 
destruction of space and time, the former saw the new traffic-oriented city of Paris 
as destroyed – in a double sense: demolished physically as well as in its spatial 
and historical continuity.  The railroad put an end to the lyricism of old modes of 
travel; the new thoroughfares signaled the end of the poeticism of Paris.  
(Contemporaries did not recognize the fact that, in both cases, the old appeared 
‘poetical’ only at the very moment when the new technology announced its 
termination.)
40
 
 
It appears as though some individuals did not know what they had until it was gone.  
Much like Lefebvre, Schivelbusch is here arguing that the Paris of old, the medieval 
Paris, is the beautiful urban space instead of its contemporary manifestation.  What the 
travel guide does not express is the idea that there was once a different Paris that was lost 
with Haussmann’s plan.  The guide gives the impression that the present day Paris, the 
modern Paris, is the one where style was born and not where style is profoundly absent. 
The prospect of experiencing boredom in Paris is entirely absent from this 
particular travel guide.  It emphasizes the ‘beauty spots’ of Paris, as opposed to what 
Lefebvre calls ‘the other Parises’.  Lefebvre is unique among academics, as he once “of 
[his] own free will” took up the profession of taxi driver, or as Lefebvre calls it 
“existentialist philosopher-taxi driver” in order to analyze the “life of the people of 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 183-184. 
40 Ibid., 184. 
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Paris.”41  To know Paris is to know its streets, it would seem.  Lefebvre’s idea of ‘other 
Parises’ forms the basis for linking boredom and the City of Light.  Lefebvre writes: 
All over the world, people have become accustomed to seeing the tower above 
Paris, and Paris at the foot of the tower.  The association has become unarguable: 
Paris has become an ‘environment’ of the Eiffel Tower; hence its popularity, 
expressed in all sorts of photographs, postcards, and more or less outrageously 
‘kitschy’ objects.  But the Tower has not entirely lost the properties of a 
technological object.  As an icon, it seems rational.  Around it lies a city based on 
reason, with Cartesian lines and horizons, occupying a homogenous space, 
without awkward roughness.
42
 
 
So while people associate the Eiffel Tower with Paris, the quotidian aspects go 
unnoticed.  It is as if people are literally overlooking the ordinary in order to see the 
Eiffel Tower.  Further to this, Lefebvre asks: “Where does the trite, ‘ordinary’ Paris 
persist, outside our mental images?  In the prosperous neighbourhoods, no question of it, 
with their modern, straight streets and perfectly aligned façades that create noble, 
monotonous vistas; in the Paris of Napoleon and Haussmann, to be specific.”43  Lefebvre 
goes on to explain the effects Haussmannization had on Paris over a century after it was 
first implemented.  Writing in the mid 1970s, Lefebvre offered this summary: 
Today, in a Paris that has spread out in an endless suburbia, there are dizzying 
swarms of people from all over the world: students, tourists, people passing 
through, travelers staying for a while, businessmen, etc.  Is it a Tower of Babel or 
the great Babylon?  In the legendary, monstrous city, everyone has some route of 
his own (from flat to school, the office, the factory) and does not know the rest 
very well.  These familiar journeys are part of the everyday, practical and 
reassuring, narrower in many respects than the old neighbourhood life.  And the 
representation (image) of the city?  You would have to be a bit naïve to think the 
prevailing image resembles the one formed in a stroller’s mind.  To wander 
through a modern city pursuing the ‘reveries of a solitary stroller’ is pleasant, no 
more, and soon becomes disappointing, unless it is accompanied by other interests 
and forms of curiosity.  Representation of the city, for the majority of people, is 
restricted to banalities about the big department stores, about places that are ‘in’ 
                                                 
41 KW, 7.  Although he is not explicit in saying so, 1928 seems to be the year of this voyage. 
42 Ibid., 152. 
43 Ibid., 155. 
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or ‘out’, to be visited or avoided.  Urban reality, in its complication and 
complexity, becomes schematized.
44
 
 
The Eiffel Tower is both a part of the everyday of Parisians as a background to the 
cityscape, but it also transcends the everyday in the sense that it is a monument standing 
above the level of the everyday.  It is, however, taken to be the everyday of Paris when 
travel guides emphasis it as an essential feature of Paris.  It is a monument that shines 
brighter than most other buildings and most other ordinary elements that are equally part 
of Paris.  Lefebvre explains that “[b]uildings are to monuments as everyday life is to 
festival, products to works, lived experience to the merely perceived, concrete to stone, 
and so on.”45 To experience Paris as the Parisians do, then, one must look past the 
monuments suggested in travel guides. 
Aside from boredom, another item missing from the tourist guidebook is the 
student and worker uprising that occurred in May of 1968 in Paris.
46
  Clearly, such a 
disturbance does not mesh very well with the emphasis on ‘beauty spots’ of travel guides.  
The emphasis on ‘beauty spots’ is at the exclusion of other items which are much more 
prevalent aspects of everyday life and are vital to its history as a city.  This is where the 
sensational nature of newspapers is important for a window into the exceptional events 
that absent from guide books.  For example, the sociologist Melvin Seeman begins his 
article ‘The Signals of ’68: Alienation in Pre-Crisis France’ with a headline from the 
French newspaper Le Monde which Seeman believes was a major cause for the worker 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 151-152. 
45 PS, 223. 
46 Lefebvre explores this event at length in his book The Explosion: Marxism and the French Upheaval, 
though he does not focus on boredom, with the exception of a few casual remarks. 
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and student uprising of May 1968 in Paris.  The headline reads: “La France s’ennuie”47 
(France is bored).  If the headline is taken seriously, what lead to this widespread 
boredom?  Can an entire country be bored?  If so, can boredom lead to rebellion?  
Seeman argues that “[t]he general boredom expressed so crisply in the pages of Le 
Monde in the Winter of ’67 erupted in a general rebellion in May of ’68.”48  Seeman then 
wonders if anyone could have predicted that this ‘general boredom’ would have led to the 
uprising in Paris.  This is, of course, a purely rhetorical exercise, as Seeman thinks 
“probably not.”49  Walter Benjamin, Henri Lefebvre, and the Situationist International 
would certainly be irritated at such a lack of recognition of their work.  Although Seeman 
makes no mention of boredom for the rest of the article, preferring instead to discuss 
worker dissatisfaction (without linking it back to boredom), his initial insight remains a 
penetrating one.  
Seeman’s article may have appeared completely different if he were aware of 
Benjamin, Lefebvre, and the Situationists who Andy Merrifield asks: “How many 
urbanists can write as tenderly about Paris as Walter Benjamin, Henri Lefebvre, or Guy 
Debord?”50 Debord, the leader of the Situationist International, was unambiguously 
dismissive of Haussmann’s plan.  He and his fellow Situationists would have loved 
nothing more than to transform the City of Light into the City of Life.  Merrifield argues 
that much like Lefebvre, the Situationists had a goal  
to renew the action of art on life (and life on art).  They were bored with art, bored 
with politicians, bored with the city, bored in the city.  The city had become 
banal; art had become banal; politics had become banal – it still is.  Everything 
                                                 
47 Melvin Seeman, “The Signals of  ‘68: Alienation in Pre-Crisis France,” American Sociological Review 
37(4), (August, 1972): 385. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Merrifield, Metromarxism, 178. 
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needed changing; life needed changing, time and space needed changing, cities 
needed changing.  Everybody was hypnotized by production and conveniences, 
by sewage systems, elevators, bathrooms, and washing machines.
51
 
 
As for May ’68, it could be said that the boredom of the Situationists was also the 
boredom portrayed in the pages of Le Monde.  Like Lefebvre, the Situationists felt as 
though life in Paris was being strangled and needed reprieve from Haussmann’s totalizing 
city planning.  Debord summarizes his group’s sentiment as follows: 
Historical conditions determine what is considered “useful.”  Baron Haussmann’s 
urban renewal of Paris under the Second Empire, for example, was motivated by 
the desire to open up broad thoroughfares enabling the rapid circulation of troops 
and the use of artillery against insurrections.  But from any standpoint other than 
that of facilitating police control, Haussmann’s Paris is a city built by an idiot, full 
of sound and fury, signifying nothing.
52
   
 
Small wonder that an English edition of the Situationist International Anthology begins 
with a piece by Ivan Chtcheglov with the opening words: “We are bored in the city, there 
is no longer any Temple of the Sun.”53   
The Situationists famously wrote that “Boredom is counterrevolutionary.  In 
every way.”54  This passage, it should be mentioned, was one of the graffiti slogans on 
the walls of Paris during the uprising.
55
  Does this mean that boredom prevents 
revolution?  I would argue no.  This can be qualified by a few passages from the 
Situationist International member Raoul Vaneigem’s 1967 book The Revolution of 
Everyday Life where he writes: “Anyone who has felt the drive to self-destruction welling 
                                                 
51 Andy Merrifield, Henri Lefebvre, 31. 
52 Guy Debord, “Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography,” Situationist International Anthology, ed. 
Ken Knabb,(Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006), 9. 
53 Ivan Chtcheglov, “Formulary for a New Urbanism,” Situationist International Anthology, ed. Ken Knabb 
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54 Situationist International, “The Bad Days Will End,” In Situationist International Anthology, ed. Ken 
Knabb (Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006), 112. 
55 Situationist International, “Graffiti,” In Situationist International Anthology, ed. Ken Knabb (Berkeley, 
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up inside him knows with what weary negligence he might one day happen to kill the 
organizers of his boredom.”56 This is a key passage for linking boredom to the uprisings 
and Haussmann.  Haussmann is one of the ‘organizers of boredom’ that Vaneigem is 
referring to.  While Haussmann’s design cannot account for every boredom in France, but 
it is a concrete example of the ‘double process’ of urbanization and industrialization at 
the heart of everyday life.  Vaneigem, a former associate of Lefebvre’s would certainly 
agree with Lefebvre’s statement that “urban life has yet to begin.”57   Vaneigem also 
writes how “boredom breeds the irresistible rejection of uniformity, a refusal that can 
break out at any moment.”58  With this, it would appear as though boredom may be 
counterrevolutionary only if one perpetuates it by perpetuating the ‘double process’, but 
it is revolutionary if one tarries with it long enough to see it as a general reflection of 
society.  Such a view permeates the writings of the Situationist International, but is most 
succinctly summarized with the revolutionary cry at the end of Vaneigem’s book: “We 
have a world of pleasure to win, and nothing to lose but boredom.”59  The Situationists, 
then, believed that only with an urban revolution could it be possible to eliminate 
boredom, or at the very least severely diminish it. 
Is the association of boredom with Paris unique to radical intellectuals?  It may be 
more prevalent amongst them, but Marxists (to use but one type of radical intellectual as 
an example) are not the only ones who believed Paris had complex ties with the 
experience of boredom.  The sentiment goes back almost a century before the 
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Situationists’s time.  In a letter written on December 25th of 1861, Charles Baudelaire 
explicitly attributes a vacation to Paris as the cause of his mother’s (Caroline Aupick) 
boredom.  Baudelaire states, “[t]hat wretched little trip to Paris affected you so much that 
now you’re bored, you who never used to be bored at all.”60  Unfortunately, Baudelaire 
does not go into any detail for his theory of Paris being the likely cause of his mother’s 
newfound affliction.  Was it the sheer amount of entertainment and excitement found in 
Paris that subsequently made everything after it utterly banal and boring?  Perhaps, that 
could be the case.  Was it the design of Paris that was boring?  That, too, could be what 
Baudelaire was getting at.  After all, it was the ‘wretched little trip’ that is being blamed 
for the prolonged experience of boredom that was previously absent.  If so, it would seem 
that boredom was spreading like a disease.  It would appear as though Benjamin was on 
to something when, as mentioned in the first chapter, he believed the spread of boredom 
to be an epidemic in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
In the sections (convolutes) C, D, and E of his Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin 
discusses Ancient Paris, boredom, and Haussmannization, respectively.  If one were to go 
by the travel guide alone, boredom would surely seem out of place here.  After all, how 
can the City of Light and love be so boring?  The response to Haussmann’s city planning 
is a clue.  Such a clue can be found in Benjamin’s decision to organize his project in this 
particular way.  It is significant that the bridge from the old, Ancient Paris to the Paris of 
Haussmann is boredom.  That is to say, although the physical space of Ancient Paris is 
usually thought of as being transformed by Haussmann’s city planning, what goes 
unrecognized is the emergence of boredom around the same period of time. 
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 Haussmann is one of the most influential city planners in the history of planning 
in general, but the modern world in particular.  Although it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to sketch the extent of someone’s influence, Sigfried Giedeon in his “modernist 
summa”61 Space, Time and Architecture attempts to do so for Haussmann, albeit in a very 
general way.  Giedeon clearly states that 
Haussmann’s direct influence was immense.  In every country where 
industrialization was late in developing, one encounters details imitated from the 
transformation of Paris, particularly from the early accomplishments of the first 
réseau.  There are few cities without a main street directed toward the axis of the 
central station, like the Boulevard Sébastopol and the Garde de l’Est.  The 
Parisian boulevards find many an echo in monumental streets built up along the 
line of razed fortifications.  But it was only details which were imitated.  There 
was no one with Haussmann’s power to attempt a general attack upon the new 
problem of the city.
62
 
 
So, while no one anywhere in the world was able to enact the sweeping changes 
Haussmann was afforded to impart on Paris, they were given the opportunity to model 
their cities after the Baron’s design.  They may be similar, but not exactly the same.  As 
Lefebvre notes in his book The Production of Space, “[t]here is no need to subject 
modern towns, their outskirts and new buildings, to careful scrutiny in order to reach the 
conclusion that everything here resembles everything else.”63  As well, in an earlier book, 
The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre argues: “In spite of any efforts at homogenization 
through technology, in spite of the constitution of arbitrary isotopies, that is, separation 
and segregation, no urban place is identical to another.”64  A key distinction must be 
made here in order to reconcile a contradiction between these two lines of argumentation.  
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To Lefebvre, many urban areas are not identical, but they do resemble one another.  As 
he would put it, “[t]he space that homogenizes thus has nothing homogenous about it.”65 
Haussmann’s influence is global in scope but there is no space that is identical to 
the one he created.  The above passage from Giedeon’s text on Haussmann’s influence 
can be supplemented by David Harvey who, too, has sketched a direct line of influence, 
albeit using much more concrete examples.  Harvey writes: 
There is a strong connecting thread from Haussmann’s re-shaping of Paris in the 
1860s through the ‘garden city’ proposals of Ebenezer Howard (1898), Daniel 
Burnham (the ‘White City’ constructed for the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893 and 
the Chicago Regional Plan of 1907), Garnier (the linear industrial city of 1903), 
Camillo Sitte and Otto Wagner (with quite different plans to transform fin de 
siècle Vienna), Le Corbusier (The city of tomorrow and the Plan Voisin proposal 
for Paris of 1924), Frank Lloyd Wright (the Broadacre project of 1935) to the 
large-scale urban renewal efforts undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s in the spirit 
of high modernism.
66
 
 
The allusion to a connecting thread remains unspecified by Harvey.  So what is the thread 
Harvey refers to?  The predominant use of the right angle is certainly an overt possibility, 
but the less obvious possibility is the experience of boredom shared amongst those who 
inhabit those spaces, as well as by the critics who assess them.  Below, I will attempt to 
demonstrate the parallels between Haussmann’s vision for Paris and one of the 
abovementioned urbanists, Le Corbusier. For now, it is important to note that Le 
Corbusier was an admirer of Haussmann, one who was deeply influenced by the straight 
streets in the Baron’s design.  Referring to the benefits of streets with right-angles in 
Paris, Le Corbusier argues: 
Your mind is free instead of being given over every minute to the complicated 
game imposed on it by the puzzle of our European cities.  Do you want to go from 
your home to the Opera, to Père-Lachaise, to the Luxembourg Museum, or to the 
Eiffel Tower?  First get the city plan out of your drawer and look for the route.  It 
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is a task.  Old gentlemen will pretend to discover in that the charm of Paris.  I do 
not agree; nevertheless I accept the inconvenience imposed by the very history of 
the city; on my way I thank Louix XIV, Napoleon, and Haussmann for having cut 
through the city with some clear and intelligent axes.
67
 
 
This ‘free mind’ means one does not have to think about where one is going to the same 
extent as one had to in the past.  In this sense, the influence of Haussmann’s design as a 
truly global one becomes apparent.  As Edward Relph notes, the twentieth century may 
have inaugurated the first era in all of history where people can survive and flourish 
without having a shred of “first-hand knowledge of their surroundings.”68  Today, Global 
Positioning Systems in the process of becoming standard features in both cars much to 
the convenience of their drivers as well as in the smart phones of pedestrians. Due in no 
small part to the general ideology imparted by Haussmann and his plan, people are 
requiring less and less first-hand knowledge of their surroundings in order to go about 
their everyday lives.
69
 
To end this section, it should be noted that cities are often designed to forestall 
boredom.  If one is bored in the city, such as the Situationists claimed to be, it is merely 
an unintended consequence.  No one designs an urban space in order to bore people.  The 
American geographer Edward Soja, heavily influenced by Lefebvre’s work, draws a 
distinction between two types of cities and how they are constructed for dealing with 
boredom.  Without Soja stating as much, the two types can roughly be described as 
vibrant on the one hand and dull on the other.  Or, for the present purposes, they are a city 
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that has been built properly to not induce boredom and one that struggles to combat 
boredom. 
Amsterdam’s center feels like an open public forum, a daily festival of 
spontaneous political and cultural ideas played at a low key, but all the more 
effective for its lack of pretense and frenzy.  Its often erogenously zoned 
geography is attuned to many different age groups and civically dedicated to the 
playful conquest of boredom and despair in ways that most other cities have 
forgotten or never thought possible.  Downtown Los Angeles, on the other hand, 
is almost pure spectacle, of business and commerce, of extreme wealth and 
poverty, of clashing cultures and rigidly contained ethnicities.  Boredom is 
assuaged by overindulgence and the bombardment of artificial stimulation; while 
despair is controlled and contained by the omnipresence of authority and spatial 
surveillance, the ultimate in the substitution of police for polis.
70
  
 
Based on this description, downtown Amsterdam appears to be a space which requires 
little effort to enjoy.  Downtown Los Angeles, on the contrary, seems to require a great 
deal of persistent effort in order to ‘assuage’ boredom.  Referring to California in general, 
Baudrillard writes: 
What is hardest is that, in this idealized universe, it is not permissible to be bored.  
The need to preserve this paradisiac reputation (much more than happiness itself) 
obviously makes life twice as difficult.  There is an extraordinary pressure of 
collective responsibility.  All new arrivals conform immediately; the solidarity is 
total.  The Californians are committed to a job of advertising just as ascetic as the 
task of the Mormons with whom they share a geographical and mental space.  
They are a huge sect devoted to proving happiness, as others have dedicated 
themselves to the greater glory of God.
71
 
 
The goal, then, in California in general and Los Angeles in particular is to have the 
appearance of happiness regardless of one’s boredom. Money, in this formulation, would 
seem essential for keeping boredom at bay in a city such as Los Angeles.  In order to 
examine this further, I will now turn away from the spatial arrangement of city planners 
to the spatial usage of everyday people in the city. 
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The Street: Freezing Metropolitan Blaséness 
As was mentioned at the end of the last chapter, for Lefebvre, the street is a 
microcosm of everyday life.  For him, the street “epitomizes the modern city.”72  It is in 
the street where the city and everyday life shine brightest.  Other continental scholars 
such as Walter Benjamin and Georg Simmel have this thought in common with Lefebvre, 
although, unlike Benjamin and Simmel, Lefebvre does not have an ideal type of urban 
occupant strolling through the streets.
73
  Benjamin’s is the flâneur and Simmel’s is the 
blasé personality.  While these are different labels, these two figures are not so different.  
Fran Tonkiss has sketched some commonalities between these two figures.  “Distracted 
by the urban spectacle even as he is estranged from it,” writes Tonkiss, “the bored desire 
of the flâneur bears a likeness to Simmel’s jaded metropolitan, battered to the point of the 
blasé.”74 Aside from sharing the desire to assert themselves as pedestrians, these two 
figures are both plagued by seemingly perpetual fits of boredom.  To Tonkiss, the flâneur 
and the blasé personality both “exemplify an ambivalent mode of being in the modern 
city which combines emersion with estrangement, consumption with detachment, desire 
with boredom.  He is always ‘just looking’.”75  In a certain sense, this is passive 
observation in that these figures are not actively participating in the activities taking place 
in the immediate surroundings.  In another sense, it is an active observation where they 
are much more in tune with what is happening in their surroundings than the ones who 
are participating in the activities.  It is both active and passive at the same time.  It would 
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seem as though the blasé personality is developed by being both present and absent in the 
city. 
In what Fredric Jameson has called a “seminal essay,”76 ‘The Metropolis and 
Mental Life’ by Georg Simmel offers the best and perhaps most famous example of 
blaséness.  This “peculiarly modern form of boredom”77 is what one develops through the 
constant process of mediation in the metropolis best exemplified by the impersonal 
exchange of money.
78
  Simmel writes of “the rapid crowding of changing images, the 
sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance.  And the unexpectedness of onrushing 
impressions.  These are the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates.”79  
But cities have been around much longer than modernity has, why would a blasé 
personality suddenly develop?  To Simmel, it is the modern metropolis, which is 
historically specific, that is of concern to him.  Anthony Giddens glosses the difference 
between the modern metropolis and cities of the past when he writes how “modern 
urbanism is ordered according to quite different principles from those which set off the 
pre-modern city from the countryside in prior periods.”80  One of these principles is the 
money economy of capitalism.  Simmel notes how “the metropolis has always been the 
                                                 
76 Fredric Jameson, “The Brick and the Balloon: Architecture, Idealism, and Land Speculation,” In The 
Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso Press, 1998), 165. 
77 Patrice Petro, “After Shock/Between Boredom and History,” Fugitive Images: From Photography to 
Video, ed. Patrice Petro, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 1995), 273. 
78 Regarding the money economy, or capitalism, Klapp believes no “particular content of ideology appear 
to have much to do with the prevalence of boredom.” Overload and Boredom, 22.  Agnes Repplier, writing 
in 1893, claims a socialist “dreams of preparing for all of us a lifetime of unbroken ennui.”  In “Ennui,” 
Essays in Idleness, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1893), 167. 
79 Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” In Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings (London: 
Sage Publications, 1997), 175.  Simmel wrote this essay in 1903 about his experiences in Europe, while 
four years later in 1907 Maxim Gorky wrote in a similar vein about his trip to Coney Island, New York 
where he noticed the people there were suffering from a “boredom [that] deafens their ears and blinds their 
eyes.” Maxim Gorky, “Boredom,” In Writing New York: a Literary Anthology, ed. Phillip Lopate (New 
York: Library of America, 2008), 358. 
80 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 6 
179 
seat of the money economy,”81 but it is the capitalist one that is of concern to him.  But 
what does this have to do with the blasé attitude?  Simmel continues by saying how “the 
immense growth of the monetary-industrial complex also brought with it the modern city 
[…] the megalopolis whose uncontrollable cellular division and spread now threatens to 
choke so much of our lives.”82 Specifically, money is the key culprit for blaséness 
because it “reduces all quality and individuality to the question: How much?”83  Money,84 
then, is a leveller of difference where everyone requires it to sustain oneself.
85
  That is, 
we all need money to buy food, clothes, shelter, etc.  Of course, the amount of money 
people possess is not levelled.  “Money,” observes Simmel, “with all its colourlessness 
and indifference, becomes the common denominator of all values.”86  Lefebvre referred 
to money as the “arch-sorcerer of the Western world.”87  It conjures up hopes and dreams 
seemingly out of thin air.  It can make things appear or disappear.  It has cast a spell on 
many who relentlessly pursue it as if to replicate the machinery which produces it.  The 
mediation of money in the metropolis, so widespread throughout the world, is believed to 
be the chief cause of the blasé personality. 
 Blaséness is characterized by Simmel as a ‘mood’.  Elizabeth Goodstein claims it 
is “a mental attitude associated with the experience of boredom in relation to the 
historical and cultural circumstances of urban existence.”88  Simmel believes that “this 
mood is the faithful subjective reflection of the completely internalized money 
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economy.”89  Here, reflection is meant in the sense that it mirrors, rather than the 
reflection of deep thinking, or to reflect in a philosophical sense.  The money economy 
ensures that encounters in the metropolis are certainly impersonal, “for entirely unknown 
purchasers who never personally enter the producer’s actual field of vision.”90 Simmel is 
here emphasizing the lack of familiarity in the exchange of goods and services.  That is, 
although the situation of exchange is one that can be found throughout the metropolis and 
is therefore quite familiar, the inter-subjective interaction is relatively hollow and 
customers and vendors both simply go through the motions in order to complete a 
transaction.  Neither side seems to enjoy the moment.  There is always something else in 
the future or even in the past that is more desirable.  It is only a means to an end.  Along 
these lines, George Steiner writes: “The urban inferno, with its hordes of faceless 
inhabitants, haunts the nineteenth-century imagination.”91 These faceless inhabitants 
roughly echo Simmel’s assessment of the blasé personality.  Further to this point, 
Raymond Williams has mentioned two scenarios often taking place in the metropolitan 
settings of English literature.  They are two sides of the same coin, either the crowd full 
of strangers or the lonely individual in the crowd.
92
  Both scenarios are consistent with 
the faceless and nameless mass of people Steiner refers to.  While Williams’s example is 
one of fiction, it is based on the authors’ observations of the actually existing movement 
throughout the metropolis. 
With the blasé personality, there is a shift in the logic of everyday life that 
becomes most apparent with an examination of a rationalized urban space.  Over the 
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course of time, the “modern mind,” according to Simmel, “has become more and more 
calculating.”93  Simmel’s fellow philosophical countryman Martin Heidegger would 
certainly agree with this.  It should be noted that Heidegger also briefly mentions 
blaséness in his lectures on boredom,
94
 but does not refer to Simmel or the money 
economy.  The common thread between these two thinkers is not found in those lectures, 
but is instead present in Heidegger’s ‘Memorial Address’ from October 30th 1955, where 
he differentiates between two kinds of thinking in the modern world: calculative and 
meditative.  The former type of thinking, “computes ever new, ever more promising and 
at the same time more economical possibilities.  Calculative thinking never stops, never 
collects itself.”95  With the subsequent advent of computers, it would seem as though both 
Heidegger and Simmel were prophetic in their assessment of calculative thinking.  
Meditative thinking, on the contrary, constantly ‘collects itself’, evaluates and re-
evaluates, pauses, carries on, turns back, is careful, deliberate and comparatively slow.  
These two modes of thinking are opposed to one another.   
If calculative thinking is day, then meditative thinking is night.
96
  It can be said 
that there is a certain sort of coldness with this calculating mind.  The familiar saying 
‘cold and calculating’97  is relevant here for linking Simmel and Heidegger with 
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Lefebvre.  In his book Everyday Life in the Modern World, Lefebvre argues in an implicit 
way that calculative thinking (the greater the coldness of calculative thinking, the closer 
its approaches a ‘zero point’) can never be fully realized: 
Zero point is the lowest point of social experience, a point that can only be 
approached and never reached, the point of total cold; it is made up of partial zero 
points – space, time, objects, speech, needs.  A kind of intellectual and social 
asceticism can be discerned at zero point under all the apparent affluence, the 
squandering and ostentation as well as under their opposites, economic rationality, 
resistance.  Moreover it can be held responsible for the decline of the Festival, of 
style and works of art; or rather it is the sum of features and properties resulting 
from their decline.  In fact zero point defines everyday life – except for desire that 
lives and survives in the quotidian.
98
 
 
Calculative thinking is the general logic behind and perpetuated throughout everyday life 
that leads to the decline of the Festival, of style, of works of art, etc., because these are all 
superfluous activities that do not contribute to the money economy or the linear way of 
being that governs the modern world.  To Lefebvre, this rationalized manner of living is 
the opposite of a work of art and is the reason why everyday life is not a work of art.  
This rationalized thinking is a general feature of modernity, but is highly concentrated in 
a metropolis.  Lefebvre writes: 
Maybe our description of this ‘freezing’ landscape is misleading, for it has 
nothing in common with an ice-age scene; it is merely a picture of boredom.  On 
the other hand we all know only too well the dangers inherent in the boredom 
eating away at the heart of modernity.  We cannot close our eyes to the fact that 
whole nations are bored, while others are sinking into a boredom at zero point.  
We can say that people are satisfied, happy …; of course they are, for they have 
come to accept and even to like boredom at ‘zero point’; they prefer it to hazards 
of desire.
99
 
 
The widespread shift towards calculative thinking as a general logic of modernity, then, 
is a ‘picture of boredom’.  The blasé attitude, though often concealing such boredom, 
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wears a mask of satisfaction and happiness.  With a pervasive emphasis on calculative 
thinking, what is missing is quality of life. 
With the blasé attitude, quantification is valued above all else.  That is to say, 
quantity is valued more than quality.  Everything is measured in price and duration of 
time.  ‘How much is it going to cost?’ or ‘how long is it going to take?’ are frequent 
questions heard throughout the metropolis and can confirm this point, perhaps even 
together, such as with a ride in a taxi.  The clichéd
100
 saying ‘time is money’ seems to 
apply to this and it is on this point where another commonality exists between Lefebvre 
and Simmel.  Lefebvre writes: 
Since time can apparently be assessed in terms of money, however, since it can be 
bought and sold just like any object (‘time is money’), little wonder that it 
disappears after the fashion of an object.  At which point it is no longer even a 
dimension of space, but merely an incomprehensible scribble or scrawl that a 
moment’s work can completely rub out.  It is reasonable to ask if this expulsion or 
erasure of time is directed at historical time.  The answer is: certainly, but only for 
symbolic purposes.  It is, rather, the time needed for living, time as an irreducible 
good, which eludes the logic of visualization and spatialization (if indeed one may 
speak of logic in this context).  Time may have been promoted to the level of 
ontology by the philosophers, but it has been murdered by society.
101
   
 
Here, the distinction between meditative and calculative thinking is demonstrated.  While 
this passage may seem to be a tad hyperbolic, Lefebvre’s point is a penetrating one.  On 
the one hand, time is an important philosophical problem and on the other hand its 
importance is glossed over by many non-philosophers.  Much the same as with space, 
time is of serious concern for a relative few despite the fact that both categories apply to 
all. 
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While space is a shared facet between Lefebvre and Simmel’s respective work, 
time is also an important facet for the depiction of the modern world located in the work 
of each thinker.  Lefebvre’s category of linear time mentioned in the last chapter can be 
seen in Simmel’s observation of “the universal diffusion of pocket watches.”102  To 
Simmel, the profusion of pocket watches “symbolizes subjective adaptation to the highly 
rationalized form of metropolitan life.”103  This rationalization is evident in the multitude 
of time schedules such as those for work, department store hours, movie show times, or 
those found at a train station, all of which altered everyday life.  It is important here to 
reiterate the interconnectedness of time and space.  In his Production of Space, Lefebvre 
articulates this over the course of a lengthy passage: 
With the advent of modernity time has vanished from social space.  It is recorded 
solely on measuring-instruments, on clocks, that are as isolated and functionally 
specialized as this time itself.  Lived time loses its form and its social interest – 
with the exception, that is, of time spent working.  Economic space subordinates 
time to itself; political space expels it as threatening and dangerous (to power).  
The primacy of the economic and above all of the political implies the supremacy 
of space over time.  It is thus possible that the error concerning space that we have 
been discussing actually concerns time more directly, more intimately, than it 
does space, time being even closer to us, and more fundamental.  Our time, then, 
this most essential part of lived experience, this greatest good of all goods, is no 
longer visible to us, no longer intelligible.  It cannot be constructed.  It is 
consumed, exhausted, and that is all.  It leaves no traces.  It is concealed in space, 
hidden under a pile of debris to be disposed of as soon as possible; after all, 
rubbish is a pollutant.
104
 
 
Lefebvre here articulates a dialectical relationship between the widespread presence of 
time pieces along with the concurrent absence of time’s intelligibility.  It would perhaps 
only be mysterious if all of the time pieces were removed from society, such as Simmel 
theorizes: 
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If all clocks and watches in Berlin would suddenly go wrong in different ways, 
even if only by one hour, all economic life and communication of the city would 
be disrupted for a long time.  In addition, an apparently mere external factor – 
long distances – would make all waiting and broken appointments result in an ill-
afforded waste of time.  Thus, the technique of metropolitan life is unimaginable 
without the most punctual integration of all activities and mutual relations into a 
stable and impersonal time schedule.
105
 
 
Time is an important aspect of the blasé attitude.  It must be emphasized that this is not 
an obscure or rare attitude.  Simmel would claim that “there is perhaps no psychic 
phenomenon which has been so unconditionally reserved to the metropolis as has the 
blasé attitude.  The blasé attitude results first from the rapidly changing and closely 
compressed contrasting stimulations of the nerves.”106  This effectively defines how the 
blasé attitude appears as well as how prevalent it is in the metropolis.  Simmel continues 
by mentioning how “a life in boundless pursuit of pleasure makes one blasé because it 
agitates the nerves to their strongest reactivity for such a long time that they finally cease 
to react at all.”107  Such a boundless pursuit is thought to be doomed to failure from the 
beginning. 
Simmel’s concept of the blasé attitude is best summarized by Goodstein who 
argues that it “represent[s] an historically significant adaptation to modern life.”108  Seán 
Desmond Healy would agree with Goodstein’s assessment, though he notes that “one 
might have supposed exactly the opposite, given the vastly more numerous diversions 
and entertainments.”109  It is with this in mind where it becomes interesting to contrast 
Simmel’s position with Bertrand Russell’s, mentioned in the first section of the first 
chapter.   
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Whereas Simmel advocates the proliferation of the blasé personality as being 
concurrent with the spreading of metropolises, Russell’s argument clearly goes in the 
other direction.  That is, Russell believes that people were bored in the rural areas before 
the ‘double process’ of industrialization and urbanization took over as the dominant 
structures of society.  As was mentioned in the first section of the first chapter, Russell 
argues that there are simply too many distractions and stimulations (amusements) 
available in the metropolis to become bored, none of which were available to the folks in 
rural areas.  To Russell, there was little stimulation in pre-modern times and, therefore, 
there had to be a mass diffusion of boredom.  Russell’s position is a commonsensical one, 
much the same as the other intellectual mentioned in the same section, Joseph Brodsky.  
Recall the discussion in the first chapter regarding Brodsky’s linear causal chain: money–
time–repetition–boredom.  These four items are all present in Simmel’s blasé attitude.  
One difference is Simmel specifically uses the city as an example, whereas Brodsky does 
not.  Conversely, Russell does actually make mention of the relationship between the 
urban and boredom.  Of note is Russell’s view that “the special kind of boredom from 
which modern urban populations suffer is intimately bound up with their separation from 
the life of Earth.”110  This is particularly puzzling considering Russell claimed that 
boredom has diminished in the machine age.  Russell makes the case for the incredible 
boredom of the past when people were much more connected to the Earth and then makes 
the claim that a lack of connection to the Earth is what causes one form of boredom.  
Earlier in his essay Russell wrote that “[w]e are less bored than our ancestors were, but 
we are more afraid of boredom.”111  Essentially, we have a fear of boredom, but do not 
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experience it as much.  Although they arrive at different conclusions, both Simmel and 
Russell share the idea that something unique happened with the advent of the machine 
age. 
Architecture: Machines for Living In 
In contrast to many urban critics who place an enormous amount of value on the 
street, it has been said that the Swiss architect and city planner Le Corbusier (né Charles-
Édouard Jeanneret) “longs to abolish the street.”112  His primary focus was buildings and 
the spaces between them were secondary.  One of the most notorious and influential 
architects of the twentieth century, Le Corbusier was one of the path breaking figures in 
architectural modernism.  His infamous phrase that “a house is a machine for living in”113 
would prove to be a cornerstone of his legacy.  Several years after expressing this 
sentiment, in 1943 Le Corbusier admitted that he “was never forgiven for that 
expression.”114  Despite his insistence on the strictly functional aspects of the home, Le 
Corbusier was sensitive to the boredom experienced by countless individuals in such a 
space.  In his book Towards a New Architecture, the same book featuring the comment 
about ‘machines for living’, Le Corbusier outlines the problem of boredom: 
[T]he modern man is bored to tears in his home; so he goes to his club.  The 
modern woman is bored outside her boudoir; she goes to tea-parties.  The modern 
man and woman are bored at home; they go to night-clubs.  But lesser folk who 
have no clubs gather together in the evening under the chandelier and hardly dare 
to walk through the labyrinth of their furniture which takes up the whole room 
and is all their fortune and their pride.
115
 
 
                                                 
112 Lettrist International, “Skyscrapers by the Roots,” In The Situationists and the City, ed. Tom 
McDonough (London: Verso Press, 2009), 44. 
113 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, trans. Frederick Etchells (New York: Dover Publications, 
1986), 95. 
114 Le Corbusier, Le Corbusier Talks with Students: From the Schools of Architecture, trans. Pierre Chase 
(New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999), 26. 
115 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, 120-122. 
188 
In Le Corbusier’s view, emotions are rooted in architecture.  How one feels is dependent 
on where one is, which space one dwells in.  The boredom of the modern man and 
modern woman is rooted in the boringness of the architecture of their homes.  To Le 
Corbusier, this could be remedied with an architecture that reflected the demands of 
modernity and facilitated its flow.  To him, architecture is “an admirable thing, the 
loveliest of all.  A product of happy peoples and a thing which in itself produces happy 
peoples.”116  Further to this, he believed that “the business of architecture is to establish 
emotional relationships by means of raw materials.”117  These emotional relationships 
were to extend far beyond the space of the home, as Le Corbusier envisioned a better 
society through better architecture.  It would begin with buildings and extend out to the 
surrounding city.  The basic formula is: “The happy towns are those that have an 
architecture.”118 The final two sentences of his book Towards a New Architecture are 
“Architecture or revolution.  Revolution can be avoided.”119 In order to preempt unrest or 
dissatisfaction amongst its inhabitants, the city, or society more generally, would require 
modern architecture, specifically Le Corbusier’s architecture.   
Le Corbusier strove to be the architect of modernity and he was largely successful 
at achieving this goal.  Lefebvre once described him as “the most celebrated architect and 
town planner of modern times.”120  This statement is geared towards Le Corbusier’s 
overall reception and not Lefebvre’s overall view.  Lefebvre’s position can be contrasted 
with Le Corbusier’s theory that “our epoch is fixing its own style day by day.  It is there 
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under our eyes.  Eyes which do not see.”121  Whereas Lefebvre would say there is an 
absence of style, Le Corbusier would say the style is there, it is just beneath one’s 
attention.  This can be contrasted with another passage of Lefebvre’s on Le Corbusier 
where he assures readers that he “was a good architect, but a catastrophic urbanist.”122  
Lefebvre characterized Le Corbusier’s supposed style and the one that is ‘fixing itself day 
by day’ as “the dictatorship of the right angle.”123 As was seen above in the case of 
Haussmann, for urban planners the right angle results in straight streets, which Le 
Corbusier acknowledged are boring for pedestrians to walk in, but are at the same time 
are efficient for automobiles.  Le Corbusier would rather have a straight street to facilitate 
the flow of business than fabricate curved streets that would be enjoyable to walk in.  
This is not to say that Le Corbusier was insensitive to leisure activities as a whole, they 
were simply subordinate to the speed of automobiles and business.  Le Corbusier likened 
the curved road to the ‘Pack-Donkey’s Way’.  Conversely, the straight road was the way 
of the future, the way of modernity.  The Pack-Donkey wanders aimlessly, whereas the 
man of modernity “walks in a straight line because he has a goal and knows where he is 
going.”124 Curved streets are imprecise relics of the past; straight streets are rational 
achievements of modernity.  The straight street was to reflect Le Corbusier’s view that 
“the modern sentiment is the spirit of geometry.”125  He acknowledged that while 
boredom may lie in wait for pedestrians walking these streets, but they accommodate 
automobiles.  He believed the appropriate solution to accommodating business and 
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leisure was to separate business and automobiles from pedestrians and leisure by having 
specific spaces for each.
126
 Much like houses were ‘machines for living in’, the street was 
a “traffic machine” for Le Corbusier which he felt ought to be “as well equipped in its 
way as a factory.”127   
Lefebvre and Le Corbusier approached the city from different points of view.  
Lefebvre comes from an academic, philosophical position, whereas Le Corbusier’s 
perspective was fashioned much more by practical, empirical work in spatial design.  
Both were, however, concerned above all else with everyday life.  Le Corbusier once 
wrote in reference to the tasks facing planners that “what we must do, therefore, is to 
study modern man’s daily existence.”128  Based on this limited information it would 
appear as though he and Lefebvre are kindred spirits.  After all, Lefebvre is the 
‘quintessential theorist of everyday life’.  However, dig a little bit into Lefebvre’s book 
The Production of Space and one finds several unambiguous statements that set him apart 
from Le Corbusier.  For example, Lefebvre writes: “Surely it is the supreme illusion to 
defer to architects, urbanists or planners as being experts or ultimate authorities in matter 
relating to space.”129  This clearly applies to architects and urban planners in general, but 
especially to Le Corbusier in particular.  In his book The Survival of Capitalism, Lefebvre 
also argued that “the urban has no worse enemy than urban planning and ‘urbanism’, 
which is capitalism’s and the state’s strategic instrument for the manipulation of 
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fragmented urban reality and the production of controlled space.”130 Lefebvre elaborated 
this thought in his earlier text The Urban Revolution: 
The architect who draws and the urbanist who composes a block plan look down 
on their “object,” buildings and neighborhoods, from above and afar.  The 
designers and draftsmen move within a space of paper and ink.  Only after this 
nearly complete reduction of the everyday do they return to the scale of lived 
experienced.
131
 
 
While Le Corbusier wished to study everyday life, he nevertheless fell well short in 
Lefebvre’s eyes.  Everyday life is exactly what suffers when it is regulated, at least when 
it is attempted to be regulated, by functionalist planners.   
Not surprisingly, David Harvey sides with Lefebvre on this matter when he 
argues that “a planner-architect like Le Corbusier, or an administrator like Haussmann, 
creates a built environment in which the tyranny of the straight line predominates, then 
we must perforce adjust our daily practices.”132  Harvey is here claiming that the design 
of an urban space impacts the routines and routes of everyday life.  Constant 
Nieuwenhuys, a member of the Situationist International, would agree with Lefebvre and 
Harvey when he writes: 
In response to the need to construct whole towns rapidly, cemeteries in reinforced 
concrete are being built where great masses of the population are condemned to 
die of boredom.  For what is the use of the most astonishing technical inventions 
that the world now finds at its disposal if the conditions for deriving benefit from 
them are lacking, they contribute nothing to leisure, and the imagination 
defaults?
133
 
 
Le Corbusier is a particularly important figure for discussing the relationship between 
boredom and the urban.  Not only because he is one of the most influential urbanists of 
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all time, but because, oddly enough, Le Corbusier sought to eliminate boredom from 
urban spaces.  While often accused of (such as in the case of Constant) imposing 
boredom on those who walk in his streets, or live in his buildings, Le Corbusier was 
adamant that boredom should be excluded from the urban.  In his book The City of To-
Morrow and its Planning, Le Corbusier makes it clear when he writes that “there must 
never come a time when people can be bored in our city.”134  This was his vision, to 
eliminate boredom via urban planning and architectural design.  His major weapons were 
the straight lines on a Cartesian plane, the very same he acknowledged as boring to walk 
in.
135
 However, what he also believed was that too much interest in the street would also 
lead to boredom.  He argued that “[p]icturesqueness is a pleasure which quickly becomes 
boring if too frequently gratified.”136 It would seem that, for Le Corbusier, both straight 
streets and ‘picturesque’ streets lead to boredom, so they, in a sense, cancel one another 
out.   
Perhaps Le Corbusier sought to expunge cities of boredom because he was so 
often afflicted by this experience in his early life.  This is exemplified in a letter written 
December 2
nd
, 1910 to his parents, where Le Corbusier sums up his overall experience 
working for the German architect Peter Behrens in the city of Berlin: 
As for me, what sickens me most is not being able to get well.  Each day begins 
by opening a big hole in front of me and dropping me into it because I thought I 
wasn’t being an idiot, which I am, and in a way that’s disgustingly and 
unacceptably unfair.  Of course it’s my own fault, but my sickness is right there 
mocking me, frustrating me.  You no longer understand such a creature, my dear 
parents, nor do I.  I’ve given up – first victory, or already a first defeat: trying to 
analyse why.  It’s all summed up in a single word of two syllables: Boredom.137 
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This letter contains several points which should appear ironic if considered in tandem 
with the criticism leveled at Le Corbusier’s work.  Le Corbusier’s everyday life was one 
that was often filled with boredom, a boredom which he considers a type of ‘sickness’.  
No wonder that he, as what could be called a doctor of space, tried to cure the boredom of 
the city with urban design and architecture.  At the time of writing the letter, Le 
Corbusier was said to have had a “state of mind” that “devolved into a “crisis of profound 
boredom.”138  Berlin was not the only city Le Corbusier associated with boredom.  In 
another letter to his parents, written in November 17, 1907, Le Corbusier complained 
about the boredom of Vienna.  He writes: “Sad day; no purpose whatever, mortal 
boredom; one rages, one rears up, one is a tiny angry god in solitary combat against this 
mocking inert mass, the inexorable indifference of the big city.”139  To Le Corbusier, the 
modern city, described above as a ‘mocking inert mass’, needed to be transformed into 
something that meshed with the symbol of the modern age, the machine.  Le Corbusier’s 
boredom with urban design was a catalyst for his machine aesthetic.  However, a machine 
aesthetic is bound to be repetitive if it is to remain deserving of the name.  Lefebvre notes 
the problems associated with this type of design: 
A homogeneous and utterly simultaneous space would be strictly imperceptible.  
It would lack the conflictual component (always resolved, but always at least 
suggested) of the contrast between symmetry and asymmetry.  It may as well be 
noted at this juncture that the architectural and urbanistic space of modernity 
tends precisely towards this homogeneous state of affairs, towards a place of 
confusion and fusion between geometrical and visual which inspires a kind of 
physical discomfort.  Everything is alike.  Localization – and lateralization – are 
no more.  Signifier and signified, marks and markers, are added after the fact – as 
decorations, so to speak.  This reinforces, if possible, the feeling of desertedness, 
and adds to the malaise. 
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This modern space has an analogical affinity with the space of the 
philosophical, and more specifically the Cartesian tradition.  Unfortunately it is 
also the space of blank sheets of paper, drawing-boards, plans, sections, 
elevations, scale models, geometrical projections and the like.
140
   
 
The last line makes mention of ‘blank sheets of paper’.  In Le Corbusier’s book The City 
of To-Morrow and its Planning, Le Corbusier reserves a space for what he believes to be 
an archetypal work of the modern era.  Since the space goes unfilled, an empty space 
persists.  What the reader is left with is essentially a blank sheet of paper.  But is the 
blank sheet of paper itself an archetypal work of the modern era?  Intentionally or 
unintentionally, this is telling.  The Situationists, those harsh critics of Haussmann, were 
equally repulsed by Le Corbusier’s approach: 
We will leave Monsieur Le Corbusier’s style to him, a style suitable for factories 
and hospitals, and no doubt for prisons.  (Doesn’t he already build churches?)  
Some sort of psychological repression dominates this individual – whose face is 
as ugly as his conceptions of the world – such that he wants to squash people 
under ignoble masses of reinforced concrete, a noble material that should rather 
be used to enable an aerial articulation of space that could surpass the flamboyant 
Gothic style.  His cretinizing influence is immense.  A Le Corbusier model is the 
only image that arouses in me the idea of immediate suicide.  He is destroying the 
last remnants of joy.  And of love, passion, freedom.
141
 
 
Where to begin with this passage?  Le Corbusier would probably take offense to being 
referred to as having a style,
 142
  but would most certainly take offense to inducing 
suicidal thoughts with his designs.  By having an ‘immense’ influence, Le Corbusier’s 
vision lives on in the plans and designs of many others.  So, following the logic of the 
Situationists, Le Corbusier is not only ‘destroying the last remnants of joy’, but so too are 
those who take a cue from him, or were made, so to speak, from a similar mould. 
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When asked by a New York reporter what he thought of New York’s skyscrapers, 
Le Corbusier exclaimed that the “skyscrapers of New York are too small and there are 
too many of them.”143  Le Corbusier, instead, wished to promote his idea of the 
“Cartesian skyscraper,” which “easily reaches a thousand feet,” and is “normally vertical, 
plumb from top to bottom, without setbacks or slopes.”144  The façade is almost all glass, 
its base should have plenty of green space (away from other skyscrapers), and it could 
potentially contain anywhere from ten to forty thousand people.
145
  Isolated from other 
buildings, surrounded by green space, the ideal location for Le Corbusier’s Cartesian 
skyscraper in New York would most likely have been Central Park.  As influential as Le 
Corbusier was, and still is, his ideas were/are not always followed.  The absence of a 
skyscraper in Central Park is testament to this.  However, there are some occasions when 
his influence is profound.  For example, as Edward Relph notes in his book The Modern 
Urban Landscape, Le Corbusier’s fingerprints can be found in Toronto.146  Relph 
juxtaposes two images: a design sketch from Le Corbusier’s alongside a picture of 
Highway 427 in Toronto.  The similarities are uncanny.  It is as if Le Corbusier’s drawing 
has come to life.  The two images, the sketch and the photograph, are virtually 
indistinguishable.   
Despite his great influence on people and places alike, Le Corbusier was unable to 
apply his brand of modernism towards the capital of modernity, though he would have 
leapt at the chance.  He writes: “Paris the Cartesian city, Paris refusing all confusion, 
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Paris means clarity.”147  Le Corbusier admired its Cartesian design, but believed it was 
not Cartesian enough.  A few pages later in the same book he was quick to point out that 
it needs to evolve with the machine age.  “Paris is truly in danger;” writes Le Corbusier, 
“for if Paris doesn’t move, Paris will become senile.”148  It just so happens to be the case 
that Le Corbusier believed he had the answer for solving this problem.  Le Corbusier saw 
the basic need for seamless harmony between home and the urban environment.  He once 
wrote: “Home or city, it is all the same thing: both are manifestations of the same 
unity.”149  At first glance, Le Corbusier’s point may appear to be similar to his critics 
perspectives, such as Jane Jacobs, who have an intense and unwavering belief in the 
importance of community and feeling at home in the city.  It becomes apparent that Le 
Corbusier and Jacobs are at odds when one considers what Le Corbusier means by home 
or city: a machine.     
Up to this point the discussion of the urban and boredom has focused on European 
spaces with one short mention of Toronto and another of Los Angeles.  In keeping with 
the theme stated in the introductory chapter of focusing on Europe and America, the 
question arises: What about America?  Le Corbusier was fond of America.  Le Corbusier 
admired much about what he saw as the American way of life, writing that “there is a 
style, a true style, in American cleanliness.”150  What, if any, impact did Le Corbusier 
have on America?  To answer this question it would be beneficial to turn to the work of 
Jane Jacobs. Why Jacobs?  Undoubtedly, she was one of, if not the most vocal critics of 
not only Le Corbusier, but of modern American city planning and architecture. Marshall 
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Berman believed that “if there is one work that perfectly expresses the modernism of the 
street in the 1960s, it is Jane Jacobs’ remarkable book The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities.”151  According to Berman, “all she is doing is talking about her 
everyday life.”152  Indeed, Jacobs begins her book by stating that she is simply “writing 
about common, ordinary things.”153  She effectively constructed an “urban montage.”154  
In a certain sense, the book is a tale of 24 hours in the life of Jane Jacobs much the same 
as James Joyce’s Ulysses.  Berman has noted the parallels between Jacobs’ work and 
Joyce’s work.155 By talking about her everyday life, Jacobs offers a cornucopia of topics 
regarding the success and failures, mostly failures, of American cities, specifically city 
life.  Discussing all of the various details and arguments in this book falls well outside the 
scope of this dissertation.  For the present purposes, two themes are of primary 
importance: streets and dullness.  Jacobs emphasizes the importance of streets in a city.  
She boils it down to the following formula: “If a city’s streets look interesting, the city 
looks interesting; if they look dull, they city looks dull.”156  This can be extended by 
Lefebvre’s assertion that “when the street stops being interesting, so does everyday 
life.”157  This is a fundamental point that seemed to escape Le Corbusier and his fellow 
modernists.   
While Jacobs did not go far enough for Lefebvre, where she did go was 
nevertheless an exemplary condemnation of modern city planning. Much like Berman, 
Lefebvre also noted the importance of Jacobs’ work: 
                                                 
151 Berman, All That is Solid Melts Into Air, 314. 
152 Ibid., 315. 
153 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: The Modern Library, 1993), 5. 
154 Berman, All that is Solid Melts Into Air, 315. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 37. 
157 CEL 2, 310. 
198 
As long ago as 1961, Jane Jacobs examined the failures of ‘city planning and 
rebuilding’ in the United States.  In particular, she showed how the destruction of 
streets and neighbourhoods led to the disappearance of many acquired 
characteristics of city life – or, rather, characteristics assumed to have been 
permanently acquired: security, social contact, facility of child-rearing, diversity 
of relationships, and so on.  Jacobs did not go so far as flatly to incriminate 
neocapitalism, or as to isolate the contradictions immanent to the space produced 
by capitalism (abstract space).  But she did very forcefully demonstrate how 
destructive this space can be, and specifically how urban space, using the very 
means apparently intended to create or re-create it, effects its own self-
destruction.
158
 
 
Jacobs was by no means a Marxist like Lefebvre, though Lefebvre’s note that Jacobs 
identified cities as carrying the seeds of their own destruction is consistent with 
Lefebvre’s version of Marxism.  What is inconsistent with Lefebvre is contentious issue 
of the city as a work of art.  Jacobs writes: “When we deal with cities we are dealing with 
life at its most complex and intense.  Because this is so, there is a basic esthetic limitation 
on what can be done with cities: A city cannot be a work of art.”159  This is a point where 
Lefebvre definitively departs from Jacobs.  Quite simply, to Lefebvre, “towns have 
always been collective works of art.”160  Despite this, Lefebvre has also noted that 
“[u]rbanism does not try to model space as a work of art.”161  Clearly, Jacobs does not 
think it possible, or even desirable for a city to be a work of art, which on this point puts 
her position closer to the very modernists she condemns.  But are Jacobs and Lefebvre 
speaking the same language when it comes to the phrase ‘work of art’?  It may seem as 
though, yes, they simply have differing views.  However, I argue they are much closer in 
their positions than these two lines make it seem.  Where Jacobs and Lefebvre differ is 
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when it comes to defining ‘work of art’.162  Now, to clarify, Lefebvre does not believe 
that a city is the same kind of work of art as a painting or sculpture.  It is much more 
complex than that.  “Obviously,” observes Lefebvre, “a city does not present itself in the 
same way as a flower, ignorant of its own beauty.  It has, after all, been ‘composed’ by 
people, by well-defined groups.  All the same, it has none of the intentional character of 
an ‘art object’.”163 Defined this way, Jacobs may have reconsidered her position on the 
city as a work of art.  The modernists she condemns, on the other hand, would have 
rejected Lefebvre’s position as it goes against the grain of modernity and its quest for 
efficiency. 
Another thread, mentioned in the first chapter, can be picked up at this point, that 
of Taylorism.  Edward Relph notes that, while it is certainly not obvious, Taylorism was 
“at the heart” of the development of the urban landscape(s) throughout the twentieth-
century.
164
  Relph, it should be noted, defines landscapes as “the visual contexts of daily 
existence.”165  Although ordinary in appearance, these urban areas, according to Relph, 
often accused of “lack of grace or style,” have “an almost obsessive concern for 
efficiency of operation and for scientific management.”166  The basic idea seems to be to 
have “cities function as efficiently as factories.”167  Le Corbusier was, of course, an 
ardent proponent of Taylorism.  Le Corbusier explains in his book The Radiant City: 
“People blame Taylorism.  It must be suppressed, they cry.  Yet it enables us to do our 
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work quickly, well, and without fatigue.”168  To Le Corbusier, then, Taylorism, despite its 
bad reputation, is an exemplary model.  It is just that ordinary people do not seem to 
recognize its benefits.  Le Corbusier’s intentions were noble, as he explains that “from 
the point of view of the way of life we want, there is no harmony at all as yet.”169  
Harmony was his goal and Taylorism was a means of achieving this goal.  If it were up to 
Le Corbusier, Taylorism would reign supreme throughout all urban areas, from dawn 
until dusk.  This was not realized during his lifetime, but it gradually permeated urban 
areas, especially in America.  Andy Merrifield has noted how the “Taylorist stamp on 
urban America did eventually spread from hour 1 to hour 24.  We see it everywhere 
today in the sacked downtowns plaguing many cities, hollowed-out spaces devastated by 
interstate highways, by ‘people movers’ lined with faceless office parks, anodyne 
shopping malls, bland pedestrian streets.”170   
In his book Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, the architect Robert 
Venturi’s position is described by Vincent Scully in the introduction as “diametrically 
opposed” to Le Corbusier.171  The basics of this opposition can be found near the 
beginning of the book when Venturi writes “less is a bore.”172  This terse phrase should 
ring a bell for most.  Clearly, this is a play on the now clichéd saying ‘less is more’.  The 
object of Venturi’s ridicule is not this well-known platitude so much as it is the well-
known architects of the International Style, most notably Le Corbusier, the Bauhaus, 
especially its founder Walter Gropius, as well as Mies van der Rohe.  According to 
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Edward Relph, this style, also known as International Modernism, “was to become the 
overwhelmingly dominant architectural style in the urban landscapes of the 1960s and 
1970s.”173  The phrase ‘less is more’ was actually Mies van der Rohe’s architectural 
mantra, which Venturi describes as a “magnificent paradox.”174  Mies, as he is often 
affectionately referred to, embraced simplicity, precision, and function, all the while 
detesting ornamentation much the same as Le Corbusier.
175
  Ornaments are utterly 
superfluous to both architects and should be discarded.  Such additions or inclusions to 
buildings were viewed as unnecessary and ostentatious.  Ornaments added to the 
complexity of a building, which Venturi is quick to note, both architects were not 
interested in.
176
 According to Robert Venturi et al., a common thread throughout Modern 
architecture is the effort to distinguish itself from painting, sculpture, and graphics.
177
  
By limiting itself to strident articulations of the pure architectural elements of 
space, structure, and program, Modern architecture’s expression has become a dry 
expressionism, empty and boring – and in the end irresponsible.  Ironically, the 
Modern architecture of today, while rejecting explicit symbolism and frivolous 
appliqué ornament, has distorted the whole building into one big ornament.
178
 
 
With this the emphasis on function takes the lead over aesthetics.  Eliminating any trace 
of resembling a work of art, architectural modernists instead move toward machines as a 
basic blueprint for their buildings.  While specifically referring to architecture, Charles 
Jencks argues that “[e]very movement has its weakness.  That of Modernism was mass-
produced boredom, the machine aesthetic repeating itself endlessly.”179   
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Modernist architects in the International Style mould were, essentially, avoiding 
the two concepts in the title to Venturi’s book: complexity and contradiction.  Simplicity 
and continuity were valued above all else, thus inevitably leading to an emphasis on 
function.  As Relph notes, such a stance toward architecture was shared by many 
modernists. 
A hallmark of modernism is the lack of ornament and decoration.  In modernist 
cityscapes this means that there is not handmade detail, no evidence of 
craftsmanship to draw and to hold our attention, except perhaps for the occasional 
graffito on a blank wall.  Colours range through the limited palate of pale greens 
and browns to metallic and concrete greys.  Textures are smooth like glass, or 
rough like concrete aggregate, in neither case especially pleasant to touch.  Put 
bluntly – unornamented modernism is boring.180 
 
It is not a stretch to see greyness everywhere, because the ‘double process’ of 
industrialization and urbanization ensures that it is everywhere.  Pollution from cars and 
factories colour the sky grey much the same as the concrete on the ground. Utilizing 
concrete may be functional, inexpensive, and practical, but it is deadly boring to look at, 
walk on, and to be surrounded by.  Believing that grey is surrounding him, the 
Situationist, Raoul Vaneigem, wrote that “there is an incredible dullness in everything 
having to do with urbanism.”181  This is similar to Jane Jacobs’ lament of what she calls 
the ‘Great Blight of Dullness’ found throughout the cities of America.182  Vaneigem’s 
frustration was emblematic of those who advocated a wholesale change in urban 
thinking, design, and implementation.  Steven Best and Douglas Kellner elaborate on this 
point:  
Modern architecture is admirable in its utopian impulses, its emphasis on social 
relevance, and its drive to build a better world.  Some of its best work by Wright, 
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Le Corbusier, Gropius, and Mies is still extremely impressive, but it congealed 
into a deadening orthodoxy, in the service of corporate capital, that produced 
boring buildings and unlivable cities.  This orthodoxy violated the very spirit of 
modernism, which extolled creativity, innovation, and a constant drive to “make it 
new.”  The emphasis on innovation in postmodern architecture, its historicism, 
eclecticism, and return to ornamentation, surely represents a positive step forward 
in comparison to the orthodoxy of the International Style.  But postmodern 
architecture fell prey to ludic excess, to banal eclecticism and bad taste, and itself 
became repetitive, predictable, and boring, leading some to call for a revival of 
modernism.
183
 
 
With this, the epitome of modernist architecture, embodied in the International Style of 
Le Corbusier and his brethren, was found to be so boring and predictable that it inspired 
what came to be called postmodern architecture.  As Andreas Huyssen claims, “Nowhere 
does the break with modernism seem more obvious than in recent American 
architecture.”184 So it is in America where one can see the biggest shift from modernism 
to postmodernism.  After a period of interest, postmodern architecture was met with the 
same fate as modern architecture.   Postmodern architecture, too, was found to be boring, 
thus leading the architectural world in search of something else.  There was a certain 
amount of urgency to this, a dire need for change.  What kind of change was called upon?  
Interestingly enough, a reversion back to modernism.  If there is a lesson from this it 
seems to answer the question: How does one cure the boredom that ails?  In the case of 
postmodern architecture it would seem as though it succumbed to the same fate as 
modernist architecture.   
The mass-produced boredom of modernist architecture is not limited to buildings.  
One piece of furniture that seems to repeat itself in all modern urban spaces is the bus 
shelter. In his book Reading the Everyday, Joe Moran argues that “[i]t would be difficult 
to find a piece of modern architecture that inspires less interest than the bus shelter.  It is 
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an omnipresent object of everyday life that, when it registers in the public consciousness, 
is usually only associated with graffiti and vandalism.”185 With all of the spray paint, 
permanent marker, discarded refuse, and broken glass, among other things, it could also 
be argued that nothing inspires more than a bus shelter.  In a way, they are miniature 
billboards that frequently have advertisements large enough to be seen from vehicles 
passing by.  The advertisements that are plastered on the back of a bench could be read as 
discouraging users from sitting in front of them.  This bench is brought to you by 
company x… But please don’t sit on it, you’ll block the advertisement.  The upper lips of 
the models and/or actors (is there a difference?) in these advertisements seem to dare, if 
not invite, bus passengers to demonstrate their best mustache illustration skills.  Although 
the inspiration may only entail defacing this particular urban space, it is still inspired.  
Regardless of whether one sees it as inspiring or not, Moran’s point is well taken.  Bus 
shelters are symbols of waiting par excellence.  Of course, they do not just symbolize 
waiting, they are also functional, or they are at least meant to be.  They can shield one 
from the weather, as long as there are not too many people also waiting.  Perhaps the 
application(s) of graffiti throughout the rest of the city (any city) reflect a similar 
frustration.  Lefebvre would argue that it is a frustration rooted in everyday urban life. 
New Towns: Chemically Pure Everyday Life 
It is now appropriate to return to a theme from the previous chapter: the absence 
of style in everyday life.  To delve further into Lefebvre’s idea it is perhaps best to look 
at Lefebvre’s most detailed discussion of new towns in English translation, which can be 
found in the seventh prelude of his book Introduction to Modernity titled ‘Notes on the 
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New Town’.186  But first, what exactly are new towns?187  Put simply, new towns are 
purely planned urban spaces, specifically constructed in order to create unique styles of 
life.
188
  According to one commentator, the basic blueprint for new towns was laid in 
Ebenezer Howard’s book from 1898 called Garden Cities of To-Morrow.189  The practice 
of constructing new towns transcended political and geographical boundaries, as they 
were constructed by the Eastern European socialist countries, Western liberal 
democracies, and even in the Third World.  Occupying a widespread, global presence, 
they literally “are being built as a matter of public policy around the world.”190  For 
Lefebvre, new towns serve as prime examples of everyday life in a “chemically pure 
state.”191 It is somewhat ironic that Lefebvre chose a new town as an archetypal space of 
boredom since new towns are often constructed precisely to combat boredom.  For 
example, the new town of Evry in the Southwest of France is useful to highlight this 
point.  One commentator notes: “It must be emphasized that Evry New Town was 
conceived as a city, not as a suburb.  The point was to appeal to those of the French who 
wished “to rediscover urban life and to escape from the boredom of suburb 
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dormitories.”192  Interestingly enough, ‘Evry’ new town is one vowel away from being 
‘Every’ new town.  Nevertheless, the basic idea behind new towns is the construction of a 
self-sufficient, rationally organized space.  All of the necessities and luxuries of the large 
city are grafted on to spaces much smaller in size in order to reduce disparities in wealth, 
revitalize depressed regions, foster growth of industry and create jobs, etc.
193
   
If there is one word that best encapsulates the general sentiment, aura, feeling of a 
new town, it is ‘functionalism’.194  This is by no means restricted to France.  Lefebvre 
recalls a visit to a planning school in the United States where functionalism was the 
major intellectual foundation for its faculty and students: 
I gave a seminar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on urban questions 
and discussed these questions with students.  They said to me; do you want to see 
a project for a town?  They took me to an enormous model and said: General 
Motors provides you with a ‘key in your hand’ in a town of 100 000 inhabitants.  
Then I looked at the model; it was built in an outrageously functionalist style, 
quite extreme, and everything was planned in advance.  The different functions 
were juxtaposed and dispersed; it was quite astonishing.  Then I said to them: are 
you not going to be bored stiff?
195
 
 
Functionalism to Lefebvre is the key dimension for this boredom.  The proposed design 
for this new town was reminiscent of the new town of Mourenx that he wrote about 
several years before and seems to reflect Guy Debord’s suggested motto for new towns: 
“On this spot nothing will ever happen – and nothing ever has.”196 
In Lefebvre’s text, ‘Notes on the New Town’, Lefebvre juxtaposes the boredom 
found in two geographically close yet socially, historically and structurally distant towns 
in Southwestern France.  One is an old town with roots going back to the Middle Ages, 
                                                 
192 Kenneth Kolson, Big Plans: The Allure and Folly of Urban Design (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 128. 
193 Rubenstein, The French New Towns, 5. 
194 For an example of Lefebvre’s use of the concept of ‘functionalism’, see CEL 2, 198-206. 
195 INT, 32. 
196 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 126. 
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whereas the other is a new town with roots going back to a modern urban planner’s 
imagination, albeit one tempered by government officials and corporate interests.  The 
old town is Naverrenx, which is not only where Lefebvre resided at the time of his 
writing, but also where he grew up as a child.  Lefebvre describes Navarrenx as a dying 
medieval town, which, by the way, has no relation to Bertrand Russell’s medieval town 
mentioned in the first chapter, as it is one that has been gradually feeling the effects of 
modernity.  Slowly changing its spatial makeup, the town struggles with and against 
modernization all the while glancing back at the traditional ways of life that are melting 
away into thin air.  In contrast, the second town, Mourenx, is completely fabricated 
within the context of modernity without the traditions and organic maturation of old 
towns.  The problem of Russell’s synchronic analysis could not arise with a consideration 
of a new town, as Mourenx’s boredom is one that can be said to represent modernity 
itself.  When Lefebvre wrote his essay, he argued that Mourenx was looking like a failure 
in its quest to create a new style of life.  However, to Lefebvre, it was “pregnant with 
desires, frustrated frenzies, unrealized possibilities.  A magnificent life is waiting just 
around the corner and far, far away.  It is waiting like a cake is waiting when there’s 
butter, milk, flour and sugar.”197 This is a fundamental point in Lefebvre’s conception of 
boredom.  Boredom is a window into society and presents an opportunity for change.  
Here, Lefebvre’s position is similar to Benjamin’s, which Joe Moran nicely summarizes: 
“For Benjamin, the value of boredom is that it can form the beginnings of an awareness 
that the dull monotony of the present will only end with a resolution of the deeper 
contradictions of society, and the creation of an alternative society based on true 
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creativity and pleasure.”198  Both Benjamin and Lefebvre see great potential to break out 
of the boredom inflicted by such urban spaces.  The ingredients are all there, one simply 
has to mix them together to create the desired experience, which is perhaps easier said 
than done.   
Lefebvre wonders if with Mourenx one is “entering the city of joy or the world of 
unredeemable boredom?”199  The plan is for the former, but Lefebvre suspects the 
inevitability of the latter.  Naverrenx, too, has its boredom, but it is distinct from that of 
Mourenx.  Lefebvre articulates the difference as being the equivalent to sampling 
different varieties of wines at a wine-tasting event.
200
  Lefebvre mentions the boredom of 
Naverrenx as having the aroma of things gone by, as long winter nights and summer 
Sundays.  This would appear to echo Russell’s imaginary medieval town, or even 
Heidegger’s example of walking in a big city on a Sunday, but Lefebvre approaches this 
boredom from an historical perspective, one that is aware of the effects of modernity.  
Unlike Heidegger, Lefebvre’s portrayal of the boredom of Navarrenx on a Sunday is not 
an example of profound boredom but is much closer to Barthes’ view of idleness 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.  As well, unlike Russell who looks back in 
time without realizing that he is looking with eyes fashioned by modernity, Lefebvre 
acknowledges the same form of underwhelming boredom, but places it in its proper 
historical context.  Therefore, the boredom of the medieval town may be boring to those 
who look back on it, but it was not boring for those who lived there. 
 Though it is “relatively easy on the eye,” the new town of Mourenx is a specific 
form of modernity that oozes sterility, precision, and dullness and where functionalism 
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ultimately reigns supreme.
 201
  Referring to it as a “novel of objects,” Lefebvre reads 
Mourenx as a text, which he claims “modernity opens its pages” to him.202  One of 
Lefebvre’s key insights in his reading of the ‘book of Mourenx’ involves the rationality at 
work throughout this new town.  Though having few actual traffic lights, Mourenx is 
viewed by Lefebvre as reflecting the permissive and prohibitive ‘do’ and ‘don’t’ logic of 
the traffic light.
203
  Essentially, to Lefebvre, the entire town is one giant traffic light.  To 
him, there is no need for very many traffic lights because the town itself is a seemingly 
endless series of greens and reds.  If this logic is followed, one’s ability to be spontaneous 
is severely diminished.  Although, to Lefebvre, the lack of spontaneity imposed by the 
new town both restricts experience as well as offers the opportunity to break out and 
become a work of art in Lefebvre’s utopian sense of the phrase.  Functionalism can never 
fully dominate such a space; there is always a space for change.  For this, one would have 
to discard the schedule imposed on one’s everyday life.  Lefebvre explains: 
Sociologically, the truth is that new towns reduce the everyday to its simplest 
terms while at the same time ‘structuring’ it heavily: the everyday in them is 
perfect and stripped bare in its privation, basic and deprived of basic spontaneity.  
It wanders around stagnantly and loses hope in the midst of its own emptiness, 
which nothing technical can ever fill, not even a television set or a car.  Everyday 
life has lost a dimension: depth.  Only triviality remains.  Apartment buildings are 
often well-constructed ‘machines for living in’, and the housing estate is a 
machine for the upkeep of life outside work.
204
   
 
                                                 
201 Ibid., 118. 
202 Ibid., 119.  As early as the first volume of his Critique, Lefebvre considered space(s) a(s) text(s).  There, 
he writes: “Our towns may be read like a book (the comparison is not completely exact: a book signifies, 
whereas towns and rural areas ‘are’ what they signify).  Towns show us the history of power and of human 
possibilities which, while becoming increasingly broad, have at the same time been increasingly taken over 
and controlled, until that point of total control, set up entirely above life and community, which is 
bourgeois control.” CEL 1, 233.  Despite Lefebvre’s recurring usage of a text as a metaphor for space, and 
his unambiguous depiction of it as something that ‘may be read like a book’, this point is not widely 
acknowledged.  For example, Scott Lash argues against Lefebvre when he writes that “[t]he city is for 
Lefebvre not something to be ‘read’.”  Critique of Information (London: Sage, 2002), 119. 
203 IM, 119. 
204 CEL 2, 78-79. 
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With this passage we can see Lefebvre’s thinly veiled critique of Le Corbusier, as well as 
those city planners that are in the same mould, with his reference to apartment buildings 
as ‘machines for living in’.  Here, the use of the term ‘machines for living’ is reminiscent 
of what Wallace Stevens referred to in his poem ‘Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ as 
“the celestial ennui of apartments.”205 
 Lefebvre saw Le Corbusier’s spectral fingerprints all over Mourenx and though it 
is relatively easy on the eye for him, he was admittedly terrified whenever he fixed his 
gaze on the ominous ‘machines for living’ that are strewn throughout.206  This new town 
had little of value for Lefebvre in transforming everyday life.  Instead, Mourenx would 
further galvanize the functionalism and efficiency of modernity and consequently 
severely limit creative potentialities.  As mentioned above, though Mourenx could never 
completely destroy spontaneity, it would come very close to it.  This subordination of 
leisure to work is what Lefebvre finds so boring about the new town and this makes him 
wonder whether “the new towns which are born of ugliness and boredom [can] become 
works of art.”207  Here we again see Lefebvre’s use of the phrase ‘work of art’.  Above it 
was mentioned that Lefebvre believed towns to have been collective works of art.  If 
anything, Lefebvre was at least hopeful that the boredom would subside in Mourenx.  Of 
course, Lefebvre soon dispatched his hopefulness and eventually arrived at the realization 
that new towns were unredeemable errors in urban planning. Writing around the same 
time as his essay on Mourenx and Naverrenx, Lefebvre, in the second volume of his 
Critique of Everyday Life, claimed: 
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Every town planning scheme conceals a programme for everyday life.  Explicitly 
or not, it refers to an overall conception of man, of life and of the world.  In our 
new towns, the project or programme is all too apparent.  Everyday life sees itself 
treated like packaging: a vast machine seizes the worker’s time outside work and 
folds it in a wrapping as sterile as the protective cellophane round a commodity.  
People are separated from group to group (workers, craftsmen, technicians) and 
from each other, each in his box for living in, and this modernity organizes their 
repeated gestures.  The same machinery whittles down the number of essential 
gestures.  That most of these housing estates depend upon technically outstanding 
firms – automated – where work is almost entirely reduced to the control and 
upkeep of equipment makes the emptiness all the more blatant.  Of course 
equipment does not function by itself; technical objects make up an ensemble 
which requires occasional attention.  However, this can only come when the 
technical object issues a message, a signal.  The town and the factory complement 
one another by both conforming to the technical object.  An identical process 
makes work easy and passive, and life outside work fairly comfortable and 
boring.  Thus everyday life at work and outside work become indistinguishable, 
governed as they are by systems of signals.
208
 
 
Signals, directing and regulating one’s everyday life, are scattered throughout a town 
both outside buildings, as well as inside them.  They are equally at home in the street or 
the factory, or even the home. 
The signal is a key facet to the ‘double process’ of industrialization and 
urbanization.  The signal is a common link between these two processes.  According to 
Lefebvre, “the signal was born with industrialization.”209 The traffic light mentioned 
above is one such signal.  Lefebvre elaborates the emergence and growth of signals when 
he writes:  
At first they were limited to factories and railways, but soon they invaded 
everyday life in the form of traffic signals, and innumerable signals to permit or to 
prohibit.  In ‘industrial society’, urban life becomes peopled by innumerable 
signallings.  Each one programmes a routine, exactly like a calculator, regulating 
patterns of conduct and behaviour.
210
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Both the factory and the railway are mentioned here as archetypal spaces that exemplify 
the general logic of the industrial signal.  In addition, Lefebvre likens the signal to a 
calculator, which is consistent with the calculative thinking emphasized by Simmel and 
Heidegger, mentioned in the second section of this chapter.  Lefebvre notes how 
something like calculative thinking, to use Heidegger’s term, not only occurs within 
people, but is also imposed upon them.  One’s freedom to partake in meditative thinking 
can be sidetracked by the rationality imposed on one’s everyday life, especially in the 
structurally rigid design of a new town.  There are few, if any, spaces available for 
meditative thinking, as one is overtly or implicitly being instructed by signals on what to 
do or not to do.  Although this is present in the metropolis, this is especially the case for 
those who live in new towns.  Lefebvre argues that 
[f]or the inhabitant of a large building in a new town things will be very different, 
for his time-table is fixed, formulated, functionalized, inscribed on the walls, in 
what is left of roads, in shopping centres, parking spaces, bus stops and stations.  
The suburban householder talks in monologues, the new-town dweller talks in 
dialogues, with the authorities and with the absent but ever-present state; he 
speaks the language of wisdom, an organized wisdom claiming ever more 
organization.  The rational neurosis of the suburban householder is echoed by the 
neurotic rationality of the other for whom make-believe is the rationality of 
commitments that fix his time-table and consume his life; the quotidianness of 
‘privacy’ snuggling in the heart of everyday life is identified with a brief period of 
recuperation between days, weeks, months of commitments, after exhaustion.  For 
each one the meaning of life is life without meaning; self-realization is a life 
without a history, total quotidianness, but unseen and evaded as soon as 
possible.
211
 
 
To conclude this chapter it is worth noting that here Lefebvre makes a distinction 
between new towns and the suburbs in several respects.  It is important for the present 
discussion to look at the ‘neurotic rationality’ of the suburbs in order to probe further into 
the ‘double process’ of industrialization and urbanization and its implications for the 
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relationship between boredom, modernity, and everyday life.  It is now time to switch 
from the dialogues of new town dwellers to the monologues of suburbia.  
214 
Chapter 4: The Endless Yawn of the Suburbs 
 
Suburbia is the geography of late capitalism  
as it extends itself into the farthest reaches  
and most minute details of everyday life.1 – Amy Maria Kenyon 
 
Small wonder new suburbs all look the same.2 – Mark Gottdiener 
 
 Suburbs are uniformly boring.3 – Mike Rock  
 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
The last of the above epigraphs emerged from an interview with the City Manager of 
Lakewood, Colorado (a suburb of Denver) as a response to the question: ‘What do you 
think of the suburbs?’  At the time of the interview, Lakewood was attempting to break 
the mould of suburban boredom by revitalizing its largest shopping centre.  The general 
sentiment in the interview is that while ‘suburbs are uniformly boring’, the appropriate 
production of spaces of consumption is not only a suitable remedy, but the suitable 
remedy.  While the ties between boredom and consumption will be explored in much 
more depth in the next chapter, this epigraph raises an important question: If the boredom 
or boringness of the suburbs does not hinge solely on the newness of a local shopping 
centre, then why are suburbs uniformly boring?  Of course, it should be mentioned, not 
everyone would agree the suburbs are boring, especially not ‘uniformly boring’.  To 
some, these peripheral habitats are ideal spaces for living, raising a family, pursuing a 
career, and much more.    
Based on the suburb literature, there appears to be a gap between the experience 
of the people who live in suburbs and the scholars that study them.  The City Manager’s 
                                                 
1 Amy Maria Kenyon, Dreaming Suburbia: Detroit and the Production of Postwar Space and Culture 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004), 173. 
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assessment seems to be the exact opposite of many scholars writing on the subject.  For 
example, on the back cover of The Suburb Reader, Andréas Duany, one of the co-authors 
of the book Suburban Nation – one of the major commentaries on the state of suburbia in 
America – offers his praise of the contents inside while marginalizing the connection 
between the suburbs and boredom.  He writes: “What a treasure trove of complexity and 
contradiction!  After this collection no one can again say that the suburbs are boring!”4  It 
is somewhat ironic that Duany would acknowledge contradictions in the ‘reader’ while 
offering his own contradictory remark on the boredom of suburbs.  To Duany’s 
exclamatory remarks regarding the inability to claim the suburbs as boring, I would reply 
both positively and negatively for the purposes of this chapter.  Is Duany on to something 
here?  Yes, Duany is correct in the sense that suburbs are highly interesting to study and 
no, in the sense that these interesting studies show that they can indeed be boring to live 
in.  One of my chief sources for this claim is Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine 
Mystique, which is not only a ‘treasure trove’ of analysis on suburban boredom, but it is 
also one of the texts featured in The Suburb Reader that Duany relied upon to make his 
point.  This particular contradiction reveals a deeper, heavily entrenched general 
contradiction at the heart of suburban everyday life that I will explore in this chapter: the 
hidden yet omnipresent boredom of the suburbs.   
The hypothesis that suburbs are boring will guide this chapter,
5
 the title of which 
is derived from the surrealist Luis Buñuel’s brief reflections on the suburbs.6  Buñuel’s 
                                                 
4 Becky M. Nicolaides and Andrew Wiese, eds., The Suburb Reader (London: Routledge, 2006).  
5 I purposely exclude the word ‘uniformly’ that precedes ‘boring’ in Mike Rock’s assessment.  It would be 
impossible to argue that every single thing, space, and temporal experience in the suburbs is boring, so I 
have limited my critique to key elements as opposed to the entirety of the suburbs. 
6 The passage is as follows: “The endless yawn of the suburb, its fringed and withered eyes, are always the 
huge maleficence of the city.  Even when day dances gaily through the nearby rooftops, it is immediately 
seized by the snare of the endless sadness of the suburb, which is the black brushstroke upon the riotous 
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poetic phrase ‘the endless yawn of the suburb’ is an apt metaphor for the central 
hypothesis.  While Buñuel’s words (penned in 1923) pre-date the golden age of suburbia 
that began after the Second World War, he is nevertheless correct in his assessment, if 
not utterly prophetic.  It is as though he had dreamt the future.  Then again, if the suburbs 
seem to yawn endlessly, it would be safe to assume that they would continue to grow, 
morph, and sprawl long into the future.  An aerial view of these sprawling urban 
offshoots often reveals row after row of cookie-cutter homes, gas guzzling SUVs,
7
 and 
vast chains of big box stores, which is an image that is consistent with Buñuel’s artistic 
genre of surrealism.  “Because sprawl is so unsatisfying,” writes Duany and his co-
authors, “it remains tempting to think of it as an accident.”8  This “seemingly irreversible 
American project”9 of highly rationalized, planned similitude is by no means accidental.  
If thought of in Buñuel’s surrealist terms, it is a dream for some, but a nightmare for 
others.  The boredom experienced in these vast areas of sameness can perhaps be claimed 
as accidental, but this ‘American project’ as a whole cannot. 
Building on the above hypothesis, the central question of this chapter is: 
Following Goodstein, if boredom is first of all an urban phenomenon, how are the 
suburbs linked to the experience of boredom?  To answer this question I have divided this 
chapter into four sections.  The first section will delve into the general characteristics of 
suburban development.  The point of departure is Lefebvre’s work, specifically his 
                                                                                                                                                 
gaiety of the town.  These lethargic quarters belong to the land of the incurable, the doomed.  Their 
emotion is the emotion of dried trees.  The inhabitants have become victims of the rabid bite which the soul 
of the suburb produces.  This suburbophobia has no cure other than the premature injection of some sacks 
of gold.”  Luis Buñuel, “Suburbs,” in Francisco Aranda, Luis Buñuel: A Critical Biography, trans. and ed. 
David Robinson (London: Secker & Warburg, 1975), 254. 
7 In fact, one of the larger Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV) currently manufactured by Chevrolet is called the 
‘Suburban’. 
8 Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck.  Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the 
Decline of the American Dream (New York: North Point Press, 2000), 12. 
9 Kenyon, Dreaming Suburbia, 19. 
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concept of ‘urban fabric’ which helps to further connect his project of a critique of 
everyday life with his urban and spatial writings.  The second section will argue that 
Marc Augé’s notion of ‘non-places’ is an important concept for understanding not only 
Lefebvre’s  approach to the suburbs, but also the boredom associated with some of its 
archetypal spaces such as the highway and the shopping mall.  The third section will 
attend to a critical discussion of an often overlooked, if not maligned suburban figure, the 
suburban housewife.  While luminary feminist figures such as Betty Friedan have paved 
the way by elevating the status of housewives as a serious topic of research, the key 
experience of boredom is either detached from this work (as was noted above with 
Duany) or boredom is given short shrift in the overall academic schematic.  Essentially, if 
housewives are given attention at all and deemed to be a serious area of research, their 
boredom generally is not and vice versa.  This section will argue against the position – 
best represented in the boredom literature by Reinhard Kuhn’s text – that the boredom of 
the suburbanite is the most superficial of all boredoms by arguing for the opposite, which 
is the immense importance of a housewife’s profound boredom.   The final section will 
highlight an important technological aspect of suburban living, the television, and its 
dual/duel (dialectical) role of eliminating boredom while concurrently creating the 
conditions for it.  The growth of the suburbs in concert with the availability of televisions 
in the home will be explored as mutually reinforcing spaces and objects.  The oscillation 
between boredom and distraction with television viewing will also serve as a point of 
departure for a more general discussion of technology and everyday life that will apply 
not only to suburbia, but to society more generally.   
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Sprawl: The Urban Fabric 
In the expansive foreword to the first volume of his Critique of Everyday Life, 
Lefebvre notes the suburban development surrounding Paris.  These brief remarks, 
lasting no more than two pages were written in 1958 and sprang forth after Lefebvre 
glanced up from writing the foreword.  He ultimately predicts that these suburbs will be 
“swamped” by “mediocrity.”10  However, before condemning these suburbs to perpetual 
mediocrity, Lefebvre acknowledges how grateful many working class and/or poor 
individuals would be in order to live in such a place.  Those beneath the archetypal 
everyday life of the middle-class would relish such an opportunity, whereas those that 
live above this archetypal quotidian mode of life would surely live in a much more 
exclusive and costly space.  Lefebvre, then, is not speaking on behalf of all people when 
he speaks of the mediocrity of the suburbs, he is speaking of the socio-economic group 
that predominantly calls these areas home.  It is the middle-class that will be forced to 
tarry with what Lefebvre calls the mediocrity of the suburbs, if they choose to live in 
such a space.    
As for the particular case of America, in his book on the ‘rise and fall of 
suburbia’, titled Bourgeois Utopias, Robert Fishman argues that “if the nineteenth 
century could be called the Age of Great Cities, post-1945 America would appear to be 
the Age of Great Suburbs.”11  ‘Great’ in the latter case appears to be a quantitative 
                                                 
10 CEL 1, 43.  He qualifies this thought elsewhere, arguing that certain outsiders may dislike the suburban 
lifestyle, but there are many who happily call the suburbs home. He writes: “In ‘naturality’ we find, 
recreating themselves in an odd sort of waking dream, ‘lived’ happiness  and the consciousness that lives it, 
the illusion and the real.  This waking dream is the discourse of the owner of the pavillon, his everyday 
discourse, poor as others see it, but rich for him.” KW, 133.  In keeping with the passage from Luis Buñuel 
mentioned above, the suburban lifestyle can indeed be seen, following Lefebvre, as a ‘waking dream’ for 
many.  
11 Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 
182. 
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valuation as opposed to an assessment of quality.  Indeed, over the span of three decades 
(1950-1980), the suburbs saw their collective population jump from 35.2 million 
residents to 101.5 million, and in 1990 roughly half of all Americans called the suburbs 
home.
12
  This general process of post-war spatial production was not, however, restricted 
to America.  While America is the purest example, Lefebvre sees this shift in the 
configuration of space as a global phenomenon. 
It is on the worldwide scale that the space born in the second half of the twentieth 
century is reproduced: airports, highways, vertical cities of concrete, horizontal 
cities of detached houses [pavillons].  The sameness need not be underlined, and 
only the details differ among the ugly buildings, functional edifices, and even 
monuments.  We enter into a world of combinations whose every element is 
known and recognized.  The resemblances border on (abstract, self-evident) 
identity and visible equivalence.  Systems of equivalence take on a sensible 
existence and are inscribed in space.  Futile effects of difference, understood 
scornfully as aesthetic (variations in color and form), do not interrupt the 
monotony.  This repetitive consumption of things in space and of space filled with 
things gives rise to an indelible boredom.
13
 
 
Indeed, the boredom accompanying the production of space is widespread.  I argue that 
the above passage from Lefebvre is a key for linking the suburbs with boredom and I 
shall utilize it as the point of departure for connecting the two.  As well, a Lefebvrean 
triad will inform my analysis of the critical literature on the suburbs: homogeneity-
fragmentation-hierarchization.
14
  
It should be mentioned that suburbs are not new; they were not invented in the 
twentieth century.  Their mass-production, however, is specific to this time period.  
While suburbs have been around for some time, the focus of this chapter is on this mass-
produced post-war development that took place in the middle of the twentieth century 
                                                 
12 Kenyon, Dreaming Suburbia, 19. 
13 SSW, 212-213. 
14 These three interrelated characteristics are specific to the space produced by modernity.  KW, 210.  This 
triad can be found in both Lefebvre’s spatial writings as well his everyday life writings. For the former, see 
“Space and Mode of Production,” SSW, 212-216.  For the latter, see CEL 3, 83-88.   
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most forcefully and pervasively in America.  This process can be referred to as 
suburbanization.  The process of suburbanization is not restricted to the United States, but 
gradually became one that is worldwide in scope.  Such a claim follows Lefebvre who 
along with the extended passage above has noted that “there was a space produced from 
the 1960s on; it was at a world scale, based on aeroplanes, motorways, suburbs, 
peripheries, the disintegration of historic centres and conurbations.”15  Following 
Lefebvre, suburbanization is not only a construction of specific dwelling spaces on the 
outskirts of city limits, but is, much more generally, a process of decentralization.  A 
centre eroding into peripheries is a useful and much more accurate way of viewing this 
process than the simple characterization of one (or one’s family) realizing the American 
Dream
16
 through the acquisition of the stereotypical green lawns, white picket fences, and 
nosey neighbours.
17
  Of course, these latter items are certainly part and parcel of 
suburbanization to varying degrees, but the general concern for this chapter is the one, or 
centre, becoming others, or peripheries.  At the same time, this is not to say that the 
center vanishes with the extension of peripheries.  Rather, Lefebvre’s point should be 
                                                 
15 INT, 31. 
16 As for the mythical ‘American Dream’, I agree with Genrich Krasko who essentially identifies it as one 
where people relentlessly pursue “affluence and wealth” in the United States of America.  The Unbearable 
Boredom of Being: a Crisis of Meaning in America, 37.  However, this is the only point I borrow from 
Krasko who argues that education is the root of the problem and “the future of your children, grand- and 
great-grandchildren is at stake at this crucial turning point in this country’s [America’s] destiny,” xxiv.  For 
Lawrence Grossberg, the socio-cultural shifts in America after World War II resulted in the perception that 
“the American Dream turned out to be boring.”  Lawrence Grossberg, “Another Boring Day in Paradise: 
Rock and Roll and the Empowerment of Everyday Life,” Popular Music 4 (1984): 229.  Grossberg’s point 
can be contrasted with James A. Roberts’s, who believes boredom arises when the American Dream is no 
longer sought: “We are a nation adrift, having lost sight of the true American Dream.  We are a people 
afflicted with the diseases of boredom and meaninglessness.” James A. Roberts, Shiny Objects: Why We 
Spend Money We Don’t Have in Search of Happiness We Can’t Buy (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), 
301. 
17 This is not to say that the centre is not holding.  Rather, the centre has dramatically shifted throughout the 
middle of the twentieth century.  So, while it makes sense to speak of a city as a specific physical space, it 
does not make sense to limit the urban fabric to a certain self-contained area.   
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emphasized, which he was adamant about, that “urban cores do not disappear” they 
persist, albeit in a mutated form.
18
 
To further situate the problematic of suburbia within the theoretical framework 
offered by Lefebvre some clarification is in order.  The applicability of this framework is 
by no means commonplace or obvious.  To simplify the debates in the secondary 
literature, two broad currents of Lefebvre scholars can be articulated.  On the one hand, 
there are those who believe Lefebvre’s project of a critique of everyday life is suitable to 
the suburbs much more than the urban, and on the other hand, there are those who argue 
for the obverse.
19
  For example, Kristin Ross argues that Lefebvre’s critique of everyday 
life is much more suited to suburban life than urban.  She writes: “The contemporary 
‘urban’, for Lefebvre then, is closer to what others have called the suburban or 
‘periurban.”20 This perspective can be contrasted with Susan Willis who begins her book 
A Primer for Daily Life with an author’s note acknowledging the importance of 
Lefebvre’s pioneering texts, but distinguishes her work from his by characterizing his as 
being in a primarily European urban context, whereas she opts for an American suburban 
context.
21
   Ross and Willis are both correct in their assessments of Lefebvre’s project as 
well as both incorrect in the sense that they both write of partial truths.  If one fuses 
certain elements of both perspectives together, discard the remainders, the approach I 
take in this chapter will begin to take shape.  Essentially, Lefebvre’s critique of everyday 
                                                 
18 WC, 73. 
19 Amy Maria Kenyon’s book Dreaming Suburbia is an exception to these undialectial portrayals of 
Lefebvre’s project.  Kenyon makes considerable use of Lefebvre’s work to discuss the dialectical 
relationship between the urban area of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs. 
20 Ross, “Streetwise,” 75. 
21 Susan Willis, A Primer for Daily Life (London: Routledge, 1991).  There is no page number for this note, 
though it is before page 1.  It should be mentioned that along with Lefebvre, Willis also attributes the 
importance of the European notion of everyday life in an urban context to Michel de Certeau. 
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life, understood as a general orientation for a large part of his oeuvre, is concerned with 
both the urban and suburban, both American and European contexts.   
While the previous chapter primarily focuses on the urban European context and 
this chapter focuses on the suburban American context, it is important to note that the 
boredom of the suburbs is not unique to America.  For example, Lefebvre’s former 
student Manuel Castells has argued that boring suburbs are widespread throughout 
Europe.  Castells claims that “the new professional middle class in Europe is torn 
between attraction to the peaceful comfort of boring suburbs and the excitement of a 
hectic, and often too expensive, urban life.”22  With this, it is apparent that Castells 
departs from Lefebvre’s position by offering a fairly one-dimensional portrayal of the 
city as exciting and fast-paced.  As was the purpose of the previous chapter, the urban 
may be filled with excitement but it is also filled with boredom, and it is important to 
stress that the two terms share a dialectical relationship, one at the heart of everyday 
modern life.  With Castells formulation, it would seem as though the black sun of 
boredom shines brightest outside the city limits.  As if the skyscrapers of the metropolis 
provide the necessary shade of excitement from the harmful rays of boredom.  But 
exiting the city limits is not so easy.  It is not as if one throws off the cloak of boredom by 
entering or leaving a certain physical space, which is consistent with Lefebvre’s work, 
and is why Lefebvre is a key figure for linking boredom with space more generally. 
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘urban fabric’ is important here.  It not only exemplifies the 
‘double process’ of industrialization and urbanization, this term also disrupts the normal 
                                                 
22 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 433.  
Castells was an assistant to Lefebvre at the University of Paris – Nanterre. 
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conceptions of the urban as a synonym for city.
23
  It is a dialectical concept that allows 
one to theorize the countryside as part of the urban despite the seemingly antithetical 
nature of the two.  One of the most succinct definitions of this term can be found near the 
beginning of Lefebvre’s book The Urban Revolution: 
The urban fabric grows, extends its borders, corrodes the residue of agrarian life.  
This expression, “urban fabric,” does not narrowly define the built world of cities 
but all manifestations of the dominance of the city over the country.  In this sense, 
a vacation home, a highway, a supermarket in the countryside are all part of the 
urban fabric.  Of varying density, thickness, and activity, the only regions 
untouched by it are those that are stagnant or dying, those that are given over to 
“nature.”24   
 
Following Lefebvre, I claim the suburbs are at the same time both urban and not urban.  
To put it in Lefebvrean terminology, they are part of the urban continuity and 
discontinuity.  Lefebvre summarizes his perspective thusly: “If one defines urban reality 
by dependency vis-à-vis the centre, suburbs are urban.  If one defines urban order by a 
perceptible (legible) relationship between centrality and periphery, suburbs are de-
urbanized.”25 On the one hand, it could be argued that the suburbs have the best of the 
city and the country.  On the other hand, it could be argued that the suburbs have neither 
the best of the city or the country, but actually synthesizes the worst elements of the two.  
It all depends on one’s perspective, as well as one’s suburb. 
A de-urbanized, yet dependent periphery is established around the city.  
Effectively, these new suburban dwellers are still urban even though they are 
unaware of it and believe themselves to be close to nature, to the sun and to 
greenery.  One could call it a de-urbanizing and de-urbanized urbanization to 
emphasize the paradox.
26
 
 
                                                 
23 As Lefebvre once put it in a debate, “I don’t use the words ‘city’ or ‘urban’ in their restrictive meanings.”  
In Leszek Kolakowski and Henri Lefebvre.  Reflexive Water, 247. 
24 UR, 3-4. 
25 WC, 79.  This is characterized by Lefebvre as a “double movement” of “explosion-implosion, 
condensation-dispersion.” Ibid., 123. 
26 Ibid., 77-78. 
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As Lefebvre notes, downtown metropolitan cores altered their makeup extensively in the 
middle of the twentieth century, and he most notably found that “city centres empty 
themselves for offices.”27  The most obvious example of this is the rise in the population 
of the suburbs and the decline of urban populations.  At the same time as the suburbs are 
expanding, expensive condominiums and skyscrapers are being erected throughout 
metropolises around the world.  The city becomes much more vertical, while suburbia 
becomes much more horizontal.  Or, it could be said, the urban fabric expands in a three-
dimensional manner. 
Alongside Lefebvre’s concept of the urban fabric, an apt label for the general 
process of suburbanization is ‘sprawl’.  Sprawl is a phenomenon of the twentieth century 
and does not apply to the earlier suburbs from the nineteenth century.  The suburbs that 
were constructed between 1850 and 1920 were strung along railway lines.
28
  These 
suburbs were, according to Lewis Mumford, “discontinuous, and properly spaced.”29  
Walking was a common mode of transportation, which largely vanished with the 
expansion of highways and the proliferation of automobiles.
30
  The “earlier type of 
suburb”31 with its definitive parameters inevitably gave way to a continuous sprawl of 
urban fabric.  Mumford argues that when this happened suburbs could no longer be 
considered as neighbourhoods; they “became part of the inescapable metropolis.”32  Here, 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 78. 
28 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: 
Harcourt, 1961), 503. 
29 Ibid., 504. 
30 Ibid., 505. 
31 Ibid., 504. 
32 Ibid., 505.  Mumford’s use of the term ‘neighbourhoods’ is fairly consistent with the anthropological and 
geographical concept of ‘place’.  This suggests a transition from ‘place’ to what has been referred to by 
Edward Relph as ‘placelessness’.  For a distinction between these terms, see Relph’s Place and 
Placelessness (London: Pion Limited, 1976).  For the present purposes, it is worthwhile to note that Relph 
argues in this work that: “roads, railways, airports, cutting across or imposed on the landscape rather than 
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there is an affinity between Mumford’s position and Lefebvre’s, which is especially 
evident in the following extended passage from Mumford’s book The City in History: 
The ultimate outcome of the suburb’s alienation from the city became visible only 
in the twentieth century, with the extension of the democratic ideal through the 
instrumentalities of manifolding and mass production.  In the mass movement into 
suburban areas a new kind of community was produced, which caricatured both 
the historic city and the archetypal suburban refuge: a multitude of uniform, 
unidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform distances, on uniform roads, 
in a treeless communal waste, inhabited by people of the same class, the same 
income, the same age group, witnessing the same television performances, eating 
the same tasteless pre-fabricated foods, from the same freezers, conforming in 
every outward and inward respect to a common mold, manufactured in the central 
metropolis.  Thus the ultimate effect of the suburban escape in our time is, 
ironically, a low-grade uniform environment from which escape is impossible.  
What has happened to the suburban exodus in the United States now threatens, 
through the same mechanical instrumentalities, to take place, at an equally 
accelerating rate, everywhere else – unless the most vigorous countermeasures are 
taken.
33
 
 
If one takes Mumford at his word, it is remarkable that the search for a better lifestyle in 
the suburbs was met with disappointment in virtually every aspect of living.  It would 
seem as though if action is not taken soon, there will be no escape from the ‘low-grade 
uniform environment’ of the suburbs. 
 Is everything in the suburbs low-grade and uniform?  That would be a rather 
difficult claim to make, if not empirically impossible to verify or falsify.  Surely many of 
its inhabitants are happy with what the suburbs have to offer; many of its inhabitants are 
not profoundly bored or dissatisfied.  But are boring suburbs a bad thing?  Boredom in 
the Lefebvrean sense of the term is an indictment of society.  However, in common, 
everyday terminology, referring to one’s suburban lifestyle as boring can be a declaration 
of satisfaction and comfort.  Boring here is predicated upon predictability.  Many people 
                                                                                                                                                 
developing with it, are not only features of placelessness in their own right, but, by making possible the 
mass movement of people with all their fashions and habits, have encouraged the spread of placelessness 
well beyond their immediate impacts,” 90. 
33 Mumford, The City in History, 486. 
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would be perfectly happy with a boring life.  That is, a stable existence with little 
variation is an appealing prospect to many.  Knowing that the mortgage will be paid, the 
car will start on the first try, the kids will have time after school to do their homework, 
and so on, are all largely predictable for many middle-class suburban families, and many 
other families would be happy to live this way. 
Alternatively, Marxists can be particularly hostile to the suburban way of life.  
Lefebvre’s former associates, the Situationists, mentioned in the previous chapter as 
harsh critics of contemporary city planning, are extremely hostile to the suburbs and 
would not accept the suburban lifestyle as an example of happiness in modernity.  They 
claim that “boredom and total lack of social life characterize suburban housing 
developments.”34  This ‘total lack of social life’ echoes Lefebvre’s claim (mentioned at 
the end of the previous chapter) that suburban dwellers speak in monologues.  There is no 
reciprocal exchange of ideas.  Although not encapsulating the entire problem, part of the 
unidirectional and seldom heard monologue stems from the isolation of the detached 
housing schemes.  Lefebvre writes: 
In France the beginnings of the suburb are also the beginnings of a violently anti-
urban planning approach; a singular paradox.  For decades during the Third 
Republic appeared documents authorizing and regulating owner-occupied suburbs 
and plots.  What could be more accurately referred to here is the banlieue 
pavillionaire, a type of suburbanization begun in this period in France 
characterized by small owner-occupied housing whose nearest Anglo-Saxon 
equivalent in terms of typology and social relations is the ‘bungalow‘.35 
 
This passage, though written with France in mind, equally applies to America.  The 
dream of happiness is shared in both parts of the world.  This is the expectation, 
according to Lefebvre, of those that live in the peripheries. 
                                                 
34 Situationist International, “Geopolitics of Hibernation,” In Situationist International Anthology, ed. Ken 
Knabb (Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006), 105. 
35 WC, 77-78. 
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What do those who live in it expect from it?  Nothing less than happiness.  Many 
people experience it like that, forgetting the disadvantages, arguing them away.  
This happiness, in which fiction and reality are as thoroughly mixed as water and 
wine in a glass, ought to be attained via nature, a healthy and regular life and 
normality, all connected in this utopia with the pavillon.
36
 
 
Bungalows are certainly widespread in the suburbs of the United States, but they are the 
much more modest version of today’s symbol of suburban housing: the McMansion.  The 
authors of Suburban Nation put it as follows: “In the sparse universe of sprawl, the 
elementary particle is the single-family house.  The current model is the fast-food version 
of the American dream – some call it the McMansion.”37  The McMansion is a hyper 
version of the standard one floor bungalow.
38
  While significantly larger in size than its 
cousin, the McMansion follows the same logic of cookie-cutter design.   
Orrin E. Klapp summarizes suburban development as the process of “making 
places seem alike.”39  In this view, one shared by Lefebvre, houses seemingly roll off 
assembly lines one after the other with the same house dimensions, same lot size, same 
number of windows, etc.  Mark Gottdiener notes that this is a fairly widespread criticism 
of the suburbs.  “[S]ince the advent of suburban development,” writes Gottdiener, “untold 
numbers of critics have complained about the rather ordinary, banal, and boring 
landscape created by mile after mile of sprawling, ticky-tacky housing.”40 These ticky-
tacky houses also place a demand on its owners that they follow certain tick-tock 
routines.  Lefebvre argues that a “home-buyer buys a daily schedule.”41  Regardless of 
                                                 
36 KW, 132. 
37 Duany et al., Suburban Nation, 41. 
38 It could even be said that it is the postmodern version of a suburban bungalow.  Both can be considered 
as simulacra. 
39 Klapp, Overload and Boredom, 78. 
40 Mark Gottdiener, The Theming of America: Dreams, Media Fantasies, and Lived Environments 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 37. 
41 PS, 339.  A few pages later in the same text, Lefebvre adds another dimension to this when he writes: 
“All the same, what is it that a buyer acquires when he purchases a space?  The answer is time.” Ibid., 356. 
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whether one works inside or outside the home, routines begin to take shape after the 
dotted line on the property deed is signed.  The daily schedule of a suburban dweller is de 
facto different from those who call the city their home.  This goes for both domestic 
workers and those who work external to the home.  “[T]he city dweller today,” notes 
Lefebvre, “has a different relation to everyday life than that suffered unwillingly by the 
suburban householder or the new-town dweller, for in his case adaptation 
counterbalances compulsion.”42 One must adapt to an environment of homogeneity, 
while feeling the concurrent fragmentation of the social, and striving to keep up culturally 
with the Joneses and the hierarchization of status.   
While experiencing a somewhat different daily life than city dwellers, suburban 
dwellers do share some commonalities.  In general, the suburbs are characterized by this 
sprawling ticky-tacky housing (simulacra housing), whereas urban areas generally do not 
have the same type of homogeneity regarding domestic spaces.  That is to say, the huge 
tracts of land predominantly devoted to homogenous housing are generally a suburban 
phenomenon as opposed to an urban one.  However, the idea of ticky-tacky housing is 
not exclusive to the suburbs if one considers the urban equivalent: condominiums.  
Suburban ticky-tacky housing sprawls outwards, or horizontally, with bungalows and 
McMansions, but urban ticky-tacky housing sprawls upwards, or vertically, with the 
mass-produced condominiums that are populating downtown cores more and more these 
days.  Lewis Mumford – believing these condominiums have their roots in Le 
Corbusier’s International Style – has called these high rise buildings a type of “vertical 
suburb.”43  When viewed in this light, condominiums can be thought of as a 
                                                 
42 ELMW, 123. 
43 Mumford, The City in History, 519. 
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suburbanization of the urban.   The urban fabric, then, not only flows outwards to the 
spaces on the periphery, but the periphery, too, flows into the centre in a dialectical 
relationship.  The same can be said for the flow of traffic around a city centre depending 
on the time of day.  During a weekday morning, for example, the traffic predominantly 
flows in a unilateral direction from the suburbs into the city centre, and the reverse occurs 
in the evening.  It is important to note this dialectic between the urban and suburban, as it 
gives some colour to Lefebvre’s concept of urban fabric.44  Lefebvre discusses this in his 
first major book on urbanism from 1968 Le Droit à la ville (The Right to the City).  
Lefebvre argues that  
the extension of the city produced suburbs, then the suburb engulfed the urban 
core.  The problems have been inversed, when they are not misunderstood.  
Would it not be more coherent, more rational and agreeable to work in the 
suburbs and live in the city rather than work in the city while living in a hardly 
habitable suburb?
45
 
 
Lefebvre’s hypothetical scenario effectively inverts the standard living and work spaces 
for suburban dwellers.  It is an interesting question to ponder.  Such a question is 
indicative of one aspect of Lefebvre’s dialectical approach, to invert what is for what 
could be.  That is, the utopian demanding for the impossible becoming possible.   
American suburbs, those new ‘utopian’ spaces of modernity, have been referred 
to by Robert Fishman, such as in the title of his book of the same name, as ‘bourgeois 
utopias’.  While the movement of people from the city to the suburbs in mid-nineteenth 
century Paris – as a result of Haussmann’s revolutionary plan – was a forced mass 
exodus, the flight from the city to the suburbs for many one hundred years later in 
                                                 
44 The missing third term for a proper Lefebvrean triad could be said to be ‘rural’.  While Lefebvre has 
written a substantial amount on the rural, it is not of concern here for the purposes of this dissertation.  For 
more on this aspect of Lefebvre’s work, see the following representative essay: “Perspectives on Rural 
Sociology,” In KW, 111-120. 
45 WC, 128. 
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America was largely fuelled by the hope for a better style of life.  As Lynn Spigel points 
out, “by purchasing their detached suburban homes, the young couples of the middle 
class participated in the construction of a new community of values; in magazines, in 
films, and on the airwaves they became the cultural representatives of the ‘good life’.”46  
This initiated a dialectical intertwining of the striving of the good life and the promotion 
of it, which Spigel outlines as follows: 
Postwar America witnessed a significant shift in traditional notions of 
neighborhood.  Mass-produced suburbs like Levittown, New York, and Park 
Forest, Illinois, replaced previous forms of public space with a newly defined 
aesthetic of prefabrication.  At the center of suburban space was the young, 
upwardly mobile-middle class family; the suburban community was, in its spatial 
articulations, designed to correspond with and reproduced patterns of nuclear 
family life.  Playgrounds, yards, schools, churches, and synagogues provided 
town centers for community involvement based on discrete stages of family 
development.  Older people, gay and lesbian people, homeless people, unmarried 
people, and people of color were simply written out of these community spaces, 
and were relegated back to the cities.
47
 
 
The suburban community profile, however, has changed a considerable amount since the 
immediate years after World War II.  The central criterion for suburban living today is 
credit.  If one can borrow it, one can buy it, and one can live in it.  This is not to say that 
ageism, sexism, racism, or homophobia do not exist in the peripheries; rather, present-day 
suburbs are much more inclusive than the suburbs of yesteryear. 
Robert Fishman has argued that an example of the ‘classic suburb’ could be found 
at the end of the nineteenth century outside of Philadelphia in Chestnut Hill, 
Pennsylvania.
48
  Conversely, it has also been argued that there is no such thing as a 
                                                 
46 Lynn Spigel, Welcome to the Dreamhouse: Popular Media and Postwar Suburbs (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), 32. 
47 Ibid., 33. 
48 See Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias, 134-154. 
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‘classic suburb’.49 If there is a basic blueprint for the suburbs, however, I would argue 
that Levittown, U.S.A.
50
 would certainly be close to it.  Where exactly is Levittown?  It is 
in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, as well as Puerto Rico.  These are the official 
Levittowns, but their simulacra sprawl throughout the United States.  Named after the 
family that spawned them, it is somewhat difficult to imagine that Levittowns sprang 
forth from somewhere at some point.  Although the family company Levitt and Sons is 
mostly forgotten today, the cover of the July 13
th
, 1950 edition of Time Magazine 
features a large illustrated drawing of William J. Levitt’s head on the cover.  Visible in 
the background behind Levitt’s looming visage is the row after row of uniform tract 
housing which appears in a similar fashion to a thought bubble.  This cover image is 
suggesting that here is the brain behind, or in this case, in front of, Levittown.  Having 
immense, albeit indirect, influence over aspiring developers, Levitt was the poster boy 
(magazine cover boy) for “industrial style planner-developer-builders.”51  While other 
suburbs may not share the name ‘Levittown’, Levitt’s blueprints are copied in one form 
                                                 
49 Amy Maria Kenyon, Dreaming Suburbia: Detroit and the Production of Postwar Space and Culture 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004), 19. 
50 An album was released in 2008 called Levittown by the progressive-rock band Planet P Project.  It is a 
concept album that explores the endless striving amongst residents of the suburbs to live the mythical 
American Dream.  Though not referring to Levittown, the Canadian indie-rock band Arcade Fire released a 
concept album on the suburbs of its own in 2010 with the appropriate title The Suburbs (winner of the 2011 
Grammy Award for Album of the Year).  The latter album features songs that mesh well with the theme of 
boredom such as ‘Modern Man’, ‘City With No Children’, ‘Empty Room’, ‘Sprawl I (Flatland)’ and 
‘Sprawl II (Mountains Beyond Mountains)’.  The song ‘Modern Man’ concerns a person waiting for 
something, but they are not sure what it is.  The song’s story is reminiscent of a Benjamin passage 
mentioned in the first chapter that “we are bored when we don’t know what we are waiting for.”  Since the 
first and the last track are both title tracks, if played on a continuous loop, the transition between the last 
track and the first track give a sense that once you are in the suburbs there is no escape.  For an explicit 
reference to boredom, the opening track has the following lyrics: “By the time the first bombs fell we were 
already bored, we were already bored.” 
51 Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias, 193. 
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or another around the United States.  According to Robert Venturi, the “infinite 
consistency of Levittown” belies its complexity, the fate of which “is boredom.”52 
The Levittowners 
How is Levittown boring?
53
  This is one of the questions the sociologist Herbert 
Gans set out to answer in his appropriately titled book The Levittowners which was 
published in 1967.  He wanted to get to the heart of American suburban living, so Gans 
sought out what he believed to be the “prototype of postwar suburbia”54 Gans conducted 
his research via participant observation in Levittown, New Jersey.  Demonstrating 
immense dedication to his project, Gans purchased a four-bedroom ‘Cape Cod’ home 
there and was one of the first 25 families to move into the area.
55
  In a way, Gans’ study 
is that of a gossipy neighbor with an academic twist.  While trying to blend in to his 
surroundings, Gans acknowledges that he was a “researcher” and did not participate as “a 
normal resident.”56  Gans notes that if he had revealed that he was a researcher, people 
would have not been as forthcoming with information, if not exclude him entirely.  
Instead of them shutting him out, he shut himself off.  While Gans believes that he 
succeeded with his “Saturday morning bull session on the front lawn” with the men of 
Levittown, he acknowledges that “relaxed conversation with women was more 
difficult.”57 For his study to succeed, Gans claims that he “had to be neutral, not offering 
opinions on controversial issues,”58 which is ultimately why his study is problematic.  His 
                                                 
52 Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, 59. 
53 I have not specified a particular Levittown, as they are all produced with the same general schematics.  
There would, of course, be differences, but the experience of boredom, I argue, is not one of them. 
54 Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community (New York: 
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55 Ibid., xviii. 
56 Ibid., xxv. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., xxiv. 
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participant observation is thus one of non-participation and, as a result, one of non-
observation.   
How exactly could one be a participant-observer for the boredom of others?  This 
simply would not do if one’s boredom was concealed from immediate view.  What 
exactly would you look for in such a case?  How can one fully participate in the boredom 
of another?  In addition to his participant-observation, Gans conducted three different sets 
of interviews with two random samples and one from those who originally lived in 
Philadelphia.  For boredom, he asked his interviewees the question: “We all get bored 
every so often.  How often do you find yourself feeling bored, having nothing to do, or 
nothing you want to do especially?  Do you feel this way: almost everyday, a few times a 
month, about once a month, or less often than that?”59  His basic findings are summarized 
on the following passage: 
Although people may underreport, 40 per cent (about a third of the women and 
more than half the men) are never bored and only a few women are constantly so.  
Boredom does not seem to be a serious problem in Levittown.  Younger people 
experienced somewhat more boredom than older ones, but there was no pattern by 
class.  Since former city dwellers reported as much boredom in their prior 
residence as suburban ones, the common idea that suburbanites are more bored 
than city dwellers is inaccurate.
60
 
 
With this, Gans essentially claims that the boredom of the suburbs, at least those called 
Levittown, is nothing more than a myth perpetuated by those who do not know what 
actually takes place there.   
The question arises: Are interviews an appropriate method for understanding the 
relationship between boredom and the suburbs?  Gans certainly thought so even though 
he acknowledges that underreporting boredom is a strong possibility.  It would seem that 
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this would occur in particular with those who do not wish to be associated with the 
experience of boredom.  For example, Patricia Meyer Spacks has noted that regarding the 
image of the bored suburbanite, “women do not wish to be identified with this 
unattractive figure.”61 Margaret Atherton, writing in 1910, makes the salient point that 
while women may outwardly appear to be as happy as can be, they will – if they trust you 
– take you aside and “confide in you that they are bored to death.”62  I would argue that 
there is a strong possibility that the people of Levittown that Gans interviewed were not 
willing to confide in him.  The stigma attached to boredom would surely prevent these 
people from being candid.  Such a situation is best exemplified in the Sinclair Lewis 
novel Babbitt when the title character is having a conversation with his friend named 
Paul.   Babbitt, though perplexed by the topic, listens intently while Paul offers his 
opinion on the complexities of boredom: 
 [I] don’t know the solution of boredom.  If I did, I’d be the one philosopher that 
had the cure for living.  But I do know that about ten times as many people find 
their lives dull, and unnecessarily dull, as ever admit it; and I do believe that if we 
busted out and admitted it sometimes, instead of being nice and patient and loyal 
for sixty years, and then nice and patient and dead for the rest of eternity, why, 
maybe, possibly, we might make life more fun.
63
 
 
 Evidently, Paul is of the belief that many people do not admit to their experiences of 
boredom.  There is a stigma attached to such an admission.  However, to Paul, the answer 
to the riddle of boredom would be the key to an authentic and meaningful style of life.  
Along with the risk involved with exclaiming one’s boredom and the stigma attached to 
it, withholding one’s experience of boredom also entails a risk of not being afforded the 
opportunity to seek or find a solution to it.   
                                                 
61 Spacks, Boredom, 180. 
62 Gertrude Atherton, “The Woman in Love: Part III,” Harper’s Bazaar 44(5), (May, 1910): 305. 
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In addition to his methods of participant-observation and interviewing, Gans 
noted that he “used newspaper articles” to inform his study.64  Despite this, there is one 
article in particular that seems to refute his assertion that Levittown is not boring.  While 
the article itself is from Levittown, Pennsylvania, the article could have easily been about 
Gans’ very own Levittown, New Jersey.  A story from 1963 in the January 23rd edition of 
a Philadelphia newspaper, The Evening Bulletin, was titled ‘Levittown Youth Blames 
Riot on Plain Boredom’.  The basic message embedded in the article is that two groups of 
Levittown teenagers – the Conservatives and the Jives – engaged in a battle royal of 
boredom versus boredom.  A local reverend was asked to comment on the riot and he 
replied that “instead of ‘Conservatives’ and ‘Jives’, we should call them ‘the Orphans’ 
and ‘the Neglected’.”  One of the riot’s participants, an unnamed sixteen year old boy, 
informed a police officer that over the course of the ten years he has lived in Levittown 
he has become “just plain bored.”  He is not alone with his boredom, as he goes on to 
state that “we all are […] we just hang around the shopping center looking for any kind 
of action.”65 These teenagers could be considered as both ‘victims of sprawl’ as well as 
‘victims of boredom’. 
In Suburban Nation, the authors offer several characterizations of ‘victims of 
sprawl’ with the caveat that “upon investigation, it is difficult to identify a segment of the 
population that does not suffer in some way from the lifestyle imposed by contemporary 
suburban development.”66  While the third section in this chapter will focus on one of 
these ‘victims’ (suburban housewives), it is important to also mention another ‘victim’, 
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broadly labeled as ‘cul-de-sac kids’.67  As long as they live under the suburban roof of 
their parents, children of all ages seem to fall under this label.  The basic definition is “a 
prisoner of a thoroughly safe and unchallenging environment.”68  The general sentiment 
of ‘cul-de-sac kids’ is best summed up in a postcard sent to Frank Warren’s compilation 
project called Postsecrets where individuals anonymously send postcards to Warren and 
disclose a secret that has never been shared before.  One particular book, My Secret (a 
sequel to the original Postsecrets) features a postcard that could have been sent from/to 
any suburb in America.  Written in capital letters (spelling and grammar aside), it appears 
as follows:  
SURPRISE! 
ADOLECENCE IS NOT AN EXITING ADVENTURE 
IT’S ACTUALLY VERY BORING 
AND LONLIER THAN YOU COULD EVER IMAGINE...
69
 
This postcard, if it were to arrive at its destination, would be received long after its best 
before date.  If this is advice, chances are it is impossible to do anything about it.  How 
exactly does an adolescent combat the boredom and loneliness imposed upon them by 
modernity, by the developers, and by their parents?   
The authors of Suburban Nation claim that “those who have experienced 
adolescence in modern suburbia have their own stories of boredom and frustration.”70 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 116.  For a commentary on the boredom experienced by adolescents at suburban high schools, see 
Thomas E. Linton and Erwin W. Pollack, “Boredom Transcended: Adolescent Survival in the Suburban 
High School,” The High School Journal 62(2), (November, 1978), 69-72.   
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something such as economic concerns are not a matter of life and death. 
69 Frank Warren, My Secret: A Postsecret Book (New York: Regan, 2006), np. 
70 Duany et al., Suburban Nation, 118. 
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James Howard Kuntsler recounts his awareness even as a teenager of the boring 
atmosphere that plagued suburban life: 
As a teenager I visited my old suburban chums back on Long Island from time to 
time and I did not envy their lot in life.  By puberty, they had entered a kind of 
coma.  There was so little for them to do in Northwood, and hardly any 
worthwhile destination reachable by bike or foot, for now all the surrounding 
territory was composed of similar one-dimensional housing developments 
punctuated at intervals by equally boring shopping plazas.
71
 
 
A coma is an appropriate metaphor for the boredom of suburbia.  Much like the comatose 
patient lying in a hospital bed, there is no place to go.  Duany et al. claim that “isolation 
and boredom is the outcome of an environment that fails to provide teenagers with the 
ordinary challenges of maturing, developing useful skills, and gaining a sense of self.”72  
Duany et al. also note that in an effort to quash their boredom and instill a sense of 
responsibility and independence, these ‘cul-de-sac’ kids often take their weekly 
allowances and ask their parents to drive them to the mall.
73
  Perhaps this association 
with the mall as a relief from boredom is why the City Manager of Lakewood, Colorado, 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, believed boredom could be effectively 
combated with the appropriate space(s) of consumption. 
Spaces of Consumption 
The struggle against boredom for a teenager does not stop en route to the 
shopping mall or even when they arrive there.  I argue that something is not only missing 
inside the home, but also outside the home.  As for outside the home, these are the spaces 
that Marc Augé wrote about in his book Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of 
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Supermodernity
74
 without referring to them as particularly relevant to the spaces of 
suburbia.  Augé’s concept of ‘non-place’ is useful for capturing the essence (or absence) 
of these spaces which constitute a fairly substantial portion of suburbia.  While many 
spaces fit the concept, airports, shopping malls, and highways are the archetypal non-
places.
75
  I believe that these spaces can all be viewed as part of Lefebvre’s urban fabric.  
These spaces are not ends in themselves, but are instead simply meant “to be passed 
through.”76  This effectively outlines the general characteristics of the other dominant 
spaces of suburbia besides their homes, those that foster transience.  While Augé’s book 
on ‘non-places’ is a key source for understanding spaces of suburbia, the most succinct 
explanation of non-places is given in one of Augé’s later books: 
The multiplication of what we may call empirical non-places is characteristic of 
the contemporary world.  Spaces of circulation (freeways, airports), consumption 
(department stores, supermarkets), and communication (telephone, faxes, 
television, cable networks) are taking up room all over the earth today.  They are 
spaces where people coexist or cohabit without living together, where the status 
of consumer or solitary passenger implies a contractual relation with society.
77
 
 
This calls to mind a passage of Jean Baudrillard’s from the fourth installment of his Cool 
Memories diaries where he offers the prophecy that “the future airport will be 75 miles 
from Paris.”78  The idea being that the urban fabric will continue to grow to such an 
extent that one will not be able to say “I’m flying into Paris” since the airport will be so 
far away from the city centre.  At the same time, if this were to happen, it would 
nevertheless remain a part of Paris.  This would extend the range of transitional spaces, 
                                                 
74 As is clear from the subtitle, Augé opts to use the term ‘supermodernity’ when discussing ‘non-places’ as 
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75 Marc Augé, An Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds, trans. Amy Jacobs (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
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76 Ibid., 104. 
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thus creating even more spaces that could be deemed to be non-places.  This 
suburbanization would entail that commuting time increase substantially. 
 Commuting 
Commuting is an essential component of suburbia.  Commuting is a standard part 
of the workday and is dictated by the time-schedule afforded by the suburban home.  One 
of the key features of suburban living in general is the centrality of automobiles.  At the 
centre of the periphery, so to speak, is an “auto-dependent lifestyle.”79  Mumford explains 
how   
[u]nder the present suburban regime, every urban function follows the example of 
the motor road: it devours space and consumes time with increasing friction and 
frustration, while, under the plausible pretext of increasing the range of speed and 
communication, it actually obstructs it and denies the possibility of easy meetings 
and encounters by scattering the fragments of a city at random over a whole 
region.
80
 
 
Further to Mumford’s point, in an article on ‘mundane’ roadways, Tim Edensor refers to 
the daily commute to work for so many individuals as “drivetime” and argues that it 
“might be understood to epitomize mundane, everyday time.”81  The commuters of today, 
at least those in automobiles, often take the opportunity during ‘drivetime’ to listen to the 
radio, talk on the phone/send text messages (legally or otherwise), apply makeup, and 
even catch up on their reading.  Once upon a time, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when the eight-hour workday became common such as was the case with 
Fordism, this effectively freed up “two hours daily for the pursuit of happiness,”82 
whatever that may be.  With the rise of a ‘suburban nation’, these two hours can no 
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longer be spent as free time, but have been gradually recuperated back into the working 
day because of the time demands of the daily commute to work.
83
  In addition, leisure 
activities require commuting as well since suburban tract housing space is often 
specialized to accommodate one type of space: houses.  Going to a movie or to the mall 
virtually demands an automobile as the mode of transportation.  One estimate claims that 
four out of five trips in an automobile are not spent on the “wasteful commute,” but spent 
doing other activities such as going shopping, taking kids to school, and going to the 
park.
84
  All of these activities were accessible by foot in the not too distant past.    
 Commuting is not the only source of boredom behind the wheel.  That is to say, 
being inside an automobile is itself not the only source of boredom.  Long journeys 
across country in an automobile will surely induce fits of boredom because of the 
vastness of the urban fabric one must encounter.  Not surprisingly, car manufacturers 
have installed television screens in various models as something to distract from the 
monotony of the open road.  In his book Reading the Everyday, Joe Moran quotes one 
comment from the narrator of the film London Orbital that articulates a highway that is a 
pure example of the link between the open road and boredom: 
More than other motorways, the M25 is designed to test thresholds of boredom…. 
It is mainline boredom, it is true boredom, a quest for transcendental boredom, a 
state that offers nothing except itself, resisting any promise of breakthrough or 
story.  The road becomes a tunneled landscape, a perfect kind of amnesia.
85
 
 
The M25 (aka London Orbital) is suburban by virtue of its spatial configuration as a 
highway that surrounds the city of London.  Although, it should be said, that following 
Lefebvre, it is also urban as it is an extension of the urban fabric.  While the M25 appears 
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to be a pure representation of the experience of boredom while driving in a European 
context, I would argue that countless roadways throughout North America, too, offer 
little in the way of interesting landscapes.   Following the above quoted passage, Moran 
makes a key point that is applicable to all studies of boredom.  While driving on the M25 
may indeed be ultra boring, studying this boredom creates a shift from experience to 
analysis.  Thinking about one’s boredom has the potential to lead  to having interest in 
this boredom.   
In his book The Geography of Nowhere, James Howard Kunstler describes the 
ideal type of suburban streets from a planning standpoint.  It is evident from this example 
that there is a considerable gap as far as perfection is concerned between the design from 
a planning perspective and a living perspective. That is to say, there is a gap between the 
planners of a space and the people who use them. 
The perfect modern suburban street has no trees planted along the edge that might 
pose a hazard to the motorist incapable of keeping his Buick within the thirty-six-
foot-wide street.  The street does not terminate in any fixed objective that might 
be pleasant to look at or offer a visual sense of destination – no statues, fountains, 
or groves of trees.  Such decorative focal points might invite automotive 
catastrophe, not to mention the inconvenience of driving around them.  With no 
trees arching over the excessively wide streets, and no focal points to direct the 
eye, and cars whizzing by at potentially lethal speeds, the modern suburban street 
is a bleak, inhospitable, and hazardous environment for the pedestrian.
86
 
 
This description could double as the background material for a post-apocalyptic movie 
script or novel.  Uniformity is the key to this archetypal modern suburban street.  Such a 
depiction of a suburban street is an important example of the Lefebvrean triad of 
homogeneity-fragmentation-hierarchization. That is, the suburban street is the space 
where everyone has to drive an automobile (homogeneous), they are isolated from one 
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another (fragmentary), and some cars are more expensive than others (hierarchy).
87
  This 
triad is linked to the ideology of functionalism.  It is clear that the streets are purely 
functional in their design and implementation. Specifically, they are functional for 
automobiles.  For the pedestrian, a great deal of risk is involved when venturing down the 
street. 
In the book Suburban Nation, the authors go against the grain of the common 
critique of suburban streets as being boring because of the planner’s slavish adherence to 
the straight line.  They argue that this is a myth that can be dispelled by looking at the 
straight streets in two cities: San Francisco, California and Savannah, Georgia.  True, 
when looked upon from above, such as from an airplane flying overhead, or, better yet, 
looking at a map, these two cities appear to have straight streets.  It is only when one is 
actually walking the streets of these cities does one come to the realization that they are 
not quite straight.  The authors neglect to mention that the streets of San Francisco are 
known around the world for their rolling hills.  While they are straight forwards and 
backwards, they have immense curves going upwards and downwards.  A similar, yet 
ultimately different problem occurs when the authors fail to mention the details in 
Savannah’s design.  The overhanging trees that James Howard Kuntsler noted were 
absent from modern suburban streets are everywhere in Savannah.  One cannot, of 
course, see these on a standard map, one has to actually be there, walking those streets 
and not driving through them.  From this, the following hypothesis arises: Walking the 
streets of an urban or suburban area is a different experience than both driving through 
them and looking at a map can provide. 
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This brings a theme from the previous chapter back into focus: walking in the 
city.
88
  A key distinction between the metropolis and its suburbs is the difference in 
necessary automobile usage and necessity of walking.  Jane Jacobs describes the impact 
automobiles have had on everyday life for those who live in the suburbs: 
We are all familiar with the great need for automobiles in suburbs.  It is common 
for wives in suburbs to chalk up more errand mileage in a day than their husbands 
chalk up in commuting mileage.  Duplication of car parking is also familiar in 
suburbs: the schools, the supermarkets, the churches, the shopping centers, the 
clinics, the movie, all the residences, must have their own parking lots and all this 
duplicate parking lies idle for much of the time.
89
   
 
Walking in suburbs appears to be to and from the car.  From this depiction it is evident 
that a considerable amount of space is reserved for automobiles, much more so than for 
pedestrians.  Single, double, even triple car garages attached to the home with a driveway 
leading out of the cul-de-sac onto a highway and eventually flowing into one of the many 
parking spaces available across the vast sprawl.  Such parking spaces are most prominent 
outside retail stores. 
 Shopping Centres 
For the retail store, as a non-place, the monotony of a blurred soundscape is a 
difficult problem to combat.  When heard above the white noise of cash registers, buzz of 
the lights, and chatter of shoppers and employees, the music being piped into the 
showrooms is mass-produced like the commodities on the shelves.  While employees at 
independently owned stores often have the autonomy to select the music that they are 
going to listen to while they work, workers at big box and chain stores are not so lucky.  
Having been an employee at one of these stores (The Bay) I can confirm that the same 
                                                 
88 As for everyday life, one of the most influential writings on the theme of ‘walking in the city’ can be 
found in Michel de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life on pages 91-110. 
89 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 464. 
244 
compact discs are often played over and over again ad nauseam.  If not CDs or mp3s, 
Top 40 radio stations are a suitable substitute.  Similar to how the function of CDs set to 
‘repeat’ will play the same songs ad infinitum, Top 40 stations play a fairly narrow list of 
songs with a gradual shift in the overall lineup contingent upon the latest and greatest pop 
songs being released.  Going from one’s car into the shopping centre can be seamless in 
an auditory sense if the radio stations in both areas synch up.  The repetition of sounds 
can be annoying as a customer, but they have far more impact on the employees who are 
not at liberty to come and go as they please.  That is, if they want to keep their jobs.  
According to Tia DeNora in her study of the importance of music in everyday life, the 
employees at these larger retail stores often “get bored hearing the same tape over 
extended periods of time.”90  These loops help create an atmosphere of monotony 
amongst all the ‘newness’ of the commodities and services available for purchase. 
Shopping malls have been referred to as the “accidental capitals of suburbia” 
which “address,” or at least attempt to address, “the notorious suburban boredom among 
them.”91  In his book on consumer culture, Paco Underhill notes the evolution of the 
shopping centre from a primarily retail space consisting of department stores and small 
shops to the incorporation of a multifaceted shopping experience that integrates 
entertainment and dining.  According to Underhill, malls today cannot be considered 
malls without also having movie theatres, video arcades, and vibrating chairs in addition 
to retail.  What was the major driving force behind this?  While Underhill explicitly notes 
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that consumer boredom is responsible for this shift, what is implicit in this assertion is 
that capitalism and its eternal quest for profit is adapting to the boredom of consumers.  
There is an emphasis on increasing diversions in order to combat buyer boredom. 
There must be a lot of people bored with shopping since the nonstore portion of 
malls – what is sometimes optimistically referred to as ‘entertainment’ – keeps 
becoming a bigger part of the mix.  Once upon a time, a dank little video game 
arcade was considered sufficient.  Today malls have taken on a lot of the burden 
of keeping suburban America diverted.
92
 
 
Following Underhill’s argument, it would appear as though these people may be bored 
with shopping, but not with shopping malls.  What exactly are Americans being 
‘diverted’ from?  Underhill does not delve into such a question.  I argue that it is the 
everyday that needs diversion in this scenario.  The everyday is the ‘it’ people want to get 
away from.  This is an ongoing struggle, as it seems that while attempts to creatively 
enact distraction may temporarily succeed with the transformation of a mall, this also 
entails keeping up with an equally creative boredom.  Later in the same text, Underhill 
expands on his initial idea. 
We baby boomers are in a postshopping mode, psychically speaking.  We’re not 
as thrilled as we used to be at the mere prospect of buying, of being in the 
presence of multitudes of objects, talismans, fetishes, beautifiers, intensifiers, 
glorifiers, junk.  If we needed it, we bought it, more than once.  Now we’re 
feeling bought out.  We’re bored.93 
   
Clearly, Underhill is not referring to all baby boomers here.  Not everyone can afford to 
buy things they need – though I am suspicious of Underhill’s claim of ‘need’ – that they 
can buy it twice, if not more times.  Underhill believes that this faith in the healing 
powers of consumption is unique to baby boomers and not to their elders or even the 
younger generations.  While the previously mentioned ‘cul-de-sac kids’ refutes this 
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assertion, Underhill does make a valid point with regards to the increasing emphasis on 
entertainment at shopping centres. 
George Ritzer argues that “there is a tendency for people to become bored and to 
be put off by too much machine-like efficiency in the settings in which they consume.” 94  
As was the case with Paco Underhill’s analysis, the catch is that the production side of 
things is well aware of this and actively counteracts it, often with more machine-like 
efficiency.  Ritzer notes that the “challenge for today’s cathedrals of consumption (as for 
religious cathedrals) is how to maintain enchantment in the face of increasing 
rationalization.”95  This brings to the light the title of Ritzer’s book that this passage 
comes from: Enchanting the Disenchanted World.  The suggestion seems to be applicable 
to the act of continuously applying paint to a rusting car whenever the rust spots appear.  
While the appearance may indicate a kind of newness, the rust will eventually resurface 
in due time.  This rust is an apt metaphor for the suburban lifestyle in general. 
 David Harvey gives a broad synopsis of such a style of life by arguing that the 
suburban lifestyle is produced in a dialectical manner between its residents and the titans 
of lifestyle industries.  Of course, they are not mutually exclusive, but often overlap one 
another.  An owner of an SUV, for example, could also own or work at an SUV 
dealership.  Regardless if one buys what they directly sell, there is an overall tendency 
amongst suburban dwellers to perpetuate this style of life. 
An immense amount of effort, including the formation of a vast advertising 
industry, has been put into influencing and manipulating the wants, needs and 
desires of human populations to ensure a potential market.  But something more 
than just advertising is involved here.  What is required is formation of conditions 
of daily life that necessity the absorption of a certain bundle of commodities and 
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services in order to sustain it.  Consider, for example, the development of the 
wants, needs and desires associated with the rise of suburban lifestyle in the 
United States after the Second World War.  Not only are we talking about the 
need for cars, gasoline, highways, suburban tract houses and shopping malls, but 
also lawn mowers, refrigerators, air-conditioners, drapes, furniture (interior and 
exterior), interior entertainment equipment (the TV) and a whole mass of 
maintenance systems to keep this daily life going.  Daily living in the suburbs 
required the consumption of at least all of that.  The development of suburbia 
turned these commodities from wants and desires into absolute needs.
96
 
 
Harvey then goes on to state that 70% of the American economy is consumer based.
97
  
While the immense complexities of the current economic system fall well outside the 
scope of this dissertation, Harvey’s point is simple to grasp and helps to sketch the 
driving forces behind everyday life.  There is a need both real and perceived to 
continuously consume in order to reproduce both the suburbs and its lifestyle.  Such has 
been the case since the first mass-produced suburbs and continues up until this very day. 
While the material presented above is largely focusing on the 1950s and 1960s, it 
can be argued that suburbs have not changed very much since then.  While the cars are 
newer, the houses have more electronics, and the shopping centres have expanded, it 
would be incorrect to place too much weight on the discontinuities that have emerged in 
the intervening decades from then until now.  To illustrate the similarity, a passage from 
David Harvey’s 2010 book The Enigma of Capital will be beneficial.  Harvey offers an 
outline of a typical suburb from 2005, in which he highlights the complexities of this 
spatial formation and its predominant mode of life.  To begin, Harvey offers a description 
of the makeup of the typical suburb: 
The population is relatively homogenous (mainly white but with a scattering of 
educated African Americans and equally educated recent immigrants from 
countries as diverse as India, Taiwan, South Korea and Russia) and reasonably 
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affluent.  The suburban tract housing is laid neatly out and the schools, 
supermarkets and shopping malls (incorporating entertainment functions), 
medical facilities and financial institutions, gas stations and auto showrooms, 
sports facilities and open spaces are all within easy driving distance.
 98
   
 
Much the same as the suburbs constructed in the years following World War II, 
homogeneity of its people with regards to class and ethnicity have been maintained.  The 
automobile is a key tool for getting to and from the spaces of consumption and 
production.  The general ethos of the residents is perpetuated with leisure and work.  
Harvey continues: 
Local employment is heavily involved in services (particularly finance, insurance 
and real estate, software production and medical research) and whatever 
production there is, is either oriented to supporting a middle-class suburban 
lifestyle (a car repair, garden centres, ceramics, carpentry, medical equipment) or 
involved in the reproduction or further production of the built environment (all 
facets of the construction industry and its suppliers such as plumbers, roofers and 
road menders).   The tax base is stable and adequate and the local administration, 
apart from engaging in the usual suburban practices of cosying up to construction 
interests and developers, is reasonably efficient.   Commuting times are longish 
but bearable, particularly with the help of all that electronic equipment that turns 
the interior of a car into an entertainment centre.  Daily life is reasonably well 
ordered, apart from a few scandalous family break-ups or egregious crimes; social 
relations are individualistic but loosely integrated through social forms, 
particularly those associated with the churches, schools and golf clubs.  Home 
ownership (mortgage induced and tax subsidized) is widespread, which 
guarantees that the defence of individual housing value is a collective norm, 
upheld by homeownership associations, even in the midst of plenty of isolated 
individualism.  The houses are all laden with different kinds of electronics and of 
course everyone has iPods and cell phones which are in perpetual use.
99
  
 
This passage is an exemplary portrait of suburbia.  In the second to last sentence, Harvey 
mentions its ‘isolated individualism’.  This is a key term for demonstrating Lefebvre’s 
triad of homogeneity-fragmentation-hierarchization.  One simple way of putting it is, the 
same lifestyle (homogeneous) is being sought by countless individuals (fragmentary), 
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each trying to get ahead in life (hierarchical).  While this applies to virtually everyone in 
suburbia, the most isolated of all individuals is the bored housewife. 
Suburban Housewives: Sentenced to Everyday Life 
The bored housewife is a stereotypical portrayal of many women living in the 
suburbs, but the boredom literature rarely takes note of this in any depth.  Instead, a 
general malaise of suburbia is highlighted, such as in the following passage from Orrin E. 
Klapp in his book Overload and Boredom: 
One can feel cut off or sealed in even in a suburb, with its newly planted trees, 
tidy lawns, and cleans streets.  And people themselves can give the feeling in 
“one-layer” communities, such as suburbs or mobiles home parks, where there is 
only one kind of people who think and act pretty much alike.  In such a case, the 
feeling is of a certain sterility.
100
 
 
While this passage from Klapp is important for sketching the general contours of 
suburban life, it fails to articulate the specific circumstances of a suburban housewife.  
While people in general have the ‘feeling of sterility’, specific types of people are lumped 
in to the same general category.  There is no specific mentioning of the heightened 
sterility experienced by a suburban housewife in Klapp’s formulation.  Conversely, 
Reinhard Kuhn discussed the figure of the ‘bored suburbanite’ at the beginning of his 
book The Demon of Noontide, albeit to denigrate it as a lesser experience than the 
boredom felt by more important individuals.  Kuhn portrays the boredom of a suburbanite 
as a superficial experience, one that is not worthy of serious, scholarly consideration.  
Kuhn argues that  
[s]he is tired of the magazine that she is reading or the television show that she is 
watching and mixes another cocktail for herself.  Or perhaps she telephones and 
equally bored friend and they talk for hours about nothing, or perhaps she drifts 
into an affair that means as little to her as the television show or the magazine 
article.   
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Further down the same page, Kuhn concludes that the boredom that ails the typical 
housewife is “a problem for the psychologist, and the victim of this malady is a 
prospective patient for the psychiatrist,” thus ultimately claiming that it “represents a 
primarily medical problem.” 101  It is a matter to be treated by a specialist who can 
provide the proper treatment and/or medication.  Kuhn was not alone with his 
assessment, as this view of the suburbanite’s boredom was so widespread that it was even 
portrayed on a novelty greeting card.  The card, adorned with a woman’s distressed face, 
features the caption “I’m bored, send drugs.”102  In this view, it is a personal matter that 
can be dealt with via pharmaceuticals rather than one that ought to be considered as a 
deeper reflection of a widespread societal problem.  Kuhn’s argument for the inferiority 
of this type of boredom (in comparison to the profundity of ennui) is predicated upon his 
impression of the inferiority of the bored subject.  To sum up his position, he is arguing 
that a bored suburbanite is inconsequential to the study of boredom because she is a 
bored woman.   
It is none other than Elizabeth Goodstein who sets Kuhn upright.  Goodstein 
summarized the problems with Kuhn’s dismissal of the ‘bored suburbanite’ quite nicely 
as follows: “If Kuhn’s claims are read in historical context,” argues Goodstein, “his 
purported ability to distinguish ennui from quotidian, or everyday boredom on empirical 
grounds appears as an ideological maneuver that effectively excludes women and the 
working class from the realm of cultural production and philosophical reflection.”103  
Kuhn’s approach, as was argued in the first chapter, is an ahistorical one that neglects 
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historically specific situations and/or circumstances.  As well, as Goodstein argues, 
Kuhn’s reflections fail to incorporate other classes and genders, and what is ultimately 
presented is a fairly myopic perspective that effectively excludes the importance of 
everyday life.  Kuhn’s limited portrayal of the bored housewife can be compared to 
Nietzsche’s aphorism ‘boredom’ from his book Human, All Too Human where he states 
that “many people, especially women, never feel boredom because they have never 
learned to work properly.”104  Such a perspective, shared by Kuhn and Nietzsche, is best 
summarized by Simone de Beauvoir who, in her book The Second Sex, writes: “Woman 
in truth represents the everyday aspects of life; she is silliness, prudence, shabbiness, 
boredom.”105 Following de Beauvoir and Goodstein, it is clear that Kuhn effectively 
formed a triad of women-silliness-boredom in which a woman’s boredom is mediated by 
her silliness.  This is an unfortunate error on Kuhn’s part, one that oversimplifies an 
experience that is highly complex. 
 Throughout this chapter, the Lefebvrean triad of homogeneity-fragmentation-
hierarchization has been emphasized as a key for understanding the widespread 
production of specific spaces and lifestyles after the World War II that are conducive to 
an ‘indelible boredom’.  In this section, I argue that if there is a human figure that 
embodies this Lefebvrean triad it is the bored suburban housewife.  In this case, the 
homogeneous element is perhaps the most apparent aspect from the Lefebvrean 
constellation since it can be seen by anyone who wanders, or, more likely, drives, into an 
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area dominated by suburban tract housing.  As was discussed above, the uniformity of 
homes is a well-known facet of suburban life.  While not spending all of her time in her 
home, suburban housewives would spend the most amount of time in this particular space 
when compared with, say, their children who attend school and their husbands who work 
outside the home.  The fragmentary aspect is apparent with the isolated nature of 
suburban living.  The hierarchy stems from the gender inequality between husbands and 
wives during the birth of the suburbs after the Second World War.  This is consistent with 
the path-breaking work of Betty Friedan on the complex, yet often overlooked, everyday 
life of the suburban housewife.   
At the beginning of this chapter, Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique was 
mentioned as a key source linking boredom and the suburbs.  Friedan’s text is filled with 
both indirect and direct references to boredom.
106
   It should be mentioned that the 
difference between suburban housewives and urban housewives is merely a matter of 
emphasizing certain elements.  It is not as if there is no continuity between the two 
simply because they live in different spaces.  The suburban housewife is more of an 
‘ideal type’ in the Weberian sense of the term.  Friedan explains that a move from the big 
city to a suburb was not accompanied by a substantial shift from a total absence of 
boredom to its omnipresence.  No, Friedan gives an example of a bored housewife who 
resides in the city, makes the transition to suburban life, and is met with the same feeling 
of utter emptiness, or, as Elizabeth Goodstein would say, the same ‘experience without 
qualities’. 
                                                 
106 Friedan describes her boredom with writing articles on breastfeeding and related topics for the 
magazines Redbook and Ladies’ Home Journal as part of the reason for writing the book, 45.  Her 
boredom, then, inspired her to investigate the boredom of American housewives. 
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The woman with two children, for example, bored and restive in her city 
apartment, is driven by her sense of futility and emptiness to move, “for the 
children’s sake,” to a spacious house in the suburbs.  The house takes longer to 
clean, the shopping and gardening and chauffeuring and do-it-yourself routines 
are so time-consuming that, for a while, the emptiness seems solved.  But when 
the house is furnished, and the children in school and the family’s place in the 
community has jelled, there is “nothing to look forward to,” as one woman I 
interviewed put it.  The empty feeling returns, and so she must redecorate the 
living room, or wax the kitchen floor more often than necessary – or have another 
baby.  Diapering that baby, along with all the other housework, may keep her 
running so fast that she will indeed need her husband’s help in the kitchen at 
night.  Yet none of it is quite as real, quite as necessary, as it seems.
107
 
 
Friedan is here writing about what she famously referred to as the ‘problem that has no 
name’.108  Household chores and running errands in this scenario appear to temporarily 
relieve the perceived emptiness, but something is always missing.  In what is perhaps one 
of the most famous passages from Friedan’s book,109 she here outlines the ‘problem that 
has no name’. 
The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American 
women.  It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that 
women suffered in the middle of the twentieth century in the United States.  Each 
suburban wife struggled with it alone.  As she made the beds, shopped for 
groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her 
children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night – 
she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question – “Is this all?”110 
 
This simple, yet complex, little question is a widespread utopian longing for content.  
Further to this, Friedan asks the probing question: “Why have so many American wives 
suffered this nameless aching dissatisfaction for so many years, each one thinking she 
                                                 
107 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 345.  While 
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was alone?”111 After much consideration of ‘the problem that has no name’, Friedan 
claims to have arrived at the realization that it is not an outlier, or insignificant in the 
number it afflicted, but was actually widespread and experienced by countless women 
throughout all of America.
112
  Similar to Friedan, this experience of the common 
suburban housewife has been described by the sociologist S. D. Clark – with an eye 
towards a specifically Canadian context – as “a feeling of being caught in a net from 
which escape was impossible.”113  Such an experience is surely without qualities.   
As for Lefebvre, he has articulated a similar problem to the ‘problem that has no 
name’ when he writes: “I would ask you if you had ever experienced those hours when 
everyday life produces a malaise, when the mind pursues an idea which it dares not 
confront.”114 This is a common link between Lefebvre’s work and Friedan’s.  As well, 
Friedan explicitly linked her concept of ‘the problem that has no name’ with everyday 
life.  Both Lefebvre and Friedan were writing in the 1960s on this matter, which was 
unique at the time amongst scholars.  Friedan notes the problem as follows: “Instead of 
destroying the old prejudices that restricted women’s lives, social science in America 
merely gave them new authority.”115  This brings the Levittown study back into the 
picture.  Though not referencing Gans’ work, Friedan is highly critical of such studies.  
To Friedan, they do not capture the experience of housewives because their 
methodological approaches are severely flawed.  Instead, these studies were geared 
towards men to answer the questions as they see fit.  Women (housewives) and children 
(cul-de-sac kids) were not accorded the same status.   
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How severe was the boredom of housewives in Friedan’s view?  Referring to 
soldiers with brain injuries as “doomed to the inhuman hell of eternal dailyness” Friedan 
draws a parallel with housewives: 
The housewives who suffer the terror of the problem that has no name are victims 
of the same deadly “dailyness.”  As one of them told me, “I can take the real 
problems; it’s the endless boring days that make me desperate.”  Housewives who 
live according to the feminine mystique do not have a personal purpose stretching 
into the future.  But without such a purpose to evoke their full abilities, they 
cannot grow to self-realization.  Without such a purpose, they lose the sense of 
who they are, for it is purpose which gives the human pattern to one’s days.116 
 
These housewives seem to be suspended in time and frozen in space.  I would like to 
highlight Friedan’s line that ‘they cannot grow to self-realization’.  The potential is there, 
but it is extremely difficult to realize.  This is similar to Lefebvre when he writes of such 
women that “[b]ecause of their ambiguous position in everyday life – which is 
specifically part of everyday and modernity – they are incapable of understanding it.”117  
This is a source of frustration in both Lefebvre and Friedan’s work who together believe 
that there is great potential for emancipation from this ‘problem that has no name’, but 
their inability to name the problem is also why they cannot escape the problem.  This is a 
testament to the profundity of this boredom.  This ‘problem without a name’ is a longing 
for that light to appear at the end of the tunnel.  The dim glow this light indicates that the 
immediate future is hardly bright, if it can be seen at all.  This light represents a simple 
glimmer of hope for something else, something different, something better.  This longing 
is for something outside of the advertisements that claim to point the way to a happy life.  
Friedan argues that the “happy modern housewife as she is described by the magazines 
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and television” are “mystical creatures.”118  These images offer an impossible, 
unattainable goal for their readers or viewers to strive for.  If one were able to recreate the 
image found in a magazine after countless hours of work and money spent acquiring the 
right look, the proper house, the suitable car, the image will have drifted away.  As soon 
as one thinks they have caught up, the finish line has changed position. 
For Lefebvre, where Friedan does not go far enough is her inability to see the 
connections between the plight of women with the capitalist mode of 
production/consumption.  Lefebvre makes this point about Friedan in his book The 
Survival of Capitalism when he writes that Friedan often “penetrate[s] these slippery 
slopes, without seeing the connections or the global configuration.”119  Despite their 
differing intellectual foundations, Friedan (feminism) and Lefebvre (Marxism) share a 
common concern for women in general.
120
  Women’s magazines are such a link Friedan 
shares with Lefebvre.  For example, he writes: “the best examples of social make-believe 
are to be found neither in films nor in science fiction, but in women’s magazines.”121  
This can be extended by Friedan: 
Judging from the women’s magazines today, it would seem that the concrete 
details of women’s lives are more interesting than their thoughts, their ideas, their 
dreams.  Or does the richness and realism of the detail, the careful description of 
small events, mask the lack of dreams, the vacuum of ideas, the terrible boredom 
that has settled over the American housewife?
122
 
 
                                                 
118 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 333. 
119 SC, 73. 
120 The third volume of Lefebvre’s Critique was originally going to be titled and focused on the Situation of 
Women in the Modern World.  Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 117.  This is consistent with Tom 
Conley’s assertion that “Lefebvre’s politics contain a nascent feminism.” Tom Conley, “Henri Lefebvre,” 
The Columbia History of Twentieth-Century French Thought, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 577. 
121 ELMW, 85. 
122 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 107. 
257 
Friedan goes on to write: “The growing boredom of women with the empty, narrow 
image of the women’s magazines may be the most hopeful sign of the image’s divorce 
from reality.”123  This boredom, then, is not a simple case of someone incapable of 
locating something productive to do with her time.  Rather, this boredom is an awakening 
to the ideological mechanisms at work in the production of a mythical, yet ultimately 
unattainable, image of what a woman should be.  In a certain sense, it is like opening a 
doorway to another world.  The difficulty is recognizing one’s ability to crossover to the 
other side.     
After having argued for the parallels between the feminism of Friedan and the 
Marxism of Lefebvre, it is now appropriate to return to a thread that was suspended in the 
second chapter, Laurie Langbauer’s analysis of Lefebvre’s work.  Langbauer’s criticism 
of Lefebvre’s conception of everyday life is particularly scathing when it comes to his 
portrayal of women.  Essentially, Langbauer argues that Lefebvre relegates women to the 
margins of everyday life.  In actuality, Lefebvre was so concerned with the situation of 
women in everyday life that he believed the hope of the world lie with women creating a 
revolution in everyday life.  He envisioned a ‘new Eve’, which was a theoretical 
construct, yet one that was based on real women Lefebvre came across.  He describes this 
utopian figure as follows: 
This new Eve is still beautiful and desirable, her body has kept its youthfulness.  
By cultivating her own sensuality and feelings, she has risen above the level of 
her own physiological and social functions, which hitherto had defined her; she 
has become a human being, therefore she is no longer limited by her own 
alienation.  As an individualized human being who can assume ‘functions’ 
without being eliminated by them, who can overcome time, who can fight time 
and create a new time, this woman is one of modernity’s most extraordinary 
conquests, although it is still insecure, limited, and poorly understood (even by 
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women themselves).  And it is this new woman who gives us hope for 
‘modernity’.124  
 
While it is true that Lefebvre argued that women as a whole occupy a different sphere of 
everyday life than their male counterparts, Langbauer takes this as a lacuna in Lefebvre’s 
work as opposed to one of its strengths.  As is evident from Lefebvre’s above prescription 
of a new Eve as the saviour of modernity, Lefebvre held women in high esteem.  
Lefebvre’s portrayal is best encapsulated when he writes: “It weighs more heavily on 
women, who are sentenced to everyday life, on the working class, on employees who are 
not technocrats, on youth – in short on the majority of the people, yet never in the same 
way, at the same time, never all at once.”125  What is so perplexing about Langbauer’s 
critique is her defense of a feminist position contra Lefebvre while Lefebvre’s work has 
also been cited approvingly by other feminist scholars.  Although they only mention him 
briefly, Lefebvre’s work, at least his preceding passage, inspired Leslie Johnson and 
Justine Lloyd to title their book Sentenced to Everyday Life.
126
 With this, one can 
differentiate between the general orientation of Lefebvre’s work from the general thrust 
of Kuhn’s work.  While it has been argued above that Kuhn excluded women from his 
analysis of profound boredom (or as he calls it ‘ennui’), Lefebvre specifically wanted to 
incorporate the specific situation of women into his analysis in order to have a deeper 
understanding of everyday life in the modern world. 
Technology and the Peripheries 
In his lengthy writings on modernity, Introduction to Modernity, Lefebvre asks a 
probing question regarding the relationship between technology and boredom: 
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“Organized along the lines of a railway network or a system of traffic lights, would not 
the cybernetic society be a society which raised boredom to the level of a dangerously 
invisible yet omnipresent institution?”127 This is a key insight of Lefebvre’s.  In this 
formulation, boredom is both everywhere and nowhere.  Lars Svendsen argues that 
boredom has become further entrenched throughout modernity with the emergence and 
advancement of various technologies: 
Anthropocentrism gave rise to boredom, and when anthropomorphism was 
replaced by technocentrism, boredom became even more profound.  Technology 
involved the dematerialization of the world, where things disappear into pure 
functionality.  We have long since passed a stage where we could keep track of 
technology.  We curry along behind, as is perhaps particularly clear in IT, where 
hardware and software have always become obsolete before most of the users 
have learned how to use them.
128
 
 
To use a McLuhanesque phrase, it is the extensions of (hu)man that have extended 
boredom.  And, of course, technology seems to continuously evolve into newer, faster, 
bigger, smaller things.  As Kostas Axelos puts it, “[t]echnology irresistibly advances.”129  
With the advancement of technology and ‘technocentricism’, it would follow that 
boredom will become further and further entrenched into the fabric of everyday life.  
Once technology has been acquired, it becomes difficult to escape its grasp of distraction.  
As Lefebvre notes, “Life outside technology does not participate.  It contemplates, it 
admires, it gets bored.”130 This gives rise to a paradox.  By not participating in the use of 
technology, one can contemplate its boringness, but from the perspective of a different 
kind of boredom.  Conversely, if one participates in technological use, one cannot 
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contemplate its boringness outside of the boredom it instills.  Acquiring the proper 
critical distance seems to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.  To some, this ought to 
be a very serious concern for society.   
Erich Fromm, for example, has noted the problems of boredom facing humanity 
with the overreliance on the latest technological advancements.  Technology, for Fromm, 
has the potential for the opposite effect proposed by McLuhan with his ‘extension of 
man’ hypothesis.  Humans are not extended through technology, but are stunted in 
growth.  The technology is what gets extended as opposed to the human.  In Fromm’s 
view, this has dramatic implications for the future of society with regards to the 
experience of boredom. 
The danger of the past was that men became slaves.  The danger of the future is 
men may become robots.  True enough, robots do not rebel.  But given man’s 
nature, robots cannot live and remain sane; they become “Golems”; they will 
destroy their world and themselves because they will be no longer able to stand 
the boredom of a meaningless life.
131
 
 
Here, Fromm argues for the seriousness of boredom as a deeply existential problem 
facing countless individuals on a daily basis.  If one were to make the transition to this 
figurative robot, total passivity would be realized.  This calls to mind Baudrillard’s 
seemingly fruitless search for a “genuine madman in the street,” who does not require “a 
mobile phone to talk to himself.”132 The idea here, amongst the humourous observation, 
is that the relationship between people and technology is becoming much more tightly 
intertwined as technological advances occur. 
One of the most defining features of modernity is the emphasis on industrial 
technology.  This technology was vital to the development of two of its chief ideologies – 
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Fordism and Taylorism – throughout the twentieth century, especially in the United 
States of America.  While both Fordism and Taylorism are largely associated with 
industry, their intertwined ideologies are evident in the home in general, but the suburban 
home in particular.  The mantra of efficiency in production can also be found at home.  
For example, at the beginning of the second volume of the Critique, Lefebvre noted the 
increasing importance of technology in everyday life, especially as it concerns 
housework: 
The situation of the everyday per se has become increasingly serious.  It is true 
that technology is penetrating it much more than it did twenty years ago, and it is 
impossible to ignore the importance of domestic science, for example; but we also 
know that technology and domestic science have not eliminated the most trivial 
aspects of everyday life; by reducing the time spent doing tedious chores 
technology raises very clearly the problem of available free time.
133
 
 
Free time is not easily acquired for a housewife, even with the technological advances 
and their proponents that claim they free up time.  For example, in his book The 
Consumer Society,
134
 Jean Baudrillard envisions the free time a housewife gains after the 
purchase of a brand new washing machine.  Baudrillard imagines the time being spent 
watching television and seeing advertisements for washing machines.
135
 In this scenario, 
consumption fuels consumption.  The free time here is hardly spent away from the 
household chores.  It seems to be a perpetual circuit where once one begins consuming, it 
is virtually impossible to stop.  This brings Lefebvre’s project back into the picture.  
Lefebvre writes: 
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Domestic appliances have certainly altered daily life.  By opening it out on the 
world?  Quite the reverse: they have aggravated its closure, by reinforcing 
repetitive everydayness and linear processes – the same gestures around the same 
objects.  Let us note once again that ‘household’ appliances have not liberated 
women; they have made liberation movements possible by alleviating daily 
drudgery.  Only then did specific demands regarding divorce, contraception, 
abortion, and freely chosen maternity emerge.
136
 
 
In Lefebvre’s formulation, while technological advances have taken place and have 
altered everyday life for many, they have not significantly elevated the everyday lives of 
women or men for that matter.  Technological advances, nevertheless, have steadily 
become key components of everyday life, especially for those who live in the suburbs. 
 The shift in the emphasis on home technology that has occurred throughout the 
twentieth century is clear when one compares the situation at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  At that time, the household medium of choice was the radio and 
movie theatres were the most frequented entertainment mediums outside of the home.  
Siegfried Kracauer, writing about listening to the radio, argues that listening to the radio 
with headphones closes off the possibility of boredom.  
Who would want to resist those dainty headphones?  They gleam in living rooms 
and entwine themselves around heads all by themselves; and instead of fostering 
cultivated conversation (which certainly can be a bore), one becomes a 
playground for worldwide noises that, regardless of their own potentially 
objective boredom, do not even grant one’s modest right to personal boredom.137  
 
It is amazing that this passage was written over 80 years ago.  If one did not know better, 
this passage could pass for having been written today.  Are not these dainty headphones 
the calling card of the latest personal mp3 players?  It is as if Kracauer is describing the 
infamous white ear buds that come standard with all versions of Apple’s iPod.  Among 
many others, one key feature missing from Kracauer’s description when compared with 
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an iPod is the presence of a screen, which, at the time, was in the realm of movie theatres 
and not the home.  One key element amongst many of the technological advances that 
have occurred since Kracauer’s time is the screen.  With the increasing shift towards 
screen technologies such as televisions and computers, the two preferred types of 
entertainment of the early twentieth century (radio in the home; cinema outside the home) 
can both be found outside the home and inside the home.   
As was mentioned in the second chapter, one of Lefebvre’s preferred metaphors 
for everyday life is the screen.  Not simply a clever metaphor, screens have gradually 
invaded everyday life.  Kenneth T. Jackson notes that it was during the 1950s that 
television supplanted movies as the medium of choice for entertainment amongst most 
Americans.
138
  This explosion of television sets in the home coincides with the explosion 
of suburbs in America.  Lynn Spigel has claimed that the television set is “the 
quintessential medium of the suburban home.”139 Spigel has argued that “television 
meshed perfectly with the aesthetics of modern suburban architecture.  It brought to the 
home a grand illusion of space while also fulfilling the ‘easy living’, minimal motion 
principles of functionalist housing design.”140  Much like a mirror, the television gives 
the impression that there is more space than there really is.  However, unlike a mirror 
lying flush against a wall, the first generation of televisions were clunky, large boxes, so 
this illusion is an impressive one as it is clear that the television is actually taking up a 
considerable amount of space in a room.  With the advancements in television technology 
the similarities with the mirror have become much more pronounced.   As well as even 
                                                 
138 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 282. 
139 Lynn Spigel, Welcome to the Dreamhouse: Popular Media and Postwar Suburbs (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), 2. 
140 Lynn Spigel, “Installing the Television Set,” in Ben Highmore, The Everyday Life Reader, 327. 
264 
hanging on a wall like a mirror.  In this case, it is as if one is looking through a window 
to the world.   
After World War II, the rise of mass-produced suburbs on the outskirts of major 
cities rekindled a long-term American romance with the detached family home.  
Built largely for the white middle class, these mass-produced suburban 
developments became the ideal ‘terminals’ for a new traffic in media culture.  
Television, drive-in theaters, and corporate shopping centers brought previous 
forms of visual culture into the space of suburban family leisure, a pattern that 
seem inaugural for today’s more high-tech ‘information superhighway’ and 
World Wide Web, which promise to link all forms of public life to the private 
space of the family home.
141
 
 
In order to further disseminate their message, instructions for optimal television viewing 
were provided by television manufactures in magazine articles and advertisements.  
Spigel has referred to this as the “scientific management of the gaze in the home.”142  In 
order to maximize one’s enjoyment of this technology, special instructions were 
supposed to be followed.  This articulates another functionalist aspect of modernity, the 
emphasis on structure and hierarchy in leisure time. 
In his book Bourgeois Utopias, Robert Fishman has argued that suburbs, 
particularly those in the United States, are in the process of morphing into what he calls 
‘technoburbs’.  The term denotes the centrality of technology in suburban living. Fishman 
states that “television has proved to be the perfect medium for the technoburb.”143  The 
number of televisions brought into homes across America over the course of the 1950s is 
substantial.  At the beginning of the 1950s roughly 9% of all American homes owned a 
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television set.  By the end of the decade that amount grew to 90% and the average 
American at the time watched approximately five hours of television per day.
144
 It would 
be difficult to speak of these percentages with any substantial degree of certainty today.  
Obtaining the same data today is much more difficult since television watching has 
become blurred.  It can take place on a car ride, in the street, on the computer, etc. 
It would seem that the suburbs and television go together like a hand in a glove.  
Perhaps this is why it makes so much sense to ‘sprawl’ on a couch in front of the 
television.  Television programs have been representing suburban life since the advent of 
televisions and the suburbs.  In particular, housewives have been portrayed on television 
for some time now, such as, what could be seen as the archetypal suburban housewife 
from the 1950s and 1960s, June Cleaver in Leave it to Beaver.  ABC’s television show 
Desperate Housewives is a notable example of a present day depiction of housewives.  
The sexual promiscuity of the characters are certainly a departure from the ‘feminine 
mystique’ of June Cleaver.  In yet another departure, the television channel Bravo 
currently produces a series of programs focusing on the ‘real’ housewives of certain 
regions: Orange County, New Jersey, Atlanta, etc.  The term ‘real’ seems to mean 
‘reality’, or nonfiction, and can be opposed to the fictitious characters in Desperate 
Housewives.  Interestingly, the heroines of the Real Housewives series have been 
described as “botoxed, bored-stiff women shopping off their husbands’ enormous wealth 
and living in McMansions.”145  These bored housewives are outliers as far as domestic 
everyday life is concerned, and can be opposed to the deep longing of the educated 
housewife portrayed by Friedan.  There is a huge lifestyle disparity between the two 
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types.  The television has distorted the image of a housewife beyond recognition.  Robert 
Fishman explains this phenomenon as follows: 
Since the 1950s television and the technoburb have been in alliance, each 
promoting the interests of the other.  For television, the decentralized audience is 
the ideal audience, the perfect consumers of the standardized products that 
advertisements offer.  In return, television has glorified the single family house as 
the standard American home, enshrined the low density neighborhood, and 
(perhaps not coincidentally) has provided an unrelenting negative picture of the 
city as the haven of crime and violence.
146
 
 
As part of living in fragmentary, atomistic houses, the connectivity via technology is 
heightened.  Part of what makes the suburbs palatable for some is the ability to extend 
oneself (in the McLuhan sense of technology) into the surrounding world.  The easiest, 
most efficient and least expensive way to do this is through the television.    
The assertion that “television is the cheapest and least demanding way of averting 
boredom”147 is almost a platitude today.  Parents even use it as a quick fix for bored 
children.  Instead of thinking of an alternative that would undoubtedly require much more 
effort, it is simple enough to place the kids in front of the television screen.  Of course, it 
not just a remedy for a bored child.  If a child is bored, the parent(s) can turn on the 
television to alleviate this boredom and that is that.  However, repressing boredom is 
much more complicated than that.  In what could be described as a ‘return of the 
repressed’, boredom also surfaces when one is watching television.  As Patricia Meyer 
Spacks argues, “[w]e gaze at television to forestall boredom, and the television generates 
more of it.”148  The antidote carries the affliction.  It would seem as though television is 
an endless cycle of boredom and interest.   
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It is important to note that all television programs are not created equal.  Some are 
more thoughtful than others, some are more engaging than others, and some appeal to 
certain demographics more than others.  In addition, it could be said that some are much 
more boring than others.  This is a moot point to Susan Sontag who has argued that 
television is inherently boring.  “The whole point of television,” argues Sontag, “is that 
one can switch channels, that it is normal to switch channels, to become restless, 
bored.”149 With this, it is not just the passive viewing that facilitates the experience of 
boredom.  The active participation of changing channels, too, invites boredom.  In a 
related way, Adorno refers to television watching as “the dreamless dream.”150  Such a 
statement recalls Luis Buñuel’s surrealist reflections on the suburbs mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
In his Understanding Media, Marshall McLuhan has but one short reference to 
boredom, but it is nevertheless an important one.  Here he notes an important transition 
between the initial impression of technology and its lingering response.  He writes: “The 
effect of electric technology had at first been anxiety.  Now it appears to create 
boredom.”151 If the initial sampling of a technology such as television instills a sensation 
of anxiety, its long, lingering aftertaste is one of boredom.  Perhaps, in the case of 
television, the initial anxiety stemmed from the belief that the television is looking back 
at its owner.  Lynn Spigel suggests that the cabinet doors that accompanied early 
televisions were designed to close off the television’s gaze.  Spigel notes that such terms 
as ‘hypnotic eye, ‘all seeing eye’, and ‘mind’s eye’ were all given to the television in its 
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initial exposure to consumers.
152
 On the other side of things, looking towards the 
television, Arthur Kroker has labeled the television viewer’s gaze as the ‘bored eye’.  
Kroker elaborates this concept when he claims: “We watch the Web and download TV.  
We watch ourselves watching TV.  We watch the screen watching us.  We like the 
screen.  It’s our friend.  It’s our boredom.”153  It is no surprise, then, that “television not 
only enriches and enters the interwoven texture of everyday life, it represents it, too.”154  
We are able to watch our everyday lives on television vicariously through soap operas, or 
even see our neighbours compete on a ‘reality’ television show.  Anything and everything 
seems to be on television these days.  It is not difficult to suppose that “reality is viewed 
through the filter of the television screen, that the meaning given quotidian life on the 
screen is reflected back upon everyday life itself.”155 
While television and the broader category of technology are important to 
suburbia, everyday life is by no means fully automated with technological gizmos.  If it 
were so, the infusion of Taylorism throughout society would be entirely realized.  That is, 
the persistent striving for efficiency above all other considerations would realize the 
ideology of Taylorism through the increased use of efficient technologies.  The 
importance of technology in everyday life, however, is considerable, as Lefebvre notes:   
Only partially technicized, everyday life has not created its own specific style or 
rhythm.  Unconnected objects (vacuum cleaners, washing machines, radio or 
television sets, refrigerators, cars, etc.) determine a series of disjointed actions.  
Small technical actions intervene in the old rhythms rather like fragmented labour 
in productive activity in general.  The equipment of everyday life finds itself more 
or less in the same situation as industrial mechanization in its early stages, in the 
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period when specific tools had unique and exclusive functions.  If these gestures 
increase effectiveness – productivity – they also split things up; they truncate, 
they make mincemeat of everyday life; they leave margins and empty spaces.  
They increase the proportion of passivity.
156
 
 
This would entail the rise of a new class that Lefebvre has termed the ‘technocrats’.  This 
is “Lefebvre’s term,” which, according to Gary Genosko, “refer[s] to those who would 
seek to make us and our surroundings more cybernetic, more systematic, more 
technocratic.”157  For Lefebvre, it is a matter of everyday life synching with technology, 
which he notes in his writings on modernity. 
Indeed, for many people, innovation in life is synonymous with technicity.  
Technical objects, be they scooters, IBM computers or interplanetary rockets, are 
passionately interesting; they give enormous pleasure and provoke a feeling of 
novelty, just as much by the way they function scientifically as by the way they 
can be used empirically.
158
 
 
On the next page in the same text Lefebvre picks up this thread: 
So how does disappointment in technicity arise?  From the fact that interest in it, 
like all interests, is quickly exhausted.  As soon as we know how a technical 
object works and how to make it work, our concentration starts to wander.  We 
must look for something else.  If it is to be maintained, the technological 
sensibility needs ever-accelerating technological progress.  Conversely, 
accelerated technological progress will destroy interest in technicity, only to 
renew it again.  Technological progress forces the individual and social man to 
accept the constraints of technicity; he plays his part in this destiny forging ever 
forward without knowing where he is heading, and without needing to know.  
Pleasure in technology has very little to do with culture, although it may be seen 
as a fact of modern cultural life.
159
 
 
A little further in the same text Lefebvre notes, “times changed.  Technology began 
penetrating everyday life; there were new problems.”160  Jean Baudrillard similarly 
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observes, “[t]oday it is quotidian reality in its entirety – political, social, historical and 
economic – that from now on incorporates the simulatory dimension of hyperrealism.”161  
Best and Kellner, writing in a similar vein to Baudrillard and Lefebvre, put it this way: 
“In recent decades, new technologies have emerged that have altered the pattern of 
everyday life and have powerfully restructured work, leisure, education, communication, 
politics, and personal identities.”162   
Lars Svendsen has argued that technology is a major catalyst in the societal 
expansion and retention of boredom in the modern world.  While these reflections on 
technology are not specific to the suburbs, they serve as ideal examples, especially 
considering their label of ‘technoburbs’.  Svendsen writes: “The problem is that modern 
technology more and more makes us passive observers and consumers, and less and less 
active players.  This gives us a meaning deficit.”163  There is a certain disconnect between 
active participation and passive observation imparted by the increased reliance on 
technology in everyday life.  Lefebvre explains a typical scenario as follows: 
Technology is omnipotent.  With it, anything is possible.  Put your trust in 
technology, that is, in the products of modern technology, which are involved in 
all of our everyday chores – all those demeaning, tiresome chores, like going to 
the office, taking the metro, sweeping floors, doing pieces of writing – and all 
those boring everyday things will be imbued with morning freshness if you put 
your trust in modern technology.
164
 
 
Computers, especially since the advent of the Internet as a widespread phenomenon, are 
much more current versions of the television in the sense of watching a screen.
165
  This 
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technology fills the everyday with something and it perpetuates the absence of meaning, 
or the absence of style.  Baudrillard explains that the “[t]elevision says nothing but: I’m 
an image, everything’s image.  The Internet and computers say nothing but: I’m 
information, everything’s information.  It’s the sign making itself sign, the medium doing 
its own advertising.”166  Of course, it does not stop with the television or computer 
screen, as Slavoj Žižek explains: “They – all this (often boring and repetitive) 
proliferation of gadgets – render most directly what Lacan called objets petit a.”167  What 
Žižek is referring to is the unattainable x as theorized by Jacques Lacan.  This is never it 
and neither will that be it.  ‘It’ cannot be obtained because ‘it’ does not exist per se.  The 
‘object petit a’, I argue, is a helpful theoretical concept for analyzing the dialectic of 
newness and dullness with technology.  What at first seems to be so satisfying inevitably 
morphs into a boring thing because it was produced in order to only temporarily satisfy 
its consumers.  Today’s new is tomorrow’s dull.  This has been made abundantly clear by 
Martin Parr and his collections of Boring Postcards, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
A much more explicit link can be made between technology and the suburbs 
when one considers and contrasts it with a key figure of metropolitan life.  The 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman offers such a consideration, which is a useful explanation 
for the shift in the practice of strolling from the nineteenth century to the twentieth 
century: 
                                                                                                                                                 
behind this is that if someone is bored, a random experience will alleviate that boredom.  The technology 
itself is not considered as an accessory to boredom. 
166 Jean Baudrillard, Paroxysm: Interviews with Philippe Petit, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1998), 
72. 
167 Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (London: Routledge, 2001), 20.  Technological gadgets are not the only 
examples of the ‘objet petit a’.  For an example of a specific commodity, see Žižek’s “Coke as object petit 
a,” in The Fragile Absolute (London: Verso Press, 2008), 19-36. 
272 
More than a century ago another Frenchman, the poet and critic Baudelaire, 
suggested that the right way to observe and make sense of the modern world is to 
stroll along the streets and past the shops of the urban metropolis.  It is the 
flâneur, Baudelaire proposed, who has the best view of the true essence of 
modernity.  Baudrillard tied the flâneur to the armchair in front of the TV set.  
The stroller does not stroll any more.  It is the TV images, TV commercials, the 
goods and joys they advertise who now stroll, and run, and flow in front of the 
hypnotized viewer.  Viewing is the only activity left to the former stroller.  
Baudelaire’s stroller has turned into Baudrillard’s watcher.168 
 
The stroller of yesteryear has been superseded by the surfer of today.  Instead of strolling 
around the cityscape, Baudrillard’s watcher channel surfs with the television along with 
surfing the Internet all from the comfort of home or a friend’s place (couch surfing).  Of 
course, the stroller still exists in the sense that people still walk around urban areas, but 
the suburban surfer is much more prevalent since the influx of televisions in the home.  
Below, Lefebvre uses his favourite metaphor of a screen to demonstrate the partial 
perspective offered to and consumed by a television viewer.   
One need only ‘see’ the interest aroused in television by live news broadcasts.  
You take part in events as and when they happen.  You watch the massacres and 
the dead bodies and you contemplate the explosions.  Missiles and rockets shoot 
off before your eyes, heading toward their targets.  You are there! – But no, you 
are not there.  You have the slight impression of being there.  Subjectivity!  You 
are in your armchair in front of the little screen, well named insofar as it hides 
what it shows.
169
 
 
Televisions and couches (or armchairs) are major components of most suburban 
family rooms.  The title of this room is important to note since it gives the connotation 
that that is where a family gathers.  It is also interesting to note that this room is often 
referred to as a ‘living room’, as if this is where the living happens in a house.  The 
family gathers there and lives there.  Together, yet separate, each family member gazes at 
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the events of the world on a daily basis.  Lefebvre refers to this as the television giving 
the everyday a ‘worldwide dimension’, which he elaborates as follows: 
Television allows every household to look at the spectacle of the world, but it is 
precisely this mode of looking at the world as a spectacle which introduces non-
participation and receptive passivity.  The idea that the audiovisual as it was lived 
in archaic communities (in scenes of magic) could be reconstituted is laughable 
and frivolous.  The mass media strip the magic of presence from what was the 
presence of magic participation – real, active or potential.  Sitting in his armchair, 
surrounded by his wife and children, the television viewer witnesses the universe.  
At the same time, day in and day out, news, signs and significations roll over him 
like a succession of waves, churned out and repeated and already 
indistinguishable by the simple fact that they are pure spectacle: they are 
overpowering, they are hypnotic.  The ‘news’ submerges viewers in a 
monotonous sea of newness and topicality which blunts sensitivity and wears 
down the desire to know.  Certainly, people are becoming more cultivated.  
Vulgar encyclopedism is all the rage.  The observer may well suspect that when 
communication becomes incorporated in private life to this degree it becomes 
non-communication.
170
 
 
Here is another example of the homogeneity-framentation-hierarchization triad.  The 
whole family is there (homogeneity), though they are not communicating 
(fragmentation), and spaces are occupied according to rank such as the father in his 
armchair (hierarchization).  
Lefebvre points out that “there are always new things, and better things, for doing 
the same thing.”171  With this, the question arises: Are these new (old) technologies really 
necessary?  Necessity is debatable, but here the dialectical notion of new and old should 
be elaborated.  It is a matter of seeing the continuities and discontinuities.  Taking just 
one of these aspects into account will give only a partial view.  In this case, it is fairly 
clear that they are not new in the sense that society has never seen something like them 
before.  Conversely, they are new in the sense that they are a variation on a theme.  The 
extent of the variation would itself vary.  For Lefebvre, the impetus for the perpetual 
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influx of new technologies is what he has referred to as the ‘bureaucratic society of 
controlled consumption’, which I will examine in the next chapter.  For the time being, 
Lefebvre’s former associate Guy Debord has succinctly articulated the linkages between 
technology, everyday life, and capitalism as follows: 
Many technologies do, in fact, more or less markedly alter certain aspects of 
everyday life – not only housework […] but also telephones, television, music on 
long-playing records, mass air travel, etc.  These developments arise anarchically, 
by chance, without anyone having foreseen their interrelations or consequences.  
But there is no denying that, on the whole, this introduction of technology into 
everyday life ultimately takes place within the framework of modern 
bureaucratized capitalism and tends to reduce people’s independence and 
creativity.
172
  
 
There are those, such as Jean Baudrillard, who take an extreme stance towards the quality 
of programming available on television or other, similar technologies: “At home, 
surrounded by information, by screens, I am no longer anywhere, but rather everywhere 
in the world at once, in the midst of a universal banality – a banality that is the same in 
every country.”173  It is the banality that binds as far as homogeneity of viewer experience 
goes, but it also promotes fragmentation amongst viewers.  Although Baudrillard is 
everywhere, he is also nowhere.  Everywhere he is able to gaze with the aid of his army 
of screens he is not physically present.  His experience is totally mediated by technology.  
With an eye on the future, Baudrillard writes: 
One day the only people left on the streets will be zombies – one group with their 
mobile phones, the other with their headphones or video headsets.  Everyone will 
be simultaneously elsewhere.  They already are.  In the past, you could isolate 
yourself internally.  Now you can isolate yourself externally, can retreat into the 
outer core of your being.  Confinement in prison is giving way to the mobile 
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confinement of the network, just as rigor mortis has given way to the corpse-like 
flexibility of switching-man, protean man, Nietzsche’s ‘chameleon’.174 
To end this chapter, Baudrillard’s mention of a zombie to begin the above passage 
is worth consideration.  While not specific to the suburbs, the aesthetic sameness 
throughout is entirely applicable to the suburban situation sketched above.  In the film 
Shaun of the Dead (Directed by Edgar Wright, 2004), the protagonist (Shaun) gradually 
becomes surrounded by people infected with a flesh biting disease, which he does not 
notice until the zombies arrive at his home.  How is it that the zombies went unnoticed?  
Shaun’s daily routine – walking in the same areas of town, commuting on the same bus 
route, and going to the same convenience store, etc. – was so often filled with similar 
zombie-like characters, the difference between characters in the pre-zombie era and post-
zombie era was negligible.  The empty visages of the zombies are so similar to the bored 
faces of Shaun’s fellow commuters that he is totally unaware of the discontinuity grafted 
onto his everyday life.  It is not until the zombies attempt to eat his brain does Shaun 
break out of his everyday routine and thus ensues an extraordinary adventure of slaying 
and evading the persistent onslaught of zombies.  While this movie is a work of fiction,
175
 
it not only demonstrates the linkages between boredom and everyday life, but it also 
serves as an example of boredom in entertainment.  In the next chapter, this will be 
considered alongside Lefebvre’s dialectic of boredom and interest mentioned at the 
conclusion of the first chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The Banality of Consumption 
 
‘Boredom’, the absence or even temporary interruption  
of the perpetual flow of attention-drawing, exciting novelties,  
turns into a resented and feared bugbear of the consumer society.1 – Zygmunt Bauman  
 
The need for novelty and fresh stimulation becomes more and more intense,  
intervening interludes of boredom increasingly intolerable.2 – Christopher Lasch 
 
Of course, the endless consumption of images results in disappointment and boredom,  
because they only fulfill artificial rather than genuine human needs.3 – Michael Gardiner 
 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
The common thread running through these three passages from Bauman, Lasch, and 
Gardiner is the dialectical process at work in everyday life: the concurrent quest for 
meaningful content and the fear and inevitability of boredom.  Interesting things are at 
the heart of this.  The general orientation and purpose of this chapter is to expound the 
unity and simultaneous opposition between boredom and interest in the consumption of 
objects, sounds, and images.  The objects of consumption will mediate between boredom 
and interest and can be represented in a triad of boredom-consumption-interest.  It will be 
argued that the historically specific boredom of modernity is especially evident in the 
common, ordinary, everyday practice of consumption.  Consumption is here used in a 
broad sense to denote the transmission of a message from an object to a subject.  This is 
not to argue for a definitive causal chain from one to the other, as the message from the 
object was generated by a subject or subjects, who were in turn influenced by other 
subjects and other objects, and so on and so on.  Since consumption is a broad signifier 
for an equally broad process, the point here is to identify certain key elements that are its 
general characteristics and can be located throughout the continuous process that 
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facilitates the experience of both interest and boredom for consumers.  If this chapter 
were to have a subtitle, a simple rearrangement of the title would suffice in order to 
convey the desired message.  Along with the banality of consumption, this chapter will 
also examine the consumption of banality.  It will be argued that these two processes are 
at the heart of everyday modernity. 
The previous chapter developed two aspects of consumption that were important 
in order to begin this chapter.  The first is the consumption outside of the home in 
suburban shopping centres – although this can be linked to shopping centres in general – 
and the second was the consumption that occurs inside the home in front of a television 
screen.  Where the previous chapter concluded with some reflections on the dialectical 
relationship between technology and boredom, this chapter will focus on the dialectical 
relationship between the specifics of consumption that are promoted by these 
technologies.  To use Marshall McLuhan’s terms, these elements of the previous chapter 
were part of a discussion of the medium as the focal point, or, of the idea that ‘medium is 
the message’.  Instead of privileging the technological aspect such as McLuhan, I argue 
that both the technological apparatuses and the messages they convey have important 
implications for a discussion of boredom in everyday life.  This chapter, then, is based on 
an analysis of the message from mediums as opposed to the medium as a message. 
The main goal of this chapter is to discuss boredom and consumption by 
distinguishing between what the Frankfurt School has referred to as the ‘culture industry’ 
and its rejection and concurrent facilitation of boredom with the embrace of boredom by 
certain avant-garde movements.  In order to analyze boredom and consumption, this 
chapter has been organized into five sections.  The first section will sketch the affinities 
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between Lefebvre’s theorizing of everyday consumption with the concept of the culture 
industry, which is a concept Lefebvre adopted in his later writings.
4
  This will serve as a 
general framework for the four sections that follow.  The second and third sections 
primarily deal with sound whereas the fourth and fifth sections deal with images.  The 
second section will incorporate Theodor Adorno’s extended essay ‘On Popular Music’ as 
a window into the general tendencies of one key form of culture industry entertainment: 
popular music.  To contrast the culture industry’s version of sound, the third section is an 
examination of the avant-garde group Fluxus and their integration of boredom into their 
performance art pieces.  The music of the movement’s most famous member, John Cage, 
will be the focal point.
5
  Following this, I will shift from music and/or sound to images.  
The fourth section will discuss advertising, or what David Harvey has referred to as “the 
official art of capitalism,”6 and the use of boredom as a foil in order to sell objects.  To 
illustrate this point I have collected five advertisements from major advertising 
campaigns that have employed boredom or the everyday in order to promote their 
products and the seemingly new lifestyles that come with their purchase.  The fifth and 
final section will discuss the tension between the kitsch of the culture industry and the 
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noted in reference to Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry essay, “the topic here is the 
commercialization of life, and the co-authors are closer to having a theory of ‘daily life’ than they are to 
having one of ‘culture’ itself in any contemporary sense.” Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of the 
Dialectic (London: Verso, 2007), 144.  
5 Linking John Cage with boredom is fairly easy, as Mike Sell has noted.  Sell writes: “Cage’s work 
exemplifies boring art and makes clear that just because something is boring, it is not necessarily 
insignificant.  Boredom, after all, is an emotional state notable for its high degree of self-consciousness and 
awareness.  The bored possess a kind of totalizing consciousness in petulant repose.  As is insisted upon by 
the bored, absolutely nothing can inspire interest – it’s hard to imagine a more totalizing belief.  Yet this 
failure to imagine doesn’t bring with it despair.  The bored persist in their nervous, unproductive quest for 
something to entertain and can become, as any parent in the company of a bored child understands, quite 
disruptive.  Perhaps it is this that so attracted Cage, an anarchist, to boredom.” Avant-Garde Performance 
& the Limits of Criticism (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 87.   
6 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 63. 
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avant-garde – in particular Andy Warhol’s Pop art which explicitly embraced boredom.  
In addition to the concept of the culture industry/Lefebvrean model employed in the 
previous sections, in this final section I will also make considerable use of commentaries 
from two different authors: Clement Greenberg and Jean Baudrillard. 
The Quotidian Culture Industry 
 One of the most penetrating critiques of consumerism can be found in the fourth 
chapter of Horkheimer and Adorno’s book Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments.  This chapter – titled ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception’ – has been enormously influential amongst a variety of academic disciplines.7  
The key concept is to the left of the colon in the chapter title: the culture industry.
8
  While 
both Horkheimer and Adorno share equal credit for developing this concept, it is Adorno 
who did the most of out of the two to develop this concept and it is he who has utilized it 
                                                 
7 A simple way to see this influence is by looking at its inclusion as a key concept and/or text in academic 
anthologies.  Both the original chapter from Dialectic of Enlightenment and Adorno’s follow-up essay ‘The 
Culture Industry Reconsidered’ can be found in readers for various disciplines.  For example, for the 
original essay see Simon During’s, ed. The Cultural Studies Reader (2nd edition), 31-41;  Joanne Hollows, 
Peter Hutchings and Mark Jancovich’s (eds.) The Film Studies Reader, 7-11; Craig Calhoun and Joseph 
Gerteis, eds. Classical Sociological Theory, 385-389; Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan’s, eds. Literary 
Theory: an Anthology (2nd edition), 1242-1246.  For Adorno’s reconsideration of the concept, see Malcolm 
Miles, Tim Hall, Iain Borden’s, eds. The City Cultures Reader (2nd edition), 163-168; Paul Marris and Sue 
Thornham’s, eds. Media Studies: a Reader (2nd edition), 31-37; Raiford Guins and Omayra Zaragoza 
Cruz’s, eds. Popular Culture: a Reader, 103-108.  Simply having an essay in a reader may indeed denote 
the influence of a text, but it does not necessarily affirm its contemporary relevance.  For example, in 
Simon During’s introductory commentary for the Culture Industry essay in his Cultural Studies Reader, he 
argues that the essay is mostly of historical interest for the field of cultural studies.  During claims that 
much has changed in popular culture since the 1940s (when the original essay was written), and unlike the 
unilateral, top-down consumption of that time period, today’s consumers have “opportunities for all kinds 
of individual and collective creativity and decoding,” 32. 
8 Adorno has noted that in the drafts of this essay he and Horkheimer originally utilized the term ‘mass 
culture’, which was later replaced by the ‘culture industry’. In “Culture Industry Reconsidered,” In The 
Culture Industry, 98.  It should be noted that Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the culture industry, as 
well as the entire Frankfurt School (Critical Theory), has been seen as an elitist theory by some 
commentators.  Adorno, in particular, has been characterized as an intellectual mandarin that looks down 
upon the masses.  As Adorno was a Marxist, his elitism, then, has been referred to as ‘left-wing elitism’.  
For a critique of what has been referred to as Adorno’s elitism (as well as that of Herbert Marcuse), see 
Bruce Baugh, “Left-Wing Elitism: Adorno on Popular Culture,” Philosophy and Literature 14(1), (1990), 
65-78.  The charge of elitism can even be found amongst Critical Theory scholars, as Stephen Eric Brunner 
writes point blankly that “The Frankfurt School was elitist in its view of public life.” Critical Theory: A 
Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 82.  
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the most throughout his vast body of work.
9
  As a concept, then, the culture industry is a 
major fixture of Adorno’s thought.  From its initial usage in Dialectic of Enlightenment in 
the 1940s, Adorno continued to employ it up until and including his last lecture series – 
Introduction to Sociology – given in 1968.10   
A lot has changed in the last seventy or so years since Horkheimer and Adorno 
first constructed their foundational text of the Frankfurt School and their Critical Theory.  
It is important to ask, then, whether the ‘culture industry’ is still relevant as a concept 
today.  For the present purposes I take the general framework set out by Horkheimer and 
Adorno to be highly relevant to the contemporary situation.  Ben Highmore shares this 
view of their present-day relevance.  In his book Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday, 
Highmore claims that “today it requires a substantial amount of effort to avoid the 
products of the culture industry.”11  If anything, then, the culture industry, as a conceptual 
tool for analysis of contemporary society, is more relevant today than it was in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s time.  Highmore notes that a century ago the culture industry’s 
products were predominantly located in the central location of a city.  These products 
were not exclusive to the city, but were much easier to obtain in that particular space than 
elsewhere.  However, with the proper amount of money, time, and effort, many of the 
products could be acquired by those who resided outside of the city’s limits.  With the 
seemingly perpetual expansion of the urban fabric, the availability of these products has 
steadily increased over the course of time around the world.   
                                                 
9 For this reason, I will primarily draw upon Adorno’s sole-authored work below. 
10 See Adorno’s Introduction to Sociology, 57; 69; 85; 87; 89; 152; 153. 
11 Ben Highmore, Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday, 115.  Further to Highmore’s point on the 
contemporary relevance of the culture industry as a concept, see the collection of essays published in 2010 
under the title The Culture Industry Today , edited by Fabio Akcelrud Durão.  It seems as though the 
culture industry as a theoretical tool for analyzing contemporary society is either largely embraced 
(Highmore), or is relegated to the dustbin of historical interest (See During commentary in footnote above), 
if it is accepted at all. 
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In his book Everyday Life in the Modern World, which he penned in 1967, 
Lefebvre discusses the various labels that were fashionable for contemporary society 
(after World War II) such as industrial society, technological society, affluent society, 
society of leisure, and consumer society.
 12
  Not satisfied with the definitions promoted 
by others, Lefebvre sought a term that could convey its “distinctive features” and thus 
proposed the ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’13 as the most accurate 
concept for capturing the essence of society.  Lefebvre elaborates the components of this 
term as follows: “Whereby this society’s rational character is defined as well as the limits 
set to its rationality (bureaucratic), the object of its organization (consumption instead of 
production) and the level at which it operates and upon which it is based: everyday 
life.”14  Lefebvre believes that along with most other things, “‘culture’ is an item of 
consumption in this society.
15
  In fact, above all else, what is consumed is culture.  You 
can buy culture(s) several times over.  It is here that a link can be made between 
Lefebvre’s work and the Frankfurt School in general, but specifically Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno’s concept of the ‘culture industry’.  This is despite the fact that 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s work pre-dates the Second World War.  On the surface, 
Lefebvre’s concept of a ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ is reminiscent 
of Adorno’s essay ‘Culture and Administration’, which begins with the assertion that 
“whoever speaks of culture speaks of administration as well, whether this is his intention 
                                                 
12 ELMW, 45-60.  He conducts a similar inventory at the end of SM, 192-197.  
13 ELMW, 60. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 108.  This consumption of culture is directly related to boredom for Lefebvre, who writes that 
“[s]atiety and a stubborn quest for satisfaction, dissatisfaction and unrest contradict, confront and reflect 
each other as they merge; show-consuming turns into a show consuming, and the past – works of art, styles, 
historic cities – is avidly consumed till boredom and satiety set in.”  Ibid., 85.  
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or not.”16 While Lefebvre’s term is not as compact as Adorno’s essay title, it carries with 
it a remarkably similar analysis of contemporary society.  Where Adorno and Lefebvre 
come closest, however, is their shared belief in the significance of consumption in 
contemporary society without excluding its production side.  The twin aspects of 
consumption of culture (consumer) and production by industry (producer) are best 
encapsulated by Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of the culture industry as the two 
words ‘culture’ and ‘industry’ speak to both sides.  Further, the proliferation of mass 
culture is another example of the Lefebvre’s ‘double process’ for its extension of an 
industrial process through the urban fabric. 
Picking up a thread from previous chapters, most notably the second chapter, 
there is a style, or, as Lefebvre would call it, an absence of style at work with 
consumption.  The style of the culture industry is a “neon-lit style” which “covers the 
world.”17  To Horkheimer and Adorno, “the style of the culture industry, which has no 
resistant material to overcome, is at the same time the negation of style.”18  The 
production of style, then, for the culture industry, creates a void.  This void is promoted 
worldwide as “the whole world is passed through the filter of the culture industry.”19 
What once passed for culture has become “neutralized and ready-made” leaving it 
“worthless.”20 It seems as though, as Lefebvre puts it, “we are surrounded by emptiness, 
but it is an emptiness filled with signs!”21  This emptiness is undoubtedly a reference to 
boredom.  How does the emptiness surrounding us cause the emptiness within us?  Are 
                                                 
16 Theodor Adorno, “Culture and Administration,” In The Culture Industry, 107. 
17 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 94. 
18 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 102. 
19 Ibid., 99. 
20 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, 34. 
21 ELMW, 135. 
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we in fact surrounded by emptiness?  Does being left empty cause the creation of the 
emptiness surrounding us?  How does this emptiness affect everyday life?   
The ability to get away from one’s routine(s), or “flight from the everyday 
world,” is a promise of the culture industry.22  Here, another commonality emerges 
between the works of Lefebvre and Adorno.  Perhaps noticing the parallels between his 
work and theirs, in the third volume of his Critique – first published in the original 
French in 1981 – Lefebvre adopts Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of the ‘culture 
industry’.23  However, the parallels predate Lefebvre’s acknowledgement of Horkheimer 
and Adorno, as they are also evident in the second volume of his Critique, where 
Lefebvre wrote that “The consumer does not desire.  He submits.”24 This passage reveals 
both the forcefulness of the culture industry, as well as the consumer’s willingness to 
participate in it.  Part of the consumer’s willingness to ‘submit’ means that he or she 
could have chosen otherwise.
25
  The other side is, of course, the intense pressure from the 
plethora of mechanisms and mediums at work in the production of culture.  In the third 
volume of his Critique Lefebvre explains that 
[u]sers become mere receptacles of ‘culture’ – that is to say, a mixture of 
ideology, representations and positive knowledge.  The enormous culture industry 
supplies specific products, commodities to which users have a ‘right’, so that the 
output of this industrial sector no longer has the appearance of commodities but, 
rather, of objects valorized by them and destined exclusively for use.  Like 
information!  This is the consummation of the world of commodities, without 
                                                 
22 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 113.   
23 A year earlier in 1980, Lefebvre argued that the Frankfurt School only “timidly saw” the extent of the 
culture industry.  SSW, 218.  To Lefebvre, then, the culture industry was/is much larger and widespread 
than during the time period of the 1940s when Horkheimer and Adorno were first formulating this concept.  
Lefebvre’s comment appears to be a criticism of the scope of the culture industry as a concept, despite 
implicitly endorsing it in the third volume of his Critique. 
24 CEL 2, 10. 
25 With regards to consumers and their ability to choose, Lefebvre acknowledges that “[a]lthough they are 
manipulated, they still have a small margin of freedom: they will choose.” CEL 3, 72. 
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objects and products being reduced exclusively to the function of signs and props 
of what is exchangeable.  Use becomes mystificatory.
26
 
 
 How does the concept of the culture industry inform an analysis of boredom?  
There is only one mention of boredom in the ‘Culture Industry’ essay, but it is a 
significant one.  The passage which features the comment on boredom serves multiple 
purposes for the present discussion.  It not only demonstrates a parallel with Lefebvre’s 
work, but it provides valuable insight into both the ‘need’ for a continuous production of 
items for consumption, as well as the parallel ‘need’ of consumers to seek out something 
‘new’ after tarrying with the same product for awhile.27  In addition, somewhat 
paradoxically, it also explains why the culture industry continues to produce ‘sameness’.  
If there is one key facet of the culture industry that facilitates boredom, it is the 
production and reproduction of the same thing.  This is made explicit by Horkheimer and 
Adorno when they claim that “culture today is infecting everything with sameness.”28  As 
for the mention of boredom, Horkheimer and Adorno write: 
Entertainment is the prolongation of work under late capitalism.  It is sought by 
those who want to escape the mechanized labor process so that they can cope with 
it again.  At the same time, however, mechanization has such power of leisure and 
its happiness, determines so thoroughly the fabrication of entertainment 
commodities, that the off-duty worker can experience nothing but after-images of 
the work process itself.  The ostensible content is merely a faded foreground; 
what is imprinted is the automated sequence of standardized tasks.  The only 
escape from the work process in factory and office is through adaptation to it in 
leisure time.  This is the incurable sickness of all entertainment.  Amusement 
congeals into boredom, since, to be amusement, it must cost no effort and 
therefore moves strictly along the well-worn grooves of association.  The 
spectator must need no thoughts of his own: the product prescribes each reaction, 
                                                 
26 CEL 3, 80. 
27 To Lefebvre, what is sought amongst consumers is ‘new’ insofar “as its newness is not intolerably new.”  
IM, 204.   This highlights a contradictory element of modernity where stability and change confront one 
another. 
28 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 94. 
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not through any actual coherence – which collapses once exposed to thought – but 
through signals.
29
   
 
This is reminiscent of a few passages from Lefebvre’s work than have been discussed 
already.  The functionalist system of ‘signals’ Lefebvre identified in his study of the new 
town of Mourenx, for example, mentioned in the last section of the third chapter.  More 
importantly, however, is the dialectic of boredom and interest Lefebvre identified in his 
book Introduction to Modernity, which was mentioned at the end of the first chapter.   
Amusement
30
 and interest, however, are not the same things.  Amusements may 
be interesting, but what is interesting is not always amusing.  In addition, what is found to 
be either interesting or amusing one day is most likely a slight variation of a previously 
successful amusement or interesting thing.  As Lefebvre argues, what is deemed as ‘new’ 
is oftentimes a variation of the old. 
The allegedly new is often only a revival that is unconscious of the fact.  
Sometimes people also wittingly revive religious, metaphysical and political 
themes, renovated like old palaces in historic cities: the new tacked on to the old.  
Some terminological innovations are enough to produce this effect.  Fashion and 
culture have also become mixed up to the point of merging – an old phenomenon, 
but one that is increasing in scale.  Anything that amounts to fashion is regarded 
as new.  Clever advertising makes the neo contain the archaeo, and vice versa.  
Presentation and verbal packaging conceal the persistence and deterioration of the 
old in the allegedly new; they also conceal the fact that such exaltation of the 
archaeo prevents the birth of what could spring from the genuinely new.  By 
definition, fashion, even when it results from a cycle (the periodic return of 
forms), always passes for new.  Otherwise, there would be no fashion!  The cycle 
involves obliviousness of its own moments.
31
 
 
This passage is an extension of the culture industry thesis.  That is, it articulates the 
general logic at work in the contemporary world of consumption.  The persistence of the 
new is the persistence of the old.  That is, although what is bought and sold is the idea of 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 109.  (my italics). 
30 Whereas Bertrand Russell, mentioned in the first chapter, argues that amusement(s) forestalls boredom, 
Adorno and Lefebvre see a dialectical relationship between boredom and amusement. 
31 CEL 3, 40-41.  
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a type of teleological progress towards a newer and newer world of objects, there is 
relatively little that is innovative.  There is no avant-garde to the culture industry because 
these terms are antithetical to one another.  What is portrayed as avant-garde in the 
culture industry is not worthy of the name. 
If there is a counterbalance, or “adversary,” of the culture industry it is “avant-
garde art.”32  This is an important distinction, but one that can be blurred.  In the last 
section of this chapter, I will show how the culture industry has integrated avant-garde art 
(though Adorno would surely disagree).  To Horkheimer and Adorno, the banality of 
everyday life is blurred with the excitement of film and television.  They write: “The 
familiar experience of the moviegoers, who perceives the street outside as a continuation 
of the film he has just left, because the film seeks strictly to reproduce the world of 
everyday perception, has become the guideline of production.”33  Similarly, in the third 
and final installment of their postmodern trilogy, Best and Kellner argue that “for many, 
the world of media fantasies and soap operas is more real than everyday life.”34  These 
imaginary worlds are more real than real for some.  Whether they resemble anything 
remotely similar to an empirical example from their own actual everyday life is fairly 
inconsequential.  Movies and television programs offer entertainment that is so 
improbable that some individuals cannot help but become entranced by it.  Living 
vicariously through the lives of the actors on screen becomes a way to escape from one’s 
everyday life, one that is utterly unsatisfactory.  This often results in the use of 
                                                 
32 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 101.  As for the historical presence of the avant-
garde, Lefebvre believed “In the thirty years between 1930 and 1960, the avant-garde virtually 
disappeared.” IM, 343. 
33 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 99.  Writing to a perceived European audience, 
Baudrillard has a similar observation about America: “In America cinema is true because it is the whole of 
space, the whole way of life that are cinematic.  The break between the two, the abstraction which we 
deplore, does not exist: life is cinema.” America, 101. 
34 Best and Kellner, The Postmodern Adventure, 74. 
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imagination for imaginary things and a concurrent “withering of imagination”35 for 
creating real things.  This is part of a process of ‘running away’ from reality. 
 In his reflections on his ‘damaged life’ found in his book Minima Moralia, 
Adorno further reflects on the boredom facilitated by the culture industry.  Here, Adorno 
writes: “The boredom that people are running away from merely mirrors the process of 
running away, that started long before.  For this reason alone the monstrous machinery of 
amusement keeps alive and constantly grows bigger without a single person being 
amused by it.”36  Adorno portrays the culture industry as an endless spiral of 
entertainment that is inevitably met with boredom, which then leads one to seek out other 
entertainment, which, again, leads one to be bored, and so on ad infinitum.  In his 
collaborative work with Hans Eisler, Adorno argues for the possibility of objective 
boredom.  That is, they claim that “it should be noted that today almost every product of 
the culture industry is objectively boring, but that the psycho-technique of the studios 
deprives the consumers of the awareness of the boredom they experience.”37  
Consumers, then, are bored, but they are unaware of their boredom.  This is where 
boredom can be connected with ideology in the traditional Marxist sense of the term: 
people are unaware of it, but they continue to feed into it and are fed into it.
38
  This is 
facilitated by the culture industry’s insistence that their commodities will remedy 
boredom while neglecting to acknowledge that they also instill boredom in their 
                                                 
35 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 100. 
36 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 139. 
37 Theodor Adorno and Hanns Eisler, Composing for Films, (London: Continuum, 2007), 84. 
38 This deserves some clarification, as Lefebvre has pointed out, “[t]here is nothing more difficult to define 
than ideology.” ME, 26.  Slavoj Žižek argues that “The most elementary definition of ideology is probably 
the well-known phrase from Marx’s Capital: ‘Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es’ – ‘they do not know it, 
but they are doing it.’” The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso Press, 1989), 28.  In an English 
translation of the first volume of Marx’s Capital this passage is translated as: “They do this without being 
aware of it,” 166-167.   
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consumers.  Similar to his fellow Frankfurt School member, Erich Fromm, referring to 
the “general boredom and lack of joy” in society, writes: 
Most people are bored because they are not interested in what they are doing, and 
our industrial system is not interested in having them be interested in their work.  
The hope for more amusement (than the older generation had) is supposed to be 
the only incentive that is necessary to compensate them for their boring work.  
But their leisure time and amusement time, however, is boring.  It is just as much 
managed by the amusement industry as working time is managed by the industrial 
plant.  People look for pleasure and excitement, instead of joy; for power and 
property instead of growth.  They want to have much, and use much, instead of 
being much.
39
 
 
This pursuit of happiness inevitably falls short because, as Fromm writes: “All our 
amusements serve the purpose of making it easy for him to run away from himself and 
from the threatening boredom by taking refuge in the many ways of escape which our 
culture offers him; yet covering up a symptom does not do away with the conditions 
which produce it.”40 It would appear as though in the case of the culture industry the title 
to Claudia Schafer’s book Bored to Distraction41 can be flipped to ‘distracted to 
boredom’ and then flipped again in an endless loop.  Lefebvre expands on this process as 
follows: 
Someone comes up with a certain subject; it’s popular; it’s successful.  Writers 
and producers fall over each other to use it.  Audiences flock to see the films and 
plays which use it, people listen to the radio and watch television whenever there 
are programmes about it.  Then, on the production side, the subject is finally 
milked dry.  As for the public, it gradually tires of it.  Interest wanes; the subject 
becomes a bore.  It is discarded.  Time goes by, and it is relegated to the past.  Bit 
by bit it is forgotten; but on the other hand, there are newcomers: young people, 
new listeners, a new audience.  The moment comes when the subject can be 
resuscitated.  Someone does just that.  It seems new.  And the process starts all 
over again.  All that is needed are a few novel touches, or a technical back-up, and 
people can be relied upon to find it interesting.
42
 
                                                 
39 Erich Fromm, On Being Human, ed. Rainer Funk (New York: Continuum, 1994), 40. 
40 Fromm, The Sane Society, 203. 
41 See Claudia Schafer, Bored to Distraction: Cinema of Excess in End-of-the-Century Mexico and Spain 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). 
42 IM, 163. 
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To conclude this section, I should say that while the products of the culture 
industry generally promote an image of happiness, there are a small number of works that 
actually utilize boredom as an important topic or even as a major focal point.  The 
examples (though not all could be considered as part of the culture industry) stem from 
multiple forms of media, such as a graphic novel that shares its name with its protagonist 
David Boring;
43
 Walter Sickert’s Impressionist painting ‘Ennui’; a French film titled 
‘Ennui’ adapted from Alberto Moravia’s novel La Noia (Boredom);44 an HBO television 
series called ‘Bored to Death’ based on the short story with the same title by Jonathan 
Ames;
45
 a Japanese punk band goes by the name ‘Boredoms’, and the English punk band 
the Buzzcocks have a song called ‘Boredom’.  These are the obvious examples as the 
emphasis on boredom is made explicit in the titles.  The difficulty is finding examples 
that are not explicitly labeled.   
A not so obvious example can be found in Todd Solondz’s dark comedy film 
from 1998 simply called ‘Happiness’.46  It is interesting to note this dialectical reversal 
where an ideal example of boredom is found in a movie called ‘Happiness’.  In the 
                                                 
43 Daniel Clowes, David Boring (New York: Pantheon, 2000).  In 1994, the author of this graphic novel 
also released a board game called ‘Boredom: The Dismal Anti-Game for 1 to 3 Players’.  The game is 
described on the box as “a game that explores the mind-numbing sameness of daily existence in modern 
urban America.” The chief objective of the game is to either commit suicide before the other players, or be 
the last player left alive.  As the instructions put it, “The last player left after the others have committed 
suicide wins or loses, depending on your perspective.” 
44 Alberto Moravia has referred to boredom as a muse of sorts.  He explains: “Boredom has been my great 
inspirer.  At a certain point, certain subjects, certain ways of dealing with them, inspired in me an 
intolerable boredom, and so I then tried to change them.” Alberto Moravia and Alain Elkann, Life of 
Moravia, trans. William Weaver (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2000), 279. 
45 For the source material of this television show, see Jonathan Ames, “Bored to Death,” McSweeney’s 24 
(2007): 37-66.  This short story is a detective-noir piece, which begins with the following sentence: “The 
trouble happened because I was bored,” 37. 
46 Incidentally, artwork for the movie’s poster and DVD/VHS covers was provided by Daniel Clowes, the 
author of the previously mentioned graphic novel David Boring. 
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movie, Phillip Seymour Hoffman’s character Allen is talking with his psychotherapist47 
Dr. Bill Maplewood (played by Dylan Baker) regarding his inability to garner even the 
absolute minimum amount of courage in order to request a date with a female neighbour 
of his.  The key scene is set in the psychotherapist’s office and begins with Allen’s 
monologue describing his problem: 
What can I talk about?  I have nothing to talk about.  I’m boring.  I know, I’ve 
been told before, so don’t tell me it’s not true, cause it’s a fact.  I bore people.  
People look at me and they get bored.  People listen to me and they zone out.  
Bored.  ‘Who is that boring person?’ they think.  I’ve never before met anyone so 
boring.  For her to see how boring I am… 
 
At this point in the film the audio shifts from Allen’s outwardly spoken monologue to the 
therapist’s internal monologue.   
A gallon of skim milk, a dozen eggs, one of those disposable cameras… 
 
Despite the concerned look on the therapist’s face, he is entirely disengaged from his 
patient’s problem.  Instead of attentively listening, as was the purpose of the session, he is 
constructing a grocery and errands list.  Behind the appearance of professionalism, the 
experience of boredom is being concealed.
48
 
Culture Industry Sound: Popular Music 
In the boredom literature, Lars Svendsen is somewhat unique in his discussion of 
music in his book A Philosophy of Boredom.  In particular, Svendsen has noted that 
popular music has the ability to negate boredom in everyday life.  By entertaining its 
                                                 
47 For more on the dynamic between patient and psychotherapist that pertains to boredom, see E. Mark 
Stern, ed. Psychotherapy and the Boredom Patient (London: Routledge, 1988). 
48 Writing in 1967, Raoul Vaneigem of the Situationists International noticed a trend in the simultaneous 
disappearance and emergence of happiness in cultural artifacts.  “The face of happiness vanished from art 
and literature,” Vaneigem contends, “as it began to be reproduced along endless walls and billboards, 
offering to each passerby the universal image in which to recognize himself.” The Revolution of Everyday 
Life, 67.  Vaneigem is arguing that happiness is both everywhere and nowhere.  Similar to the scene from 
the movie ‘Happiness’, boredom is often waiting behind the appearance of happiness.  What is so often 
presented as a remedy for boredom also instills it. 
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listeners, popular music eliminates or at the very least severely diminishes one’s 
experience of boredom.  Implicit in Svendsen, then, is a conceptual triad consisting of 
everyday life, boredom, and popular music.  Svendsen does not acknowledge the 
dialectical relationship between these three elements.  He, instead, sees a fairly rigid 
causal chain.  Svendsen argues that 
[p]op music is based on the banalities of everyday life, and it attempts to convert 
these banalities in such a way that they make a break possible with everyday 
boredom.  In pop music a hope is formulated that these banalities can become 
something more…As long as the music lasts, we escape boredom, but, sooner or 
later, the music will stop.
49
   
 
This is a suspension of one’s boredom.  In his argument, Svendsen, in a similar manner 
as Adorno, establishes pop music as a form of distraction that temporarily alleviates the 
experience of boredom.  However, Adorno sees the dialectical relationship between 
boredom and amusements.  Adorno writes: 
Once men have remedies, however poor, against boredom, they are no longer 
willing to put up with boredom; this contributes to the mass base of musical 
consumption.  It demonstrates a disproportion between condition and potential, 
between the boredom to which men still are prey and the possible, if unsuccessful, 
arrangement of life in which boredom would vanish.
50
 
 
With this, the difference between Svendsen and Adorno emerges.  For Svendsen, it would 
seem as though one could stave off boredom as long as they had something like an iPod 
attached to one’s ears with a continuous loop of songs playing.  While this is a valuable 
insight, what is missing in this analysis is the possibility of pop music itself being boring.  
For this, Adorno’s work is an important source. 
One of the most explicit examples of the culture industry’s tendency to have 
‘amusements congeal into boredom’ is that of popular music.  All forms of music, but 
                                                 
49 Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, 140. 
50 Theodor Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury 
Press, 1976), 48. 
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especially popular music, constitute significant elements in the fabric of everyday life in 
modernity.  After all, what does not pass for music?  Where do sounds begin and music 
end?  These questions are difficult to answer considering that there is a blurring between 
music and non-music in modernity.  It is not surprising, then, that Lefebvre structured his 
Introduction to Modernity with twelve preludes in lieu of chapters.  The twelve preludes 
are meant to correspond to the twelve notes found in a chromatic music scale. To 
Lefebvre, music is a key cultural element in any study of modernity simply because it is 
virtually everywhere in the modern world.  Lefebvre argues that “a popular song is part 
of the dimension of the everyday.”51  Similarly, Adorno has noted that “[m]usic is no 
longer exceptional, as at feudal and absolutist festivities and in the bourgeois concert; 
rather, it has achieved an ubiquity that makes it part of everyday life.”52  This ubiquity of 
music is the ubiquity of distraction.  Regardless of the quality of the music itself, its use 
in the background in spaces of consumption relegates it to the periphery of everyday life.  
It is central to everyday life as a ubiquitous presence, but its importance as a serious art 
form is pushed to the margins of the everyday.  Adorno elaborates on this in his 
unfinished book Aesthetic Theory: 
Music, whether it is played in a café or, as is often the case in America, piped into 
restaurants, can be transformed into something completely different, of which the 
hum of conversation and the rattle of dishes and whatever else becomes a part.  
To fulfill its function, this music presupposes distracted listeners no less than in 
its autonomous state it expects attentiveness.  A medley is sometimes made up of 
parts of artworks, but through this montage the parts are fundamentally 
transformed.  Functions such as warming people up and drowning out silence 
recasts music as something defined as mood, the commodified negation of the 
boredom produced by the grey-on-grey commodity world.
53
 
 
                                                 
51 CEL 2, 175. 
52 Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 129. 
53 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 253. 
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Indeed, the distraction of music can be found in numerous areas of everyday life such as 
in the streets, in taxis, in elevators, etc.  Similar to Svendsen, Lefebvre has argued that 
music can “bring compensation for the miseries of everydayness, for its deficiencies and 
failures.”54 However, Lefebvre acknowledges the dialectical character of music much the 
same as Adorno.  On the one hand, the proper combination of, to use a Lefebvrean triad, 
melody-harmony-rhythm
55
 enables one to be pulled out the boredom of everyday life.  
On the other hand, certain combinations of music can also induce boredom.  A third 
possibility is for music to not simply allow one to escape boredom or be pulled into 
boredom, but it could create the conditions for realizing the profound boredom 
throughout society. 
To delve further into boredom and music it is important to differentiate between 
different types.  While there are dozens of genres currently available, it will be prudent 
for the present discussion to articulate two, which can be found in Adorno’s expansive 
essay ‘On Popular Music’.56  According to Adorno, in a general way it is possible to 
distinguish between two spheres of music: serious and popular.  Serious music does not 
equate to ‘good music’, as serious music can be either good or bad.57  As for the basic 
characteristics of serious music, Adorno argues that “[e]very detail derives its musical 
sense from the concrete totality of the piece which, in turn, consists of the life 
                                                 
54 RH, 66. 
55 See Ibid., 12; PS, 370.  Lefebvre argues this triad “does not lack interest.”  RH, 66. 
56 This essay is an ideal example of the culture industry applied to a particular medium.  Indeed, John 
Storey astutely argues that this particular essay “is a representative example of the Frankfurt School 
approach to popular culture.” ‘Marxism: Introduction’, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: a Reader, 
56.  It should be mentioned that I am not concerned with Adorno’s infamous critique of ‘Jazz’, but am 
instead concerned with popular music in general.  For an examination of jazz and boredom, see Ted Gioia, 
“Boredom and Jazz,” In The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 108-126. 
57 Theodor Adorno, “On Popular Music,” In Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert and trans. Susan H. 
Gillespie (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 441. 
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relationship of the details and never of a mere enforcement of a musical scheme.”58  In 
contrast to the acute attention to detail found in serious music, Adorno claims that the 
“fundamental characteristic of popular music” is what he calls “standardization.”59  To be 
popular, then, songs need to conform to a fairly rigid song structure, lyric content, and 
length/duration.  There is a slavish attention to detail, but one that stifles creativity.  
Whereas the intricacies of serious music are all part of a creative totality, the totality of 
popular music is a retread devoid of the same emphasis on pure creativity.  When 
followed, Adorno argues that this standardization “guarantees that regardless of what 
aberrations occur, the hit will lead back to the same familiar experience, and nothing 
fundamentally novel will be introduced.”60   This is not to say that there is no flexibility 
with the songs.  In fact, Adorno argues that “every detail is substitutable; it serves its 
function only as a cog in a machine.”61  The machine of modernity in its capitalist guise 
is the driving force behind this standardization. 
 In contrast to serious music, Adorno claims that popular music promotes both 
“distraction and inattention.”62  Popular music songs not only distract from important, 
worldly issues, they also distract a listener from seeking out other music, and they distract 
the listener from their own thoughts and individuality.  This is a relatively new 
phenomenon, specific to the industrialized and urbanized society of modernity.  Adorno 
writes: 
Distraction is bound to the present mode of production, to the rationalized and 
mechanized process of labor to which, directly or indirectly, masses are subject.  
This mode of production, which engenders fears and anxiety about 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 439. 
59 Ibid., 437-438. 
60 Ibid., 438. 
61 Ibid., 440. 
62 Ibid., 458 
295 
unemployment, loss of income, war, has its ‘non-productive’ correlate in 
entertainment; that is, relaxation which does not involve the effort of 
concentration at all.  People want to have fun.  A fully concentrated and conscious 
experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on 
them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort 
simultaneously.  The whole sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects 
this dual desire.  It induces relaxation because it is patterned and pre-digested.  Its 
being patterned and pre-digested serves within the psychological household of the 
masses to spare them the effort of that participation (even in listening or 
observation) without which there can be no receptivity to art.  On the other hand, 
the stimuli they provide permit an escape from the boredom of mechanized 
labor.
63
 
 
On the next page in the same text, Adorno expands on this thought: 
 
To escape boredom and avoid effort are incompatible – hence the reproduction of 
the very attitude from which escape is sought.  To be sure, the way in which they 
must work on the assembly line, in the factory, or at office machines denies 
people any novelty.  They seek novelty, but the strain and boredom associated 
with actual work leads to avoidance of effort in that leisure-time which offers the 
only chance for really new experience.  As a substitute, they crave a stimulant.  
Popular music comes to offer it.  Its stimulations are met with the inability to vest 
effort in the ever-identical.  This means boredom again.  It is a circle which makes 
escape impossible.  The impossibility of escape causes the widespread attitude of 
inattention toward popular music.  The moment of recognition is that of effortless 
sensation.  The sudden attention attached to this moment burns itself out instater 
and relegates the listener to a realm of inattention and distraction.  On the one 
hand, the domain of production and plugging presupposes distraction and, on the 
other, produces it.
64
 
 
Here, Adorno identifies the dialectic of mass culture that Lefebvre identified in his work.  
That is, the unity in the opposition between boredom and interest as a defining feature of 
modernity.  There is also a shared identification of the utopian element in the experience 
of boredom: the wish for something else.  This something else is rarely viewed as one 
that necessitates a radical transformation of everyday life, but it is the foundation for such 
a view.  Instead of dealing with it as a complex and difficult problem of modern life, a 
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quick fix is sought.  Adorno’s characterization of popular music as a ‘stimulant’ that is 
‘crave(d)’ is fairly similar to the actions of drug addicts with their drugs.   
Similar to a drug, or as Orrin E. Klapp would call it, though not very accurately, a 
‘social placebo’,65 popular music provides temporary relief without actually solving the 
problem.  That is, the problem of a style of life that is endlessly creative; a style of life 
that is a work of art in the Lefebvrean sense of the term. While popular music is part of 
the problem of the persistent boredom experienced in everyday life, the solution, at least 
for Adorno, is nevertheless music.  He explains that  
[i]n the first place, as a temporal art, music is dynamic in terms of its own 
material conditions: just as time is irreversible, so all music balks at a 
manipulation of time that implies its indifference to it.  A meaningful musical 
organization is necessarily one in which meaning and time sequence relate to each 
other, so that the passage of time proves to be more meaningful rather than more 
arbitrary vis-à-vis the concrete musical content.  Thanks to its integration, great 
music will undoubtedly deal with the passage of time by making it shorter.  Its 
ability to drive out boredom has, like entire heteronomous musical categories, 
become an element of the music itself and of its autonomous status.  The great, 
classical symphonic movements of Beethoven, the first movement of the Eroica 
or of the Seventh, can be heard ideally as if they lasted only a moment.
66
 
 
‘Great music’ in Adorno’s theory is the key model for a work of art similar to that 
expressed in Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life.  Music that drives out boredom is one 
that lasts a moment.  This particular term (moment) demonstrates an affinity between 
with the works of Adorno and Lefebvre.   
At the end of volume two of Lefebvre’s Critique there is a theory of moments that 
parallels Adorno’s usage of the term.67  Lefebvre’s work, then, is a ‘key’ that helps open 
                                                 
65 The final chapter in Klapp’s book focuses on what he calls ‘social placebos’.  He defines these as those 
items which “relieve tensions such as boredom,” although “they do not remedy sources of tension but 
merely make people feel better about an unsatisfactory state of affairs.” Overload and Boredom, 131. 
66 Theodor Adorno, Sound Figures, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 190. 
67 See CEL 2, 340-358. 
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the door on Adorno’s work here, and vice versa, as opposed to the circumstances Adorno 
has described where the “key indeed goes in, but the door doesn’t open.”68  To open the 
door on Adorno’s emphasis on a musical ‘moment’, a basic definition of Lefebvre’s 
concept of moments is important.  For Lefebvre, moments emerge out of the everyday, 
but they are not part of everydayness.
69
  Lefebvre argues that “[o]nce profundity and 
beauty are lived (and not simply gazed at or seen as a spectacle) they become moments, 
combinations which marvelously overturn structures established in the everyday, 
replacing them by other structures, unforeseen ones, and fully authentic.”70  A 
specifically ‘authentic’ musical moment, for Adorno, can be found, but it must be outside 
the ‘standardized’ framework of popular music.  To both Lefebvre and Adorno, a 
specifically ‘authentic’ life is one that is created outside the same standardization which 
permeates virtually all sectors of everyday life in modernity. 
While Adorno claims that certain texts, images, and/or sounds are inherently 
boring, he also argues that there are art works that defy boredom such as can be found 
with the music of Gustav Mahler.  Adorno claims that “no one, not even an opponent, has 
been bored by Mahler.”71 Essentially, one need not enjoy Mahler’s music, but one cannot 
be bored by it.  This example is where Adorno’s work fails to reflect present-day society, 
as today this is a rather difficult argument to sustain.  Boredom has become much more 
imbedded in the fabric of everyday life than in the time of Adorno’s reflections on the 
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culture industry.  Anyone can claim that they are bored by something, but this does not 
mean that they are actually bored by it.  In fact, Lawrence Grossberg has observed “an 
increasing propensity for youth to describe desires and life-changes in terms of a decrease 
of boredom rather than an increase of pleasure or excitement.”72  It is not whether one 
likes music or not, it is whether or not it bores.  For Grossberg, this is especially evident 
among younger people. Grossberg explains how 
[y]outh lives its postmodern affect between the boredom of terror and the terror of 
boredom; it is positioned in an ironic play (a celebration of excess?) between the 
demand/threat of subjectification (boredom) and of commodification (terror); it 
exists within the space between the absolute loss of control and the partial 
recuperation of that mastery at the level of its own imagery and imaginary. Youth 
avoids both boredom and terror by living them out in the highs and lows of our 
media culture, which has become a buffer zone between this affective reality and 
the lack of an ideological description which would enable us to respond to it. 
Culture has become the paradoxical site at which youth lives out an impossible 
relation to the future.
73
  
 
Following Grossberg, young people may very well express themselves in terms of 
boredom.  It is rare, however, for artists to express boredom in their work.  Perhaps if life 
were expressed in artistic terms, there would be a greater emphasis on transforming the 
everyday into a work of art.  The opposite occurs, albeit in among relatively few.  That is 
to say, instead of transforming the boredom of everyday life into art, certain avant-garde 
artists transform art into the boredom of the everyday.  The present discussion will now 
shift from the culture industry side of music to one group of avant-garde artists who make 
use of boredom as part of their art. 
                                                 
72 Lawrence Grossberg, “Rockin’ with Reagan, or the Mainstreaming of Postmodernity,” Cultural Critique 
10 (Autumn, 1988), 139.  Elsewhere, Grossberg argues that “the most devastating rejection of a particular 
rock and roll text is to say that it is ‘boring.” Grossberg, “Another Boring Day in Paradise,” 233. 
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Avant-Garde Sound: Fluxus  
In avant-garde music, much the same as it was for architecture mentioned in 
chapter three, postmodernism has been said to be a response to the dullness of 
modernism.  In the second volume of their postmodern trilogy, Steven Best and Douglas 
Kellner argue that modernism was displaced by a new form of aesthetics under the broad 
term postmodernism.  Various artistic ventures such as the novels of William S. 
Burroughs, the music of John Cage, the choreography and dance of Merce Cunningham, 
the architecture of Robert Venturi, and the overall visual artistry of Andy Warhol are 
cited approvingly as examples of this postmodernism.  “Seen as stale, boring, pretentious, 
and elitist,” argue Best and Kellner, “European and American high modernism were 
rejected.”74  Susan Sontag argues that the “history of forms is dialectical.  As types of 
sensibility become banal, boring, and are overthrown by their opposites, so forms in art 
are, periodically, exhausted.  They become banal, unstimulating, and are replaced by new 
forms which are at the same time anti-forms.”75  While I would agree with Sontag on this, 
I argue, following Lefebvre, that this dialectical process of form/anti-form is slightly 
more complex.  What is exhausted is not swallowed by the process, but is relegated to the 
sidelines of fashion, only to be reinstated after a certain period of time.   
Dick Higgins argues that “[b]oredom was, until recently, one of the qualities an 
artist tried to avoid.  Yet today it appears that artists are deliberately trying to make their 
work boring.”76  Higgins, a composer, is an important source here as he was part of the 
Fluxus movement, of which John Cage was a central member.  The Fluxus movement 
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created works of art that defy the conventional relationship of performers/participants and 
listeners/viewers because there are “no passive spectators, only participants.”77  The 
spectators, then, are also participants.  Interestingly enough, what Higgins advocates is a 
participation in boredom.  Higgins is effectively emphasizing and promoting an embrace 
of the boring.  This is odd since, as Michael Raposa notes, when a work of art in any 
form is perceived as boring it is usually “considered to be a failure.”78  If Higgins truly is 
advocating an embrace of the boring, would it not follow that, contra Best and Kellner, 
high modernism is what he and his fellow Fluxus member John Cage are striving for, and 
not postmodernism?  That is, at least, the ‘stale and boring’ aspects of it.   
As an artistic movement, Fluxus has Surrealism and Dada as its major 
predecessors.
79
  One of Dada’s most influential members, Marcel Duchamp, has 
remarked on the relationship between boredom and the artistic Fluxus practice of 
‘happenings’ as follows: “Happenings have introduced into art an element no one had put 
there: boredom.  To do a thing in order to bore people is something I never imagined!  
And that’s too bad, because it’s a beautiful idea.  Fundamentally, it’s the same idea as 
John Cage’s silence in music; no one had thought of that.”80  
According to Higgins, John Cage was the first to incorporate both boredom and 
intensity into serious art, as opposed to favouring one element over the other.  According 
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to Higgins, the two elements were intertwined in his work as “Cage was the first to try to 
emphasize in his work and his teaching a dialectic between boredom and intensity.”81  A 
musical composition by Cage such as 4’33” is one such example of this dialectic.  As 
difficult as it can be to put music into words, it is appropriate here as this particular piece 
of ‘music’ does not contain one single note.  That is, at least not from any musicians in 
the traditional sense of those with instruments.  Instead, it is four minutes and thirty-three 
seconds of silence ‘performed’ in front of an audience.  The performance begins when an 
individual sits down behind a piano and closes the fallboard, which covers the piano 
keys.  The ‘music’ or ambient sounds come from the audience and surrounding 
environment.  It is music without music.
82
  Everything within earshot becomes part of the 
performance.  A squeak of a chair here, a cough and a sneeze over there, the ‘silence’ 
actually contains a plethora of sounds which should vary with each performance.
83
  Even 
if a chair squeaks and a few people sneeze and/or cough the same amount, it would 
certainly be impossible for them to spontaneously occur at the same moment in each 
performance.   
As for Higgins’s description of the dialectic of intensity and boredom, what is 
intense about the lack of music?  Is it the expectation of music without hearing it part of 
this intensity?  Watching and/or listening to a performance where there is no performance 
would seemingly induce boredom.  But does it?  Higgins notes, “boredom often serves a 
useful function: as an opposite to excitement and as a means of bringing emphasis to 
                                                 
81 Dick Higgins, “Boredom and Danger,” 22. 
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what it interrupts, causing us to view both elements freshly.”84  Is this the message 
embedded in Cage’s piece 4’33”?  Higgins writes how “boredom played a comparable 
role, in relation to intensity, that silence plays with sound, where each one heightens the 
other and frames it.”85 What if Cage’s dialectic of boredom and intensity was an example 
of the intensity of boredom?  If this is the case, Cage’s music served as a window into the 
alienating effects of the modern world through this dialectic.  Whereas popular music 
offers escapism from this boredom, this type of avant-garde music allows one to confront 
this boredom by encountering the rhythms of everyday life instead of masking them. 
Lefebvre’s final project involved conceiving a new type of scholar, one that was 
in tune with rhythm.  As opposed to psychoanalysis and the psychoanalyst, Lefebvre was 
constructing the foundations for rhythmanalysis as an interdisciplinary point of departure 
and the rhythmanalyst as its practitioner.  Illustrating a portrait of the ideal 
rhythmanalyst, Lefebvre states that she or he must not only listen for noises (sounds 
devoid of meaning), murmurs (sounds full of meaning), but also listen to silences.
86
  Of 
course, silence is an extraordinarily complex thing.  Where does silence begin and noise 
end?  This is the experience one finds with John Cage’s piece 4’33”.87  If one participates 
in this piece without forehand knowledge they will be forced to tarry with emptiness, 
which may be boring for some.  For others, it is an opportunity to think through the 
(im)possibility of silence, which may be a very interesting prospect.  Cage, then, can be 
seen as one of the first practitioners of rhythmanalysis, one of the founders of a yet to be 
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named practice of listening to the spectrum of sounds.  The intensity of boredom reveals 
itself in his work. 
What does Cage have to say on the relationship between art and boredom?  To 
Cage, boredom is something inherent to his creative process.  In his appropriately titled 
book Silence, Cage argues that “the way to get ideas is to do something boring.  For 
instance, composing in such a way that the process of composing is boring induces ideas.  
They fly into one’s head like birds.”88  This can be compared with Benjamin’s metaphor 
for boredom as a dream bird of experience where a rustling in the leaves drives him 
away.  Similarly, a rustling in the leaves would negate Cage’s inspiration by triggering a 
moment of creativity. Boredom for Cage, then, is essential to his creative process.  Cage 
derives this insight from Buddhist mediation.  Cage explains as follows: “In Zen they 
say: If something is boring after two minutes, try it for four.  If still boring, try it for 
eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and so on.  Eventually one discovers that it’s not boring at all 
but very interesting.”89 This is reminiscent of Lefebvre’s assertion that the extraordinary 
is lurking in the ordinary.  The mysteries of the everyday are those items that initially 
appear commonplace and obvious.  In the case of boredom, one must tarry with boring 
things in order to understand it.  
Regarding Cage’s work in particular and the Fluxus movement in general, 
Higgins asks the rhetorical question: “Boring?  Of course; if one were to ignore the more 
intense activity involved, which we might call “super boring,” and which took one 
beyond the initial level of simple boredom.”90  Here it becomes evident that Higgins 
identifies the plural forms of boredom instead of just a singular boredom.  The pieces that 
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are ‘super boring’ in the aesthetic sense used by Higgins are “repetitive pieces.”91 The 
repetitions are intense in the same manner as a drop of water from a tap gradually 
intensifies as the tap degenerates, or the drop of water intensifies as the state of mind of 
the observer degenerates.  The super boring is an overload of sameness where the boring 
develops intensity as it repeats over and over again.  This sameness is different from that 
of the culture industry since it is transparent with its emphasis on the same, and the 
expectation of boredom is explicit.  The super boring, however, is the everyday become 
manifest.  Is the everyday not the most ‘repetitive piece’ of all?  In this light, the super 
boring is the background of the everyday whereas ‘simple boredom’ is what masks the 
profundity of modernity’s societal boredom.   
To conclude this section, it is worth noting that along with his musical work, 
Higgins “explored the possibility of projecting a blank film which would be gradually 
burned by the projector during showing.”92  Here the dual elements – dueling elements, 
even – of boredom and danger are evident.  A blank film is a good candidate for inducing 
boredom.  However, the degeneration of the film via burning the cellulose acetate film is 
an element of danger, especially if the audience is unaware of the planned activities.  
While planned, they are also spontaneous in two senses.  First, the audience is not 
expecting it and secondly, the planners do not know exactly how this burning will finish.  
Higgins writes: “the most intense art is necessarily involved with these things, boredom 
and danger, not as a new mode, but because they are implicit in the new mentality of our 
time.  This mentality is one in which total success is impossible, total victory 
                                                 
91 Ina Blom, “Boredom and Oblivion,” The Fluxus Reader, ed. Ken Friedman (West Sussex: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1998), 80. 
92 Ibid., 83. 
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inconceivable, and relativism axiomatic.”93 This passage from Higgins’ essay (published 
in the late 1960s) speaks of a mentality that is prophetic of Jean-François Lyotard’s book 
from 1979 La Condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir (The Postmodern Condition: 
a Report on Knowledge), which offers what Lyotard refers to as an entirely simplified 
definition, of the postmodern condition as “incredulity toward metanarratives.”94  In the 
boredom literature, Patricia Meyer Spacks makes the observation that “[a]s its declared 
dominion spreads, boredom becomes a metaphor for the postmodern condition.”95  It is 
not exactly clear what Spacks means by this.  Is she here referring to Lyotard’s work?  It 
is, after all, Lyotard’s concept.  Does this mean that boredom is prevalent in postmodern 
society, if it can in fact be called that?  To Lyotard, the transformation toward a 
postmodern society began roughly around the end of the 1950s when the “status of 
knowledge is altered.”96  While Lyotard’s argument is an epistemological one, it serves 
as an important insight into broader cultural transformations.  As was discussed in the last 
chapter, there was an exponential growth of the suburban way of life, especially in 
America, which entailed an influx of automobiles, televisions, detached housing, etc.  
One cultural form that ties all of these elements together is advertising. 
                                                 
93 Dick Higgins, “Boredom and Danger,” 27. 
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Culture Industry Image: Advertisements 
In a short article published in 1962 on the topic of the ‘myths of everyday life’, 
Lefebvre urges his readers to “think about advertising.”97  Lefebvre argues that 
advertisements are one of the mythical elements of the everyday in that they perpetuate 
myths throughout the everyday and even about the everyday.  Perhaps the most visible 
and constant representatives of the culture industry, advertisements are vital for its 
growth and maintenance.  So vital, in fact, to its presence in society that Adorno referred 
to advertising as the culture industry’s “elixir of life.”98  Along these lines, and from 
another text, Adorno once wrote that culture “has assumed the character of advertising.”99  
These commodified images/images of commodities are, in a way, the poetry of the 
everyday by way of exclaiming the extraordinary about ordinary things in ordinary 
settings.  Adorno has claimed that the “poetic mystery of the product, in which it is more 
than itself, consists in the fact that it participates in the infinite nature of production and 
the reverential awe inspired by objectivity fits in smoothly with the schema of 
advertising.”100  This line can be read as the ‘poetic mystery of the product’ is that which 
is perpetuated by the poetry of advertising.
101
  Similarly, Lefebvre scholar Kristin Ross 
                                                 
97 KW, 103.  Elsewhere, he ponders whether advertisers are ‘magicians’ of modernity.  He writes: “Is the 
advertiser the magician of modern times working out spells to entrap and subjugate desire, or is he merely a 
modest, honest intermediary investigating public requirements and broadcasting the discovery of new, 
exciting products to be launched shortly on the market in answer to such requirements?  No doubt the truth 
lies between these two extremes.” ELMW, 55.  So, to Lefebvre, advertisers are not all scheming 
opportunists trying to manipulate the public into purchasing their goods and services.  No doubt, advertisers 
are trying to entice consumers, but, according to Lefebvre, it is not necessarily with the goal of ‘entrapping’ 
them.  This is perhaps a point of contention between Lefebvre and Adorno, as Adorno would not be as 
forgiving of advertisers. 
98 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 131. 
99 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, 79. 
100 Theodor Adorno, “The Schema of Mass Culture,” In The Culture Industry (London: Routledge, 1991), 
63. 
101 It is important to acknowledge the difficulty in linking Adorno with poetry when one considers his 
famous quip: “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.”  Prisms, 34.  Later in his career, Adorno 
became less certain about this, arguing “I do not know whether the principle that no poem can be written 
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calls advertising “the poetry of modernity,”102 perhaps alluding to Lefebvre’s broader 
assertion that “publicity is the poetry of modernity.”103  Adorno, Ross, and Lefebvre all 
share this thread in their analyses of everyday life in the modern world.  All three 
theorists acknowledge that advertisements and the process of advertising are major 
components to the interrelated elements of consumption, modernity and everyday life. 
The widespread flight from boredom is apparent in recent advertisements.  The 
central tendency is for boredom to serve as a foil for the commodity being advertised.  
The basic formula for these commercials begins with the assumption that boredom is an 
unwelcome experience that ought to be eliminated from one’s life as soon as possible.  
This is a generally accepted message, as advertisements are rarely thought to need any 
explanation regarding their use of boredom.
104
  Boredom is simply an obvious experience 
that all consumers understand.  Essentially, it is undesirable and should be avoided at all 
costs.  One could do this, as advertisements are all too ready to demonstrate, by 
purchasing the product and/or service being advertised and the problem of boredom is 
solved.  As was argued above, consumerism offers only a temporary relief from the 
boredom of everyday life if it offers any relief at all.  One has to continually look for new 
advertisements for the instructions on how to live one’s life.  Of course, not everyone 
succumbs to the suggestions imparted by these ads.  One does not have to believe the 
advertisements to buy the product.  The point being made here is the representation of 
boredom in advertisements seems to be entirely in the negative all the while exciting 
                                                                                                                                                 
after Auschwitz can be sustained.” Theodor Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a 
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alternatives are offered for purchase as more than just distractions, but as new ways of 
living.  An important contribution to boredom scholarship would entail an analysis of all 
of its representation in advertisements.  This would be difficult as boredom is both 
explicit and implicit in these advertisements produced by the culture industry. 
 At the beginning of her ninth chapter titled ‘Cultural Miasma: Postmodern 
Enlargements of Boredom’ from her book Boredom: The Literary History of a State of 
Mind, Patricia Meyer Spacks notes that as far as the use of boredom as a conceptual tool 
in advertisements, advertisers not only utilize it, but “advertisers could hardly do without 
it.”105  A few pages later in the same chapter Spacks expands on this thought: “Boredom 
has become an embracing rubric of discontent.  Although those who explain its 
omnipresence typically attribute it to large cultural causes, advertising thrives on the 
suggestion that specific remedies will alleviate it.”106 What remedies would those be?  
The remedies are the very products that are being advertised.  It is not a coincidence that 
the all-pervasive boredom waiting for any and all consumers as portrayed in these 
advertisements is also presented as being easily alleviated with the purchase of a specific 
commodity.  For this, spectacular images or slogans are utilized in an effort to sway the 
consumer.  This tactic has a finite quality and quantity of efficacy.  Spectacles may divert 
or capture one’s attention, but they do so for a relatively short period of time.  As George 
Ritzer notes, “spectacles tend to grow dated and boring quickly.”107  Attracting one’s 
attention via spectacular advertisements can be effective yet fleeting.  As is argued by 
Mica Nava, “[c]ynicism and boredom about ads are widespread and part of a more 
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general neurasthenia of postmodern culture.  In fact the battle of the advertisers to 
overcome this boredom is what has led to the creation of so many witty, sophisticated, 
intertextually referenced and visually appealing ads.”108 Because of this boredom with 
advertisements, advertisers have to work hard in order to capture the interest of potential 
consumers, or retain the attention of their current consumers. 
Lefebvre argues that the general tendency of capitalists and their companies in 
their quest to sell a product is to “endeavour – mainly through advertising – [to] create a 
need for it.”109  These are ‘false’ needs generated by what Lefebvre calls “ceaseless 
intrusions upon our daily experience.”110  They are ‘false’ in that the specific objects for 
sale are not genuine needs required to sustain one’s life in any way.  No one needs this 
particular car, or that particular piece of furniture, despite the attempts of various 
advertisements to portray them otherwise.  Lefebvre argues that advertisements “help to 
proliferate the spread of images, smothering walls and cramming consciousness with 
stereotyped messages and debased symbols.”111  
David Ogilvy, the widely acclaimed ‘father of advertising’, incorporated 
television viewer boredom into his advertising strategies.  Ogilvy claimed that the “better 
the program on which your commercials appear, the fewer sales you make.  When 
viewers are bored by an old movie, they are more likely to pick up the telephone and 
order your product than when they are riveted by an episode of Dallas.”112  The key here, 
for Ogilvy, is a consumer’s boredom.  Following Ogilvy’s advice, it would appear that 
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advertisements that present themselves to bored individuals are more likely to be 
considered than if they are interested in what they are doing.  To Ogilvy, boredom is an 
ideal foundation for the successful reception of an advertisement’s message.  The 
emptiness felt by the viewers and their longing for content was a fertile soil for Ogilvy to 
plant the seeds of his advertising.  Below I will build on this assertion by giving five 
examples of advertisements that have actively incorporated boredom or everydayness 
into their messages.  Each example is taken from a different medium, each of which can 
be found throughout virtually anyone’s everyday life, especially those in a highly 
urbanized and industrialized country such as the United States of America. 
1) Catalogue: Furniture Store 
For the first example, I will use an advertisement that appeared by chance
113
 in 
my own everyday life: the 2011 IKEA catalogue.  The catalogue arrived in my mailbox 
one day in the fall of 2010, the cover unambiguously displaying its slogan for the 
upcoming year: ‘Hooray for the Everyday’.114  With a multinational corporation 
embracing the everyday in such an overt and accepting manner, this slogan may at first 
glance appear to be at odds with a number of claims made throughout this dissertation of 
the everyday as being often neglected or overlooked.  IKEA is not, however, embracing 
the everyday as an important area of inquiry.  Is IKEA celebrating the repetitive and often 
overlooked everyday theorized by Lefebvre?  To use a Lefebvrean answer: yes and no.  
On the one hand, given his relative obscurity in academia, let alone those outside of it, it 
is most likely that the advertising executives employed by IKEA for this campaign have 
                                                 
113 While it is not a matter of ‘chance’ that the catalogue arrived at my door, as the company fully intended 
to send it to my address, it is a matter of chance that I was the one who checked the mail that particular day, 
and it was also a matter of chance that I retained this catalogue instead of recycling it with the rest of the 
unsolicited mail I usually receive. 
114 This is the American version of the catalogue. 
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probably never heard of Lefebvre.  On the other hand, this is a celebration of furnishing 
one’s everyday life akin to Lefebvre’s utopian wish for a transformation of everyday life.  
That is, of course, until next year’s IKEA catalogue arrives, which will undoubtedly 
celebrate the everyday (albeit with a different annual slogan), and which will reveal a 
much more current and vibrant everyday life to pursue.   
IKEA’s trademarked slogan – which is prominently displayed on the spine of the 
catalogue – is ‘the life improvement store’.  The catalogue’s message, then, is one’s 
everyday life will be interesting and exciting (hence the ‘hooray’) if one makes the 
necessary improvements at the ‘life improvement store’.  The suggestion is that this can 
be accomplished solely by purchasing the items inside the catalogue.  Taken together, the 
2011 catalogue theme, as well as the company’s trademarked slogan, the following steps 
are implicitly suggested for its consumers.  1) Obtain the catalogue; 2) Simultaneously 
admire the prospective objects while acknowledging the banality of one’s current 
everyday life; 3) Make the necessary purchases of the desired objects either in person or 
online; 4) Repeat the previous three steps the following year when the new catalogue 
materializes in one’s mailbox.  The desired effect is to create a cycle of steady 
consumerism where new consumers and returning customers both try to stay abreast of 
the latest trends in home furnishings, or, as IKEA would have it, ‘life improvement’. 
To illustrate the above cycle of consumerism with regards to IKEA, an additional 
example, one from popular culture, will aid the current discussion.  A previous edition of 
the IKEA catalogue was featured in Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Fight Club.115  The first 
                                                 
115 For an analysis of Palahniuk’s work and boredom, see Lance Rubin’s essay “The Politics of Boredom: 
Punk, the Situationist International and Chuck Palahniuk’s Rant,” In Reading Chuck Palahniuk: American 
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instance comes when the novel’s nameless protagonist narrates the interesting 
relationship some of his associates developed with their IKEA catalogues: “The people I 
know who used to sit in the bathroom with pornography, now they sit in the bathroom 
with their IKEA furniture catalogue.”116  For these people, a different type of imagery 
was being sought out.  In his book on photography, Roland Barthes discusses a similar 
scenario, albeit without IKEA in mind.  Barthes juxtaposes the pornographic image with 
the erotic image. To Barthes, “there is no punctum in the pornographic image; at most it 
amuses me (and even then, boredom quickly follows).”117  In Barthes’ estimation, the 
emphasis on sexual organs is boring, whereas their concealment in erotic images is 
interesting.  Pornographic images using women as objects were being replaced by the 
eroticism of actual objects.  Fight Club’s nameless protagonist goes on to explain why 
people return again and again to the catalogue: 
You buy furniture.  You tell yourself, this is the last sofa I will ever need in my 
life.  Buy the sofa, then for a couple of years you’re satisfied that no matter what 
goes wrong, at least you’ve got your sofa issue handled.  Then the right set of 
dishes.  Then the perfect bed.  The drapes.  The rug. 
Then you’re trapped in your lovely nest, and the things you used to own, 
now they own you.
118
 
 
The protagonist emphasizes the importance placed on these objects in one’s life.  While 
the ‘nest’ comforts, it also terrorizes.  In a dialectical reversal, the consumer transitions 
from the role of owner of the objects to being owned by the objects.  That is to say, one’s 
life becomes dominated by the artificial need to surround oneself with artificial things 
such as new furniture.  It is a vicious cycle, especially for those individuals such as the 
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protagonist who have little else in their lives.  The extent of the narrator’s isolation and 
boredom is expounded further in the novel:  “I was tired and crazy and rushed, and every 
time I boarded a plane, I wanted the plane to crash.  I envied people dying of cancer.  I 
hated my life.  I was tired and bored with my job and my furniture, and I couldn’t see any 
way to change things.”119 The narrator eventually gets to a breaking point where he 
completely rejects the prescribed lifestyle found in the IKEA catalogue. 
2) Magazine: Automobile 
The second example of advertisements comes from an advertisement in a 
magazine. Magazines appear throughout the everyday regardless of whether one has a 
subscription or not.  A friend may have them on his or her coffee table, they could be in 
the waiting room at the doctor’s or dentist’s offices, or they may have been left by 
someone on the subway.  Additionally, magazines can be purchased on a whim, or by 
design, on the streets at newspaper stands, in convenience stores, or even bookstores. 
Amongst the journalistic coverage and/or opinion pieces in most magazines are 
advertisements.  Canada’s Maclean’s magazine is one such example.  In the April 23rd, 
2007 issue, Maclean’s featured an advertisement on its 11th page.  In this space the 
Chrysler car company featured an advertising campaign for its 2008 Dodge Avenger 
model with the slogan: “Boredom is the Villain.”120  It should be noted that this 
advertisement ran on both billboards and magazines.  In the magazine ad, the foreground 
features the Avenger with a ‘Brilliant Black Crystal Pearl’ paint job parked at a 45 degree 
angle in a city street.  The background features skyscrapers to the left and right of the 
image with a giant ‘A’ being projected into the night sky from a light source in the 
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middle.  The whole image is a riff on the popular superhero Batman.  The desired 
message is fairly simple.  1) Boredom is the villain; 2) If you purchase this car you can be 
like batman; 3) When you own/drive this car you will be able to successfully combat 
boredom.  Such a strategy involving boredom for selling vehicles is not new.  It has been 
used in the past in the United States by Suzuki in the 1970s, who utilized the general 
slogan ‘Suzuki Conquers Boredom’, as an advertisement for all of their motorcycles. The 
image accompanying the text is a man riding a motorcycle at the side of the mountain.  
As I write this, there is an advertising campaign for John Deere’s Gator XUV 4x4 (an all-
terrain utility vehicle) with the slogan ‘Gator vs. Boredom’.121 Much the same as Suzuki, 
this ad, too, shows a man riding the vehicle up a mountain.  With these images/messages 
taken together, motorcycles, cars, and all-terrain vehicles, it is apparent that these 
vehicles have all been portrayed as remedies for boredom.  The consistent message is that 
boredom needs to be combated, but despite this common thread there is also a 
contradiction.  Each advertisement makes the claim that their vehicle is the one true 
remedy for boredom, but they remain silent on the similar messages conveyed by 
competitors, regardless of whether they, too, explicitly use boredom or not.   
The Dodge Avenger’s advertisement message of ‘boredom is the villain’ is 
expanded in Strada, a consumer magazine produced by Chrysler for those who already 
own Chryslers.  The spring 2007 issue of Strada featured an expanded version of the 
advertising campaign found in Maclean’s which elaborates on the Avenger’s slogan of 
‘boredom is the villain’.  They write: “In a segment of sameness, the all-new 2008 Dodge 
Avenger exceeds expectations, saving you from the sinister sameness of typical mid-size 
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sedans.”122  It is interesting to note the use of the term ‘sameness’ in this advertisement.  
As mentioned above, ‘sameness’ is an essential feature of the culture industry and it 
seems as those the culture industry is aware of this.  Additionally, in Strada it is also said 
that the “Avenger leaves ordinary in the dust with brilliant technology, sleek style and 
race-inspired performance.”123 Ordinary is here equated with boredom.124 Through the 
use of this particular technology (automobile) the advertisement implies that one’s 
boredom can be remedied. 
3) Television: Deodorant 
In this example, two aspects of everyday life are blended together: television 
watching and deodorant use.  People watch the television on a daily basis and use 
deodorant on a daily basis.  This example is a television advertisement for deodorant 
from 2010.  The featured commodity is called ‘Twist’ and is produced as part of the AXE 
body spray line of product.   The commercial - thirty seconds in duration – for AXE 
Twist begins with a young male (who appears to be in his early twenties) in his bathroom 
spraying the deodorant on his bare chest before he embarks on a date.  From here, scenes 
shift as often as the young man’s image who – in the process of courting a young woman 
of roughly the same age – is able to alter his appearance (attire, haircut, and facial hair) 
several times throughout their date.  Throughout the commercial his date loses interest in 
him because of his sameness.  After a period of a few seconds she becomes bored with 
him and turns her attention elsewhere, such as to her mobile phone.  Whenever the 
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female companion gazes back at him he is sporting a new look and he regains her 
interest.  Why does he do this?  Quite simply, so he is not boring.  A narrator’s voice 
appears in the final seconds of the advertisement stating that “women get bored easily.”  
The narrator then concludes the commercial by proclaiming the product slogan: “the new 
AXE Twist: The Fragrance that Changes.”  Returning to a previous example from the 
movie ‘Happiness’, it would seem as though this could have been the solution to Allen’s 
problem with being a bore and therefore unable to approach a woman for a date. 
According to the explicit message in commercial, it seems as though the last thing 
a heterosexual male ought to do when on a date with a woman is to present a consistent 
image.  Women are portrayed as ‘easily’ bored, which is reminiscent of how the suburban 
housewife was portrayed as having a superficial boredom that can be easily remedied and 
is unworthy of serious attention.  The idea is to keep moving.  If she gets bored, it is with 
the old you.  By the time she realizes how boring you are, you have morphed into a 
newer, more interesting version.  That is, of course, as long she only notices the attire, 
haircut, and facial hair.  If she notices the same old heroic stories, tired pickup lines, and 
so forth, the body spray will not matter.  Or will it?  Does the spray mask body odour (as 
well as create it) along with masking one’s personality (as well as create it)?  Presumably, 
if one considers the logic of the advertisement, AXE Twist does not change either.  The 
message seems to be, if you use AXE Twist, you will be a nomadic adventurer and 
unique in life, but only if you are a consumer of sameness.  Buy the same product over 
and over again and you will be unique.  Buy the same product as your friends and you 
will still be unique.  Essentially, the contradiction in the advertisement is the suggestion 
to be the same as everyone else and you will at the very same time be unique.  As a 
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result, women will be attracted to you because you will not be boring.  This plays on the 
fear of consumers that they will be considered boring. 
4) Napkin: Restaurant Chain 
The fourth advertising example demonstrates the vast reach advertising has with 
everyday life.  In the summer of 2009 I ventured into the Oxford, Ohio location of the 
restaurant chain Buffalo Wild Wings for dinner.  This restaurant chain is of the bar and 
grill variety, specializing in boneless chicken wings.  This particular restaurant franchise 
offers an assortment of cocktail napkins featuring various witty catchphrases and enticing 
messages.  Underneath my beverage I found the following message on the napkin: 
“You’re here with all your pals because without them you’re boring.”  On the bottom 
right corner of the napkin is the restaurant logo and the restaurant’s trademarked slogan, 
which reads: “You have to be here.”  By combining the trademarked slogan with the 
message on the napkin, the following logical chain takes shape: 1) You have to be here; 
2) When you are here, you ought to be accompanied by other people; 3) If you come 
alone, you will be considered boring. Since being boring is highly undesirable, and if this 
message is taken seriously, a stigma emerges where customers will not want to enter this 
establishment alone.  In bringing friends to the restaurant, the customer benefits by not 
appearing boring and the restaurant benefits in the increased sales derived from additional 
consumers.  
This is another example of an advertisement that employs boredom as a foil in 
order to promote and perpetuate the consumption of its product(s).  The difference being 
that the distribution of napkins is directed solely at pre-existing customers, as opposed to 
advertisements that are directed at drawing in new customers, this advertisement is solely 
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directed at those who have already purchased the product(s).  The napkin’s message is to 
be applied to the next visit where, if it is followed, one’s friends will be in tow.  
5) Billboard: Breakfast Cereal 
 Finally, the last example of boredom and advertising comes from a billboard.  
Billboards occupy both a significant and insignificant part of everyday life.  Especially 
for those who commute to work on a daily basis, dozens of billboards enter into one’s 
field of vision along the way.  Anywhere from the side of a highway or street, to the 
interior or exterior of a subway station, to the side of a bus bench/shelter (or the bus 
itself), billboard advertisements are prominent objects in what Lefebvre calls the ‘social 
text.’125  While the billboards in subway or bus stations are flexible if their patrons are 
waiting around, in general they need to be seen and understood in a very short period of 
time.  For example, if a bus is driving by and an individual is stationary or if an 
individual is driving by a stationary billboard, both situations entail a limited opportunity 
for the advertisement to imbed itself in the psyche of a potential consumer. 
I came across the billboard for the present example while I was walking on a 
sidewalk in Sudbury, Ontario.  Beside a railway track was an advertisement for a new 
and improved version of Shreddies cereal.  The advertisement was based on the 
reinvention/rebranding Shreddies undertook by introducing its new product, Diamond 
Shreddies.  On the left of the billboard was the old version of the cereal in the shape of a 
square with the caption ‘boring’.  On the right side of the billboard was an image of the 
new version in the shape of a diamond with the caption ‘exciting!’ underneath.  This is a 
concrete example of Lefebvre’s dialectic of the ‘new’ and ‘archaeo’ mentioned in the 
first section of this chapter.  The ‘new’ version of Shreddies is an example of an 
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advertising campaign making a slight alteration in order to create a new product.  Its 
newness is solely predicated upon the consumer’s inability to recognize the difference or 
taking the advertisement as an attempt at humour.   
The advertisement for Shreddies – along with all of the other advertisements – is 
directed towards the masses.  That is to say, all of the above advertisements are directed 
at the mass consumption by a mass of consumers.  Almost all of these advertisements 
mask this fact of mass consumption and are instead directed towards an individual, 
authentic experience.  However, advertisements are not alone in their use of boredom to 
sell their products.  One of the most explicit examples of boring images for sale is Martin 
Parr’s multi-volume collection of Boring Postcards.126  Parr’s collection is situated in the 
space between advertising and art.  Postcards not only account for where one has been, 
but they also promote it, at least they used to.  Parr’s postcards are all decades old and 
represent a modernity that still persists, but what passes for advertising via postcard has 
largely changed.  The postcards in Parr’s collections are unaccompanied by explanation 
or contextual markers.  The picture is all that is revealed and not the text on its verso (if 
such a text indeed exists on these particular postcards).  What each individual card does 
not show are the processes of modernity in motion.  As Lefebvre would say, “No camera, 
no image or series of images can show these rhythms.”127  Indeed, these postcards merely 
document a dull moment frozen in time.
128
  But were they dull at the time they were 
produced?  Were they exciting and interesting when these scenes/settings were first 
                                                 
126 There are currently three-volumes of boring postcards that feature the modernism/modernity of England, 
America, and Germany, respectively.  See Martin Parr’s Boring Postcards (London: Phaidon, 1999); 
Boring Postcards USA (London: Phaidon, 2000); Langeweilige Postkarten (London: Phaidon, 2001). 
127 RH, 36. 
128 Lefebvre has argued that the “time of daily life is not only represented in clocks and watches; it is also 
represented in photographs and curios-souvenirs.” CEL 3, 133. 
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captured on film?  If people did send these postcards, what did they write on them?  Joe 
Moran offers an interesting explanation of what these images mean for boredom, 
everyday life, and modernity. 
If we read these pictures as amusing kitsch, a reading which may account for the 
commercial success of these books, then we are only repeating the ahistoricism of 
capitalism’s endless search for the new and improved.  In fact, the boredom of 
these postcards exposes not only the recently fashionable but, by extension, the 
currently fashionable as well.  If contemporary examples of the dismally 
humdrum, such as tower blocks and ringroads, were seen only recently as 
symbols of thrilling modernity, then today’s thrillingly modern is the subject of 
tomorrow’s boring postcard.129 
 
In the case of advertisements, any interest they conjure up will have a shelf life akin to 
the postcards in Parr’s collection.  They will be replaced by newer and more fashionable 
material.  They could, however, become interesting again, as is evidenced by Parr’s 
collection, or they could be permanently discarded.  The culture industry is flexible in 
this way.  If a critical perspective is to be retained, however, it must be remembered that 
this flexibility is all part of a process of commodification imparted by the culture 
industry.  
Avant-Garde Image: Pop Art 
The transition from the previous section to this section is apparent when one 
realizes that the leading figure of Pop art, Andy Warhol, worked in advertising before 
becoming a prominent artist.  On the surface, the transition appears to be fairly fluid 
when one considers his most famous pieces.  For example, the Campbell’s soup can(s), 
Brillo boxes, and the silk screen prints of Marilyn Monroe are all pieces that feature 
products of the culture industry.  At first glance it would seem as though Warhol was 
                                                 
129 Moran, “Benjamin and Boredom,” 177.  For a reading that takes Parr’s collection as essentially 
‘amusing kitsch’, see Tom Vanderbilt, “This Bland is My Bland,” Interiors 160(2), (February, 2001): 59-
61. 
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merely parroting his previous career in the advertising business, producing artworks that 
have no greater aesthetic value than advertisements.  Another way to view Warhol is as a 
critic of consumerism akin to Lefebvre and Adorno, but one who predominantly worked 
with canvases, sculptures, and films as opposed to texts and high theory.  For this section, 
I will argue for the latter view while working through the tension of the former view.  
Furthermore, in order to distinguish the popular music mentioned in the second section of 
this chapter with Warhol’s Pop art, I follow Jean Baudrillard’s pronouncement in his 
book The Consumer Society that the proper reading of Warhol’s art begins by 
acknowledging that “Pop art is not a popular art.”130  The key distinction between ‘Pop’ 
and ‘popular’ is on the production side as opposed to the consumer side.  That is to say, 
even if Pop art is adored by a great deal of people, it is a commentary on that very 
popularity as opposed to popular music, which cannot comment on the popular as such. 
As an artist, Warhol has been referred to as the “prince of boredom.”131  Warhol is 
a world renowned/reviled artist whose avant-garde approach successfully combined 
boredom with art in what has come to be known as Pop art.  Referring to Pop art as 
avant-garde may at first appear to be a contradiction, if one follows Clement Greenberg’s 
distinction between ‘avant-garde and kitsch’ from his famous essay of the same name.  
These two broad categories for types of art are antithetical to one another in Greenberg’s 
eyes.  In fact, another name given to kitsch by Greenberg is ‘rear-guard’.132  With this, it 
would seem impossible to be both at the front and the back of art.  However, for this 
section I will predominantly focus on the work of one artist that straddles the line 
                                                 
130 Baudrillard, The Consumer Society, 120. 
131 See William Wilson’s essay “Prince of Boredom: The Repetition and Passivities of Andy Warhol,” In 
Pop Art: A Critical History, 291-294. 
132 Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1961), 9. 
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between kitsch and avant-garde: Andy Warhol.
133
  While I use the term ‘avant-garde’ for 
Warhol’s contribution of Pop art, affixing this label to him is not without its difficulties.  
It must be acknowledged that today Warhol has been at least partially, if not completely, 
absorbed into the culture industry and his catchphrase of “in the future, everyone will be 
world-famous for fifteen minutes”134 has become a well-known and often repeated 
phrase.  Whatever meaning it once had is forgotten.
135
   
Before establishing the links with the avant-garde, it is important to first ask, how 
are Pop art and kitsch related?  According to Jean Baudrillard, it is simple, “Pop is 
kitsch.”136  Kitsch is the broader of the two categories in that all Pop art is kitsch, but not 
all kitsch is Pop art.  Pop art may have evolved into Kitsch, but a reading of some of 
Warhol’s early pieces reveals Warhol’s technique of ‘mirroring’ society.  Jean 
Baudrillard believes that “Warhol’s position [is] particularly interesting, when he holds 
up the mirror of a utopia based on sheer banality.”137  How did Warhol make such banal 
items interesting?  It began with an admiration of boring and often overlooked ‘things’.  
In fact, Warhol made the rare claim, especially for an American, that he liked boring 
things.  
                                                 
133 I should clarify here regarding the application of the ‘avant-garde’ label to Andy Warhol and why it is 
problematic.  For example, Jean Baudrillard has claimed that “Andy Warhol does not belong to any avant-
garde.” Conspiracy of Art: Manifestoes, Interviews, Essays, ed. Sylvère Lotringer and trans. Ames Hodges. 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), 44.  This can be contrasted with Peter Bürger whose take on Warhol is 
that he is part of the “neo-avant-garde,” which Bürger defines as something that “stages for a second time 
the avant-gardiste break with tradition, becomes a manifestation that is void of sense and that permits the 
positing of any meaning whatever.”  Theory of the Avant-Garde, 61.  From these two passages a triad 
emerges: kitsch - avant-garde - neo-avant-garde.  Depending on one’s perspective, Warhol can be viewed 
as any one of these or perhaps even all three. 
134Andy Warhol, I’ll Be Your Mirror, xxv. 
135 Lynn Spigel makes the point that “not only was pop art about commercial media, it was easily 
appropriated by the media.” Lynn Spigel, “Warhol TV: From Media Scandals to Everyday Boredom,” In 
TV by Design: Modern Art and the Rise of Network Television (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 257. 
136 Baudrillard, The Uncollected Baudrillard, 144. 
137 Ibid., 148. 
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I’ve been quoted a lot as saying, “I like boring things.”  Well, I said it and I meant 
it.  That doesn’t mean I’m not bored by them.  Of course, what I think is boring 
must not be the same as what other people think is, since I could never stand to 
watch all the most popular action shows on TV, because they’re essentially the 
same plots and the same shots and the same cuts over and over again.  
Apparently, most people enjoy watching the same basic thing, as long as the 
details are different.  But I’m just the opposite: if I’m going to sit and watch the 
same thing I saw the night before, I don’t want it to be essentially the same – I 
want it to be exactly the same.  Because the more you look at the exact same 
thing, the more the meaning goes away, and the better and emptier you feel.
138
 
 
Warhol identifies the difference involved with the experience of boredom by asserting 
that what bores one person does not necessarily bore the next.  Furthermore, Warhol’s 
emphasis on tarrying with the exact same thing is reminiscent of John Cage’s approach to 
music.  The goal for Warhol was to feel completely empty instead of experiencing the 
half emptiness (half fullness) offered by television and related forms of entertainment.  
While this may appear to be a complete disconnect with one’s environment, this 
emptiness is at the same time a deep connection with the modern world.  That is, in order 
to grasp the boredom of modernity, Warhol distanced himself from what the interesting 
things of the culture industry and he was then afforded the appropriate distance with 
which he could critique it. 
It is both difficult and easy to ‘like boring things’.  It is difficult to actively and 
consciously drift further into boredom, but it is easy to like things that induce boredom 
under the guise of it being interesting.  It can, however, be difficult to assert one’s 
boredom as an aesthetic judgement when the artwork in question is highly revered.  “And 
the people,” quips Clement Greenberg, “who in their boredom with this sort of thing 
pretend to themselves – they’re saying a new era of art is opening up, big doors into the 
future, and so forth – these people who see this and don’t confess to themselves that they 
                                                 
138 Andy Warhol and Pat Hackett, POPism: The Warhol Sixties (Orlando: Harcourt, 1980), 64. 
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are bored are inauthentic too….”139  This passage comes from Greenberg’s lectures titled 
Homemade Esthetics.  Greenberg expands on this thought on the next page in the same 
text: 
If you say, “I like being bored,” as Warhol has said, you’re not talking about real 
experience, you’re saying something that gets put in the category of surprising 
because it’s a contradiction in terms.  It’s all very well to say these things, but the 
inauthenticity I talk about is to see people putting up with boredom for fear that 
they may be thought not to be “with it.”140 
 
Greenberg points to an important dilemma many art enthusiasts face when they are 
presented with art that could be classified, such as Warhol’s, as anti-art.  Not accepting a 
banal artwork as a masterpiece when it is deemed as such may result in one not being 
‘with it’, as Greenberg puts it.  It is akin to the dilemma of the emperor who has no 
clothes.  As opposed to posing as ‘bored’ in order to appear superior to one’s 
environment, this is posing as ‘interested’ in order to fit in.  This is the dilemma Warhol’s 
art imparts on its spectators.   
Warhol’s creations were not only on the canvas but also in the showroom.  
Warhol was not only striving to have his work viewed as an art object, but he was also 
holding up a mirror to spectators in order to say look at yourself and the society around 
you.  This is what differentiates Warhol’s work from standard kitsch.  In the aesthetic 
sphere, kitsch has little artistic value aside from serving as a distraction from everyday 
life.  Warhol’s art may be received as a distraction from everyday life, but it is an explicit 
reflection of everyday life, unlike what is traditionally understood as kitsch.  Clement 
Greenberg offers the following account for the emergence of kitsch: 
                                                 
139 Clement Greenberg, Homemade Esthetics: Observations on Art and Taste (New York: Oxford 
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140 Ibid., 136. 
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The peasants who settled in the cities as proletariat and petty bourgeois learned to 
read and write for the sake of efficiency, but they did not win the leisure and 
comfort necessary for the enjoyment of the city’s traditional culture.  Losing, 
nevertheless, their taste for the folk culture whose background was the 
countryside, and discovering a new capacity for boredom at the same time, the 
new urban masses set up a pressure on society to provide them with a kind of 
culture fit for their own consumption.  To fill the demand of the new market, a 
new commodity was devised: ersatz culture, kitsch, destined for those who, 
insensible to the values of genuine culture, are hungry nevertheless for the 
diversion that only culture of some sort can provide.
141
 
 
This is where Warhol’s work blends with standard kitsch.  It is seen as the very mass 
culture that it holds up a mirror to.  This standard kitsch is a major component of the 
modern world, as Matei Calinescu argues in his book The Five Faces of Modernity, 
kitsch is one of the five faces of modernity.
142
 
The phenomenon of compulsive consumption, the fear of boredom, and the need 
for escape, combined with the widespread view of art as both play and display, 
are among the factors that in various degrees and fashions have contributed to the 
growth of what is called kitsch.  Kitsch is one of the most typical products of 
modernity.
143
 
 
Lefebvre, too, acknowledged kitsch as a product of modernity, but was utterly dismissive 
of its lack of message. In the third volume of his Critique, Lefebvre writes: “Kitsch, an 
industrial product, becomes positively comforting – an art of happiness in security – 
whereas the art work, born out of anguish that has or has not been mastered, disturbs.”144 
Here, again, the blurring between Warhol’s work and standard kitsch is evident.  While 
Pop art may make some happy like standard kitsch, its creative potential is its ability to 
disturb.  This disturbing element is much more apparent in Warhol’s piece ‘Green Car 
Crash’ where he painted a picture found in the magazine Newsweek of a car crash.  It is 
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disturbing to know that the driver of the car in this image was killed in this accident.  
While this is a much more apparent type of disturbance in Warhol’s art, the same mirror 
held up to the car crash is being held up with his other works. 
Warhol’s success and acceptance by the culture industry makes it difficult to see 
him as a critic of society.  It is for this reason that his art appears as kitsch.  Adorno 
identifies one aspect of kitsch as “the dictatorship of profit over art.”145  Following 
Adorno, this would mean that all advertisements are kitsch since profit is the goal and art 
is not.  Warhol’s kitsch emphasizes such a dictatorship of profit, but one that, read in the 
context of a work of avant-garde art, reveals a penetrating critique of consumerism.  It is 
important to note that Andy Warhol’s studio was affectionately referred to as ‘the 
factory’.  This signals a link between Warhol’s production of art with the assembly line.  
Industrialization and aesthetics are interwoven in Warhol’s work, but it is an aesthetics of 
industrialization more than the industrialization of aesthetics.   
Boring things were produced in Warhol’s factory.  The focus of Warhol’s Pop art 
has been described as art that “reproduces mass reproduced reality.”146  It is not 
surprising, then, that Fredric Jameson elected to have Andy Warhol’s painting ‘Diamond 
Dust Shoes’ on the cover of his book Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism.  Warhol’s work is ideally suited for a discussion of the ‘cultural logic of late 
capitalism’.  Jameson explains Warhol’s work early on in this book. 
Andy Warhol’s work in fact turns centrally around commodification, and the 
great billboard images of the Coca-Cola bottle or the Campbell’s soup can, which 
explicitly foreground the commodity fetishism of a transition to late capital, ought 
to be powerful and critical political statements.  If they are not that, then one 
would surely want to know why, and one would want to begin to wonder a little 
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more seriously about the possibilities of political or critical art in the postmodern 
period of late capital.
147
 
 
Similarly, David Harvey argues that it is worth highlighting, 
[t]he mobilization of fashion, pop art, television and other forms of media image, 
and the variety of urban life styles that have become part and parcel of daily life 
under capitalism.  Whatever else we do with the concept, we should not read 
postmodernism as some autonomous artistic current.  Its rootedness in daily life is 
one of its most patently transparent features.
148
 
 
Despite Harvey’s observation that “its rootedness” is “in daily life,” Pop art is not a major 
concern of Lefebvre’s in his project of a critique of everyday life.  The art movement 
does, however, surface in his writings, albeit only briefly.  In Everyday Life in the 
Modern World Lefebvre wrote disparagingly that with Pop art “aestheticism is added to 
the technicist trend.”149 While I do not want to argue that Lefebvre is wrong in his 
assessment, he nevertheless fails to see the commonalities between his project and Pop 
art.  One way or another Pop art and everyday life share a strong bond.  This is especially 
evident in the vast oeuvre of Warhol who, it is worth mentioning, worked with a variety 
of media.   
In order to show the continuity of Lefebvre’s work with Warhol’s it is important 
to note that Lefebvre argued that the “critique of everyday life encompasses a critique of 
art by the everyday and a critique of the everyday by art.”150 In addition, Lefebvre argued 
“thus it is that the functions of the critique of everyday life can be determined by 
reference to an art which immerses itself in everyday life.”151  I argue that Warhol’s art is 
one that immersed itself in everyday life.  As Andreas Huyssen has noted, there are 
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connections between not only Pop art and everyday life, but there are also connections 
between the critique at the heart of Pop art and its relationship to Lefebvre’s critique of 
everyday life: 
If Pop art has drawn our attention to the imagery of daily life, demanding that the 
separation of high and low art be eliminated, then today it is the task of the artist 
to break out of art’s ivory tower and contribute to a change of everyday life.  He 
would be following the precepts of Henri Lefebvre’s La vie quotidienne dans le 
monde moderne (Everyday Life in the Modern World), no longer accepting the 
separation of the philosophical and the non-philosophical, the high and the low, 
the spiritual and the material, the theoretical and the practical, the cultivated and 
the non-cultivated; and not the planning only a change of the state, of political 
life, economic production and judicial and social structures, but also planning a 
change of everyday life.  Aesthetics should not be forgotten in such attempts to 
change everyday life.  The aesthetic activity of human beings not only manifests 
itself in the iconic arts but in all spheres of human activity.
152
 
 
To Huyssen, then, Warhol’s work provides the opportunity to reflect on everyday life in 
the modern world.  However, despite the window it opens into thinking critically about 
the quotidian fabric, it also provides the opportunity for its viewers to gloss over the 
contradictions at the heart of the daily.  Whereas culture industry images provide 
distraction, but inevitably have a by-product of critical examination, Warhol’s Pop Art 
offers the opposite.  While critical reflection is arguably its intention, distraction is the 
by-product of Warhol’s aesthetic. 
Huyssen also argues that “pop seemed to liberate art from the monumental 
boredom of Informel and Abstract Expressionism.”153  With this, it seems as though the 
action painting of Jackson Pollock and his fellow Abstract Expressionists morphed from 
abstract expression to a concrete impression of boredom.  Jean Baudrillard shares this 
sentiment with Pop art as he has declared that “[m]asterpieces bore us with their sacred 
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conformism.”154  However, if one follows Herbert Read’s line of thought that “art 
redeems our actions from monotony and our minds from boredom,”155 then masterpieces 
cannot be boring.  Similarly, art historian Francis Colpitt once wrote that “[a]s far as I 
know, no artist, Warhol included, likes to be accused of making trivial or irrelevant 
works of art.  Boredom negates the possibility of any enjoyment of, or interest in, a work 
of art.”156  Here, then, are four theorists with four different takes on the function of 
serious art.  For Huyssen, Pop art is a response to the boredom of its immediate 
predecessors.  Similarly, for Baudrillard, the most serious of all artworks, such as the 
masterpieces of Abstract Expressionism, are boring because they conform to society.  For 
Read, a serious artwork alleviates the boredom of lesser cultural works such as those 
found in everyday life.  For Colipitt, Warhol’s art cannot be deliberately boring because 
artists do not want to be considered boring.  But what if boredom is the goal of a serious 
artwork?    
Matei Calinescu argues that Duchamp was “kitschified by Andy Warhol.”157 For 
Calinescu, Duchamp is profound and Warhol is banal.  The possibility of the banal being 
profound is lost on Calinescu in this assessment.  Additionally, Calinescu claims that: 
“Kitsch appears as an easy way of ‘killing time’, as a pleasurable escape from the 
banality of both work and leisure.  The fun of kitsch is just the other side of terrible and 
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incomprehensible boredom.”158  To Calinescu, then, kitsch is only a diversion and not a 
critique of the modern world’s ever increasing propensity for commodification.  But what 
if kitsch and boredom are combined?  What if kitsch and boredom were one and the 
same?  This, I argue, is what Warhol has done with his Pop art.   
Baudrillard – a great admirer of Pop art in general and Warhol in particular – saw 
in Warhol’s work both a continuation of Duchamp’s legacy, as well as something new.  
Baudrillard believed that “Duchamp and Warhol were the two great instigators of radical 
liquidation.”159 To Baudrillard, Warhol, like Duchamp before him, “introduced 
nothingness into the heart of the image.”160 Furthermore, for Baudrillard, Warhol was a 
“founder of modernity” whose work is so influential and profound that it “freed us from 
aesthetics and art.”161  Warhol’s basic modus operandi can be described, as Baudrillard 
once put it, as a double movement of “collapsing of banality into art and art into 
banality.”162  Clement Greenberg similarly argues that Marcel Duchamp was the principal 
innovator, inspiration and catalyst for the fusion of banality and art. 
And so Duchamp anticipated everything.  All they do is recapitulate and run 
variations on themes he has set.  And I find Conceptual Art fascinating because of 
its desperation – and intriguing.  It’s as though Conceptual Art says, all right, we 
are going to turn around on you, we are not going to give you any surprises at all 
and there won’t be an expectation involved either.  You are going to get boredom 
so undifferentiated as to constitute a surprise all in itself.  This solid, monolithic, 
unadulterated, undifferentiated boredom will really stand you off and be our 
memorial.
163
 
 
Following Baudrillard and Greenberg, Warhol can be viewed as a variation of Duchamp.  
One difference can be seen in the misdirection involved in Duchamp’s most famous piece 
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from 1917: ‘Fountain’.  This readymade, found object is a urinal with two signifiers that 
do not match what is signified.  The first is the title ‘Fountain’, which, in a way, can be 
viewed as the opposite of the urinal.  The object and the signifier differ.  Secondly, the 
piece has the name R. Mutt inscribed on it instead of Duchamp’s name.  In contrast with 
Duchamp, Warhol does not have the same misdirection at work in his pieces.  The 
Campbell’s soup can(s), for instance, is exactly what it says it is.  What is misdirected 
with Warhol seems to be the mirror he is holding up to society.  Interestingly, Duchamp 
himself once said that “You can’t do a boring painting.  Obviously it’s been done, but it’s 
easier in the semitheatrical realm.”164 As was shown above with the Fluxus group, 
boredom and the ‘semitheatrical realm’ can work, but it is not without its difficulties.  As 
for the impossibility of doing a boring painting, Warhol accepted Duchamp’s challenge 
and created not only boring paintings but other boring things.  He defied Duchamp all the 
while following in Duchamp’s footsteps.   
Part of Warhol’s mystique involved his admiration for two main features of 
contemporary society: machines and boring things.  In an interview on Warhol, Jean 
Baudrillard remarked: “What separates us from Andy Warhol, for instance, is that he was 
lucky enough to be a machine.  And we are not.”165 This resemblance to a machine is 
apparent when Warhol spoke.  In some of Warhol’s interviews from 1962, for instance, 
Warhol replicates the tendency of most machinery to remain passive until activated when 
he only wanted to answer in binary with yes or no answers.
166
  This was part of his 
mystique, his aura.  Baudrillard summarizes Warhol’s mystique in the following 
expansive passage from his book The Perfect Crime:   
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So far as fame is concerned, Warhol’s position is very simple.  Fame is based on 
boredom, just as the aura of images is founded on their insignificance.  In his 
Journal, the meticulous management of his fame is accompanied by a remarkable 
indifference to his own life.  Fame is the accidental spotlight that lights up the 
involuntary actor of his own life.  It is the aura of an existence conceived as an 
exceptional fait divers, rendered exceptional by artificial light.  Everything is in 
the lighting.  The natural light of genius is rare, but the artificial light which 
reigns over our world is so plentiful that there will inevitably be enough for 
everyone.  Even a machine can become famous, and Warhol never aspired to 
anything but this machinic celebrity, a celebrity without consequence which 
leaves no trace.  A celebrity which comes from the demand of everything today to 
be approved and fêted by the gaze.  It is said that he was self-advertising.  Not so: 
he was merely the medium for that gigantic advertising operation the world 
carries out through technology and images, forcing our imaginations to face, our 
passions to turn outwards, shattering the mirror we held up to it (hypocritically, as 
it happens) to tap it for our profit.
167
 
 
According to Susan Sontag, Warhol’s aesthetic sensibility “defines itself in relation to the 
twin poles of boringness and freakishness.”168 This is reminiscent of Lefebvre’s view of a 
‘double dimension’ in the everyday mentioned in the second chapter where both banality 
and drama make up the fabric of everyday life. 
It is hoped that it is now apparent that Warhol’s work is concerned with the 
everyday in a similar manner to Lefebvre, albeit coming from a different (artistic) angle.  
Along with his visual artwork, his book of philosophy contains a wealth of interpretations 
on the mundane.
169
   Furthermore, one of his forays into literature (a: a Novel) is 
organized with twenty-four chapters, one for each hour in a day.  Perhaps it can be 
referred to as a Pop art version of Joyce’s Ulysses, as this work of ‘fiction’ depicts a day 
in the life of one of Warhol’s real life associates, known as Ondine.  There is even an 
exchange between Ondine (O) and another ‘character’ named Drella (D) where Ondine 
                                                 
167 Jean Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime, 85-86.  The journal that Baudrillard is referring to here is most 
likely The Andy Warhol Diaries, ed. Pat Hackett (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1989). 
168 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Picador, 1973), 44. 
169 See Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B and Back Again), (Orlando: Harcourt, 
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asks “What means boredom in French?” to which Drella replies “Ondine.”170 While this 
book is generally considered to be a novel, it was based on, if not totally adapted from, 
audiotapes that recorded Ondine’s day.  It, therefore, blurs the distinction between fiction 
and the realities of everyday life. 
Similar to his literary work, Warhol’s films stretched the boundaries of its 
medium and its viewers’ attention spans.  In a guidebook on DVDs, the synopsis of 
Warhol’s 35 minute short film Blowjob is as follows: “A visually static series of close-
ups of a young man’s facial expressions as he experiences the titular act, this is as much 
about boredom as it is about sex.”171  It is as if Warhol was striving to echo Michel 
Foucault, who once said in an interview that “sex is boring.”172  The boringness of 
Warhol’s films seems to be intentional.  As one commentator notes, “an eight-hour 
“underground” movie by Andy Warhol is boring, but his friends are delighted to 
understand that Warhol meant it to bore.”173  If this is so, then it would appear that 
Warhol intended his audience to be bored as opposed to interested.  However, it is much 
more complicated than that.  Warhol wanted people to be interested in this boredom.  
That is, to acknowledge their boredom, the boredom that is widespread and is a hallmark 
of modernity. 
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 Taking something boring to be something interesting is a difficult perspective to 
accept.  It is a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.  As for art, the lectures Clement 
Greenberg delivered at Bennington College in 1971 offer immense insight into the 
complex fusion of boredom and art more generally.  Consider the three following 
passages from those lectures. 
Boredom is one of the flattest, most self-evident, most self-justifying of all 
esthetic judgments.  There is no appeal from boredom.  Even when you tell 
yourself you like boredom, there the verdict is.  And with this funky art – and I 
have through the list of labels before; Earth Art, Environmental Art, and so forth – 
boredom gets into all these things.  And it is as if when these items of art collapse 
– and it is a mixed figure of speech – they don’t collapse under the weight of 
boredom, they collapse under their own weight.
174
 
 
Hence, the boringness of the kind of art that, as so much far-out art does today, 
sets things hitherto considered non-art in a situation or context or setting in which 
they have to be approached as art and nothing else.  This is the boringness of art 
by fiat.  It is true that anything we choose to call art is art, but that doesn’t make it 
good art.  And boredom, as I’ve said several times before, the boringness of this 
constitutes an esthetic judgment – and you don’t escape from the difference 
between good and bad.
175
 
 
Now there are art lovers who’ll express a positive “esthetic” judgment precisely 
because they are at a loss for any judgment at all.  Or still worse: They may be 
really and truly bored because the art at hand is really and truly boring; they may 
be having a valid esthetic reaction, even if a negative one, but they’ll deny it and 
express a positive judgment because they’ve gotten used to associating boringness 
with “advancedness” and “advancedness” with quality.  Of course it’s not easy to 
register the difference between puzzlement and boredom.  But in that lies the 
challenge of “advanced-advanced” art, literature, music in this time.176 
 
Though not specifically referring to Warhol, Greenberg’s comments are applicable to 
Warhol in particular and Pop art in general.  For Greenberg, it is important to distinguish 
between bad art and boring art much the same as Adorno distinguished between popular 
music and serious music.  Greenberg believes that “Bad, inferior art is not necessarily 
                                                 
174 Greenberg, Homemade Esthetics, 173-174. 
175 Ibid., 159-160. 
176 Ibid., 61. 
335 
boring or vacuous.  What is relatively new about the badness of recent ‘advanced’ art – 
new, that is, in the context of formal art – is that it is so boring and vacuous.”177 Bad art 
in this case refers to pieces that exhibit technically inferiority.  What is missing in 
Greenberg’s articulation of good, bad, and boring art is the emphasis on social critique, 
especially in Warhol’s work. 
 As stated above, Andy Warhol’s work holds up a mirror to society.  I do not here 
use the past tense since Warhol’s work lives on.  His art is anti-art; his style highlighted 
society’s absence of style.  Where the culture industry actively promotes the ideology of 
style as something eminently desirable and attainable, Warhol’s Pop Art offers the 
opportunity to reflect on society via a reflection of society.  Seen in this light, Warhol’s 
Pop art is a variation of Goodstein’s claim of a ‘democratization of skepticism’.  In 
addition to skepticism, it is the ‘democratization of aesthetics’.  They are interrelated and 
both reveal and conceal the boredom of modernity.  In Warhol’s case, everything is art, 
so nothing is art.  In a way, Warhol’s work is a nail in the coffin of art.  On the surface, 
Warhol’s position seems to be the opposite of Lefebvre’s.  Instead of everyday life 
becoming a work of art, a work of art became everyday life.  Both, however, saw an end 
to art from both inside and outside of it.  Lefebvre makes this point clear at the end of 
Introduction to Modernity when he argues that “if life is to become the art of living, art 
must die and be reborn in life.”178  A few pages earlier in the same text, Lefebvre quickly 
shifts from claiming “I do believe that art will die” to “I will go so far as to state that art 
is already dead.”179  For Lefebvre, what passes for art has already been recuperated by the 
culture industry.  This is why Warhol’s work has the appearance of kitsch.  The only way 
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to revive art, then, for Lefebvre is through everyday life and, at the same time, the only 
way to revive everyday life is through art, by making everyday life a work of art.  This 
would result in an authentic style of life and the subsequent withering away of boredom 
as opposed to what Adorno called the culture industry’s ‘withering away of imagination’.  
Similarly, Lefebvre has written that “[t]hrough a lack of imagination derived from a lack 
of (dialectical) reason, most people (among the ‘masses’ themselves) do not think that 
things can ever really change.”180  The withering away of imagination is never complete.  
The culture industry decimates the imagination by instilling the need for distraction, but it 
necessarily leaves a space for the imagination to flourish.  In this space one finds a 
utopian longing for content.  If filled by the very sameness that created the absence, it is 
merely a matter of filling one type of emptiness with another kind of emptiness.    
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Openings and Conclusions: Boredom as 
Critique of Everyday Life 
 
[W]hat are the implications of a boredom so deeply seated 
that we drift off in our own fantasies?1 – Rob Shields 
 
We might wish we could shake ourselves free of boredom,  
or turn on happiness like a tap; but we cannot.2 – Harvie Ferguson 
 
So perhaps boredom is merely the mourning of everyday life?3 – Adam Phillips 
*      *      *      *      *      * 
 
At the beginning of the last chapter from volume one of the Critique of Everyday Life, 
Lefebvre asks a question that is fundamental to his overall project: “When the world the 
sun shines on is always new, how could everyday life be forever unchangeable, 
unchangeable in its boredom, its greyness, its repetition of the same actions?”4  For 
Lefebvre, this is a rhetorical question, but one that requires asking for understanding the 
industrialized and urbanized world of modernity.  While there is no concrete, definitive 
answer given, Lefebvre is speaking of a general orientation to his work and what he saw 
in modern society.  So what was Lefebvre getting at with this question?  The title of the 
chapter from which this passage is derived – ‘What is Possible’ – is an important clue.  
Lefebvre’s point in asking this is to emphasize that everyday life is indeed changeable.  
Everyday life in its current manifestation(s), while seemingly unchangeable, is ultimately 
an open project.
5
  Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life creates an awareness of this 
openness.   
                                                 
1 Shields, Lefebvre, Love & Struggle, 66-67. 
2 Ferguson, Self-Identity and Everyday Life, 179. 
3 Adam Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 71. 
4 CEL 1, 228. 
5 For this reason, I have opted to give this concluding chapter the same title as Lefebvre gives his 
concluding chapter of his book The Production of Space: openings and conclusions See PS, 401-423. 
338 
 What is Possible 
While the critique of everyday life is a largely negative pursuit, Lefebvre always 
offered possible solutions to the problems he saw in society.  He was a thinker of the 
possible, if not an eternal optimist.  Prescriptive solutions are almost always offered, and 
they are almost always located at the end, or near the end of his texts.  Whether it be a 
call for the creation of ‘moments’,6 ‘differential space’,7 a ‘new romanticism’,8 a 
‘permanent revolution’,9 or ‘self-management’,10 Lefebvre was always trying to offer the 
theoretical tools for practical action.  Taken together, these terms share the same general 
sentiment, same general argument, same general orientation, which roughly translates to 
a revolution of everyday life.  With this, there would be new spaces, new social relations, 
different modes of production, different uses of technology, etc.  Essentially, everything 
would have to change.  When Lefebvre considers ‘what is possible’, he is speaking of a 
new society that transcends both capitalism and communism, as well as all other hitherto 
existing types of societies.  Despite this enthusiasm for the possible, there is a gap 
between what is and what is possible.  For example, how one gets from the abstract space 
of capitalism to the differential space of this new society is not exactly clear, and the 
same applies for the other prescriptions.  However, if these gaps can be bridged, it is at 
that point when everyday life will be a work of art, and this is the everyday life that, 
according to Lefebvre, would not be filled with boredom.  Throughout Lefebvre’s 
lifelong project of formulating a critique of everyday life, he was always aware of what 
he believed to be a pervasive boredom clouding modernity.  For him, to understand the 
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modern world is to understand both its interesting elements and its boring elements.  As 
most scholars studied the interesting, Lefebvre set out to study the boring.  One of his key 
insights, left nascent in his writings, is that boredom and interest are dialectically 
intertwined.  Boredom is a recurring theme in Lefebvre’s project, yet one which is 
fragmented and spread across numerous texts.  While Lefebvre failed to realize his 
proposed ‘sociology of boredom’ as part of his critique of everyday life, I have attempted 
to contribute towards such a study with my analysis of boredom.  I have argued that 
Lefebvre’s project is a key for unlocking a door to the phenomenon of boredom, but it is 
one that on its own is too small to properly fit in the lock.  As Adorno would say, the key 
goes in, but it is not enough to open the door.  Lefebvre’s work, then, served as a point of 
departure for integrating the reflections on boredom put forth by a variety of other 
thinkers.  This could, in a way, be referred to as a collaborative effort, albeit one where 
the collaborators are unaware of their collaboration.  This is an essential feature of the 
interdisciplinarity of this dissertation.  To understand boredom in modernity it was 
necessary to look at some of modernity’s key features.  Lefebvre’s concept of the ‘double 
process’ of industrialization and urbanization is one such example.  This concept helps 
establish the internal dialectic of mass culture, as these two intertwined forces of 
modernity foster growth and development with the proliferation of mass culture, all the 
while leaving an absence of style in everyday life.  For the double process of 
industrialization and urbanization, I have frequently referred to the factory as the 
archetypal symbol of industry and the street as the archetypal symbol of the urban.  The 
intertwining of these two processes is evident with a consideration of railways and/or 
highways.  Railways, as mentioned in the first chapter, extend both the urban fabric and 
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industry and modernity itself.  By looking at what extends modernity, one can begin to 
see the contours of the boredom it fosters throughout society.   
Another ‘double process’ implicit in this study is production and consumption. 
They translate to the factory and the street.  One produces in the factory, one consumes 
on the street.  However, it is not quite as simple as that.  There is a dialectical relationship 
between them.  As well, these two elements share a connection with boredom and 
interest.  As was mentioned in the fifth chapter, consumption, boredom, and interest are 
interconnected and form a conceptual triad.  The dialectic of boredom and interest, or 
boring and interesting, is a persistent thread, perhaps the persistent thread.  To see 
boredom lurking in the interesting is just as important as looking at the monotonous 
aspects of everyday life.  However, the interesting and the boring are dialectically related.  
This dialect is at the heart of what Lefebvre calls the ‘absence of style in everyday life’.  
At the end of the first chapter I highlighted Lefebvre’s insight of the dialectic of 
boredom.  Boredom and interest, or boring and interesting, are intertwined in modernity.  
Although everyday life in the modern world has the appearance of being fixed so that this 
process will continue, it is only within the everyday life that something else can be 
established.  The appropriate Lefebvrean triad here, then, is boredom-interest-work.  This 
can be read in at least two ways.  The first is a continuation of the same and the second is 
a creative breakout.  The key distinction being made here involves the term ‘work’.  It 
will either be within the context of industrialized, rationalized, urbanized, secularized 
everyday life, or it will be an original and non-repeatable everyday life akin to what 
Lefebvre calls a ‘work of art’.  The third term, often employed by Lefebvre, is a 
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methodological tool that articulates this type of bimodal movement between 
contradictions.  
Lefebvrean Triads 
Two opposing terms can often be mediated by a third.  In Lefebvre’s view, three 
conflictual terms can also be expressed as two conflictual terms and vice versa, 
depending on one’s perspective.  Throughout this dissertation I have employed what I 
refer to as Lefebvrean triads, modeled after Lefebvre’s own approach.  These triads are a 
way of demonstrating the dialectical relationship amongst three interrelated concepts, or 
‘conflictual moments’.  It would be instructive to recapitulate a few of the triads here, as 
well as discuss their linkages.    
1) Boredom-Interest-Utopia 
This triad, I argue, is implicit in Lefebvre’s latent theory of boredom.  In his book 
Introduction to Modernity, he clearly identifies the dialectical relationship between 
boredom and interest, as discussed above, and while it is hinted at, he did not explicitly 
state the third term: utopia.  By adding this third term, the dialectical movement of 
boredom and interest is much more evident.  The utopian longing for content that is felt 
when one is bored often results in the seeking of something interesting.  This seeking is 
often accomplished through the consumption of interesting things.  When these 
interesting things no longer interest, one becomes bored and, again, has a utopian longing 
for something else interesting, something newer, something that has been produced much 
more recently.  The dialectical spiral repeats as time goes on.  This is an abstract model 
for what Lefebvre argues is a ‘concealed movement’ of modernity. 
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2)  Boredom-Modernity-Everyday Life 
A much more concrete application of this model occurs when the historical 
dimension of modernity is considered.  In Lefebvre’s work, modernity is an historical era, 
and everyday life is the verso of this era.  If modernity is the era of perpetual newness 
(interest), everyday life is generally associated with perpetual sameness (boredom).  
Nevertheless, everyday life is the testing ground for the happiness promised by 
modernity.  When the promised happiness is not achieved, boredom often sets in, along 
with a longing for content, or something new, something interesting.  This is not to say 
that boredom is the only response to this disappointment, but, in a Lefebvrean theoretical 
framework, it is a predominant one. 
3) Mass Culture-Style-Absence of Style 
As stated in the introduction, Lefebvre identifies an internal dialectic of mass 
culture as the key component for understanding boredom in modernity.  The above two 
triads are its abstract version and its historical version.  Another dimension can be added 
to Lefebvre’s theoretical framework when one considers the dialectical relationship 
between mass culture and style.  Whereas, according to Lefebvre, there was a time before 
modernity where authentic style reigned, with the advent of mass culture everything 
changed.  Style was replaced by mass culture, despite being referred to as style.  With 
mass culture came, what Lefebvre calls, the absence of style in everyday life.  This is his 
basic definition of boredom.  A void persists in the everyday life of the modern world.  It 
occasionally gets filled, but, more often than not, becomes empty again.  Part of the 
reason why this absence of style is so pervasive is that it is part of the fabric of everyday 
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life and, therefore, applies to the spatial arrangements of streets, buildings, cities, 
suburbs, etc. 
4) Space-Time-Boredom 
Mass culture, then, also applies to the spatial configurations of modernity.  This is 
somewhat unique, as boredom is most often associated with the passage of time, and 
rightly so.  However, from a Lefebvrean perspective, the spatial must also be considered.  
Space and time are dialectically intertwined for Lefebvre, and if one wants to get to the 
heart of the rhythms of modern life, one must theorize the spatial, specifically the 
contradictions of space.  If one wishes to understand boredom in modernity, then, one 
must look at its spatial makeup, which more often than not begins in a central location, 
such as a city, or urban area, and spreads from there in the urban fabric.  For this reason, I 
first discussed urbanism in chapter three and the suburbs in chapter four.  Here, the 
contradictions of space become apparent.  Whereas a space promises a new type of 
lifestyle or experience, the experience of boredom arises and negates this promise. 
5) Homogeneity-Fragmentation-Hierarchization 
One particular contradiction of space noted in this dissertation is the unity 
between three conflictual moments that Lefebvre believes constitute the core elements of 
the space(s) of modernity: the homogenous, the fragmentary, and the hierarchical.  
Suburban housing tracts are prime examples of virtually identical houses (homogeneity), 
its occupants talk in monologues (fragmentation), and, in many cases, there is a class 
hierarchy where everyone is trying to keep up with the proverbial Joneses.  This is a 
certain style of life (or absence of style) that is prevalent in the suburbs, but it is, 
admittedly, not shared by everyone.  What is the significance of this?  By utilizing a 
344 
Lefebvrean framework, a study of boredom is dialectical.  Boredom is virtually 
everywhere, but it is given serious consideration virtually nowhere.  If it appears as 
though I have argued for its omnipresence, this is not quite true.  It is both everywhere 
and nowhere in modernity.  Boredom can appear anywhere from the world-renowned 
urban centre of Paris, or even in the steadily expanding peripheries that are the sprawling 
American suburbs.  It is both present and absent in these spaces.  It is an historically 
specific mood linked to the rhythms of modernity.  By looking closely at what Lefebvre 
calls the ‘black sun of boredom’ it is apparent that boredom is not only part of a 
constellation of experiences in modernity, but boredom itself is a constellation of various 
facets of everyday life in modernity.  By assembling some of the fragments that 
constitute boredom as a constellation, the internal dialectic of mass culture begins to take 
shape.  Depending on one’s perspective, boredom can either be a monolithic entity or it 
can appear as composed of many elements.   
Lefebvre’s use of ‘screen’ as a metaphor for everyday life is equally appropriate 
for boredom.  In everyday life, boredom is both concealed and revealed.  In turn, the 
experience of boredom both reveals and conceals everyday life.  Boredom is a window 
into the alienating effects of everyday life whether one experiences this boredom first 
hand or one examines texts on this subject.  Boredom in this sense is a utopian wish for 
something else.  For Lefebvre, this wish is for a style of life.  Modernity both prevents 
this style of life while endlessly promising it.  Something interesting always seems to be 
waiting when boredom arises.  Advertisements and the commodities they advertise are 
temporary placeholders for this something else, an unknown ‘x’.  The mass culture that 
proliferates with the urban fabric generally offers the promise of a negation of boredom 
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without understanding it.  Conversely, certain avant-garde artists take boredom as a 
problem of modern life that must be confronted.  Both in the actual artistic piece(s) as 
well as the artistic process(es), certain avant-garde artists (Cage, Warhol) consciously 
employ boredom in their artistic ventures.  Further to this, according to Lefebvre and 
mentioned in the second chapter, James Joyce had no choice with his monumental 
Ulysses but to make it profoundly boring.  If it were to succeed as a novel of a day in the 
life, it had to be boring.  It is both the flight from boredom promised by the culture 
industry and the confrontation of boredom provided by artists that the dialectic of 
boredom and interest becomes apparent. 
It has been argued that whereas modernity continuously promises newer, more 
exciting things, it concurrently fosters the experience of boredom.  This position can be 
opposed to the ordinary conception of boredom in several ways.  First, boredom is 
common but it is not commonly understood.  It is a widespread phenomenon, but it is 
highly complex.  Second, while it is usually perceived as a superficial emotion that can 
be easily remedied, the remedies also foster the boredom they claim to prevent.  Third, 
the locus of boredom in the ordinary conception is predominantly ascribed to the 
psychology of the bored individual as opposed to being a (by)product of modern society.  
Fourth, boredom is usually perceived as ahistorical and the afflicted are either just as 
bored as they have always been throughout time, or, because of the prevalence of 
amusements, the boredom of today is less than it would have been in the past.  That is, as 
opposed to boredom being historically unique to modernity.  Fifth, while boredom is 
primarily associated with time for most, the neglected category of space is here viewed as 
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equally important for understanding the contemporary prevalence of boredom.  It is with 
the unique rhythms of the time-space of modernity where boredom becomes possible. 
Although Roland Barthes anointed the 19
th
 century as the century of boredom, 
this experience has gradually become further entrenched into everyday life throughout 
the 20
th
 century and even the 21
st
 century.  Lefebvre’s theoretical framework has made it 
possible to unravel some of the mysterious links between boredom and these time 
periods.  In order to bring the discussion of boredom into the twentieth century it was 
necessary to examine the United States of America.  Here, the fear of boredom is 
heightened through the seemingly perpetual striving for a better way of life, or, as it is 
better known, the pursuit of the American Dream.  While Lefebvre argued that new 
towns are everyday life in its chemically pure state, I would add that the American Dream 
offered by its suburbs is fairly close company.  By examining these two phenomena, the 
contradictions of space become apparent as a key component to the boredom of everyday 
life.  While there are dialogues in the new town dwellers and there are monologues of 
suburban housewives, both share the common thread of an urbanism based on 
functionalism.  This common thread runs through both of these spaces.  Lefebvre takes 
the signals of these spaces to be what establishes the background of boredom in everyday 
life as well as opens a space for spontaneity and an awareness that change is a possibility.  
A simple question asked by suburban housewives – ‘Is this all?’ – discovered by Betty 
Friedan articulates the profundity of the boredom felt in these spaces. 
 While I have integrated Lefebvre and boredom in this dissertation, I have by no 
means exhausted the material of either of them.  It is worth noting that Lefebvre and 
boredom parallel one another with regards to interest from academics, as both Lefebvre 
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and boredom have received the bulk of their attention in the last few decades.  It is hoped 
that both continue to receive serious consideration in the future, although there are 
presently a few stumbling blocks.  For example, Lefebvre’s body of work is so diverse 
and expansive that it would be difficult to say what ought to be investigated further since 
there is so much to investigate.  A number of his books are out of print and the majority 
of them have not been translated into English.  In order for Lefebvre’s work to continue 
its dissemination in the English speaking academy, new translations are required, along 
with new interpretations.  On the theme of boredom, there are several threads that were 
discussed throughout the preceding pages within the context of Lefebvre’s work, but 
there are a few that deserve to be highlighted as in need of much more attention than they 
have been given here. 
Descartes 
 Especially with regards to city planning and architecture, I have made several 
mentions of Cartesianism.  Now a household name, Descartes has left an indelible 
impression on the modern world either directly or indirectly.  Several of modernity’s 
influential figures have utilized their own unique variant of Cartesianism as the bedrock 
of their works.  Additionally, these works have been linked to the experience of boredom.  
Haussmann’s Paris, with its vast boulevards that reflect the straight lines of a Cartesian 
plane, is exemplary here.  Le Corbusier’s Cartesian Skyscraper is another instance of the 
Cartesian plane as a guide for a project, among many others.  Descartes, of course, is not 
to be solely blamed or praised for the work of his followers or the mass profusion of 
boredom in modernity.  Are the seeds of boredom sown with Cartesianism?  Do 
Cartesian designers produce boring spaces?  Does the philosophical separation of mind 
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and body in Descartes’ work influence the experience of boredom?  It would be 
worthwhile to examine Descartes’ influence in greater detail.  An in-depth study of both 
Descartes’ philosophical and scientific works would be a valuable contribution to the 
study of boredom.   
Taylorism 
Much like Descartes, the work of Frederick Taylor has been highly influential in 
shaping modernity.  While I have noted Descartes’ influence on the producers of space, 
Taylorism is much more geared towards the regulators of time, such as those in the 
factory.  I have attempted to argue that Taylorism is not only in the factory, but can also 
be found in the streets, shopping malls, at home, etc.  Its links to boredom as well as the 
widespread tendency to strive for efficiency above all else has yet to be fully mapped out.  
With regards to efficiency, the straight lines of a Cartesian plane resemble the general 
orientation of Taylorism.  The shortest distance between two points is a straight line and 
the greatest efficiency is usually considered to be achieved by following a straight line.  
What does such an ideological drive for maximum efficiency entail for the experience of 
boredom in modernity?  Where else is Taylorism in society?  Does it go by another 
name?  Whether one refers to it as Taylorism or not, efficiency is nevertheless a 
widespread goal of present-day society. 
What could be called its postmodern heir, the concept of McDonaldization put 
forth by George Ritzer, is an interesting point of departure for any considerations of the 
contemporaneity of Taylorism and boredom.  The efficiency found in this fast food 
model is both continuous and discontinuous with Taylor’s project.  Whereas Taylor could 
have only dreamed of the implications of such a fast food model, its self-serve efficiency 
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meshes well with his prescription for all of daily life to strive for efficiency.  It is also 
through a new consideration of Taylorism where one can see the ruptures between the 
modernity of Taylor’s time and today.  What does this mean for everyday life?  How 
does the efficiency of today impact the experience of boredom?  Can one still speak of 
boredom as an historically specific experience unique to modernity, or is there a new era? 
Postmodern/Postmodernism/Postmodernity 
 I have limited my discussion of the postmodern to occasional remarks in order to 
remain consistent with Lefebvre’s project.  There are, however, many so-called 
‘postmodern’ figures present in this dissertation, such as Jean Baudrillard in theory, 
Robert Venturi in architecture, Andy Warhol in art, John Cage in music, etc.  While the 
‘postmodern’ label does not hang neatly on any or all of these intellectual figures, they 
all, in some fashion or another, have been referred to as such.  It can be said that the high 
modernism of literature (Flaubert and Joyce) and city planning and architecture (Le 
Corbusier and Haussmann) have complicated relationships with boredom.  Following 
this, are there postmodern equivalents to these works?  If so, how do they grapple with 
the experience of boredom?  While the above ‘postmodern’ figures have all grappled 
with boredom in one way or another, a serious book-length study has yet to be completed 
that takes the ‘postmodern’ as its focal point. 
 Regardless of whether one accepts the concept of the postmodern, several aspects 
of what could be called ‘postmodern’ life are worth future consideration.  In particular, 
so-called postmodern technologies, such as computers, smart phones, and tablets are 
becoming more and more entrenched in everyday life.  If technocentricism truly is linked 
to the spread of boredom, such as Lars Svendsen argues, it would follow that as digital 
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technologies advance, so too will the experience of boredom long into the future.  The 
final word on boredom and its history has not yet been written. 
It is hoped that a new perspective on boredom has been achieved here.  In viewing 
boredom as an experience that has a history, its complexity as a phenomenon begins to 
take shape.  Also, more generally, it is hoped that those things widely deemed to be 
‘ordinary’ and unworthy of attention deserve a second look.  After all, as Lefebvre would 
argue, the ‘familiar is not necessarily the known’ and there is no reason for the study of 
the banal to itself be banal.  In following this, what I have attempted in the preceding 
pages is an analysis of the problematic of boredom from a theoretical framework that 
takes everyday life as its point of departure.  Specifically, this dissertation has been an 
integration of the critique of everyday life initiated by Henri Lefebvre and the historically 
specific experience of boredom initiated by modernity.  It is an integration of the puzzle 
of Lefebvre with the riddle of boredom.  I hope to have contributed to a broader 
understanding of both the puzzle and the riddle, but the main focus here was on the riddle 
of boredom through the theoretical framework of Lefebvre.   
 Finally, what makes boredom such an intriguing topic of inquiry is its familiarity 
to so many individuals on the one hand and its inattention by these very same individuals 
on the other.  A great many people experience it on a daily basis throughout the globe, 
yet virtually no one takes it to be a serious phenomenon for investigation.  The mass 
culture of modernity both enables such a consideration and attempts to prevent it.  
Boredom is, nevertheless, a window onto the modern world, specifically as a critique of 
that world.  One simply has to recognize it as such.  Perhaps what Lefebvre calls the 
‘black sun of boredom’ will never set.  Boredom persists because the everyday persists.  
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Perhaps Lefebvre’s utopian wish for everyday life to become a work of art is a 
pipedream.  Perhaps the riddle of boredom will never be solved.  Boredom will, 
nevertheless, remain a window to the world and will continue to carry with it the 
potential of breathing new life into the project of a critique of everyday life.  Whether or 
not it is acknowledged as such, from a Lefebvrean perspective, the basic definition of 
boredom is that it is a critique of everyday life.  
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